1

* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

+ CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 331/2026

% 27.02.2026

# Mikkilineni Yujaya Dinesh Babu & 4 others.

……Petitioners

And:

$ Pasala Satyavathi

….Respondent

!Counsel for the petitioners : Sri B.Nalin Kumar, learned senior

counsel assisted by Sri Mannam

Venkata Krishna

^Counsel for the respondent :

<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 779

2. (2016) 1 SCC 332

3. (2011) 9 SCC 126

4. AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2033

5. (2020) 7 SCC 366

6. (2005) 7 SCC 510

7. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 975

8. (2024) 19 SCC 121

2

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

* * * *

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 331/2026

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 27.02.2026

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers

may be allowed to see the Judgments?

Yes/No

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals

Yes/No

3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair

copy of the Judgment?

Yes/No

____________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI,J

3

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 331/2026

ORDER:

Heard Sri B.Nalin Kumar, learned senior advocate, assisted by Sri

MannamVenkata Krishna Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners.

2. The present Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of Constitution of

India has been filed by the petitioners/defendants being aggrieved from the

order dated 10.12.2025 of rejection of their application under Order VII Rule

11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short ‘CPC’) in I.A.No.474 of 2025 in

O.S.No.230 of 2021 on the file of the XI Additional District Judge,

Visakhapatnam filed by the plaintiff-respondent.

3. The plaintiff (respondent herein) initially filed O.S.No.1492 of 2005 on

the file of III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam for a perpetual

injunction restraining the defendants (the petitioner Nos.1, 2 & the

predecessor in the interest of the petitioner Nos.3 to 5 herein) from interfering

with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff of the suit

schedule property.In the suit, the petitioners filed written statement raising

various pleas. The suit was dismissed on 04.07.2016. The plaintiff filed

A.S.No.155 of 2016which was dismissed as not pressed vide order dated

18.02.2016 passed by XI Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam.

4. The plaintiff thereafter filed another O.S.No.230 of 2021 in the Court of

XI Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam for declaration of title and

permanent injunction. The suit is pending.

4

5. In O.S.No.230 of 2021, the defendants/petitioners filed I.A.No.474 of

2025 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint on the ground that the

suit was barred by limitation. Inter-alia, it was stated that in the previous suit

O.S.No.1492 of 2005, the defendants had filed written statement and denied

the title of the plaintiff. The defendants case in the application under Order VII

Rule 11 CPC was that since the defendants denied the title of the plaintiff in

the written statement filed in O.S.No.1492 of 2005, as per Article 58 of the

Limitation Act, the suit O.S.No.230 of 2021 for declaration was barred by

limitation and was liable to be rejected. The O.S.No.230 of 2021 was required

to be filed within a period of limitation of 3 years from the date cause of action

first accrued i.e., when the written statement was filed in O.S.No.1492 of 2005

in 2005 itself. Reliance was placed in Article 58 of the Limitation Act.

6. The plaintiff-respondent filed objection/counter,inter-alia taking the

stand that the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground of

limitation was premature, legally untenable and misconceived. The suit was

not barred by limitation. The plaintiff-respondent further pleaded that after the

decree in O.S.No.1492 of 2005, the plaintiff had filed A.S.No.155 of 2016 and

during its pendency the defendants/petitioners with malafide intent, began

spreading false propaganda in and around the vicinity of the suit schedule

property, falsely claiming ownership thereof and on 15.08.2021 taking the

advantage of their men, they made an unsuccessful attempt to trespass into

the suit schedule property. Their right to sue for declaration was said to have

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accrued on 15.08.2021.The defendants misconstituted the cause of action

from the written statement filed in earlier suit, O.S.No.1492 of 2005.

7. Learned XI Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam framed the

following point for consideration:

“Whether any ground exists under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint as

prayed by the petitioner/defendant or not?”

8. The learned Trial Court held that the plaint averments specifically stated

that the cause of action arose on 15.08.2021. The plaintiff pleaded that

plaintiff was an owner and in peaceful possession of the plaint schedule

property and on 15.08.2021 the defendants attempted to interfere and set up

false ownership and tried to trespass. Learned Trial Court held that the Court

was bound to confine strictly to the plaint averments and the written statement

or defense documents, earlier written statement, judgment in O.S.No.1492 of

2005 or the appeal pleadings could not be looked into at this stage to

determine the limitation period based on disputed aspects. Under Article 58 of

the Limitation Act, the limitation begins when the right to sue first accrued and

according to the plaint averments a clear hostile act occurred on 15.08.2021.

