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Mis. Shyama Charan Agarwala and Sons Vs. Union of India

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal/4040/2002
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Case Background

The appeal was filed in Supreme Court of India by Special Leave Petition against the judgement of the High Court of Bombay at Goa.

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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 4040-4041 of 2002

PETITIONER:

SHYAMA CHARAN AGARWALA & SONS

RESPONDENT:

UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/07/2002

BENCH:

D.P. MOHAPATRA & P. VENKATARAMA REDDI

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

2002(1) Suppl.SCR 148 = 2002(6)SCC 201

With

Appeal (civil) 4043-4044 of 2002

D.P.MOHAPATRA,J.

Leave is granted in all the SLPs.

These appeals are directed against the

judgment of the High Court of Bombay at Goa, dated 29th

February, 2000. Indeed both the parties to the dispute

have filed appeals assailing the judgment of the High

Court.

M/s.Shyama Charana Agarwala & Sons

(hereinafter referred to as 'the Contractor') were entrusted

with the work of construction of married accommodation

for 80MCPOs/CPOs/80Pos and 16 sailors at Goa Naval

Area, Varunapuri, Mangor Hill, Vasco-da-Gama, by the

Union of India (for short 'the UOI') through the Chief

Engineer (Navy), Cochin Naval Base under the agreement

No.CECZ/GOA-12 of 1990-91. The work order was placed

vide letter no.8319/43/E-8, dated 20-7-1990 for

Rs.2,62,44,057-94. The date of commencement of the

work was 16-8-1990 and the work was to be completed by

15-11-1991.

The same contractor by another agreement

no.CECZ/GOA/40 of 1991-92 was entrusted with the work

of construction of married accommodation for MCOs/CPOs

and JCOs at Goa. The work order was placed vide letter

no.8305/88/E-8, dated 5-2-1992. The date of

commencement of the work was 24-2-1992 and the work

was to be completed by 23-2-1994.

Before the work could be completed certain

differences/disputes arose between the parties. Under

Clause 70 of the General Conditions of the Contract all

disputes [(other than those for which the decision of the

CWE (Commander Works Engineer) or any other person is

by the contract expressed to be final and binding)] shall,

after written notice by either party to the contract to the

other of them, be referred to sole arbitration of an Engineer

Officer to be appointed by the Authority mentioned in the

tender document. In the said clause it was further

provided that unless both the parties agree in writing,

such reference shall not take place until and unless after

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completion or alleged completion of the work or

termination or determination of the contract under

Conditions 5, 56 and 57 thereof. The contractor gave

notice for appointment of arbitrator specifying the items of

dispute for adjudication. The UOI agreed for appointment

of arbitrator. Accordingly Shri M.V.S.Rao, Chief Engineer

(Air Force), Bangalore was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator

vide the Engineer-in-Chief's letter dated 30th December,

1993. The nature of disputes raised in both the cases are

similar though the amounts claimed against them differ.

The disputes referred for arbitration were enumerated at

Appendix 'A' to the said letter. In the contract agreement

No.CECZ/GOA-12/1990-91 the items of claim were as

follows :

Sr.No.

Brief desc-ription of Claims/Items

Amount in

Rupees

(Approx.

1

Reimbursement of additional costs in

the procurement of stone aggregate

from crushers of Belgaum, Hubli, etc.

in lieu of local sources of Goa

8,00,000-00

2

Reimbursement of additional costs in

excavation encountering rock other

than soft/disintegrated rock/laterite

rock

14,00,000-00

3

Reimbursement of additional costs

due to working in restricted area in

lieu of unrestricted area

25,00,000-00

4

Interest on Serial Nos.1,2,3 above

Not indicated

5

Costs of reference

50,000-00

In respect of the contract agreement

No.CECZ/GOA/40/1991-92 the following claims were

made by the contractor :

Sr.No.

Brief desc-ription of Claims/Items

Amount in

Rupees

(Approx.

1

Reimbursement of additional costs in

the procurement of stone aggregate

from crushers of Belgaum, Hubli, etc.

in lieu of local sources of Goa

36,00,000-00

2

Reimbursement of additional costs in

excavation encountering rock other

than soft/disintegrated rock/laterite

rock

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12,00,000-00

3

Reimbursement of additional costs

due to working in restricted area in

lieu of unrestricted area

30,00,000-00

4

Interest on Serial Nos.1,2,3 above

Not indicated

5

Costs of reference

50,000-00

The arbitrator by his Award dated 28th

February, 1994 accepted the claims raised by the

contractor. In respect of CECZ/GOA-12/1990-91 the

award reads as follows:

Reference made to the

Arbitrator

Award given by the

Arbitrator

CLAIM NO.1

Reimbursement of

additional cost in

procurement of stone

aggregate from

crushers of Belgaum,

Hubli etc. in Lieu of

Local sources of Goa.

Rs.8,00,000/-.

13.10 Union of India shall

reimburse for the increase in rates

to the contractor M/s.Shyama

Charan Agarwala & Sons as

under:-

(i) For the quantity of stone

aggregate already brought after

Aug.92 and upto 24-01-94.

