2026 INSC 236 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (Civil) NO. 22 OF 2014

MIZO CHIEF COUNCIL MIZORAM, …PETITIONER

THR. PRESIDENT SHRI L. CHINZAH

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 1 of 49

J.B. PARDIWALA, J.

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the following

parts:

INDEX

A. FACTUAL MATRIX ........................................................................................... 2

B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER AND THE

INTERVENOR ........................................................................................................... 7

C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS ........................ 10

D. ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED ..................................................................... 11

E. ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................... 12

(I) Whether the writ petition is hit by delay and laches? ............................. 12

(a) Doctrine of Delay and Laches in Article 32 Petitions ........................ 12

(b) Principles Governing the Application of Delay and Laches to

Article 32 Petitions ............................................................................................ 33

(c) Application to the facts of this matter ................................................. 40

(II) Whether any fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs were violated? .... 44

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 2 of 49

1. The present writ petition has been filed by the Mizo Chief Council, through

its President, on behalf of the tribal chieftains of the erstwhile Lushai Hills

district (present-day State of Mizoram) and their legal heirs. The primary

grievance of the petitioner is that the respondents seized/acquired the

lands of these chieftains without paying due compensation. The petitioner

contends that this deprivation violated the fundamental rights of the Mizo

Chiefs, specifically the right to property, which was guaranteed at the time

of the acquisition.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX

2. To understand the dispute before us, it is indispensable to gauge how the

society was structured and organised in the Lushai Hills district, both

before and after the area was annexed and brought under the control of the

British administration. It is pertinent to note that the limited objective here

is to outline the broad administrative structure and the players involved,

so as to provide the necessary context for evaluating the legal questions

raised in the present petition.

3. Historically, Mizo society was centred around the institution of the chiefs.

The petitioner asserts that these chiefs were the absolute owners of the

lands upon which their respective villages were situated. This territory,

referred to as the chieftain’s “Ram”, was administered by the chief, who

exercised executive and judicial authority over it. It is further claimed that

the chief allotted farmland from this Ram to the villagers and, in return,

was entitled to receive “Fathang”, a customary tribute comprising a

portion of the annual agricultural produce, primarily paddy.

4. Thereafter, the British made inroads and annexed the Lushai Hills district

in the 1890’s. The administration of the district was vested in the Chief

Commissioner of Assam, the Superintendent of the Lushai Hills district,

his assistants, and the chief and headmen of the villages. Thus, following

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 3 of 49

the British annexation, the colonial administration retained the

Chieftainship system for administrative convenience. Chiefs were

appointed to ensure good governance, and in return, they enjoyed the

privilege of chieftainship. All chiefs were responsible for controlling their

villages in every way. Thus, the day-to-day administration of the villages

was left largely in the hands of the chief. The chief was entitled to collect

Fathang and other taxes and, in turn, obliged to submit a portion of his

collections to the British officers.

5. It was, however, not the case that the Chiefs operated in complete freedom.

The chiefs entered into an understanding called “Ramrilekha” with

officials of the British government, whereby the boundaries or territorial

extent of a chief’s authority and influence were roughly demarcated, and

the chiefs were made to pledge loyalty to the British government

(hereinafter referred to as “boundary paper”). These boundary papers also

stated that the area specified therein would be the Chiefs’ Ram as long as

they live, subject to them remaining loyal to the government, and that after

their death, the superintendent shall appoint their successor, who in all

probability would be their children.

6. After the British entered the picture, while the chiefs retained

administrative flexibility, their authority dwindled and was fettered by the

British officials’ supervision. The Superintendent held a swathe of powers,

such as the authority to: (i) regulate the succession to villages of deceased

chiefs, to appoint guardians to minor chiefs, and to appoint chiefs or

headmen (subject to the chief commissioner’s decision and due regard

being had to the Lushai custom and hereditary rights of existing families

of chiefs) (ii) authorise the partition of existing villages to form new

villages and (iii) punish and dispose of chiefs for misconduct, subject to the

Chief Commissioner's confirmation. Further, the formation of new villages

without the Superintendent's prior sanction was forbidden.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 4 of 49

7. The administration of the Lushai Hills district continued on much the same

lines until independence. Although supervised, the British government

recognised that the chiefs contributed to the effective administration of the

Lushai Hills district.

8. When the Lushai Hills district was formed by amalgamating tracts known

as North and South Lushai Hills in 1898, the district was governed by the

Assam Frontier Tracts Regulation, 1880, and notifications were issued

under the provisions of the aforesaid Regulation and the Scheduled

District Act, 1874. Moreover, in 1936, the Lushai Hills district was

designated as an excluded area under the Government of India Act, 1935.

However, it is essential to note that there appears to be no single,

comprehensive legislation that covered all aspects of governance in the

region during this period of British Rule. Instead, the Lushai Hills district

seems to have been administered through a patchwork of notifications,

rules, and standing orders issued from time to time.

9. Post-independence, the Lushai Hills district was administered as part of

the state of Assam. Under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, the

Lushai Hills district came to be recognised as an autonomous district and

was governed by district and regional councils, in accordance with the

provisions in the Sixth Schedule. Thereafter, the Lushai Hills district was

renamed the Mizo District vide the Lushai Hills District (Change of Name)

Act, 1954.

10. In 1954, the Assam Lushai Hills District (Acquisition of Chief’s Rights) Act,

1954 (hereinafter “the Act, 1954”) was passed by the then State of Assam.

The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, 1954, read as follows:

“The chief in the Lushai Hills has been exercising certain

administrative and judicial functions in respect of village

administrative and in recognition of their services inherent to enjoy

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 5 of 49

certain rights and privilege. With the growth of political consciousness,

and the establishment of the District Council in the Lushai Hills, there

has been an instant demand for the abolition of the system of chief. This

can be done only under law providing for the acquisition of the rights

of the chiefs in respect of " Ram" (Chief's land) and " Fathang " (Paddy

tax) which are in the nature of rights to the property, after payment of

compensation. Hence this Bill.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

11. The legislature enacted the Act, 1954, with the primary objective of

enabling the State to acquire certain rights and interests of the Chiefs in

and over the land located in the Lushai Hills district. To effectuate this

purpose, the Act, 1954, empowered the State Government to issue a

notification declaring that the rights and interests of a Chief in his Ram, as

specified in the said notification, shall stand transferred to and absolutely

vest in the State. Consequent to such transfer and vesting, the Act, 1954

laid down a comprehensive statutory scheme detailing the method for

computation and disbursement of compensation, whilst also prescribing a

specific adjudicatory procedure to resolve any disputes arising in relation

to such compensation. Furthermore, the Act, 1954 mandates that upon

such acquisition, all Ram shall be administered by the District Council or

Regional Council, as the case may be, in accordance with the laws in force

at that time. The relevant provisions of the 1954 Act are, for convenience,

extracted below:

“Section 2 – Definitions

[...]

2(p) – “Ram” means a tract or tracts of land held by a chief under a

Ramrilekha or boundary paper issued by the competent authority

[...]

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 6 of 49

Section 3 – Notification declaring the vesting of “Ram” in the

State

(1) The State Government may, from time to time, by notification

declare that the rights and interests of a chief in his Ram

specified in the notification shall stand transferred to and vest in

the State free from all encumbrances.

[...]

Section 4 – Consequence of such notification

Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in

force or in any agreement or contract expressed or implied, on the

publication of the notification referred to in section 3, all rights and

interests of the Chief in the Ram shall, save as otherwise expressly

provided in this Act, cease and shall vest absolutely in the State free

from all encumbrances in accordance with the provisions of this Act

with effect from the agricultural year next following the date of

publication of such notification.

Section 5 – Compensation how to be paid

No compensation to any chief whose rights and interests in his Ram

vest in the State under the provisions of this Act shall be payable except

as provided for in this Act.

Section 6 – Settlement of Rams

(1) The District Council or the Regional Council, as the case may be

shall take over charge of any Ram, the rights and interests of the chief

in which vest in the State.

(2) All the Rams shall be administered by the District Council or the

Regional Council, as the case may be, in accordance with the law for the

time being in force in the Lushai Hills District.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

12. On March 23, 1955, a notification was issued in exercise of the powers

conferred by Section 3(1) of the Act, 1954, declaring that the right and

interest of the chiefs in the Ram specified in the Schedule thereto would

stand transferred to and vested in the State free from all encumbrances

(hereinafter referred to as “impugned notification”).

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 7 of 49

13. Thereafter, the title/heading of Section 3 of the Act, 1954, was amended by

the Assam Mizo District (Acquisition of Chief’s Rights) (Amendment) Act,

1955, from “ Notification declaring the vesting of “Ram”

in the State” to “Notification declaring the vesting in the State of a Chief’s rights

and interest in his Ram”.

14. A total of INR 14,78,980/- was paid to the chiefs as compensation under

the Act, 1954. The petitioner claims that the compensation paid was limited

to the Fathang and does not take into account the value of the lands that

belonged to the chiefs and were subsequently vested in the State. Thus, no

compensation was paid for the lands.

15. After the passing of the Act, 1954, the Mizo chiefs have, over the decades,

agitated their claim for compensation in respect of the land that came to be

vested with the government before multiple forums. The record shows the

plethora of correspondence between representatives of the chiefs and the

State and Central Governments on this issue. In fact, the issue was agitated

by the petitioner before the Guwahati High Court at least on two occasions.

On both occasions, the High Court disposed of the matter without delving

into its merits, hoping it would be amicably resolved between the parties.

However, no settlement was reached between the parties.

16. In such circumstances referred to above, the petitioner is before this Court

with this present writ petition.

17. Further, an intervention application was filed by the Lushai Chief

Association, which was allowed vide this Court’s order dated August 13,

2025.