The suit was filed well within 3 years from the date of such cause of action.

The plaint disclosed cause of action on 15.08.2021 and so, the relief in the

suit on the face of the plaint, was not barred by limitation.

9. Learned XI Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam on such

consideration by order dated 10.12.2025 rejected I.A.No.474 of 2025.

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10. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the impugned order

suffers from illegality. He submitted that in O.S.No.1492 of 2005 the

defendants denied the title of the plaintiff. So, from such denial, cause of

action for the declaration, accrued for the first time. He referred to the

judgment of the learned Trial Court in O.S.No.1492 of 2005, (at page No.118

of the present CRP), and emphasized on the defendants pleading as

mentioned therein to the following effect:

“……they pleaded that plaintiff has no right over property since late

Panchadarla Appayyamma does not have exclusive right to alienate the

property……”.

11. From the aforesaid part of the judgment, the learned counsel submitted

that it was the defendants’ case that the plaintiff has no right over the property.

It was denial of the plaintiff’s title. So the cause of action for the suit for

declaration accrued firstly in the year 2005 when the written statement was

filed. Any cause of action as stated in the plaint of O.S.No.230 of 2021, on

15.08.2021, at best would be the subsequent or further cause of action but not

the first cause of action under Article 58 of the limitation Act.The suit was thus

barred by the limitation on the face of the material filed with the plaint, and the

learned XI Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam ought to have rejected

the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance in the judgments of

NikhilaDivyang Mehtav. Hitesh P.Sanghvi

1

, L.C.Hanumanthappa v.

1

2025 SCC OnLine SC 779

7

H.B.Shivakumar

2

,Khatri Hotels Private Limited v. Union of India

3

,

AnathulaSudhakar v. P.Buchi Reddy

4

, Dahiben v.

ArvindbhaiKalyanjiBhanusali

5

, on the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC and

Article 58 of the Limitation Act in support of his contentions.

13. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the

petitioners and perused the material on record.

14. The point for consideration and determination is as follows:

“Whether the impugned order rejecting the application under Order 7 Rule

11(d) CPC and thereby not rejecting the plaint on the plea of limitation,

suffers from any illegality?”

15. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the

question of limitation is not a mixed question of law and fact. It is a pure

question of law. He submitted that Article 58 of the Limitation Act provides that

to obtain any other declaration, the period of limitation is three years and the

time begins to run, ‘when the right to sue first accrues’. The right to sue for

declaration accrued first to the plaintiff, when the defendant/petitioners filed

written statement in O.S.No.1492 of 2005 denying the title of the plaintiff. That

suit was dismissed on 04.07.2016. The appeal there against was also

dismissed as withdrawn. So the suit for declaration in O.S.No.230 of 2021

must have been filed within a period of three years from the cause of action

2

(2016) 1 SCC 332

3

(2011) 9 SCC 126

4

AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2033

5

(2020) 7 SCC 366

8

when it accrued first, but the same was filed in the year 2021, much beyond

the period of limitation under Article 58 of Limitation Act. So on the face of it,

the suit was barred under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.

16. Learned counsel submitted that the principles of law on the scope of

Order 7 Rule 11 CPC are well settled by the Judicial precedents. Only the

plaint averments and the material filed along with the plaint is to be

considered. The defense of the defendant is not to be seen. He submitted that

consequently the defendants/petitioners did not file the copy of their written

statement of the O.S.No.1492 of 2005. He submitted that the plaintiff herself

referred in the plaint about the written statement and the copy of the judgment

dated 04.07.2016 of O.S.No.1492 of 2005 was filed along with the plaint and

from perusal of that judgment it became evident that the defendants had

denied the title of the plaintiff way back in the year 2005. So, on the face of the

plaint with its material, the suit filed in the year 2021 was barred by limitation.

17. This Court proceeds to consider the aforesaid submission on merits,

referring to the legal provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 (d) CPC, Article 58 of the

Limitation Act and the legal precedents on the subject.

18. Order 7 Rule 11 CPC reads as under:

“11. Rejection of plaint.— The plaint shall be rejected in the following

cases:—

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being

required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by

the Court, fails to do so;

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(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned

upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by

the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by

the Court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by

any law;

(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9

Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or

supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court,

for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any

cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the

requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court

and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.”