20 mm/12.5mm 2268 cm @

Rs.250/-per cm Rs.5,67,000/-

40 mm-100 cm @

Rs.230/- per cm Rs. 23,000/-

-----------------

Rs.5,90,000/-

============

(ii) For the quantities of stone

aggregate brought after 24-01-94,

reimbursement for increase in

rates shall be made at the rate of

Rs.250/- per cm for 20mm/

12.5 mm,

Rs.230/- per cm for 40 mm, and

Rs.225/- per cm for 63-40 mm.

This reimbursement shall be made

in each RAR for the actual quantity

brought at site.

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(iii) Reimbursement/refund on

variation in prices of material/fuel

and labour wages, as per

conditions 18 and 19 of special

condition on pages 111 to 116 of

the contract shall also be paid in

RARs for the stone aggregates stone

metal stone chipping brought after

24-01-94 as per the said

conditions, excepting that the value

of WO as in condition 18(a) for

stone aggregate stone metal/stone

chipping shall be taken as on 24-

01-94 or any date immediately after

24-01-94 as published by the

Economic Adviser, Govt. of India.

CLAIM NO.2

Reimbursement of

additional costs in

excavation

encountering rock

other than

soft/disintegrated

rock/laterite rock,

Rs.14,00,000/-

14.7 Union of India shall

pay to the contractor

M/s.Shyama Charan

Agarwala & Sons as per

details given below :-

(i) Additional payment .

For works already

executed using chisels.

(a)Excavation (Schedule A Partl)

3930 cm @Rs.118.70 per cm

Rs.3,83,594.80

(b) Surface excavation (as in item I

Schedule A Part V)

50 SM @ 12.41 per SM

Rs. 620.50

-------------------

Total Rs.3,84,215.30

=============

(ii) For excavation works yet to

be executed using Chisels :

(a) Additional payment for

Schedule A Part I for excavation

@Rs.118.76 per cm.

(b) Net payment for item 1

Schedule A Part V @ Rs.18.33 per

SM.

(c) Net payment for item 2

Schedule A Part VI @Rs.165.69

per cm.

(d) Net payment for item 1

Schedule A Part VII@ Rs.18.33

per SM.

(e) Net payment for item 2

Schedule A Part VII@ Rs.120.12

per cm.

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(f) Net payment for item 3

Schedule A Part VII @Rs.129.15

per cm.

(g) Net payment for item 6

Schedule A Part VII @Rs.165.69

per cm.

(h) Net payment for item 2(a)

Schedule A Part VIII @Rs.189.36

per cm.

(i) Net payment for item 2(b)

Schedule A Part VI @Rs.199.68

per cm.

(j) Extra over rate for item 26

Schedule A Part IX @Rs.294.03

each.

(k) Extra over rate for item 27

Schedule A Part IX @ Rs.441.05

each.

(iii) Reimbursement on variation

of prices as per conditions 18 and

19 of special condition of CA shall

be paid as under :-

(a) Rs.38,635/- shall be paid on

Rs.3,84,215.30 as in (i) above for

works already executed.

(b) Further, reimbursement/

refund for works done in future as

in (ii) above shall be worked out

as per conditions 18 and 19 of

special condition of CA and shall

be paid in the RARs as per CA.

CLAIM NO.3

Reimbursement of

additional costs due

to working in

restricted area in

lieu of unrestricted

area Rs.25,00,000/-

15.5 AWARD

(i) It has been brought out that

the amount of work done

including material collected upto

24-01-94 is Rs.2,03,00,000/-.

Considering 9% on

Rs.2,03,00,000/- a sum of

Rs.18,27,000/- is allowed on this

account, which should be paid to

the contractor by the Union of

India.

(ii) The Respondent, Union of

India shall also pay 9% extra on

this account for the works carried

out including material collected

beyond Rs.2,03,00,000/- to the

contractor in each RAR, till such

time the work is completed.

(iii) As regards contractor claim

of reimbursement/refund on

variation of prices, as per

conditions 18 and 19 of special

condition of CA, this should also

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be paid, as the value of work

done is increased on account of

this factor, I award as under :-

(a) A sum of Rs.1,83,718/-

towards reimbursement on

variation of prices as per

conditions 18 and 19 of special

condition of CA for the works

done upto 24-01-94 which is

Rs.2,03,00,000/- as above

should be paid to the contractor

by the Union of India.

(b) Reimbursement/refund on

variation of prices for works done

beyond 24-01-94 shall also be

made on the principle that the

value of work done including

material collected, as assessed in

the normal manner, shall be

increased by 9% to cater for the

restriction and reimbursement/

refund shall be worked out on

this increased value of work done

including material collected as

per conditions 18 and 19 of the

special condition of CA and paid

to the contractor by the Union of

India in RAR as per condition 18

and 19 ibid.

CLAIM NO.4

Interest in SL 1 to 3

above.

Amount not

indicated

Interest on claim no.1 to 3 (Past,

Pendente lite and future)

(i) Past interest I allow a sum

of Rs.7,75,920/- for past interest

on claim No.1(i), 2(i) and 3(i).