B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER AND THE

INTERVENOR

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 8 of 49

18. Broadly stated, the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and the

intervenor are as follows:

a. Historically, the Mizo Chiefs were the absolute owners of the entire

tract of land that presently constitutes the State of Mizoram. The

traditional Mizo chieftainship system was uniquely distinct from

other indigenous landholding systems, which were typically

characterised by communal or collective ownership. The Chiefs

functioned as the absolute masters and monarchs of their

respective domains, holding hereditary, complete, and exclusive

proprietary rights over the territory. While the advent of British

occupation curtailed certain powers held by the chiefs, the chiefs of

the Lushai Hills district retained complete ownership of the

territories. That the lands belonged to the chiefs is borne out by the

traditional practices of the Mizo people and by the accounts and

writings of British government scholars and officials.

b. Post-independence, the chiefs were unlawfully deprived of the said

lands without payment of any due compensation. The Act, 1954

was highly circumscribed in its scope. It merely addressed the

extinguishment of certain administrative rights and privileges of

the Chiefs and did not address the ownership rights that the Chiefs

held in the Ram. Consequently, the State's actual taking over of the

chiefs’ territorial lands was an executive action entirely devoid of

statutory authority. Since the deprivation of their land was

completely without the authority of law, it violated the right to

property, which was, at the relevant time, recognised as a

fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. Such an

arbitrary action of the State also violates Articles 14 and 21 of the

Constitution.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 9 of 49

c. Even if this Court were to construe the Act, 1954, as a law which

provided for the acquisition of the said lands, the statutory

compensation provided and disbursed thereunder was completely

‘illusory’ and a mere pittance in exchange for the vast tracts of land

that the State effectively expropriated and acquired. Such payment

of ‘illusory’ compensation is also violative of the fundamental right

to property. Therefore, from whichever angle the issue is looked at,

the inescapable conclusion remains that the fundamental rights of

the Mizo Chiefs, especially that of the right to property, were

unconstitutionally breached.

d. The State’s actions also suffer from the vice of manifest

arbitrariness. The Mizo Chiefs stood on an equal footing with the

rulers of the erstwhile Princely States. While the Princely rulers

across the country were systematically integrated into the Union

with the solemn guarantee of privy purses, the Mizo Chiefs were

arbitrarily singled out and denied such privileges. Consequently,

such actions on behalf of the State constitute a breach of the

guarantee bestowed under Article 14 of the Constitution.

e. The respondents have taken contradictory stances, prolonging the

issue for many decades under the pretext of resolving it amicably.

They cannot contend that the issue is now time-barred. The

plethora of correspondence presented shows that the

petitioner/Mizo Chiefs have consistently pursued the issue since

its inception.

f. Under the Sixth Schedule, the District Council had the exclusive

power to make laws regarding the allotment, occupation, or use of

land. Thus, the State of Assam (the parent state in 1954) lacked the

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 10 of 49

legislative power to enact the Act, 1954, effectively overriding the

District Council's powers.

19. On the basis of the above, the learned counsel prayed that there being merit

in their petition, the same may be allowed and: (i) the impugned

notification be set aside; and (ii) the chiefs be granted such compensation,

as this Court deems fit, by the respondents in lieu of their actions which

had violated their fundamental rights.

C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

20. Broadly stated, the submissions made on behalf of respondent no. 1 (Union

of India) and respondent no.2 (State of Mizoram) are as follows:

a. The present writ petition is impractical as the petitioner is virtually

seeking compensation for the entire state of Mizoram. Further,

Article 32 cannot be invoked to reignite settled matters that reached

administrative finality decades ago. The petitioner’s claims are

hopelessly time-barred.

b. Mizo Chiefs cannot be classified as the absolute owners of the land.

Whatever customary authority the Chiefs may have historically

wielded, any semblance of absolute proprietary title was

extinguished following the advent of the British administration in

the Lushai Hills district. The entire district was brought under the

supervision of the British officials, and the Chiefs were reduced to

mere intermediaries, exercising administrative control over

specific tracts of land strictly on the basis of boundary papers

issued by the British regime. Further, the area continued to be

governed by the rules and regulations established by the British

administration till the abolition of the chieftainship after the

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 11 of 49

passing of the Act, 1954, and the issuance of the impugned

notification.

c. The petitioner has failed to adduce any cogent documentary or

historical evidence to substantiate its lofty and sweeping claims of

absolute, hereditary ownership. Therefore, the foundational

premise of the petitioner’s case, that the Mizo Chiefs were

unconstitutionally deprived of their private property, is factually

unsubstantiated.

d. The Act, 1954, was enacted solely to disband the traditional

chieftainship system and to extinguish the administrative rights

and privileges that the Chiefs exercised over their respective Rams.

Accordingly, the statutory compensation provided for and duly

disbursed under the Act, 1954, was intended solely to recompense

the Chiefs for the loss of these specific administrative rights. The

petitioner’s contention that the compensation is ‘illusory’ is entirely

misconceived and falls flat, as it erroneously compares the

compensation amount to the value of land that the Chiefs never

legally owned in the first place.

21. On the basis of the above, the learned counsel for the respondents prayed

that there being no merit in the present writ petition, the same may be

dismissed.

D. ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED

22. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having gone through

the materials on record, the following questions fall for our consideration:

a. Whether the writ petition is hit by delay and laches?

b. Whether any fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs were violated?

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 12 of 49

E. ANALYSIS

(I) WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS HIT BY DELAY AND LACHES?

23. Before adverting to the merits of the rival contentions regarding the

alleged infringement of the Mizo Chiefs’ fundamental right to property, it

is incumbent upon us to address the threshold issue of delay and laches.

The respondents have contended that the present petition is barred by a

significant lapse of time and that its consideration would unsettle matters

that are long settled.

(a) Doctrine of Delay and Laches in Article 32 Petitions

24. To adjudicate this contention, it is apposite for us to examine how this

Court has addressed the applicability of the doctrine of delay and laches

to petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The best starting

point for any discussion on the doctrine of laches is the often-quoted

passage from Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd,

reported in (1874) 5 PC 221, which states as follows:

“Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a

technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a

remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which

might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his

conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy,

yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable

to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of

these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case,

if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded

upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any

statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon

principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always

important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of

the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and

cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the

other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”

25. In the Indian legal landscape, this Court’s Constitution Bench decision in

Tilokchand and Motichand & Ors v. H.B. Munshi & Anr, reported in

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 13 of 49

(1969) 1 SCC 110, serves as the primary entry point for any discussion

regarding the applicability of the doctrine of laches to petitions filed under

Article 32. The seminal issue before the Bench was whether the remedy

under Article 32, which itself is a fundamental right, could be fettered by

any period of limitation, i.e., whether any time limit could be imposed on

petitions under Article 32. While the Court dismissed the petition by a 3:2

majority on merits, the legal principles enunciated regarding the

application of the doctrine of laches are of primary importance. The

majority held that delay and laches are factors that can be considered in

Article 32 petitions, and that this Court is not precluded from declining

relief where a petitioner approaches the Court after an inordinate delay.

The relevant observations crystallising this view are extracted below:

M. Hidayatullah, C.J (as he then was)

“7. It follows, therefore, that this Court puts itself in restraint in the

matter of petitions under Article 32 and this practice has now become

inveterate. The question is whether this Court will inquire into belated

and stale claims or take note of evidence of neglect of one's own rights

for a long time? I am of opinion that not only it would but also that it

should. The party claiming Fundamental Rights must move the Court

before other rights come into existence. The action of courts cannot

harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the

part of the person moving the Court. This principle is well recognised

and has been applied by Courts in England and America.

8. The English and American practice has been outlined in Halsbury's

Laws of England and Corpus Juris Secundum. It has been mentioned

by my brethren in their opinions and I need not traverse the same

ground again except to say this that Courts of Common Law in England

were bound by the Law of Limitation but not the Courts of Chancery.

Even so the Chancery Courts insisted on expedition. It is trite learning

to refer to the maxim “delay defeats equity” or the Latin of it that the

Courts help those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights.

The Courts of Chancery, therefore, frequently applied to suits in equity

the analogy of the Law of Limitation applicable to actions at law and

equally frequently put a special limitation of their own if they thought

that the suit was unduly delayed. This was independently of the

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 14 of 49

analogy of law relating to limitation. The same practice has been

followed in the United States.

9. In India we have the Limitation Act which prescribes different

periods of limitation for suits, petitions or applications. There are also

residuary articles which prescribe limitation in those cases where no

express period is provided. If it were a matter of a suit or application,

either an appropriate article or the residuary article would have applied.

But a petition under Article 32 is not a suit and it is also not a petition

or an application to which the Limitation Act applies. To put curbs in

the way of enforcement of Fundamental Rights through legislative

action might well be questioned under Article 13(3). The reason is also

quite clear. If a short period of limitation were prescribed the

Fundamental Right might well be frustrated. Prescribing too long a

period might enable stale claims to be made to the detriment of other

rights which might emerge.

10. If then there is no period prescribed what is the standard for this

Court to follow? I should say that utmost expedition is the sine qua

non for such claims. The party aggrieved must move the Court at the

earliest possible time and explain satisfactorily all semblance of delay. I

am not indicating any period which may be regarded as the ultimate

limit of action for that would be taking upon myself legislative

functions. In England a period of 6 months has been provided

statutorily, but that could be because there is no guaranteed remedy and

the matter is one entirely of discretion. In India I will only say that each

case will have to be considered on its own facts. Where there is

appearance of avoidable delay and this delay affects the merits of the

claim, this Court will consider it and in a proper case hold the party

disentitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction.

11. Therefore, the question is one of discretion for this Court to follow

from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit. A

case may be brought within Limitation Act by reason of some article

but this Court need not necessarily give the total time to the litigant to

move this Court under Article 32. Similarly in a suitable case this

Court may entertain such a petition even after a lapse of time. It will all

depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Right and the remedy

claimed are when and how the delay arose.

S.M. Sikri, J.

14. Article 32(2) of the Constitution confers a judicial power on the

Court. Like all judicial powers, unless there is an express provision to

the contrary, it must be exercised in accordance with fundamental

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 15 of 49

principles of administration of justice. [...] I understand that one of the

fundamental principles of administration of justice is that, apart from

express provisions to the contrary, stale claims should not be given

effect to. But what is a stale claim? It is not denied that the Indian

Limitation Act does not directly apply to a petition under Article 32.