19. In Dahiben (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the principles

which are to be adhered to while considering the application under Order 7

Rule 11 CPC. Para Nos. 23.1 to 23.15 is reproduced as under:

“23.1 We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for deciding an application

under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under:

“11. Rejection of plaint.– The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:–

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by

the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do

so;

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper

insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the

requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9

Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or

supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for

reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevent by any cause of

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exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-

paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to

extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.”

(emphasis supplied)

23.2. The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special

remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the

threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the

basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated

on any of the grounds contained in this provision.

23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of

action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court

would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In

such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that

further judicial time is not wasted.

23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi this Court held that the whole purpose

of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is

meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste

judicial time of the court, in the following words :

“12. …The whole purpose of conferment of such power is to ensure that a litigation

which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to

occupy the time of the Court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword

of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or

purpose. Even if an ordinary civil litigation, the Court readily exercises the power to

reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.”

23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a

drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be

strictly adhered to.

23.6. Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the

plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint2, read

in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any

law.

23.7. Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the

plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under :

“14: Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.– (1)Where a

plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power

in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it

in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the

document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.

(2)Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he

shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.

(3)A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint

is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is

not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be

received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.

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(4)Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination

of the plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his

memory.” (emphasis supplied)

23.8. Having regard to Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed alongwith the

plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under

Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of

the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.

23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the

assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for

deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.

23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and

application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot

be adverted to, or taken into consideration.

23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the

averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the

documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test

was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v.M.V.Sea Success I which

reads as :

“139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of

fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself.

For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held

to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken

to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.”

23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. the Court further held that it is not

permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the

substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to

be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations

in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an

enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D.Ramachandran

v.R.V.Janakiraman

23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly

vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court

would be justified in exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

23.14. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at

any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons

to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the

judgment of Saleem Bhai v.State of Maharashtra. The plea that once issues are

framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar

Hussain case (supra).

23.15. The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the

plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made

out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the

suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint.”

20. The law therefore is well settled that in the exercise of the power under

Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the

12

plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta for deciding whether a case

for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. At this stage, the pleas

taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of

the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant which cannot be adverted to or

taken into consideration. The plaint averments and the documents filed along

with the plaint are only required to be taken into consideration.

21. Article 58 of the Limitation Act reads as under:

“THE SCHEDULE

Period of Limitation

[See Sections 2(j) and 3]

First Division-Suits

Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period limitation

begins to run

* * *

Part III- Suits Relating To Declarations

* * *

58. To obtain any other Three Years When the right to sue first

declaration. accrues.

22. In Khatri Hotels Private Limited (supra), the Hon’ble Aped Court held

as under:

“25. Article 58 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, which has a bearing on the

decision of this appeal, reads as under:

“THE SCHEDULE

Period of Limitation

[See Sections 2(j) and 3]

First Division-Suits

Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period limitation

begins to run

* * *

Part III- Suits Relating To Declarations

* * *

58. To obtain any other Three Years When the right to sue first

declaration. accrues.

26. Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 (for short “the 1908

Act”) which was interpreted in the judgment relied upon by Shri Rohatgi reads

as under:

13

Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period limitation

begins to run

* * *

120. Suit for which no Six years When the right to sue accrues

period of limitation is

provided elsewhere in

this Schedule.

27. The differences which are discernible from the language of the above

reproduced two articles are:

(i) The period of limitation prescribed under Article 120 of the 1908 Act was six

years whereas the period of limitation prescribed under the 1963 Act is three

years and,

(ii) Under Article 120 of the 1908 Act, the period of limitation commenced when

the right to sue accrues. As against this, the period prescribed under Article

58 begins to run when the right to sue first accrues.

28. Article 120 of the 1908 Act was interpreted by the Judicial Committee

in Bolo v. Koklan [(1929-30) 57 IA 325 : AIR 1930 PC 270] and it was held: (IA

p. 331)

“There can be no ‘right to sue’ until there is an accrual of the right asserted in

the suit and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe

that right, by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted.”

The same view was reiterated in Annamalai Chettiar v

A.M.K.C.T.Muthukaruppan Chettiar [ILR (1930) 8 Rang 645] and Gobinda

Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh [(1930-31) 58 IA 125].

29. In Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan [AIR 1960 SC 335 : (1960) 2 SCR 253]

, the three-Judge Bench noticed the earlier judgments and summed up the legal

position in the following words:

“33. … The right to sue under Article 120 of the [1908 Act] accrues when the

defendant has clearly or unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted

by the plaintiff in the suit. Every threat by a party to such a right, however

ineffective and innocuous it may be, cannot be considered to be a clear and

unequivocal threat so as to compel him to file a suit. Whether a particular threat

gives rise to a compulsory cause of action depends upon the question whether

that threat effectively invades or jeopardizes the said right.”