(ii) Pendente lite interest

There is no delay. I have been

appointed Arbitrator on 30-12-93

and had entered upon the

reference on 21-01-94 and the

award has also been finalized.

Therefore, claim of pendente lite

interest is rejected.

(iii) Future interest This is

allowed. The Union of India shall

pay interest @ 18% per annum if

the amount of award as in item (i)

of claim no.1, item (i) and (iii) (a)

of claim no.2 and item (i) and (iii)

(a) of claim no.3 is not paid

within 30 days from the date of

Award, till payment of the award

or decree from the Court,

whichever is earlier. If the award

is not paid within 30 days as

above, interest will be calculated

from the date of award to the

date of payment or decree from

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the Court whichever is earlier.

CLAIM NO.5

Cost of reference.

Rs.50,000/-.

This claim is rejected.

In respect of CECZ/GOA/40/1990-91 the

award reads as follows :

Reference made to the

Arbitrator

Award given by the

Arbitrator

CLAIM NO.1

Reimbursement of

additional cost in

procurement of stone

aggregate from

crushers of Belgaum,

Hubli etc. in Lieu of

Local sources of Goa.

Rs.36,00,000/-.

Union of India shall reimburse for

the increase in rates to the

contractor M/s.Shyama Charan

Agarwala & Sons as under:-

(i) For the quantity of stone

aggregate already brought after

Aug.92 and upto 24-01-94.

20 mm/3934 cm @ Rs.250/-

per cm Rs.9,83,500/-

40 mm-662cm @

Rs.230/- per cm Rs.1,52,260/-

-----------------

Rs.11,35,760/-

============

(ii)For the quantities of stone

aggregate brought after 24-01-94,

reimbursement for increase in

rates shall be made at the rate of

Rs.250/- per cm for 20mm/

Rs.230/- per cm for 40 mm.

This reimbursement shall be made

in each RAR for the actual quantity

brought at site.

(iii) Reimbursement/refund on

variation in prices of material/fuel

and labour wages, as per

conditions 18 and 19 of special

condition on pages 95A,96 to 99 of

the contract shall also be paid in

RARs for the stone aggregates stone

metal stone chipping brought after

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24-01-94 as per the said

conditions, excepting that the value

of WO as in condition 18(a) for

stone aggregate stone metal/stone

chipping shall be taken as on 24-

01-94 or any date immediately after

24-01-94 as published by the

Economic Adviser, Govt. of India.

CLAIM NO.2

Reimbursement of

additional costs in

excavation

encountering rock

other than

soft/disintegrated

rock/laterite rock,

Rs.12,00,000/-

14.7 Union of India shall

pay to the contractor

M/s.Shyama Charan

Agarwala & Sons as per

details given below :-

(i)Additional payment .

For works already

executed using chisels.

(a)Excavation (Schedule A Part l)

3870 cm @Rs.138.41 per cm

Rs.5,35,646.70

(b)Excavation in column pits

640 cm @ Rs.138.41 percm.

- Rs.88,582.40

(c)Excavation over areas

(Schedule A part V item I)

150 cm. @ Rs.260.14 per cm.

- Rs.39,021.00

-------------------

TOTAL Rs.6,63,250.10

==============

(ii)For excavation works yet to be

executed using Chisels :

(a)Additional payment for

Schedule A Part I for excavation

at applicable rates as in item (i)

above.

(b)Net payment (extra over) for

item 7 Schedule A Part III @

Rs.197.12 each earthing over and

above the rate given in item 7 of

Schedule A Part III.

(c) Net payment for item 1

Schedule A Part V@ Rs.260.14 per

cm.

Reimbursement on variation of

prices as per conditions 18 and

19 of special condition of CA shall

be paid as under :-

(d) Rs.41,367.51/- shall be paid

on Rs.6,63,250.10 as in (i) above

for works already executed.

(e) Further, reimbursement/

refund for works done in future as

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in (ii) above shall be worked out

as per conditions 18 and 19 of

special condition of CA and shall

be paid in the RARs as per CA.

CLAIM NO.3

Reimbursement of

additional costs due

to working in

restricted area in

lieu of unrestricted

area Rs.30,00,000/-

15.5 AWARD

(i)It has been brought out that

the amount of work done

including material collected upto

24-01-94 is Rs.1,25,00,000/-.

Considering 9% on

Rs.1,25,00,000/- a sum of

Rs.11,25,000/- is allowed on this

account, which should be paid to

the contractor by the Union of

India.

(ii)The Respondent, Union of

India shall also pay 9% extra on

this account for the works carried

out including material collected

beyond Rs.1,25,00,000/- to the

contractor in each RAR, till such

time the work is completed.

(iii)As regards contractor claim of

reimbursement/refund on

variation of prices, as per

conditions 18 and 19 of special

condition of CA, this should also

be paid, as the value of work

done is increased on account of

this factor, I award as under :-

(a)A sum of Rs.70,167/- towards

reimbursement on variation of

prices as per conditions 18 and

19 of special condition of CA for

the works done upto 24-01-94

which is Rs.1,25,00,000/- as

above should be paid to the

contractor by the Union of India.