[....]

xxx

18. [...]The history of these writs both in England and the U.S.A.

convinces me that the underlying idea of the Constitution was to

provide an expeditious and authoritative remedy against the inroads of

the State. If a claim is barred under the Limitation Act, unless there are

exceptional circumstances, prima facie it is a stale claim and should not

be entertained by this Court. But even if it is not barred under the

Indian Limitation Act, it may not be entertained by this Court if on the

facts of the case there is unreasonable delay. [...]It is difficult to lay down

a precise period beyond which delay should be explained. I favour one

year because this Court should not be approached lightly, and

competent legal advice should be taken and pros and cons carefully

weighed before coming to this Court. It is common knowledge that

appeals and representations to the higher authorities take time; time

spent in pursuing these remedies may not be excluded under the

Limitation Act, but it may ordinarily be taken as a good explanation for

the delay.

19. It is said that if this was the practice the guarantee of Article 32

would be destroyed. But the article nowhere says that a petition,

howsoever late, should be entertained and a writ or order or direction

granted, howsoever remote the date of infringement of the fundamental

right. In practice this Court has not been entertaining stale claims by

persons who have slept over their rights. There is no need to depart from

this practice and tie our hands completely with the shackles imposed by

the Indian Limitation Act[....]

R.S Bachawat, J.

39. The next and the more fundamental question is whether in the

circumstances the Court should give relief in a writ petition under

Article 32 of the Constitution. No period of limitation is prescribed for

such a petition. The right to move this Court for enforcement of

fundamental rights is guaranteed by Article 32. The writ under Article

32 issues as a matter of course if a breach of a fundamental right is

established. Technical rules applicable to suits like the provisions of

Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to a

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 16 of 49

proceeding under Article 32. But this does not mean that in giving relief

under Article 32 the Court must ignore and trample under foot all laws

of procedure, evidence, limitation, res judicata and the like. Under

Article 145(1)(c) rules may be framed for regulating the practice and

procedure in proceedings under Article 32. In the absence of such rules

the Court may adopt any reasonable rule of procedure. Thus a petitioner

has no right to move this Court under Article 32 for enforcement of this

fundamental right on a petition containing misleading and inaccurate

statements and if he files such a petition the Court will dismiss it,

see Indian Sugars & Refineries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1968 SCC

OnLine SC 158. On grounds of public policy it would be intolerable if

the Court were to entertain such a petition. Likewise the Court held

in Daryao v. State of U.P. that the general principles of res judicata

applied to a writ petition under Article 32. Similarly, this Court has

summarily dismissed innumerable writ petitions on that ground that it

was presented after unreasonable delay.

40. The normal remedy for recovery of money paid to the State under

coercion or mistake of law is by suit. Articles 32 and 226 of the

Constitution provide concurrent remedy in respect of the same claim.

The extraordinary remedies under the Constitution are not intended to

enable the claimant to recover monies, the recovery of which by suit is

barred by limitation. Where the remedy in a writ application under

Article 32 or Article 226 corresponds to a remedy in an ordinary suit

and the latter remedy is subject to the bar of a statute of limitation, the

Court in its writ jurisdiction acts by analogy to the statute, adopts the

statute as its own rule of procedure and in the absence of special

circumstances imposes the same limitation on the summary remedy in

the writ jurisdiction. On similar grounds the Court of Chancery acted

on the analogy of the statutes of limitation in disposing of stale claims

though the proceeding in a Chancery was not subject to any express

statutory bar, see Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 14, page 647,

Article 1190, Knox v. Gye. [LR 5 LH 656, 674] Likewise, the High

Court acts on the analogy of the statute of limitation in a proceeding

under Article 226 though the statute does not expressly apply to the

proceeding. The Court will almost always refuse to give relief under

Article 226 if the delay is more than the statutory period of limitation,

see State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai at pp. 273-274.

41. Similarly this Court acts on the analogy of the statute of limitation

in respect of a claim under Article 32 of the Constitution though such

claim is not the subject of any express statutory bar of limitation. If the

right to a property is extinguished by prescription under Section 27 of

the Limitation Act, 1963, the petitioner has no subsisting right which

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 17 of 49

can be enforced under Article 32 (see Sobbraj Odharmal v. State of

Rajasthan ). In other cases where the remedy only and not the right is

extinguished by limitation, it is on grounds of the public policy that the

Court refuses to entertain stale claims under Article 32. The statutes of

limitation are founded on sound principles of public policy. As observed

in Whitley Stoke's Anglo-Indian Codes, Vol. 11, p. 940; “The law is

founded on public policy, its aim being to secure the quiet of the

community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence, and to

prevent oppression”. In Ruckmaboye v. Lulloobhoy Mottichund [the

Privy Council observed that the object of the statutes of limitation was

to give effect to the maxim, “interest reipublicoe ut sit finis litium” (co

litt 303) the interest of the State requires that there should be a limit to

litigation. The rule of res judicata is founded upon the same rule of

public policy, see Daryao v. State of U.P. at p. 584. The other ground

of public policy upon which the statutes of limitation are founded is

expressed in the maxim “vigilantibus non dormientibus jura

subveniunt” (2 Co Inst. 690) the laws aid the vigilant and not those

who slumber. On grounds of public policy the Court applies the

principles of res judicata to writ petitions under Article 32. On like

grounds the Court acts on the analogy of the statutes of limitation in

the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32. [...]

G.K. Mitter, J.

65. The Limitation Acts do not in terms apply to claims against the

State in respect of violation of fundamental rights. A person

complaining of infraction of any such rights has one of three courses

open to him. He can either make an application under Article 226 of the

Constitution to a High Court or he can make an application to this

Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, or he can file a suit asking

for appropriate reliefs. The decisions of various High Courts in India

have firmly laid down that in the matter of the issue of a writ under

Article 226 the Courts have a descretion and may in suitable cases

refuse to give relief to the person approaching it even though on the

merits the applicant has a substantial complaint as regards violation of

fundamental rights. Although the Limitation Act does not apply, the

Courts have refused to give relief in cases of long or unreasonable delay.

As noted above in Bhailal Bhai case, it was observed that the “maximum

period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a

suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a

reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article

226 can be measured”. On the question of delay, we see no reason to

hold that a different test ought to be applied when a party comes to this

Court under Article 32 from one applicable to applications under

Article 226. There is a public policy behind all statutes of limitation and

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 18 of 49

according to Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn., Vol. 24), Article

330 at p. 181:

“The courts have expressed at least three different reasons

supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely,

(1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than

justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the

evidence to disprove a stale claim and (3) that persons with

good causes of action should persue them with reasonable

diligence.

66. In my view, a claim based on the infraction of fundamental rights

ought not to be entertained if made beyond the period fixed by the

Limitation Act for the enforcement of the right by way of suit. While

not holding that the Limitation Act applies in terms, I am of the view

that ordinarily the period fixed by the Limitation Act should be taken

to be a true measure of the time within which a person can be allowed

to raise a plea successfully under Article 32 of the Constitution. [...]”

(Emphasis Supplied)

26. A close examination of the aforesaid excerpts reveals a clear judicial

consensus: four out of the five learned Judges of the Bench agreed that the

remedy under Article 32, though a fundamental right, is not immune from

general principles of law and reasonable procedure. Consequently,

petitions even under Article 32, seeking to agitate stale claims, ought not

to be entertained. This restraint is largely rooted in the following factors:

(i) the law assists those who are vigilant, not those who sleep over their

rights; (ii) actions of the courts cannot harm innocent third parties whose

rights emerge by reason of delay i.e., entertaining long-dormant claims

would disturb the settled position and unjustly prejudice third parties by

placing an unreasonable burden on them to defend against claims after a

prolonged period had passed (due to loss of evidence and change in

context); and (iii) it is essential to put a time limit on proceedings to

provide certainty and prevent confusion from cases being in perpetual

flux.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 19 of 49

27. Further, a perusal of the above extracts reveals that the judicial opinion

diverged on the precise yardstick to be applied when determining whether

there has been a delay in instituting a petition under Article 32. Some

members of the Bench favoured drawing a strict analogy with the periods

prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963, whereas others advocated for a

flexible approach. However, all four opinions recognised that Article 32

was not directly fettered by the Limitation Act, 1963, nor was any explicit

period prescribed for instituting a petition under Article 32. In this context,

the view propounded by Hidayatullah, C.J., emerged as the most

pragmatic guide, holding that no fixed time limit could be laid down and

that the question of delay is one of discretion to be exercised on a case-by-

case basis. According to him, the decision would depend on: (i)whether

the petitioner has offered a valid and plausible explanation for the delay,

i.e. when and how the delay arose so as to gauge whether or not the delay

was avoidable; (ii) whether the delay had affected the merits of the case

and (iii) what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are.

28. In Tilokchand (supra), K.S. Hegde, J., in his opinion, differed from the other

four members on the Bench and held that a petition under Article 32

cannot be refused on the ground of laches. His dissent was primarily

premised on an apprehension that treating the remedy under Article 32 as

discretionary would dilute its status as a guaranteed fundamental right,

potentially reducing it to the level of an ordinary civil right. The relevant

excerpts of his dissenting opinion are reproduced below:

“77. Our Constitution makers in their wisdom thought that no fetters

should be placed on the right of an aggrieved party to seek relief from

this Court under Article 32. A comparison of the language of Article

226 with that of Article 32 will show that while under Article 226 a

discretionary power is conferred on the High Courts the mandate of the

Constitution is absolute so far as the exercise of this Court's power

under Article 32 is concerned. Should this Court, an institution

primarily created for the purpose of safeguarding the fundamental

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 20 of 49

rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, narrow down

those rights? The implications of this decision are bound to be far

reaching. It is likely to pull down from the high pedestal now occupied

by the fundamental rights to the level of other civil rights. I am

apprehensive that this decision may mark an important turning point

in downgrading the fundamental rights guaranteed under the

Constitution.