30. While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made

a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word “first” has

been used between the words “sue” and “accrued”. This would mean that if a suit

is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from

the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive

violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be

dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the

right to sue first accrued.”

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23. In Nikhila Divyang Mehta (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court considered

Article 58 of the Limitation Act and observed that the use of the words “when

the right to sue first accrues” was very relevant and important. It categorically

provided that the limitation of three years had to be counted from the date

when the right to sue first accrued. Paragraph Nos.19 & 20 of Nikhila

Divyang Mehta (supra) read as under:

“19. The relief of declaration claimed in the suit at hand does not fall under

Articles 56 and 57 and, therefore, by necessary implication, Article 58 would

stand attracted which provides for a limitation period of three years to obtain

any other declaration other than that mentioned under Articles 56 and 57. It

provides that for such a declaration, the limitation is three years from the date

when the right to sue first accrues.

20. The use of the words "when the right to sue first accrues" as mentioned in

Article 58 is very relevant and important. It categorically provides that the

limitation of three years has to be counted from the date when the right to sue

first accrues.”

24. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held in Nikhila Divyang Mehta (supra)

in paragraph No.24 as under:

“24. There is no dispute to the fact that the limitation for filing of the suit falls

under Article 58 of the Schedule to the Act wherein limitation prescribed is three

years. It may be pertinent to note that the limitation of three years is from the

date when the cause of action first arose. So, according to the plaintiff's case,

the cause of action first arose on 04.02.2014 and, therefore, the limitation would

end on 04.02.2017. However, even if the limitation is calculated from the date of

knowledge of the Will and/or the Codicil, it would run from the first week of

November, 2014 and would end in the first week of November, 2017. The suit

admittedly was instituted on 21.11.2017; much beyond the first week of

November, 2017 and as such is apparently barred by limitation, for which

neither any defence is required to be looked into nor any evidence in support is

needed to be adduced.”

25. In Nikhila Divyang Mehta (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court recorded

that according to the plaintiff’s own admission the cause of action for filing the

suit commenced on 04.02.2014 and ended on 21.10.2014. So, in view of

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Article 58 of the Limitation Act, from 04.02.2014 when the cause of action first

accrued, the limitation of three years came to an end on 04.02.2017. The suit

instituted on 21.11.2017 was apparently barred by limitation.

26. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed much reliance in para-27 of

the Nikhila Divyang Mehta (supra) to contend that the limitation is not a

mixed question of law and fact. It can be decided even without evidence. He

emphasised that the question of limitation, can be considered at the stage of

Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC and the plaint if it is barred by limitation has to be

rejected without even allowing the parties to lead the evidence on the point of

limitation. Para 27 reads as under:

“27. The submission that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and

that it cannot be decided without allowing the party to lead evidence is of no

substance. In the present case, we have earlier noted that the suit was

admittedly instituted on 21.11.2017 whereas according to the plaint

averments the cause of action first arose on 04.02.2014. Even assuming that

the cause of action last arose in the first weekof November, 2014, the suit

ought to have been filed by 07.11.2017. The suit was filed on 21.11.2017. It

was ex-facie barred by limitation for which, no evidence was required to be

adduced by the parties. The above issue is purely an issue of fact and in the

admitted facts as per the plaint, allegations stand concluded for which no

evidence is needed.”

27. Article 58 of the Limitation Act, governs the suit for declaration, not

governed by any other Article of the Limitation Act. Limitation, in such a case,

would be three years from the date the cause of action accrued first. To

maintain the suit for declaration the cause of action may arise on many

occasions but for the purpose of a suit governed by Article 58, it is the first

cause of action from which the limitation period has to be counted. If the suit is

not filed within three years from the date the cause of action accrued first, it

16

would be barred by limitation and there is no dispute on such a proposition of

law.

28. However, when it comes to the applicability of Article 58 of the

Limitation Act and so the question of within limitation or beyond limitation, at

the stage of rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, if the plaint

averments and the material filed along therewith disclose clearly the date of

first cause of action and on the face of the plaint, the suit is barred by

limitation, then only it would be a case of rejection of the plaint under Order 7

Rule 11(d) CPC.