(b)Reimbursement/refund on

variation of prices for works done

beyond 24-01-94 shall also be

made on the principle that the

value of work done including

material collected, as assessed in

the normal manner, shall be

increased by 9% to cater for the

restriction and reimbursement/

refund shall be worked out on

this increased value of work done

including material collected as

per conditions 18 and 19 of the

special condition of CA and paid

to the contractor by the Union of

India in RAR as per condition 18

and 19 ibid.

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CLAIM NO.4

Interest in SL 1 to 3

above.

Amount not

indicated

Interest on claim no.1 to 3 (Past,

Pendente lite and future)

(ii) Past interest I allow a sum

of Rs.4,14,761/- for past interest

on claim No.1(i), 2(i) and 3(i) vide

pages 13, 19 & 21 respectively

herein before.

(iii) Pendente lite interest

There is no delay. I have been

appointed Arbitrator on 30-12-93

and had entered upon the

reference on 21-01-94 and the

award has also been finalized.

Therefore, claim of pendente lite

interest is rejected.

(iv) Future interest This is

allowed. The Union of India shall

pay interest @ 18% per annum if

the amount of award as in item (i)

of claim no.1, item (i) and (iii) (a)

of claim no.2 and item (i) and (iii)

(a) of claim no.3 is not paid

within 30 days from the date of

Award, till payment of the award

or decree from the Court,

whichever is earlier. If the award

is not paid within 30 days as

above, interest will be calculated

from the date of award to the

date of payment or decree from

the Court whichever is earlier.

The contractor filed a petition under Section 14

of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short 'the Act') seeking a

direction to the arbitrator to file the final Award dated 28th

February, 1994 with all records in the Court so that the

Award could be made Rule of the Court with interest @

24% p.a. from the date of decree till payment. Notice of the

said petition was given to the UOI who filed an application

under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act raising certain

objections against the Award. The objections filed by the

UOI were rejected by the Civil Judge, Senior Division,

Vasco-da-Gama vide judgment dated 8th April, 1996 and

the Award dated 28th February, 1994 of the Arbitrator was

made Rule of the Court with a further direction to the UOI

to pay the contractor simple interest @ 18% p.a. on the

principal amount adjudged in the Award from the date of

the decree till the date of actual payment. Against the said

order the UOI filed appeals before the High Court under

Section 39 of the Act. The High Court by the judgment

rendered on 29th February, 2000 allowed the appeals in

part. The operative portion of the judgment reads as

follows :

"For the aforesaid reasons, the appeals are

partly allowed. The claim for quantity of

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stone aggregate already brought after

August, 1992 upto 20-4-1994 in Arbitration

Appeal No.2 of 1996 and Arbitration Appeal

No.3 of 1996 to the tune of Rs.11,35,760/-

and Rs.5,90,000/-, respectively, is

sustained. The interest awarded on the said

claim by the Arbitrator is also sustained.

Except for this, the remaining claims granted

by the Arbitrator are set aside. In the facts

and circumstances, we shall leave the

parties to bear their costs."

The High Court declined to interfere with the Award of the

Arbitrator relating to claim Item No.1 upto 24.1.1994 when

the statement of claims was filed before him by the parties.

The High Court held that the Award in respect of claim no.1

beyond 24-1-94 did not form part of the terms of reference

and further that the future claim in respect of stone

aggregate would be subject to various factors including

market conditions and whether the shortage continued. The

High Court further held that under the circumstances, the

Arbitrator could not have granted relief relating to future

claim of the contractor with reference to stone aggregate.

The High Court recorded the following finding in this

regard:-

"Therefore, while sustaining claim no.1 in

both the appeals for the quantity of stone

aggregate already brought after August 1992

upto 24-1-1994, and Award of

Rs.11,35,760/- in Arbitration Appeal No.2 of

1996 and Rs.5,90,000/- in Arbitration

Appeal No.3 of 1996, the remaining part of

Order on claim no.1 is set aside." [See page

31 para 21 last portion]

On claim no.2 the High Court interpreted clauses 3.3.2,

3.3.3 and 3.3.4 of the contract and held that excavation in

any type of laterite rock, that is to say, soft or hard shall be

treated as excavation in soft/disintegrated rock. The High

Court further held that the Arbitrator had totally

overlooked Clause 3.3.4 while coming to the conclusion on

the basis of Clauses 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 alone. The High Court

was of the view that the Arbitrator had not only

misinterpreted the relevant clauses totally ignoring the

Clause 3.3.4, but had also taken 'undue' interest in the

matter in order to find out the classification of the strata

which in fact, in view of Clause 3.3.4 would not have much

relevance. The High Court held that the Arbitrator had

misconducted himself and therefore, the Award against

claim no.2 was totally unwarranted and invalid. According

to the High Court, the view taken by the Arbitrator could

not be said to be a possible view on the interpretation of

Clauses 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 read together. The High

Court summed up its finding as follows :

"For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the

opinion that the Award under claim no.2 in

both the Appeals cannot be sustained and is

liable to be set aside." [see para 25 at page

36]