I am firmly of the view that a relief asked for under Article 32 cannot

be refused on the ground of laches. The provisions of the Limitation Act

have no relevance either directly or indirectly to proceedings under

Article 32. Considerations which are relevant in proceedings under

Article 226 are wholly out of place in a proceeding like the one before

us. The decision of this Court referred to in the judgment of Bachawat

and Mitter, JJ., where this Court has taken into consideration the laches

on the part of the petitioners are not apposite for our present purpose.

None of those cases deal with proceedings under Article 32 of the

Constitution. The rule enunciated by this Court in State of

M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai , is only applicable to proceedings under Article

226. At p. 271 of the report, Das Gupta, J., who spoke for the Court

specifically referred to this aspect when he says:

“That it has been made clear more than once that power to

relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power.”

78. Therefore those decisions are of no assistance to us in deciding the

present case. Once it is held that the power of this Court under Article

32 is a discretionary power — that in my opinion is the result of the

decision of Bachawat and Mitter, JJ.—then it follows that this Court

can refuse relief under Article 32 on any one of the grounds on which

relief under Article 226 can be refused. Such a conclusion militates not

only against the plain words of Article 32 but also the lofty principle

underlying that provision. The resulting position is that the right

guaranteed under that article would cease to be a fundamental right.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

29. In Rabindranath Bose & Ors v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1970)

1 SCC 84, when dealing with claims relating to seniority in appointments

under a writ petition, a Constitution Bench of this Court, upholding the

principle laid down in Tilokchand (supra), reiterated that no relief would

be given to petitioners who, without reasonable explanation, approach

this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delay. The

relevant observations made by this Court are as follows:

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 21 of 49

“31. But insofar as the attack is based on the 1952 Seniority Rules, it

must fail on another ground. The ground being that this petition under

Article 32 of the Constitution has been brought about fifteen years after

the 1952 Rules were promulgated and effect given to them in the

Seniority List prepared on August 1, 1953. Learned counsel for the

petitioners says that this Court has no discretion and cannot dismiss

the petition under Article 32 on the ground that it has been brought

after inordinate delay. We are unable to accept this contention. This

Court by majority in Tilokchand Moti Chand v. H.B. Munshi held

that delay can be fatal in certain circumstances. [...]

32. The learned counsel for the petitioners strongly urges that the

decision of this Court in Tilokchand Motichand case needs review. But

after carefully considering the matter, we are of the view that no relief

should be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation,

approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after

inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has been given original

jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution.

It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale

demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a

guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was

the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should discard

all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.

33. We are not anxious to throw out petitions on this ground, but we

must administer justice in accordance with law and principles of equity,

justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the

respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person

ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and

promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse

of a number of years. It was on this ground that this Court

in Jaisinghani case observed that the order in that case would not affect

Class II officers who have been appointed permanently as Assistant

Commissioners. In that case, the Court was only considering the

challenge to appointments and promotions made after 1950. In this

case, we are asked to consider the validity of appointments and

promotions made during the periods of 1945 to 1950. If there was

adequate reason in that case to leave out Class II officers, who had been

appointed permanently Assistant Commissioners, there is much more

reason in this case that the officers who are now permanent Assistant

Commissioners of Income Tax and who were appointed and promoted

to their original posts during 1945 to 1950, should be left alone.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 22 of 49

30. In R.S Deodhar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in (1974)

1 SCC 317, the respondents raised a preliminary objection contending that

the petition under Article 32 ought to be dismissed at the threshold on the

ground of gross delay and laches. A Constitution Bench of this Court,

however, repelled this contention and reasoned that: (i) the petitioners had

offered a valid explanation for the delay; (ii) what was challenged in the

petition was not a thing of the past and was still being followed, and thus

its constitutionality should be adjudged; and (iii) the adjudication of the

claim would not cause unjust prejudice or deprivation to the respondents.

The relevant observations in this regard are extracted below:

“10. The first preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents

was that the petitioners were guilty of gross laches and delay in filing

the petition. The divisional cadre of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars were

created as far back as November 1, 1956 by the Government Resolution

of that date, and the procedure for making promotion to the posts of

Deputy Collector on the basis of divisional select-list, which was a

necessary consequence of the creation of the divisional cadre of

Mamlatdars/ Tehsildars, had been in operation for a long number of

years, at any rate from April 7, 1961, and the Rules of July 30, 1959

were also given effect to since the date of their enactment and yet the

petitioner did not file the petition until July 14, 1969. There was a delay

of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual

of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents,

was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition

under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention

should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that

the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and

stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound

and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that

whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain

the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. [...]Here the

petitioners were informed by the Commissioner, Aurangabad Division,

by his letter dated October 18, 1960 and also by the then Secretary of

the Revenue Department in January 1961 that the rules of recruitment

to the posts of Deputy Collector in the reorganised State of Bombay had

not yet been unified, and that the petitioners continued to be governed

by the rules of Ex-Hyderabad State and the Rules of July 30, 1959 had

no application to them. The petitioners were, therefore, justified in

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 23 of 49

proceeding on the assumption that there were no unified rules of

recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector and the promotions that

were being made by the State Government were only provisional to be

regularised when unified rules of recruitment were made. It was only

when the petition in Kapoor case was decided by the Bombay High

Court that the petitioners came to know that it was the case of the State

Government in that petition — and that case was accepted by the

Bombay High Court — that the Rules of July 30, 1959 were the unified

rules of recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector applicable

throughout the reorganised State of Bombay. The petitioners thereafter

did not lose any time in filing the present petition. Moreover, what is

challenged in the petition is the validity of the procedure for making

promotions to the posts of Deputy Collector — whether it is violative of

the equal opportunity clause — and since this procedure is not a thing

of the past, but is still being followed by the State Government, it is but

desirable that its constitutionality should be adjudged when the

question has come before the Court at the instance of parties properly

aggrieved by it .It may also be noted that the principle on which the

Court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on ground of laches

or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the

delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless

there is reasonable explanation for the delay.[...] Here, as admitted by

the State Government in para 55 of the affidavit in reply, all promotions

that have been made by the State Government are provisional and the

position has not been crystallised to the prejudice of the petitioners. No

rights have, therefore, accrued in favour of others by reason of the delay

in filing the petition. The promotions being provisional, they have not

conferred any rights on those promoted and they are by their very

nature liable to be set at naught, if the correct legal position, as finally

determined, so requires. We were also told by the learned counsel for

the petitioners, and that was not controverted by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the State Government, that even if the petition

were allowed and the reliefs claimed by the petitioners granted to them,

that would not result in the reversion of any Deputy Collector or

officiating Deputy Collector to the post of Mamlatdar/Tehsildar; the

only effect would be merely to disturb their inter se seniority as

officiating Deputy Collectors or as Deputy Collectors. Moreover, it may

be noticed that the claim for enforcement of the fundamental right of

equal opportunity under Article 16 is itself a fundamental right

guaranteed under Article 32 and this Court which has been assigned

the role of a sentinel on the qui vive for protection of the fundamental

rights cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded to refuse relief solely on

the jejune ground of laches, delay or the like. “

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 24 of 49

(Emphasis Supplied)

31. This Court, in Joginder Nath & Ors v. Union of India & Ors, reported in

(1975) 3 SCC 459, relying upon the decisions in Tilokchand (supra),

Rabindranath Bose (supra), and R.S Deodhar (supra) respectively, held

that the preliminary objection raised on the grounds of delay and laches

would not succeed in the facts and circumstances of the case as: first, there

was no delay in filing the petition; and secondly, dealing with the petition

would not unsettle long standing settled matters. The relevant observation

made by this Court is as follows:

“9. In our opinion on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the

preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents cannot

succeed. The first list fixing the seniority of the Judicial Officers

initially recruited to the Delhi Judicial Service was issued on August 2,

1971. This was subject to revision on good cause being shown.

Petitioners also, as we shall show hereinafter in this judgment on one

ground or the other, wanted their position to be revised in the seniority

list. They, however, did not succeed. A revised seniority list was issued

on June 2, 1973. The filing of the writ petition was not designedly

delayed thereafter. Since the petitioners position in the seniority list vis-

a-vis Respondents 3 to 6 had not been disturbed in the new list dated

June 2, 1973 it was sufficient for the petitioners to challenge the list

dated August 2, 1971. We shall point out in this judgment that except

the promotion to the posts of Additional District Judges, the seniority

in relation to which also is under challenge in this writ application,

nothing special had happened creating any right in favour of the

respondents or no such position had been created the disturbance of

which would unsettle the long standing settled matters. The writ

application, therefore, cannot be thrown out on the ground of delay in

regard to any of the reliefs asked for by the petitioners.”

32. In Aflatoon & Ors v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors., reported in (1975) 4

SCC 285, a Constitution Bench of this Court declined to entertain an

Article 32 petition challenging land acquisition proceedings on the ground

of inordinate delay and laches. This Court, on the facts of the case, held

that the litigants acted in a non-vigilant manner by ‘sitting on the fence’

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 25 of 49

for a long period of time while the State completed the acquisition process

and thereafter filed the petition at a highly advanced stage. Allowing such

a non-vigilant petitioner to pursue the claims after inordinate delay, this

Court held, would tantamount to putting a ‘premium on dilatory tactics’.

The relevant observations made by this Court are as follows:

“9. Assuming for the moment that the public purpose was not

sufficiently specified in the notification, did the appellants make a

grievance of it at the appropriate time? If the appellants had really been

prejudiced by the non-specification of the public purpose for which the

plots in which they were interested were needed, they should have taken

steps to have the notification quashed on that ground within a

reasonable time. They did not move in the matter even after the

declaration under Section 6 was published in 1966. They approached

the High Court with their writ petitions only in 1970 when the notices

under Section 9 were issued to them. In the concluding portion of the

judgment in Munshi Singh v. Union of India, it was observed: [SCC p.