29. Here, the main question that arises is as to when, the cause of action

first accrued to the plaintiff to maintain O.S.No.230 of 2021, for declaration

and injunction. In the plaint the plaintiff mentioned 15.08.2021 as the date of

cause of action for filing the suit (vide para IV of the plaint at page 98). There

is a dispute raised by the defendants that the cause of action did not accrue

firstly, on the date mentioned in the plaint but it arose prior thereto, from the

date the written statement was filed in 2005 in O.S.No.1492 of 2005, which

according to the defendant is the first date of accrual of the cause of action as

the title of the plaintiff was denied at that time. I am of the view that, in the

facts & circumstances arising in this case, the issue which required

determination was as to when the cause of action accrued first, as there is a

dispute on the point of date of first accrual of the cause of action. At the stage

of Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, the Court will consider only the plaint averments

and the material filed along with the plaint. If as per the plaint averments itself,

17

ex-facie, the cause of action accrued firstly on the date mentioned in the

plaint and from that date the suit is not within the period of limitation, the plaint

has to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. The suit must be barred on

the averments of the plaint, ex-facie. In other words it would not require

determination of the fact as to when the cause of action accrued first. If there

is objection by the defendants that the cause of action did not accrue on the

date mentioned in the plaint but accrued on a different date and from that date

the suit is barred, then the question as to when the cause of action accrued

first, being a question of fact and its determination being dependent on the

evidence to be led, to prove the plea of the plaintiff or of the defendant, the

question of limitation would not be a pure question of law. It would then be a

mixed question of law and fact and then the question of limitation so as to

reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, cannot be gone into at this

initial stage without trial.

30. In Nikhila Divyang Mehta (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court recorded that

on the averments in the plaint the suit was barred by limitation as it was filed

after three years from the date the cause of action accrued first as already

referred (supra) in para-27 of Nikhila Divyang Mehta (supra).

31. To reiterate, a plaint can be rejected under Order 7 rule 11(d) in those

case where the suit is barred by limitation on the averments in the plaint, ex-

facie, but not in those cases where the defendants dispute the date of the first

cause of action and cites a different date.

18

32. In Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff

Association

6

, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that Clause (d) of Order 7 Rule

11 speaks of suit, as appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by

any law. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the disputed questions cannot be

decided at the time of considering the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11

CPC. Clause(d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 applies in those cases only where the

statement made by the plaintiff in the plaint without any doubt or dispute

shows that the suit is barred by any law in force. Where the suit from

statement in the plaint could not be said to be barred by limitation, plaint

cannot be rejected. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the statement in the

plaint without addition or subtraction must show that it is barred by any law to

attract the application of Order 7 Rule 11.

33. Para Nos.10 & 25 in Popat and Kotecha Property (supra) read as

under:

“10. Clause (d) of Order VII Rule 7 speaks of suit, as appears from the statement in

the plaint to be barred by any law. Disputed questions cannot be decided at the

time of considering an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Clause (d) of

Rule 11 of Order VII applies in those cases only where the statement made by the

plaintiff in the plaint, without any doubt or dispute shows that the suit is barred by

any law in force.

* * * * *

25. When the averments in the plaint are considered in the background of the

principles set out in Sopan Sukhdeo case (supra) {(2004) 3 SCC 137}, the

inevitable conclusion is that the Division Bench was not right in holding that Order

7 Rule 11 CPC was applicable to the facts of the case. Diverse claims were made

and the Division Bench was wrong in proceeding with the assumption that only the

non-execution of lease deed was the basic issue. Even if it is accepted that the

6

(2005) 7 SCC 510

19

other claims were relatable to it they have independent existence. Whether the

collection of amounts by the respondent was for a period beyond 51 years need

evidence to be adduced. It is not a case where the suit from statement in the plaint

can be said to be barred by law. The statement in the plaint without addition or

subtraction must show that is barred by any law to attract application of Order VII

Rule 11. This is not so in the present case.”