In respect of claim no.3, the High Court took note of

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Clauses 2, 3, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.3 of the Special Conditions

in which provisions were made for inspection of the site

prior to the filing of tender so that the tenderer was

familiar with the working conditions, accessibility to site of

works, etc. Regarding the security and passes to the

persons who were required to enter the area in connection

with the work in Special Condition 3.3 it was clearly stated

that nothing extra shall be admissible for any man hours

etc. lost on this account of the restrictions referred to

under Special Condition no.3. The High Court held that

the contractor had filed the tender knowing fully well the

relevant provisions of the Special Conditions in the

contract and as such he could not later on complain about

such restrictions leading to reduced output of labourers,

restricted working hours etc. The High Court opined that

the conclusions arrived at by the Arbitrator were contrary

to relevant Special Conditions which were part of the

contract and as such, the Award of the claim under the

said Award could not be sustained. Regarding claim no.4

which relates to interest, the High Court relying on the

decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs.

B.N.Agarwalla, (1997) 2 SCC 469, held that: "the Arbitrator

has jurisdiction to award pre-reference interest in cases

which arose after the Interest Act, 1978 and the power of

the arbitrator to award interest for the post-award period

also exists, besides power to grant pendente lite interest".

The High Court found that the interest awarded by the

arbitrator in relation to the claim for quantity of stone

aggregate already brought after August, 1992 to 20-4-1994

could not be interfered with and that the pre-reference

interest in respect of other items falls on account of

rejection of claim nos.2 and 3. On such findings the High

Court allowed the appeal in part and to the extent noted

earlier.

Shri V.A.Mohta, learned senior counsel

appearing for the contractor i.e. the appellants in Appeals

arising out of SLP (C) Nos.10526-527/2000 and

respondents in Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.880-881

of 2001, strenuously contended that the High Court

exceeded the limits of the jurisdiction vested under Section

39 of the Act in deciding the appeals filed by the UOI, and

in setting aside the Award of the Arbitrator in respect of

claim nos.2 and 3. Shri Mohta further contended that

even assuming that the High Court found that the

arbitrator had mis-interpreted the relevant clauses of the

agreement, then it was not open to it to interfere with the

Award since there was no error of law apparent on the face

of the award and the matter relating to interpretation of

the conditions in the agreement was within the jurisdiction

of the arbitrator.

Shri Anoop G.Chaudhary, learned senior

counsel appearing for the UOI contended that the award of

the arbitrator so far as part of the claim no.1 and claim

nos.2 and 3 are concerned was contrary to the specific

conditions provided in the agreement, and therefore, was

patently erroneous and uncalled for. Shri Chaudhary

further contended that the arbitrator being a creature of

the agreement could not ignore the relevant stipulations in

the contract nor could he travel beyond the terms of the

contract. In the circumstances, Shri Chaudhary

submitted, the judgment of the High Court does not call for

interference by this Court in the appeal filed by the

contractor under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

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The provision for appeals against the orders

passed under the Act is contained in Section 39 of the Act.

The said Section is quoted hereunder :

"Appealable orders.-(a)An appeal shall lie

from the following orders passed under this

Act (and from no others) to the Court

authorised by law to hear appeals from

original decrees of the Court passing the

order:

An order

(i) superseding an arbitration;

(ii) on an award stated in the form of a

special case;

(iii) modifying or correcting an award;

(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration

agreement;

(v) staying or refusing to stay legal

proceedings where there is an

arbitration agreement;

(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an

award;

Provided that the provisions of this section

shall not apply to any order passed by a

Small Cause Court.

(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order

passed in appeal under this section, but

nothing in this section shall affect or take

away any right to appeal to the Supreme

Court."

On a plain reading of the section it is manifest that the

section is restricted in its application. Only certain types

of orders are made appealable under the provision. Being

a special statute no appeal can be entertained except

under Section 39. The principles on which the Court can

interfere with an award or order passed under the Act are

fairly well settled. The question has engaged the attention

of this Court and different High Courts from time to time.

In the case of Coimbatore District Podu

Thozillar Samgam represented by its Secretary vs.

Balasubramania Foundry & Ors., (1987) 3 SCC 723, this

Court, construing Section 30 of the Act, observed :

"The law on this aspect is, however, settled.

In Union of India v. A.L.Rallia Ram, (1964) 3

SCR 164, this Court reiterated that in order

to make arbitration effective and the awards

enforceable, machinery was devised by the

Arbitration Act for lending the assistance of

the ordinary courts. The court was also

entrusted with the power to modify or

correct the award on the ground of imperfect

form or clerical errors, or decision on

questions not referred, which were severable

from those referred. The Court had also

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power to remit the award when it had left

some matters referred undetermined, or

when the award was indefinite, where the

objection to the legality of the award was

apparent on the face of the award. The court

might also set aside an award on the ground

of corruption or misconduct of the arbitrator,

or that a party had been guilty of fraudulent

concealment or willful deception. But the

court could not interfere with the award if

otherwise proper on the ground that the

decision appeared to it to be erroneous. The

award of the arbitrator was ordinarily final

and conclusive, unless a contrary intention

was disclosed by the agreement. The award

was the decision of a domestic tribunal

chosen by the parties, and the civil courts

which were entrusted with the power to

facilitate arbitration and to effectuate the

awards, could not exercise appellate powers

over the decision. Wrong or right the

decision was binding, if it be reached fairly

after giving adequate opportunity to the

parties to place their grievances in the

manner provided by the arbitration

agreement. This Court reiterated in the said

decision that it was now firmly established

that an award was bad on the ground of

error of law on the face of it, when in the

award itself or in a document actually

incorporated in it, there was found some

legal proposition which was the basis of the

award and which was erroneous."