344, para 10]

“In matters of this nature we would have taken due notice of

laches on the part of the appellants while granting the above

relief but we are satisfied that so far as the present appellants

are concerned they have not been guilty of laches, delay or

acquiescence at any stage.”

We do not think that the appellants were vigilant.

xxx

11. Nor do we think that the petitioners in the writ petitions should be

allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in not challenging the

validity of the notification even after the publication of the declaration

under Section 6 in 1966. Of the two writ petitions, one is filed by one

of the appellants. There was apparently no reason why the writ

petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for

challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground

that the particulars of the public purpose were not specified. A valid

notification under Section 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of

proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and

allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the

basis that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under

Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 26 of 49

which were available to them at the time when the notification was

published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ

petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on

the part of the petitioners (see Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B.

Munshi and Rabindranath Base v. Union of India).”

(Emphasis Supplied)

33. In G.P. Doval & Ors v. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. & Ors,

reported in (1984) 4 SCC 329, this Court, while dealing with the contention

that the petitioners had moved the Court after a long unexplained delay,

made the following pertinent observation:

“16. A grievance was made that the petitioners have moved this Court

after a long unexplained delay and the Court should not grant any relief

to them. It was pointed out that the provisional seniority list was drawn

up on March 22, 1971 and the petitions have been filed in the year 1983.

The respondents therefore submitted that the Court should throw out

the petitions on the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence. It was

said that promotions granted on the basis of impugned seniority list

were not questioned by the petitioners and they have acquiesced into it.

We are not disposed to accede to this request because Respondents 1 to

3 have not finalised the seniority list for a period of more than 12 years

and are operating the same for further promotion to the utter

disadvantage of the petitioners. Petitioners went on making

representations after representations which did not yield any response,

reply or relief. Coupled with this is the fact that the petitioners belong

to the lower echelons of service and it is not difficult to visualise that

they may find it extremely difficult to rush to the court. Therefore, the

contention must be rejected.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

34. The observation made by this Court in G.P. Doval (supra) adds an

important dimension to the considerations that ought to be taken into

account when deciding whether a petition under Article 32 is barred by

delay or laches. This Court, in Rabindranath Bose (supra), R.S. Deodhar

(supra), Joginder Nath (supra), and Aflatoon (supra) respectively, while

deciding whether the petition was barred by delay or laches, scrutinised

the issue from the vantage point of conduct and knowledge of the

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 27 of 49

petitioners and whether there would be any disturbance to settled matters.

However, in G.P. Doval (supra), it was explicitly recognised that

extenuating circumstances inherent to the petitioner’s status, such as

economic status, can also be one of the factors considered to validly

explain a delay in approaching the Court. In essence, this Court

acknowledged that the rigours of delay and laches cannot be mechanically

applied where the petitioners, by virtue of their status, face genuine

impediments in accessing justice.

35. In Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors vs Union of India & Ors ,

reported in (2015) 3 SCC 1, this Court dealt with a batch of writ petitions

under Article 32 challenging Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955. The

respondents raised a preliminary objection, contending that since Section

6A was enacted in 1985, a challenge mounted in 2012 was barred by delay

and laches. While examining this contention, this Court comprehensively

reviewed the jurisprudence on delay and laches in Article 32 petitions,

analysing landmark decisions including Tilokchand (supra),

Rabindranath Bose (supra), and R.S Deodhar (supra). Echoing our

observations above, it was noted that while the broad ratio in Tilokchand

(supra) is that an Article 32 petition can be dismissed for delay, no clear

majority view emerged on the exact parameters or standard for such

dismissal.

36. Crucially, this Court noted that the petitions were filed on behalf of a

whole class of people, raised contentions regarding a severe violation of

fundamental rights, particularly Articles 21 and 29 of the Constitution,

respectively, and also dealt with an issue that was still very much playing

out on the ground. Consequently, it was held that such a kind of petition

could not be dismissed at the threshold on the ground of delay/laches, as

doing so would mean that the Court would be guilty of ‘shrinking its

constitutional duty’. This Court went further, noting that significant

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 28 of 49

developments have occurred in the landscape of Indian constitutional

jurisprudence since this Court’s decision in Tilokchand (supra).

Consequently, according to the bench, the time had come for this Court to

say that, at least when it comes to violations of the fundamental right to

life and personal liberty, delay or laches, by itself, without more, would

not be sufficient to shut the doors of the court on any petitioner. Regarding

the constitutionality of Section 6-A, the court referred the matter to a

Constitution Bench for adjudication. The relevant observations made by

this Court are as follows:

“21. Article 32 of the Constitution which has been described as the

“heart and soul” of the Constitution guarantees the right to move the

Supreme Court for the enforcement of all or any of the fundamental

rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. This Article is,

therefore, itself a fundamental right and it is in this backdrop that we

need to address the preliminary submission.

xxx

27. In Express Publications (Madurai) Ltd. v. Union of India [(2004)

11 SCC 526 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 99] , the employer newspaper wished to

challenge paragraph 80 of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme,

1952, which came into force in 1956. The challenge was made in a writ

petition under Article 32, 45 years later in 2001. This was turned down

by a Bench of two Judges with a caveat, that if it was the case of the

petitioners that with the passage of time, a certain provision had become

unconstitutional, then obviously the very passage of time would not

amount to delay for which a writ petition would not be entertained.

28. Similarly in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. [(2009) 1 SCC

768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] , a Bench of two Judges held that there

is no upper and no lower limit when it comes to an Article 32 petition.

It all depends on the breach of the particular fundamental right, the

remedy claimed, and how the delay arose. On facts, the petition was

turned down as there was an unexplained delay of ten years.

29. In Bangalore City Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. State of

Karnataka, a two Judge Bench of this Court understood the ratio

of Tilokchand Motichand as follows:

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 29 of 49

“[...]

48. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is that even though

there is no period of limitation for filing petitions under

Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner

should approach the Court without loss of time and if there

is delay, then cogent explanation should be offered for the

same. However, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down or a

straitjacket formula can be adopted for deciding whether or

not this Court or the High Court should entertain a belated

petition filed under Article 32 or Article 226 of the

Constitution and each case must be decided on its own

facts.”

30. It will be seen that, in the present case, the petitioners in the various

writ petitions represent an entire People—the tribal and non-tribal

population of the State of Assam. In their petition, they have raised a

plea that the sovereignty and integrity of India is itself at stake as a

massive influx of illegal migrants from a neighbouring country has

affected this core Constitutional value. That, in fact, it has been held

in Sonowal case that such an influx is “external aggression” within

the meaning of Article 355 of the Constitution of India, and that the

Central Government has done precious little to stem this tide thereby

resulting in a violation of Article 355. As a result of this huge influx,

periodic clashes have been taking place between the citizens of India and

these migrants resulting into loss of life and property, sounding in a

violation of Articles 21 and 29 of the Constitution of the Assamese

people as a whole. Not only is there an assault on the life of the citizenry

of the State of Assam but there is an assault on their way of life as well.

The culture of an entire People is being eroded in such a way that they

will ultimately be swamped by persons who have no right to continue

to live in this country. The petitioners have also argued that this

Hon'ble Court in Sonowal case [has specifically held in para 79 thereof

that : (SCC p. 723)

“79. … Bangladeshi nationals who have illegally crossed the

border and have trespassed into Assam or are living in other

parts of the country have no legal right of any kind to remain

in India and they are liable to be deported.”

They have also raised a fervent plea that Article 14 also continues to be

violated as Section 6-A(3) to (5) are not time bound but are ongoing.

31. Given the contentions raised specifically with regard to pleas under

Articles 21 and 29, of a whole class of People, namely, the tribal and

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 30 of 49

non-tribal citizens of Assam and given the fact that agitations on this

score are ongoing, we do not feel that petitions of this kind can be

dismissed at the threshold on the ground of delay/laches. Indeed, if we

were to do so, we would be guilty of shirking our Constitutional duty

to protect the lives of our own citizens and their culture. In fact, the

time has come to have a relook at the doctrine of laches altogether when

it comes to violations of Articles 21 and 29.

32.Tilokchand Motichand is a judgment involving property rights of

individuals. Ramchandra Deodhar case , also of a Constitution Bench

of five judges has held that the fundamental right under Article 16

cannot be wished away solely on the ‘jejune’ ground of delay.

Since Tilokchand Motichand case was decided, there have been

important strides made in the law. Property Rights have been removed

from part III of the Constitution altogether by the Constitution 44th

Amendment Act. The same amendment made it clear that even during

an emergency, the fundamental right under Article 21 can never be

suspended, and amended Article 359(1) to give effect to this. In Maneka

Gandhi v. Union of India , decided nine years after Tilokchand

Motichand , Article 21 has been given its new dimension, and pursuant

to the new dimension a huge number of rights have come under the

umbrella of Article 21 [for an enumeration of these rights, see Kapila

Hingorani (1) v. State of Bihar, para 57]. Further, in Olga

Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn, it has now been conclusively held

that all fundamental rights cannot be waived (at para 29). Given these

important developments in the law, the time has come for this Court to

say that at least when it comes to violations of the fundamental right to

life and personal liberty, delay or laches by itself without more would

not be sufficient to shut the doors of the court on any petitioner. “

(Emphasis Supplied)

37. In Citizenship Act, 1955, Section 6-A, reported in (2024) 16 SCC 105, a

Constitution Bench of this Court, of which one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.) was

a member, addressed the constitutionality of Section 6A of the Citizenship

Act, 1955, on reference from the decision in Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha

(supra). Surya Kant, J (as he then was), in his leading opinion, dealt with

the issue of whether the writ petitions were maintainable in view of the

inordinate delay of 27 years. He noted that while the doctrine of laches and

the Limitation Act, 1963 served similar underlying purposes, the

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 31 of 49

difference lay in the fact that the doctrine of laches was not rigid in its

application, as its application was evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Consequently, since the principle was not an inviolable legal rule, it allows

the court to conduct individualised analyses and, in some circumstances,

entertain the claims even when they may be delayed, and third-party

interests or rights may have been created.