34. Recently, in P.Kumarakurubaran v. P.Narayanan

7

, the suit was

instituted seeking a declaration and consequential reliefs. The defendants in

their application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC stated that the appellant had

knowledge of the execution of the sale deed at the earliest point of time and

so the suit was barred by limitation. The Trial Court rejected the application

holding that the issue of limitation involved a mixed question of law and fact. In

the revision the High Court took a contrary view and rejected the plaint on the

ground that the suit was barred by limitation. The plaintiff/appellant had

specifically averred in the plaint that upon becoming aware of registration of

documents on a particular date the suit was filed, and from that date the suit

was within the period of limitation. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the issue

as to whether the appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the

transaction at an earlier point of time or whether the plea regarding the date of

knowledge was credible, all those matters necessarily required appreciation of

evidence and at the preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint must

be taken at their face value and assumed to be true. Once the date of

knowledge was specifically pleaded and formed the basis of cause of action,

the issue of limitation could not be decided summarily. It became a mixed

7

2025 SCC OnLine SC 975

20

question of law and fact, which could not be adjudicated at the threshold stage

under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the rejection of

the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead

evidence as passed by the High Court was legally unsustainable.

35. Para Nos.12, 12.1 & 13 in P.Kumarakurubaran (supra) read as under:

“12. In the present case, the appellant has specifically averred in the plaint that

upon becoming aware of registration of documents allegedly carried out among the

defendants in relation to the suit property, he immediately approached the

Additional Commissioner of Police, Chennai and lodged a land grabbing complaint

on 09.12.2011 against the family of Defendant No.1. Subsequently, he applied for

patta in his favour on 24.02.2012, and raised objections on 05.03.2012 to

Defendant No. 4 stating that the suit property belonged to the plaintiff and that no

registration concerning the same should be carried out. He has also submitted an

objection petition to Defendant No. 5 requesting that no planning permit be granted

to anybody except the appellant in respect of the suit property. Thereafter, the

appellant instituted the suit on 03.12.2014 seeking a declaration and consequential

reliefs. On the other hand, the respondents / defendants stated in their application

filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC that the appellant had knowledge of the

execution of the sale deed by his father in favour of Defendant No.1 at the earliest

point of time and hence, the suit instituted by the appellant was barred by

limitation. While the trial Court rejected the said application holding that the issue of

limitation involved a mixed question of law and fact, the High Court in revision, took

a contrary view and allowed the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and

rejected the plaint solely on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation.

12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to whether the

appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier

point of time, or whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are

matters that necessarily require appreciation of evidence. At this preliminary stage,

the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and assumed to

be true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of

the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It

becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the

threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the plaint

21

on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally

unsustainable.

* * * * * * *

13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in reversing the well-

reasoned order of the trial Court warrants interference. The trial Court had rightly

held that the issue of limitation necessitated adjudication upon

evidence, particularly in view of the appellant’s assertion that the Power of Attorney

executed by him did not confer any authority upon his father to alienate the suit

property and that the impugned transaction came to his knowledge only at a much

later point in time. In such circumstances, the determination of limitation involved

disputed questions of fact that could not be summarily decided without the benefit

of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to reject the plaint solely on a prima

facie assumption that the suit was barred by limitation, without undertaking any

examination as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was

demonstrably false or inherently improbable in light of the record. In the opinion of

this Court, such an approach amounts to an error of law and constitutes a

misapplication of the well-established principles governing the exercise of power

under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons, the decisions relied upon by

the learned counsel for the respondents are inapplicable, being factually

distinguishable.”

36. In Hanumanthappa (supra), the issue was the applicability of Article 58

of the Limitation Act to the amendment of the plaint. There, it was not disputed

that Article 58 of the Limitation Act would apply, as the amendment sought

was to add the relief of declaration of title to the already existing relief of

permanent injunction. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the amendment of the

plaint was time-barred in that the right to sue for declaration of title first arose

on 16.05.1990. There was clear denial of the title of the plaintiff in the suit for

declaration and in that very suit the amendment application to add the prayer

of declaration was sought to be added. The amendment application was

beyond the period of limitation from 16.05.1990.

22

37. Hanumanthappa (supra) is not on Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The question

whether at the stage of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the question of the suit being

barred by limitation can be determined and the plaint can be rejected was not

involved. No doubt such a question can be determined at this stage applying

the law as in Hanumanthappa (supra) but, only on the plaint averments. If the

plaint averments show the date when the first cause of action accrued and

from that date the suit is beyond three years limitation it would be liable to be

rejected.

38. Further, in Hanumanthappa (supra), the original written statement

unmistakably indicated that the defendant had not accepted the plaintiff’s title.

Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in para No. 29 of

Hanumanthappa (supra) which considered Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union

of India, {(2011) 9 SCC 126} which reads as under to contend that in the

present case also there was clear denial of title of the plaintiff in the

defendants’ written statement filed in O.S.No.1492 of 2005:

“29. Applying the law thus laid down by this Court to the facts of this case, two

things become clear. First, in the original written statement itself dated 16th

May, 1990, the defendant had clearly put the plaintiff on notice that it had denied

the plaintiff’s title to the suit property. A reading of an isolated para in the written

statement, namely, para 2 by the trial court on the facts of this case has been

correctly commented upon adversely by the High Court in the judgment under

appeal. The original written statement read as a whole unmistakably

indicates that the defendant had not accepted the plaintiff’s title. Secondly,

while allowing the amendment, the High Court in its earlier judgment dated 28th

March, 2002 had expressly remanded the matter to the trial court, allowing the

defendant to raise the plea of limitation. There can be no doubt that on an

application of Khatri Hotels (p) Ltd. (supra), the right to sue for declaration of

title first arose on the facts of the present case on 16th May, 1990 when

the original written statement clearly denied the plaintiff’s title. By 16th

May, 1993 therefore a suit based on declaration of title would have

become time-barred. It is clear that the doctrine of relation back would not

apply to the facts of this case for the reason that the court which allowed the

amendment expressly allowed it subject to the plea of limitation, indicating

23

thereby that there are no special or extraordinary circumstances in the present

case to warrant the doctrine of relation back applying so that a legal right that

had accrued in favour of the defendant should be taken away. This being so, we

find no infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court. The present appeal

is accordingly dismissed.”

39. When this Court looks into the averment of the petitioners of denial of

the plaintiff’s title in their written statement of O.S.No.1492 of 2005, from the

copy of the judgment of O.S.No.1492 of 2005, annexed with the plaint (at

page 118), referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it cannot be said

that there was a clear denial of plaintiff’s title. What was pointed out by the

learned counsel for the petitioners is as under:

“……….. They pleaded that plaintiff has no right over property since late

panchadarla Appayyamma does not have exclusive right to alienate

the property….”.

Learned counsel also referred to para-12 of the judgment under issue

No.1 and laid emphasis on the following part:

“…………….As said above it is the claim of the defendants that plaintiff’s

vendor’s vendor panchadarla Appayyamma has no exclusive right

over the total property and hence she could not covey title to the

plaintiff’s vendor….”.

Based on the aforesaid he submitted that there was denial of the

plaintiff’s title in the year 2005 when the cause of action accrued firstly to the

plaintiff, so the suit filed in the year 2021 was barred by limitation.

40. Hanumanthappa (supra) was a case of denial of title, in the written

statement. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the original written

statement unmistakably indicated that the defendant had not accepted the

24

plaintiff’s title and the original written statement clearly denied the plaintiff’s

title.

41. So, there must be a clear denial of the plaintiff’s title. The question

therefore is whether from the referred part of the judgment in O.S.No.1492 of

2005, is it a case of clear denial of plaintiff’s title by the defendants in their

written statement filed in O.S.No.1492 of 2005, so as to attract the applicability

of law as in Hanumanthappa (supra).

42. This Court is of the view that there is not a clear denial of the plaintiff’s

title in the written statement of O.S.No.1492 of 2005, from the portion referred

by the learned counsel from the judgment of that previous suit. The copy of

the written statement is not on record and the same can also not be seen at

this stage, when only plant is to be considered. The defendants’ case as per

the aforesaid was that, the plaintiffs vendor’s vendor had no exclusive right

over suit schedule property and therefore she could not convey title to the

plaintiff’s vendor. So, at best the defendants’ case was of ‘no exclusive title’,

but not the denial of complete title. ‘No exclusive’ means not the sole owner ;

not to the exclusion of all others, but along with others.

43. In the plaint of O.S.No.230 of 2021 there is a clear statement that

on18.10.2021 the cause of action accrued to file the suit for declaration. The

Court has to see the plaint averments and the material along with the plaint.

The plaint averments are very clear that the cause of action accrued on

18.10.2021 and from that date the suit was filed within three years. The

25

document annexed with the plaint, judgment copy of O.S.No.1492 of 2005

upon which the reliance was placed by the learned counsel does not establish

that the defendants had clearly denied the title of the plaintiff in their written

statement filed in O.S.No.1492 of 2005.

44. This Court is of the view that at this stage of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC,

taking the cause of action accrued as per the plaint averments on 18.10.2021,

the suit having been filed within three years from that date, the learned Trial

Court did not act illegally or without jurisdiction, in rejecting the application of

the petitioners to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

45. Anathula Sudhakar (supra) is on the point as to when a suit for

injunction simpliciter is maintainable and when the declaration is also required.