This Court in the case of Municipal Corporation

of Delhi vs. M/s.Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar & Anr., (1987) 4

SCC 497, considered the reasons given in a speaking

award and scope for the interference with such award.

This Court in that connection made the following

observations :

"In this case the reasons given by the

arbitrator are cogent and based on materials

on record. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary,

Fourth Edition, page 2258 states that it

would be unreasonable to expect an exact

definition of the word "reasonable". Reason

varies in its conclusions according to the

idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times

and circumstances in which he thinks. The

reasoning which built up the old scholastic

logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's

toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the

reasonableness within reach; and in cases

not covered by authority, the verdict of a jury

or the decision of a judge sitting as a jury

usually determines what is "reasonable" in

each particular case. The word "reasonable"

has in law the prima facie meaning of

reasonable in regard to those circumstances

of which the actor, called on to act

reasonably, knows or ought to know. See

the observations, in Re a Solicitor (1945) KB

368 at 371.

After all an arbitrator as a judge in the

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words of Benjamin N.Cardozo, has to

exercise a discretion informed by tradition,

methodized by analogy, disciplined by

system, and subordinated to "the primordial

necessity of order in the social life".

In the case of M/s.Sudarsan Trading Co. vs.

Government of Kerala & Anr., (1989) 2 SCC 38, construing

Section 30 of the Act, this Court observed that the award

can be set aside if the arbitrator had mis-conducted

himself or the proceedings and had proceeded beyond his

jurisdiction; that these are separate and distinct grounds

for challenging an award; that where there are errors

apparent on the face of the award it can only be set aside if

in the award there is any proposition of law which is

apparent on the face of the award, namely, in the award

itself or any document incorporated in the award.

Reference was made to the decision of the Judicial

Committee in Champsey Bhara & Co. v. Jivraj Balloo

Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 1923 PC 660.

Considering the point that only in a speaking award a

Court can look into the reasoning of the award, this Court

observed : "..It is not open to the court to probe the mental

process of the arbitrator and speculate, where no reasons

are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the

arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion". In this connection

reference was made to the observations in Hindustan Steel

Works Construction Ltd. vs. C.Rajasekhar Rao, (1987) 4

SCC 93. Drawing a distinction between the disputes as to

the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the disputes as to in

what way that jurisdiction should be exercised, this Court

observed :

"An award may be remitted or set aside on

the ground that the arbitrator in making it,

had exceeded his jurisdiction and evidence

of matters not appearing on the face of it,

will be admitted in order to establish

whether the jurisdiction had been exceeded

or not, because the nature of the dispute is

something which has to be determined

outside the award whatever might be said

about it in the award or by the arbitration.

See in this connection, the observations of

Russel on The Law of Arbitration, 20th edn.,

p.427. Also see the observations of

Christopher Brown Ltd. v. Genossenchaft

Oesterreichischer (1954) 1 QB 8, 10 and

Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd. vs. National

Bank of Pakistan (178) 2 Lloyd's Rep.223. It

has to be reiterated that an arbitrator acting

beyond his jurisdiction is a different

ground from the error apparent on the face

of the award. In Halbury's Laws of England

II, 4th edn., Vol.2, para 622 one of the

misconducts enumerated, is the decision by

the arbitrator on a matter which is not

included in the agreement or reference.

But in such a case one has to determine the

distinction between an error within the

jurisdiction and an error in excess of the

jurisdiction. See the observations in

Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation

Commission (1969) 2 AC 147, and Regina v.

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Noseda, Field, Knight & Fitzpatrick, (1958) 1

WLR 793. But, in the instant case the court

had examined the different claims not to find

out whether these claims were within the

disputes referable to the arbitrator, but to

find out whether in arriving at the decision,

the arbitrator had acted correctly or

incorrectly. This, in our opinion, the court

had no jurisdiction to do, namely,

substitution of its own evaluation of the

conclusion of law or fact to come to the

conclusion that the arbitrator had acted

contrary to the bargain between the parties.

Whether a particular amount was liable to

be paid or damages liable to be sustained,

was a decision within the competency of the

arbitrator in this case. By purporting to

construe the contract the court could not

take upon itself the burden of saying that

this was contrary to the contract and, as

such, beyond jurisdiction. It has to be

determined that there is a distinction

between disputes as to the jurisdiction of the

arbitrator and the disputes as to in what

way that power of the arbitrator to grant a

particular remedy.

Xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, the High Court seems to

have fallen into an error of deciding the

question on interpretation of the contract. In

the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of

the opinion that the High Court was in error.