38. According to Surya Kant, J., the claims affecting the public at large or

claims challenging the vires of a statute vis-à-vis the Constitution are two

such circumstances in which the doctrine of delay and laches would not

be strictly applied. On the facts of the case, Surya Kant J held that both the

aforesaid mitigating factors are met and that the petitioners’ claims could

not be dismissed at the threshold on the ground of laches. J.B. Pardiwala,

J., in his separate opinion, concurred with the views expressed by Surya

Kant, J., on the issue of delay and laches. The relevant observations made

by Surya Kant, J., are as follows:

“66. Hence, it is settled law that the doctrine of laches is not an

inviolable legal rule but a rule of practice that must be supplemented

with sound exercise of judicial discretion. While courts must ordinarily

apply this doctrine in light of the policy reasons discussed before, the

doctrine allows the Court to conduct an individualised analysis of each

case and entertain claims in the competing interests of justice, even

when the claim may be delayed and third-party rights may have been

created.

67. We may, however, hasten to clarify that the doctrine of delay and

laches is not to be ipso facto excluded where a breach of fundamental

rights is alleged. The five-Judge Benches of this Court in Narayani Debi

Khaitan v. State of Bihar , Daryao v. State of U.P. and Tilokchand

Motichand , and a three-Judge Bench in Amrit Lal Berry v. CCE , have

reiterated that even in such like cases the court must see the effect of

laches. However, that being said, there may be instances where

considerations of justice demand that the court adjudicate on the merits

of a case rather than summarily dismissing it based solely on procedural

grounds such as delay.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 32 of 49

68. One such factual circumstance is when the claim affects the public

at large. In Kashinath G. Jalmi v. Speaker , this Court analysed several

precedents (including Tilokchand Motichand ) and differentiated them

by holding that the doctrine of laches cannot be used to expel a claim

that is made on behalf of the public. Judicial discretion, while applying

this doctrine, must always be governed by the objective of promoting

the larger public interest; and if a claim affects the public at large, the

Court should go into the merits of the case. Where it is found that denial

of consideration on merits is likely to affect society in general and can

have a cascading effect on millions of citizens, the Court will carve out

an exception and proceed to decide the lis on merits.

69. Another vital circumstance where the doctrine of delay and laches

would not be applicable strictly is in matters where the vires of a statute

are challenged vis-à-vis the Constitution. This Court has, in the due

course of time, accepted the idea of transformative constitutionalism,

which conceptualises the Constitution not as a still document cast in

stone at the day of its formation but as a living and dynamic body of

law, capable of constant updation and evolution as per changing

societal mores. Should this Court deny a constitutional challenge solely

based on delay, it would effectively establish an arbitrary cut-off beyond

which laws could no longer be re-examined in light of changing

circumstances. Such a rigid approach cannot be countenanced as

changing societal circumstances sometimes necessitate a

reconsideration of the status quo — even when the challenge is brought

after a considerable lapse of time.

70. To instantiate, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Navtej Singh

Johar v. Union of India , held Section 377 of the Penal Code, 1860 to be

ultra vires of the Constitution, regardless of the fact that the provision

was a part of the statute for over a century. The Court took note of the

norms of contemporary society and declared them to be

unconstitutional. If the doctrine of laches were to be applied strictly,

time would run in favour of a constitutionally invalid statute, which

cannot be allowed in the larger interests of justice and the

transformative nature of the Constitution.

71. Adverting to the facts of the case, it seems that the two mitigating

circumstances mentioned above are directly attracted.

72.First, the petitioners have raised various substantial questions that

affect the public at large, including the erosion of the culture of

indigenous communities, discrimination against the State of Assam,

and the larger perceived threat to the security of the country from

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 33 of 49

immigration. Therefore, instead of being an in personam dispute

between two individuals, the questions raised by the petitioners directly

or indirectly affect a large citizenry.

xxx

74.Second, since the controversy pertains to the constitutionality of a

statutory provision, the doctrine of laches ought not to be applied

strictly to bar the claim at the very threshold. As discussed in para 69,

such constitutional adjudication cannot be made subject to any

straitjacket rule of limitation. Challenges regarding the

constitutionality of a statute require the Court to take a liberal approach

and permit a certain amount of flexibility. A contrary approach would

set a wrong precedent and act as a bar against challenging

anachronistic laws that might no longer align with the ideals of

constitutionalism. This would constitute an unsound legal principle

since oppressive laws should not persist solely because they have been

tolerated by society for a certain period.

xxx

78. To conclude, while there has undoubtedly been a considerable delay

in filing the instant writ petitions, the doctrine of laches cannot be

applied strictly to disbar the claims at the threshold. This is so because

the present proceedings raise substantial questions that affect the public

at large and the constitutional validity of a statutory provision. If we

were to decide otherwise, we would be, in essence, creating an artificial

deadline for important constitutional issues. This would give rise to an

unfair principle of law in the realm of constitutional adjudication.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

(b) Principles Governing the Application of Delay and Laches to Article

32 Petitions

39. A cumulative reading of the aforementioned decisions makes it evident

that, in the context of petitions under Article 32, the doctrine of laches

operates as a flexible rule of practice rather than a rigid rule of law to be

mechanically applied. Its application is anchored in sound judicial

discretion, moulded by the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

This discretionary approach empowers the Court to perform a crucial

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 34 of 49

balancing exercise by weighing the equity in not allowing stale claims

against its paramount constitutional duty to enforce fundamental rights.

40. Furthermore, a conspectus of the above decisions demonstrates that

whenever this Court has been called upon to apply the doctrine of laches,

its inquiry has consistently been guided by three primary considerations:

first, whether there has been an inordinate delay in approaching the Court;

secondly, whether the petitioner has provided a cogent and satisfactory

explanation for such delay; and thirdly, whether entertaining the belated

claim would unsettle settled matters and prejudice third party rights by

reopening matters long concluded.

41. It is important to clarify and emphasise that, when applying the doctrine

of delay and laches, consideration should be given to the totality of the

circumstances affecting both parties, rather than the mere fact of delay. As

has been rightly held, the test is not as to the physical running of time.

1 To

apply the doctrine strictly based on the quantum of delay would

fundamentally alter its core character, transforming it from a flexible,

discretionary standard into a rigid rule. Such an approach would

effectively convert the equitable doctrine into a rule of statutory limitation,

a position contrary to the spirit of this Court’s decisions on this issue.

42. When evaluating the totality of circumstances for applying the doctrine of

delay and laches to an Article 32 petition, the pivotal considerations, as

delineated above, are twofold: (i) whether entertaining the claim would

unsettle concluded matters and prejudice third-party rights, and (ii)

whether the petitioner has offered a cogent explanation for the delay. At

this juncture, it is crucial to appreciate the interplay between these two

factors. Frequently, when a party approaches this Court after a

1 See ¶ 13, M/s Dehri Rotas Light Railway Company Limited v. District Board Bhojpur & Ors, (1992)

2 SCC 598.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 35 of 49

considerable hiatus, adjudicating the claim and granting the relief sought

will inevitably unsettle, to some extent, existing arrangements and

potentially impact third-party rights.

43. If a rigidly conservative approach were adopted, the mere prospect of such

disruption or unsettling of third-party rights would invariably lead to the

dismissal of the petition at the threshold. Further, where the delay has been

satisfactorily explained, demonstrating an absence of blameworthy

conduct or negligence on the part of the petitioner, barring them from

pursuing their fundamental rights at the threshold stage on the basis that

it will affect third parties would be manifestly unjust, especially in the

context of proceedings under Article 32.

44. It is a well-settled proposition that the jurisdiction of this Court under

Article 32 is expansive and is not confined to the issuance of traditional

prerogative writs, but explicitly encompasses the power to issue any

directions, orders, or writs appropriate for the enforcement of fundamental

rights.

2 This Court has repeatedly affirmed its constitutional mandate to

develop new tools and devise innovative remedies to facilitate the

enforcement of fundamental rights.

3 Consequently, the mere possibility of

the potential disruption that such relief might cause cannot serve as the

sole bedrock for dismissing a petition at the threshold on the ground of

laches. Where a petitioner furnishes a cogent explanation for the delay, the

court is bound to examine the matter. If the court subsequently determines

that the specific relief claimed is unfeasible or would unduly prejudice

third-party rights, it would exercise its plenary powers to mould the relief

2

See ¶ 14, Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, 1950 SCC OnLine SC 16.

3

See ¶ 20, Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa & Ors, (1993) 2 SCC 746 & ¶ 13, Bandhua Mukti Morcha

v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 36 of 49

in such a manner that disruption is minimised whilst still ensuring that the

fundamental rights of the petitioner are enforced.

45. Flowing from the aforesaid discussion, it is evident that the adequacy of

the explanation for the delay constitutes the paramount consideration

when determining whether an Article 32 petition ought to be dismissed on

the ground of laches. Stated differently, the operative test is not one of

‘unreasonable delay’ but of ‘unexplained delay’. This principle is fortified

by the fact that, even in instances where this Court has declined relief to

prevent the disruption of crystallised third-party rights, such as in

Aflatoon (supra) and others

4, the foundational premise for dismissal was a

petitioner’s failure to furnish a cogent and satisfactory explanation for the

delay.

46. This emphasis on the unexplained delay assumes a heightened significance

in writ proceedings where the State is the respondent. Situations frequently

arise, like in G.P. Doval (supra), where the delay in invoking Article 32 is

at least in part attributable to the State’s own conduct, such as prolonged

administrative indecision or inertia. In such scenarios, the State cannot be

permitted to benefit from its own lethargy by weaponising the doctrine of

laches against a petitioner, particularly when it itself has delayed taking a

conclusive decision until matters had already attained artificial finality.