It is not relevant for the issue involved at this stage.

46. Thus considered, the conclusions are as follows:

i) At the stage of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC

only the plaint averments and the material filed along with the plaint are

to be considered.

ii) The written statement of the defendant, any material produced by the

defendant or even the contents of the application under Order 7 Rule 11

CPC are not relevant.

iii) The averments of the plaint, must ex-facie show that the suit is barred

by limitation then the plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d).

26

iv) The limitation for a suit for declaration, under Article 58 of Limitation

Act is three years from the date the cause of action accrues ‘firstly’.

v) If the plaint makes clear averment of only one date of cause of action,

or in case of many dates for accrual of the cause of action, it is the first

date of accrual of the cause of action, from which the limitation would

start to run and if the suit is within three years from such date, the plaint

cannot be rejected at the threshold.

vi) If the defendant disputes the date mentioned in the plaint as the date

of accrual of the cause of action firstly and sets up another date, then the

first question for determination would be what is the date of accrual of

cause of action firstly and depending upon such determination the period

of limitation of three years will have to be computed. This would require

evidence. The question of limitation then would be a mixed question of

fact & law and not a pure question of law. The plaint cannot be rejected

under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC in such a case.

vii) In the present case the defendants’ case is that the cause of action

accrued firstly in the year 2005 when in O.S.No.1492 of 2005, written

statement was filed denying the title of the plaintiff. The plaint on the

other hand clearly stated that the cause of action accrued on 18.10.2021

and from that date the suit was not barred by the law of limitation. So,

there was a dispute on the date of accrual of cause of action firstly. The

petitioners placed reliance in the judgment of O.S.No.1492 of 2005, to

27

show the plea taken in their written statement in O.S.No.1492 of 2005.

But, that requires evidence to determine, and so based on such a plea of

limitation, plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold.

viii) Even from perusal of the judgment of O.S.No.1492 of 2005 there is

no clear denial of the plaintiff’s title. The denial was that the plaintiff’s

vendor’s vendor was not the ‘exclusive owner’. It is not a clear and

complete denial of title of the plaintiff. What is denied is exclusive

ownership.

ix) On the point of determination; there is no illegality in the order

impugned.

47. Before parting, this Court makes it clear that it has proceeded to decide

the issue considering Article 58 of the Limitation Act for the reason that the

argument was advanced based on Article 58 of Limitation Act and the learned

Trial Court has also decided the controversy considering Article 58 of the

Limitation Act.

48. However, it is clarified that the present is a suit for declaration of title

and also for the consequential relief of injunction. In N.Thajudeen v. Tamil

Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board

8

, the Hon’ble Apex Court held

that in a suit for declaration of title if a further relief is claimed in addition to the

mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary relief and

8

(2024) 19 SCC 121

28

for the purpose of limitation it would be governed by the relief that has been

additionally claimed.

49. Para Nos.26 to 28 in N.Thajudeen (supra) reads as under:

“26. In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is

for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for

declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the

relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of

limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The

further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and

as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the the Schedule

to the Limitation Act.

27. In C.Mohammad Yunus v. Unnissa {1961 SCC OnLine SC 135} it has been

laid down that in a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be

governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief. In fact, a suit for a

declaration of title to immovable property would not be barred so long as the right

to such a property continues and AIR 1961 SC 808 subsists. When such right

continues to subsist, the relief for declaration would be a continuing right and there

would be no limitation for such a suit. The principle is that the suit for a declaration

for a right cannot be held to be barred so long as Right to Property subsist.

28. Even otherwise, though the limitation for filing a suit for declaration of title is

three years as per Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act but for recovery

of possession based upon title, the limitation is 12 years from the date the

possession of the defendant becomes adverse in terms of Article 65 of the

Schedule to the Limitation Act. Therefore, suit for the relief of possession was not

actually barred and as such the court of first instance could not have dismissed the

entire suit as barred by time.”

50. So, this Court makes it clear that, if the limitation of the suit is governed

by Article 58 or some other Article that would be an open question for

determination in accordance with law in the suit, if such a question is raised or

arises before the learned Trial Court.

51. The Civil Revision Petition is devoid of merits and is dismissed at the

admission stage.

No order as to costs.

29

As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also

stand closed.

_____________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI,J

Dated: 27.02.2026

Note: LR copy be marked

B/o.

AG

30

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 331/2026

Dated: 27.02.2026

Note: LR copy be marked

B/o.

AG