It may be stated that if on a view taken of a

contract, the decision of the arbitrator on

certain amounts awarded, is a possible view

though perhaps not the only correct view,

the award cannot be examined by the court

in the manner done by the High Court in the

instant case.

In light of the above, the High Court, in

our opinion, had no jurisdiction to examine

the different items awarded clause by clause

by the arbitrator and to hold that under the

contract these were not sustainable in the

facts found by the arbitrator."

In the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs.

J.C.Budharaja, Government and Mining Contractor, (1999)

8 SCC 122, this Court considering the point on lack of

jurisdiction of the arbitrator held that when the conditions

in the agreement specifically prohibited granting claim or

damages for the breaches mentioned therein it was not

open to the arbitrator to ignore the said conditions which

were binding on the contracting parties; that by ignoring

the same he has acted beyond the jurisdiction upon him;

that it is settled law that the arbitrator derives authority

from the contract and if he acts in manifest disregard of

the contract, the award given by him would be an arbitrary

one; that this deliberate departure from the contract

amounts not only to manifest disregard of the authority or

misconduct on his part, but it may tantamount to mala

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fide action. This Court further observed that the

Arbitration Act does not give any power to the arbitrator to

act arbitrarily or capriciously; that his existence depends

upon the agreement and his function is to act within the

limits of the said agreement. In para 17 of the judgment

this Court made the following observations :

"It is to be reiterated that to find out whether

the arbitrator has traveled beyond his

jurisdiction and acted beyond the terms of

the agreement between the parties, the

agreement is required to be looked into. It is

true that interpretation of a particular

condition in the agreement would be within

the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. However,

in cases where there is no question of

interpretation of any term of the contract,

but of solely reading the same as it is and

still the arbitrator ignores it and awards the

amount despite the prohibition in the

agreement, the award would be arbitrary,

capricious and without jurisdiction.

Whether the arbitrator has acted beyond the

terms of the contract or has traveled beyond

his jurisdiction would depend upon facts,

which however would be jurisdictional facts,

and are required to be gone into by the

court. The arbitrator may have jurisdiction

to entertain claim and yet he may not have

jurisdiction to pass award for particular

items in view of the prohibition contained in

the contract and, in such cases, it would be

a jurisdictional error. For this limited

purpose reference to the terms of the

contract is a must. Dealing with a similar

question this Court in New India Civil

Erectors (P) Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas

Corpn., (1997) 11 SCC 75, held thus : (SCC

p.79 para 9)

"It is axiomatic that the arbitrator

being a creature of the agreement,

must operate within the four

corners of the agreement and

cannot travel beyond it. More

particularly, he cannot award any

amount which is ruled out or

prohibited by the terms of the

agreement. In this case, the

agreement between the parties

clearly says that in measuring the

built-up area, the balcony areas

should be excluded. The arbitrators

could not have acted contrary to the

said stipulation and awarded any

amount to the appellant on that

account."

In the case of Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. & Anr. vs.

Balasore Technical School, (2000) 9 SCC 552, this Court

considered the question of Courts interference in case of a

non-speaking award. This Court referred to the decision

in New India Civil Erectors (P) Ltd (supra) in which it was

held that the arbitrator being a creature of the contract

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must operate within the four corners of the contract

cannot travel beyond it and he cannot award any amount

which is ruled out or prohibited by the terms of the

agreement and the decision in Associated Engg. Co. v.

Govt. of A.P., (1991) 4 SCC 93, in which it was held that if

the arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the

contract, that is an error within his jurisdiction; but if he

wanders outside the contract and deals with matter not

allotted to him, he commits a jurisdictional error and an

umpire or arbitrator cannot widen his jurisdiction by

deciding a question not referred to him by the parties or by

deciding a question otherwise than in accordance with the

contract. This Court referring to N.Chellappan v. Secy.,

Kerala SEB, (1975) 1 SCC 289, held that the principle was

unexceptionable. Summing up its decision, this Court

observed :

"However, from a reading of the

decisions of this Court referred to

earlier it is clear that when an award is

made plainly contrary to the terms of

the contract not by misinterpretation

but which is plainly contrary to the

terms of the contract it would certainly

lead to an inference that there is an

error apparent on the face of the award

which results in jurisdictional error in

the award. In such a case the courts

can certainly interfere with the award

made by the arbitrator."

Considering the scope of Section 30 of the Act, this Court

in the case of Indu Engineering & Textiles Ltd. vs. Delhi

Development Authority, (2001) 5 SCC 691, enumerated

some of the well recognized grounds on which interference

in award is permissible, observed :

"Interpreting the statutory provision

courts have laid stress on the

limitations on exercise of jurisdiction

by the court for setting aside or

interfering with an award in umpteen

cases. Some of the well-recognised

grounds on which interference is

permissible are:

(1) violation of the principle of natural

justice in passing the award;

(2) error apparent on the face of the

award;

(3) the arbitrator has ignored or

deliberately violated a clause in the

agreement prohibiting dispute of the

nature entertained;

(4) the award on the fact of it is based

on a proposition of law which is

erroneous etc."