5

47. The evolution of this Court’s application and reliance on the doctrine of

laches suggests that the apprehensions articulated by Hegde, J., in his

dissenting opinion in Tilokchand (supra) are, to a large extent, allayed. The

Court has consistently held that the doctrine of laches should not be

applied rigidly and that delay and laches cannot be valid defences in cases

4

See ¶ 30, R.S. Makashi v. I.M. Menon, (1982) 1 SCC 379 & ¶ 23-25, S.S. Moghe v. Union of India,

(1981) 3 SCC 271.

5

See ¶ 17, Sukh Dutt Ratra & Anr v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors, (2022) 7 SCC 508.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 37 of 49

where circumstances exist which shock the judicial conscience of the Court

or where the demand for justice is so compelling that a constitutional court

ought to exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promoting justice.

6 Where

the circumstances demanded, this Court has proceeded on the notion that

there is no “limitation” to doing justice and that the need for finality must

be balanced with the need to rectify injustice.

7 Further, as observed in the

decision in G.P. Doval (supra), this Court is not tethered to a purely

technical approach to delay. It recognises that a petitioner’s inability to

approach the court on time may be caused by genuine systemic and

practical hardships, rather than mere negligence.

48. The exposition by this Court in Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha (supra) and

Section 6A - In Re (supra) further adds a new dimension to the issue of

delay and laches in Article 32 petitions. By invoking the aspect of ‘public

interest’, the Court has ensured that important public issues are not held

to be beyond the purview of this court’s jurisdiction solely on the basis of

the fact that there was a delay in bringing the same before the court.

Further, by invoking the idea of transformative constitutionalism, the

Court has upheld the view that the Constitution is a social document,

whose principles and ideals ought to be appreciated and applied

dynamically, in line with the changing tides of society. Consequently,

delay and laches may not be relevant factors where it is shown that an issue

needs to be constitutionally reevaluated owing to the change in

circumstances that has ensued.

49. Another crucial facet of transformative constitutionalism, as heralded by

this Court in Navtej Singh Johar & Ors v. Union of India, reported in (2018)

10 SCC 1, and Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors v. State of Kerala

6

See ¶ 12.12 & 12.13, Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 569

7

See ¶ 18, Sukh Dutt Ratra & Anr v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors, (2022) 7 SCC 508 & ¶ 51,

Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi & Ors, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3725.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 38 of 49

& Ors, reported in (2019) 11 SCC 1, is the Constitution’s profound potential

to address and correct historical wrongs. Historical injustices are often

deeply entrenched in societal structures and arrangements, rendering

them self-perpetuating across generations. Correcting such historical

injustices forms the fulcrum of the Constitution, specifically Part III, which

deals with fundamental rights. The emancipatory power of the

Constitution lies precisely in its capacity to break these cycles. It requires

constitutional provisions to be interpreted and applied in a manner that

actively seeks to rectify these entrenched systemic inequities.

50. In this context, a rigid or mechanical application of the doctrine of delay

and laches could inadvertently serve to perpetuate historical wrongs,

effectively denying access to justice and shielding systemic inequities

behind procedural barriers. However, as our preceding analysis

demonstrates, this Court’s jurisprudence is sufficiently robust to prevent

such an outcome. The flexible, context-specific approach to laches ensures

that the historical realities and practical impediments faced by litigants are

duly accounted for. Consequently, any attempt to invoke delay as a

procedural shield to insulate historical injustices from judicial scrutiny

would likely fail.

51. When this Court is confronted with claims that are inextricably linked to

notions of historical wrong or systemic injustice, the judicial scales must

largely tilt in favour of granting access to the court. The ultimate

adjudication on the merits may or may not find the substantive law to be

in favour of a petitioner. However, the very act of allowing these claims to

be heard and deliberated upon is an essential aspect of constitutional

recognition. It ensures that the procedural threshold of laches does not

become an insurmountable wall.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 39 of 49

52. Such ideals of constitutionalism are further enabled by Article 32, which

imposes a duty and a privilege on this Court to enforce fundamental rights

enshrined in the Constitution. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the

following observation made by this Court in Daryao & Ors v. State of U.P.

& Ors., reported in 1961 SCC OnLine SC 21:

“8. There can be no doubt that the fundamental right guaranteed by

Article 32(1) is a very important safeguard for the protection of the

fundamental rights of the citizens, and as a result of the said guarantee

this Court has been entrusted with the solemn task of upholding the

fundamental rights of the citizens of this country. The fundamental

rights are intended not only to protect individual's rights but they are

based on high public policy. Liberty of the individual and the protection

of his fundamental rights are the very essence of the democratic way of

life adopted by the Constitution, and it is the privilege and the duty of

this Court to uphold those rights. This Court would naturally refuse to

circumscribe them or to curtail them except as provided by the

Constitution itself. It is because of this aspect of the matter that

in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras in the very first year after the

Constitution came into force, this Court rejected a preliminary

objection raised against the competence of a petition filed under Article

32 on the ground that as a matter of orderly procedure the petitioner

should first have resorted to the High Court under Article 226, and

observed that “this Court is thus constituted the protector and

guarantor of the fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with

the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications

seeking protection against infringements of such rights”. [...]”

(Emphasis Supplied)

53. On similar lines, this Court in Prem Chand Garg & Anr v. The Excise

Commissioner, U.P & Ors, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine SC 37, observed

as follows:

“2. [...]The fundamental right to move this Court can, therefore, be

appropriately described as the corner-stone of the democratic edifice

raised by the Constitution. That is why it is natural that this Court

should, in the words of Patanjali Sastri J., regard itself “as the protector

and guarantor of fundamental rights,” and should declare that “it

cannot, consistently with the responsibility laid upon it, refuse to

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 40 of 49

entertain applications seeking protection against infringements of such

rights.” In discharging the duties assigned to it, this Court has to play

the role “of a sentinel on the qui vive” and it must always regard it as

its solemn duty to protect the said fundamental rights' zealously and

vigilantly. [...]”

(Emphasis Supplied)

54. The overarching discourse on the doctrine of delay and laches becomes

crystal clear when situated within the broader context of this Court’s

constitutional duty and privilege under Article 32, as clearly enunciated in

Daryao (supra) and Prem Chand (supra). This Court has consciously

evolved the equitable doctrine of laches to ensure that it in no manner

circumscribes or dilutes the solemn constitutional responsibility vested in

it. A strict, mechanical application of delay would invariably lead to the

dismissal of petitions at the very threshold, precluding any substantive

adjudication of the fundamental rights claims advanced. Such an approach

would be fundamentally antithetical to this Court’s role as the protector

and guarantor of fundamental rights and would effectively shrink the

profound duty and privilege entrusted to this Court.

(c) Application to the facts of this matter

55. Adverting to the factual matrix of the present case, a prima facie assessment

might suggest that the present writ petition is barred by the doctrine of

laches. Undeniably, there has been an inordinate delay of nearly six

decades, given that the impugned notification was issued in the year 1955

and the present petition was instituted only in the year 2014. Furthermore,

adjudicating the claims raised herein would inevitably necessitate

reopening historical legal settlements that have long attained finality.

However, as delineated in the preceding analysis, the mere quantum of

delay or the prospect of disruption cannot be considered as sufficient

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 41 of 49

reasons in themselves to bar a petition under Article 32. What is important

is to gauge if the petitioner has a cogent explanation for the delay.

56. It stands to reason that an inordinate delay spanning six decades is rarely

attributable to a solitary cause. The present factual matrix is no exception.

To explain its prolonged absence from this Court, the petitioner has placed

reliance on a confluence of mitigating circumstances.

57. One mitigating factor is the region’s unique and tumultuous historical

trajectory. In the decades immediately following Independence, the

administrative and constitutional status of the area was in a state of

continuous evolution. Originally administered as the Lushai Hills district

within the State of Assam, the region was subsequently reorganised into

the Union Territory of Mizoram under the North -Eastern Areas

(Reorganisation) Act, 1971, before finally attaining full statehood in 1987.

This period was simultaneously marked by significant political upheaval

spanning nearly two decades in the form of an insurgency. Viewed

cumulatively, these background conditions would have presented

formidable practical hurdles. In such a climate of acute political unrest and

chaos, claims for compensation and historical land rights are inevitably

relegated to the periphery, making it exceptionally difficult for Mizo Chiefs

to secure meaningful engagement with their grievances, especially within

political circles.

58. Another mitigating circumstance is the Mizo Chiefs’ continuous agitation

of their claims before various forums. The material on record evidences a

pursuit of their grievances, thereby dispelling the notion that the chiefs

were indolent or slumbering over their rights. We are, however, mindful

that the mere filing of successive representations to the authorities,

particularly after previous representations have been rejected or a

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 42 of 49

reasonable period has elapsed, does not furnish a valid explanation to

surmount the bar of laches.

8

59. In the present factual matrix, while it might be contended that the chiefs

persisted with administrative representations for a prolonged duration, a

crucial factor warrants specific attention. On multiple occasions,

respondent no. 2 (the State of Mizoram) conducted itself in a manner that

engendered a legitimate expectation amongst the chiefs that an amicable

resolution was imminent, thereby obviating the immediate need for

adversarial litigation. Evidence of such conduct is reflected in the official

assurances tendered by the State before the Gauhati High Court, at a time

when the chiefs were actively agitating for their rights. To substantiate, it

would do well to look at the circumstances in which the writ appeals being

pursued by the chiefs in the Gauhati High Court came to be disposed of:

a. In Writ Appeal No. 69 of 1998, the Counsel for the State of Mizoram

submitted that the government is considering the claim for

compensation and that a suitable order would be passed shortly,

in consultation with the Union of India. In lieu of this statement,

the counsel for the chiefs did not press the issue further.

Consequently, the High Court disposed of the matter with the

observation and direction that the government of Mizoram would

consider the claim of the village chief, in consultation with the

Union of India, expeditiously and preferably within three months.

