IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

Moksh Lata . . . . Appellant

Vs.

Manohar Lal Sood thr LRs and Another . . . . Respondents

****

Reserved on: 04.12.2025

Pronounced on: 12.12.2025

Pronounced fully/opera6ve part: Fully

****

CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Argued by:- Mr. K.S. Dadwal, Advocate and

Ms. Neha Jain, Advocate for

the appellant.

Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, Senior Advocate with

Mr. Vishal Pundir, Advocate for

respondent No.1.

****

DEEPAK GUPTA, J.

The present second appeal arises from a long-standing dispute

within a family partnership. The appellant before this Court, Smt. Moksh Lata,

was defendant No.1 in the suit ins+tuted by her brother-in-law - the plain+ff,

namely, late Shri Manohar Lal Sood. The li+ga+on revolves around the dissolu-

+on of the partnership firm M/s Shankar Dass & Sons, and the consequen+al

rights of the partners over the proper+es and accounts of that firm.

2. Photocopy of the Trial Court report has been received and per-

used with the able assistance provided by counsel from both the sides. In order

to avoid confusion, par+es shall be referred as per their status before the Trial

Court.

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

3.1 M/s ShankrDsk&o According to the plain+ff, the firm, which dealt in

van and baggage material, operated from two premises in Hoshiarpur. A formal

partnership deed had been executed on 01.04.2002, cons+tu+ng the plain+ff,

defendant No.1 (the present appellant), and defendant No.2 Sunita Devi as

equal partners. The firm owned considerable immovable property, including

land measuring 6 kanal 14 marla, comprising shops, sheds and courtyards. The

plain+ff asserted that due to advancing age, he had entrusted day-to-day man-

agement with the appellant, even providing her with some blank signed

cheques for business use. However, rela+ons soured in August 2008. The

plain+ff alleged that the appellant, along with her son, misused the blank

cheques, fabricated transac+ons, caused their dishonour, and then ins+tuted

false complaints under Sec+on 138 of the Nego+able Instruments Act. He fur-

ther alleged that they a8empted to manipulate the firm structure, including ob-

taining VAT registra+on for a fic++ous concern using the firm’s premises.

3.2 Feeling compelled to terminate the business rela+onship, the

plain+ff served a no+ce on 22.08.2008, in+ma+ng that he would not con+nue

the partnership beyond 30.09.2008, and demanding se8lement of his share.

The appellant, however, did not render accounts despite controlling the finan-

cial records.

3.3 With these broad averments, plain+ff filed the suit for claiming the

following reliefs:

(i) Declara+on to the effect that firm M/s Shankar Dass Sood and

Sons, Pahari Gate as well as Bhairvani Road, Hoshiarpur stands dissolved.

(ii) Mandatory injunc+on by direc+ng defendant No.1-appellant to

se8le the accounts w.e.f. 01.04.2009.

(iii) Permanent injunc+on to restrain defendant Moksh Lata and Sunita

Devi from changing their nature of the property owned by the firm.

(iv) Separa+on of the share of the plain+ff in the firm.

Page 2 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

4. Stand of Defendant N: 1 : The appellant (defendant N: 1) con-

tested the suit, contending that the firm was actually part of an older joint fam-

ily business that had been opera+ng for decades, and that several other unre-

gistered firms existed within the family structure. She asserted that the 2002

partnership deed was only a paper arrangement, and that aCer her husband’s

death, it was the plain+ff, who monopolised the business and financial affairs.

She objected that the suit was not maintainable because the firm was unre-

gistered under Sec+on 69 of the Partnership Act; that the suit suffered from

non-joinder of necessary par+es, and that the partnership deed contained an

arbitra+on clause that barred the civil court’s jurisdic+on.

5. Stand of Defendant N: 1 : Defendant No.2, however, supported

the plain+ff’s claim and confirmed that the appellant (defendant N: 1) had mis-

used the firm’s documents and obstructed se8lement of accounts.

6. Findings of the Court’s below: Upon evalua+ng the pleadings and

evidence, the Trial Court concluded that although the plain+ff’s no+ce did not

by itself operate as a dissolu+on no+ce, but the filing of the suit clearly demon-

strated the plain+ff’s inten+on to dissolve the partnership. Since the partner-

ship was one “at will”, the Court held that the firm stood dissolved from the

date the defendants received no+ce of the suit. The Court also held that the suit

was maintainable despite the firm being unregistered, because Sec+on 69(3)(a)

of the Partnership Act expressly exempts suits for dissolu+on and rendi+on of

accounts from the bar applicable to unregistered firms. The arbitra+on clause

was also found to be no impediment, as the deed itself was unregistered and an

earlier a8empt at arbitra+on had already failed. Consequently, the Trial Court

decreed the suit, declaring dissolu+on, direc+ng rendi+on of accounts, restrain-

ing aliena+on of firm property, and recognising the plain+ff’s one-third share. A

preliminary decree was drawn accordingly.