Testing the case on hand on the touchstone of well

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settled principles laid down by Courts, we are unable to

hold that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in

interfering with the award or failed to exercise the

jurisdiction vested in it to set aside the award. The

approach of the High Court cannot be said to be contrary

to the well settled principles governing the scope of

interference with an award of the Arbitrator under the old

Act. As regards the first item, the question was whether

the contract contemplates the use of stone aggregate and

stone metal from the local sources only, the source of

supply being silent in the relevant clause. The Arbitrator

was of the view that the unprecedented situation of the

contractor being put to the necessity of procuring the stone

material from far off places was not visualized and the

parties proceeded on the basis that such material was

available locally. He further noted that the sample kept in

the office of the concerned Engineer admittedly pertained

to the material procured from local sources. A letter

addressed by the Chief Engineer in support of contractor's

claim was also relied on in this context. Hence, in these

circumstances, the Arbitrator can be said to have taken a

reasonably possible view and therefore the High Court

rightly declined to set aside the award in so far as the

quantity of stone aggregate/stone metal brought to site up

to 24.1.1994 is concerned. The Arbitrator acted within the

confines of his jurisdiction in making the award on this

part of the claim.

As already noted, the award in so far as the future

period is concerned, i.e. subsequent to 24.1.1994 which is

the date of filing of claim statement, the High Court set

aside the award on two grounds : (i) Such a claim did not

form part of terms of reference, though the contractor had

filed claim in respect of stone aggregate to be brought in

future and (ii) the future claim in respect of stone

aggregate would be subject to various factors including

market conditions and whether the shortage continued.

In our view the view taken by the High Court cannot

be sustained. It is clear from the arbitration clause viz.

clause 70 that all disputes between the parties to the

contract (other than excepted matters) can be referred to

arbitration. The contractor did make a claim in respect of

future period also. The document appointing the

Arbitrator would show that the Arbitrator was required to

decide the disputes arising between the parties. It is not

possible to hold that the claim No.1 in so far as it relates to

future period during which the contract work continued is

beyond the scope of reference or outside the ambit of

arbitration clause. The aim of arbitration is to settle all the

disputes between the parties and to avoid further

litigation. There is no legal justification in restricting the

scope of arbitration in the manner in which the High Court

did. In the list of disputes which is annexed to the letter of

appointment of the Arbitrator, it is mentioned without any

qualification or restriction as follows :

"Reimbursement of additional cost in

procurement of stone aggregate from crusher of

Belgaum, Hubli, etc. in lieu of local sources of

Goa."

The claim amount is mentioned as 36 lakhs and 8

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lakhs. This figure is over and above the amount claimed

upto 24.1.1994 and is based on an estimate. It is also

relevant to mention that Union of India did not take the

stand before the Arbitrator that the claim in respect of

future was beyond the scope of reference. However, in

order to obviate any controversy, it is made clear that the

payment at the rates specified in the award should be

made only in respect of stone aggregate actually brought to

the site from Belgaum, Hubli and other distant places. It

is open to the Engineer concerned to be satisfied on this

aspect before satisfying the award. Obviously, if any part

of the stone aggregate was brought subsequent to

24.1.1994 from local sources the directions in the award

will be ineffective. The observations of the High Court that

conditions may not be the same for the future and

therefore the Arbitrator was incompetent to make an

award for the future period cannot be supported for the

simple reason that the extra rate will become applicable

only in respect of quantities brought from sources other

than local. It has never been the case of Union of India

either before the Arbitrator or the High Court or even this

Court that the situation had changed after 24.1.1994 and

that the stone aggregate could be secured at lesser rates

from local sources or otherwise. For all these reasons, we

are of the view that the High Court ought not to have

interfered with the award in so far as claim No.1 is

concerned in any respect. To this extent, the appeals filed

by the Contractor i.e. arising out of SLP Nos. 10526-

10527 of 2000 are partly allowed.

As regards the other two items viz. 2 and 3, on a

perusal of the judgment of the High Court and on

consideration of the relevant clauses, we are of the view

that the judgment does not suffer from any serious error in

the approach to the matter. In regard to item No.2, though

the High Court may not be justified in observing that the

Arbitrator took undue interest in trying to ascertain the

classification of strata, the High Court is well justified in

holding that the view taken by the Arbitrator is not at all a

reasonably possible view and in fact he ignored one of the

relevant clauses, namely, 3.3.4. The Arbitrator was carried

away by the fact that chiselling had to be done in view of

the hardness of rock. The Arbitrator at the same time did

not choose to give a finding that what was encountered by

the contractor was something other than laterite rock

which is mentioned in the Agreement. As regards the 3rd

item, the Arbitrator again ignored the relevant clauses in

the agreement and came to the perverse conclusion that

the site became restricted on account of certain security

measures enforced in the area. The award of sum vis--vis

this item is clearly outside the terms of contract. The High

Court, therefore, rightly set aside the award on this aspect.

On the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs the

appeals arising from S.L.P. Nos.10526-27 of 2000 filed by

the contractor are allowed in part to the extent noted

earlier and the appeals arising from S.L.P. Nos.880-881

of 2001 filed by Union of India & another are dismissed.

There will, however, be no order for costs.

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