If the chiefs were not satisfied with the order, they were entitled to

seek redressal of their grievances before an appropriate forum

b. Thereafter, in Writ Appeal No. 598 of 2005, once again, the Counsel

for the State of Mizoram stated that the claim as espoused by the

8

See ¶ 5-7, State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray & Ors, (1977) 3 SCC 396 & ¶ 6-10 &

Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 43 of 49

chiefs would be adjudicated afresh by the State in accordance with

law. Consequently, the High Court closed the writ appeal with the

direction to the government of Mizoram to consider the claim of

the chiefs afresh. In the event the chiefs felt aggrieved by the

decision taken by the government of Mizoram, it was left open for

them to pursue such remedy as may be available under law.

60. Further fortifying this expectation is the fact that the Chief Minister of

Mizoram, on at least two distinct occasions, addressed formal

communications to the Prime Minister of India, espousing the chiefs’

claims for compensation. It is necessary to clarify that this Court does not

construe such intergovernmental correspondence as constituting

promissory estoppel against the State, being acutely aware that political

communications often carry dimensions beyond the purview of judicial

consideration. Nevertheless, these communications are pertinent to the

extent that they signalled a sympathetic stance towards the chiefs’

grievances. Such conduct could reasonably have led the chiefs to hope that

a resolution was forthcoming, thereby dissuading them from initiating

litigation.

9

61. Weighing the totality of these circumstances, this Court is conscious of the

fact that the delay herein is undeniably inordinate, and the explanation

offered by the petitioner is, strictly speaking, not unequivocally

convincing. Nevertheless, we are not inclined to dismiss this petition at the

threshold solely on the ground of delay. It is evident from the record that

the State of Mizoram (respondent no.2) has held out hope for an amicable

settlement and never outrightly rejected the grievances of the chiefs. It is

this unique combination, the continuous representations made by the

chiefs coupled with the State’s supportive stance, that understandably

9 See ¶ 21, P.C. Sethi v. Union of India, (1975) 4 SCC 67 & ¶ 16, Purshottam Lal v. Union of India,

(1973) 1 SCC 651.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 44 of 49

pushed the chiefs to seek an administrative resolution rather than

immediately pursuing legal remedies. Equally significant is that, on two

prior occasions when the chiefs approached the High Court, the matter was

not adjudicated on the merits. Instead, owing to the ongoing dialogue

between the parties, the High Court left the avenue open for the chiefs to

pursue appropriate legal remedies in the future. To shut the doors on them

at this third instance, without ever examining the substance of their claims,

would be highly unjust.

(II) WHETHER ANY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE MIZO CHIEFS WERE

VIOLATED?

62. It is well settled that, for relief to be granted in a writ petition under Article

32, a case must be made out establishing the existence of a fundamental

right and its breach, actual or threatened.

63. Right to property was earlier enshrined in Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the

Constitution. It may be noted that both these provisions were repealed by

the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. However, the 44

th

Amendment is prospective in its operation, and all laws passed and

executive action taken prior to 20

th June 1979 will continue to be judged by

and be subject to the provisions of Part III, including Articles 19(1)(f) and

31.

64. Article 19(1)(f) guaranteed to the Indian citizens a right to acquire, hold,

and dispose of property. Article 19(5), however, permitted the State to

impose by law reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of the

general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.

Article 31(1) laid down that no person could be deprived of his property

without the authority of law. Article 31(2), on the other hand, underwent

significant change and was the focal point of multiple constitutional

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 45 of 49

amendments. Article 31(2) as it stood when it was originally enacted and

Article 31(2) as it stood before its abrogation in 1978, are reproduced below:

“Article 31(2) at the time of enactment of the Indian Constitution

No property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in

any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall

be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law

authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the

law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or

acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies

the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is

to be determined and given.

Article 31(2) as it stood before its abrogation in 1978

No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a

public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for

acquisition or requisitioning of the property for an amount which may

be fixed by such law or which may be determined in accordance with

such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such

law, and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the

ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate or that

the whole or any part of such amount is to be given otherwise than in

cash.”

65. In the present case, the central dispute concerns the alleged violation of the

Mizo Chiefs’ right to property, as guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(f) and

31 of the Constitution, respectively. The petitioner claims this right was

breached either because the Mizo Chiefs were deprived of their lands

without lawful authority, or because the compensation paid to them was

wholly ‘illusory’. Given that the impugned actions of the respondents

occurred at a time when the right to property was a fundamental right

under Part III, and considering that the Constitution (Forty-fourth

Amendment) Act, 1978, operates only prospectively, the right to property

was firmly in existence at the relevant time. Consequently, the existence of

a fundamental right, as is required for invoking and claiming relief under

Article 32, stands satisfied.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 46 of 49

66. It is established that who bears the burden of proof in cases where

fundamental rights violations are alleged depends on the fundamental

right alleged to have been violated. The same burden of proof rule will not

apply to all fundamental rights violation challenges.

10 However, in cases

such as the present one, the initial burden is on the petitioner to satisfy the

Court and make out a case for an invasion of their fundamental right(s).

11

67. To discharge this initial burden and successfully establish a violation of

their fundamental right to property, the petitioner must necessarily

succeed on two distinct fronts. First and foremost, it must prove a clear title

of the Mizo Chiefs over the subject lands, which, in the context of its

sweeping claim, effectively encompasses the entire territorial expanse of

the present-day State of Mizoram.

12 To establish such a title, the petitioner

must conclusively demonstrate that, under the chieftainship system, as it

operated during the British regime, the Mizo Chiefs held complete

ownership of the land, rather than merely functioning as local

administrative heads. Secondly, and only upon proving the ownership as

aforesaid, the petitioner must satisfy the other parameters under Article 31.

This includes, amongst other things, proving that the respondents

deprived the chiefs of their property without lawful authority, or that the

property was acquired without providing due compensation.

68. In an effort to discharge the burden of establishing title to the land, the

petitioners have primarily relied on accounts and writings of scholars and

officials of the British government. Upon a meticulous perusal of the said

material, it is, at the very outset, highly ambiguous whether these texts

unequivocally recognise the Mizo Chiefs as the absolute owners of the

land. Furthermore, even assuming that such an interpretation could be

10 See ¶ 15-29, Deena & Ors v. Union of India, (1983) 4 SCC 645.

11 See ¶ 5, A. Hamsaveni & Ors v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr, (1994) 6 SCC 51.

12 See ¶ 4, Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 379.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 47 of 49

culled from these writings, the petitioners have advanced no compelling

justification as to why such writings and accounts should be elevated to

the status of conclusive evidentiary proof. It is legally untenable for this

Court to rest a decision of such magnitude on the fragile foundation of such

flimsy submissions and woefully inadequate proof.

69. The material adduced by the respondent, at least on a prima facie

examination, indicates that during the British administration of the Lushai

Hills district, the title over the land never vested in the Chiefs.

Furthermore, the record before us is bereft of any comprehensive

compilation or analysis of the boundary papers issued to the Chiefs, nor is

it established that these documents were uniform in their conferment of

rights and duties. However, an examination of the boundary paper

available on record entirely belies the petitioner’s claim, as nothing therein

even remotely suggests the conferment or recognition of absolute

ownership of land. Consequently, we are constrained to hold that the

petitioners have woefully failed to discharge their burden of proving title

over the subject lands.

70. We are cognisant that, unlike in modern times, establishing land title from

the pre-independence era, especially within a traditional chieftainship

system, rarely involves a neat or conclusive paper trail. However, given

the sheer magnitude of the petitioner’s claims, it is only reasonable to

expect a much deeper historical investigation on its part. To substantiate

such an extravagant demand, the petitioner ought to have relied on

alternative sources of evidence, such as government documents, official

notifications, and administrative orders, to build a coherent understanding

of their alleged title. Both sides have failed to present a continuous,

documented chain of events that would clearly map out the status of the

land at different periods.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 48 of 49

71. Furthermore, the constitutional jurisprudence governing the right to

property, particularly under the erstwhile Article 31, is deeply intricate and

has been the subject of extensive judicial exposition. Consequently, apart

from establishing ownership, there are other aspects to the right to

property that the petitioner had to prove thoroughly. For instance, while

the petitioner baldly asserts that the statutory compensation disbursed to

the Mizo Chiefs was ‘illusory’, they have entirely failed to traverse the

plethora of legal precedents rendered by this Court that delineate the

parameters for determining when compensation becomes legally illusory.

Moreover, the pleadings are silent on how this specific claim interacts with

the broader constitutional framework of property rights under Part III, or

on how it reconciles with other legislation in force in the then State of

Assam. In essence, the petitioner has approached a profoundly complex

legal issue in a simplistic and superficial manner.

72. The petitioner has further advanced a plea of discrimination, contending

that the Mizo Chiefs stood on an equal historical footing with the rulers of

the erstwhile Princely States. They argue that the State’s failure to grant

them comparable compensation or privy purses is manifestly arbitrary and

violative of their fundamental rights. However, this assertion, much like

its above claims, is entirely devoid of any legal basis and thereby merits

outright rejection. The privy purses and other privileges granted to the

erstwhile rulers of the Princely States were the direct outcome of specific,

pre-constitutional political and contractual arrangements negotiated

between those rulers and the Government. Consequently, it would be

legally flawed to equate and elevate these entitlements to the status of a

right, which all erstwhile rulers were constitutionally bestowed upon. Such

political arrangements cannot be claimed as a matter of a legally

enforceable right, much less a fundamental right.

Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2014 Page 49 of 49

73. The petitioner has also contended that the State of Assam (the parent State

in 1954) lacked legislative jurisdiction to enact the Act, 1954. However, as

the petitioner has not discharged its burden of establishing any violation

of the fundamental rights of the chiefs, we do not deem it necessary to

address the vires of the Act, 1954 or the legality of the impugned

notification in this present writ petition.

74. Therefore, having considered the matter from all vantage points, the

inescapable conclusion is that the petitioner has not been able to establish

any violation of the fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs in the present

matter. Consequently, the petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs

sought herein.

75. For all the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

76. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand dismissed.

….………………………….…. J.

(J.B. PARDIWALA)

….………………………….…. J.

(R. MAHADEVAN)

New Delhi.

March 13, 2026.