7. The appellant carried the ma8er in appeal, but the First Appellate

Court found no infirmity in the Trial Court’s reasoning and affirmed the decree

in toto.

Page 3 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

8. “gg&//sStnkrDpSt&ShpSko Assailing the aforesaid concurrent find-

ings of the Courts below, learned advocate for the appellant-defendant No.1 has

raised the following points:

MThat suit was not maintainable as the firm M/s Shankar Dass Sood and

sons was not joined as a party.

MThat said firm is an unregistered firm and therefore, suit was not main-

tainable.

MThere is an arbitra+on clause in the partnership deed (Ex.P4) and without

resor+ng to the arbitra+on, the suit was not maintainable.

MSuit was for declara+on and therefore, by filing the civil suit for declara-

+on, it does not amount to dissolu+on of the firm as has been held by the

trial Court.

MDeed dated 22.08.2008 (Ex.P4) only expressed willingness of the plain+ff

to re+re and this was not a no+ce to dissolve the firm and lastly, the origi-

nal partnership deed was not produced and rather only photocopy was

produced and therefore, without applying for secondary evidence, (Ex.P2)

was not admissible in evidence.

9. “gg/ cshpSrlp3r“ee hpSs/r b e&Sc&o During the pendency of the

appeal, the appellant moved CM No.545-C of 2025 under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC

seeking to place on record three documents marked Annexures A-1 to A-3. The

appellant claimed that while an applica+on for passing of the final decree was

pending before the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hoshiarpur, she purportedly

discovered an agreement dated 20.09.2020 said to have been executed

between the par+es (Annexure A-1). She further stated that in those final

decree proceedings, she filed a wri8en statement (Annexure A-2) and also

submi8ed an applica+on under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC seeking disposal of the

ma8er in terms of the alleged agreement. The respondent’s reply to that

applica+on was filed as Annexure A-3. According to the appellant, these

documents are essen+al for effec+ve adjudica+on, as they allegedly bear upon

Page 4 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

the resolu+on of the family property dispute, and therefore ought to be taken

on record.

10. aFkNtUADUA0FUokkNTs EDHUP In response to the appellant’s applica-

+on under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, the legal representa+ves of respondent No.1

(the original plain+ff) filed a detailed reply. They pointed out that Shri Manohar

Lal Sood had passed away on 04.05.2022, and that during his life+me, no such

agreement dated 20.09.2020 was ever executed or even men+oned before any

Court. According to the respondents, the appellant has concocted a false nar-

ra+ve by placing reliance on a fabricated document containing forged signa-

tures of the deceased plain+ff. They emphasized that the alleged agreement

never came into existence during the life+me of Manohar Lal Sood and was

never produced either before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court. It was

only in 2024, during the proceedings for prepara+on of the final decree, that

the appellant for the first +me a8empted to introduce this document. On these

premises, the respondents prayed for outright rejec+on of the applica+on, as-

ser+ng that it lacked any founda+on and was nothing more than an a8empt to

mislead the Court.

11. RDHAFHEDHOUDYUaFOkDHBFHAOUP During arguments, learned senior

counsel for the respondent reinforced these objec+ons. He submi8ed that

before an appellate court can permit addi+onal evidence under Order XLI Rule

27 CPC, it must first examine whether the pleadings contain the factual basis

necessary to support such evidence. In the absence of such founda+onal

pleadings, any addi+onal evidence becomes legally irrelevant. He pointed out

that the suit was decreed on 21.03.2016, and the first appeal was dismissed on

26.11.2021, all during the life+me of Manohar Lal Sood. Despite having full

opportunity, the appellant never disclosed the existence of any such agreement.

Even the present second appeal was filed when the original plain+ff was alive,

yet the document was not relied upon. Its sudden appearance in 2024, two

years aCer the plain+ff’s death, speaks for itself. Thus, counsel argued, the

applica+on is devoid of any bona fides and must be dismissed.

Page 5 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

12.1 Turning to the merits, learned senior counsel submi8ed that the

suit for dissolu+on was fully maintainable even though the firm was

unregistered. He relied upon Sec+on 69(3)(a) of the Partnership Act, which

expressly carves out an excep+on permiOng the enforcement of rights rela+ng

to dissolu+on, rendi+on of accounts, or realiza+on of property of a dissolved

firm irrespec+ve of registra+on.

12.2 He also argued that the suit was maintainable even though the firm

was not impleaded as a party, and that the filing of the suit itself cons+tutes

sufficient no+ce of dissolu+on, an approach recognized by judicial precedents.

12.3 Ld. Counsel referred extensively to Ex.P4, the no+ce dated

22.08.2008, sta+ng that the plain+ff had unequivocally expressed his

unwillingness to con+nue the partnership with effect from 30.09.2008, and had

demanded se8lement of all accounts within 15 days. When read with Clause 8

of the partnership deed (Ex.P2) and Sec+on 43 of the Partnership Act, the no+ce

clearly reflected an inten+on to dissolve the firm. Even assuming otherwise,

counsel submi8ed that service of summons in the suit itself brings about

dissolu+on in terms of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Banarsi

Das v. Kanshi Ram.

12.4 He further argued that the appellant never disputed the execu+on

of the partnership deed (Ex.P2) before the Courts below and cannot now be

permi8ed to raise objec+ons regarding its admissibility at this belated stage.

12.5 As regards the arbitra+on clause, Ld. counsel stressed that although

the deed contained such a clause, the partnership deed itself was unregistered

and the arbitra+on a8empt had already failed. Having fully par+cipated in the

proceedings before the Trial Court, the appellant was now estopped from

raising objec+ons based on the arbitra+on clause.

12.6 In view of the above submissions, learned senior counsel urged

that there was no ground whatsoever to interfere with the concurrent findings

of the courts below, and so, the appeal deserved dismissal.

Page 6 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

13. This Court has considered submissions of both the sides and have

appraised the en+re record carefully.

14. Admissibility of Ex.P2 : On careful examina+on of the record, it is

noted that the appellant had never objected to the admissibility of Ex. P2 during

trial or before the First Appellate Court. In fact, the execu+on of the partnership

deed dated 01.04.2002 was never disputed. In para-No.2 of the plaint, plain+ff

specifically pleaded that partnership deed was executed with the plain+ff & de-

fendants on 01.04.2002. In corresponding para-No.2 of the wri8en statement,

though defendant No.1 pleaded that it was a paper transac+on but did not spe-

cifically deny the execu+on of the said partnership deed (Ex.P2). Not only this,

when during his tes+mony, plain+ff produced (Ex.P2) - partnership deed, no ob-

jec+on was raised regarding its admissibility. Even before the first Appellate

Court, no such objec+on was raised.

15. Therefore, the appellant-defendant No.1 cannot be allowed to

raise the issue of admissibility of Ex.P-2 before this court for the first +me and

so, the conten+on of learned counsel for the appellant in this regard is rejected.

16. jkk2&r3&/shSurtpr) kkp/2hpSrplrx 3”ro Turning to the nature of the

no+ce dated 22.08.2008, Clause 8 of the partnership deed dated 01.04.2022

(Ex.P2) is as under:

“That the partnership is at will. Any partner desirous of swearing his interest

from the firm can do so by giving a reasonable +mely no+ce in wri+ng to the

other partners………………”

17. Since the partnership in ques+on ’M/s Shankarlal Sood and Sons’

is a partnership at will, as per the aforesaid clause, the ques+on is that as to

whether by serving no+ce dated 22.08.2008 (Ex.P4), plain+ff made his inten+on

clear so as to dissolve the firm. As per the conten+on of learned counsel for the

appellant-defendant No.1, no+ce (Ex.P4) only reflected the willingness of the

plain+ff to re+re from the firm and that it did not amount to dissolving the firm

and therefore, even if the plain+ff had re+red, the rest of the partners could

Page 7 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

con+nue with the firm. Learned counsel refers to sec+on 32 of the Partnership

Act in this regard.

18. On the other hand, conten+on of learned senior advocate for the

respondent is that the language of the no+ce (Ex.P4) is quite vivid that plain+ff

wanted to dissolve the firm and as such, sec+on 43 of the partnership act is ap-

plicable.

19. Sec+on 32 and 43 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 are as un-

der:

“32. Re6rement of a partner.—(1) A partner may re+re—

(a) with the consent of all the other partners,

(b) in accordance with an express agreement by the partners, or

(c) where the partnership is at will, by giving no+ce in wri+ng to all the other

partners of his inten+on to re+re.

(2) A re+ring partner may be discharged from any liability to any third party for

acts of the firm done before his re+rement by an agreement made by him with

such third party and the partners of the recons+tuted firm, and such agree-

ment may be implied by a course of dealing between such third party and the

recons+tuted firm aCer he had knowledge of the re+rement.

(3) Notwithstanding the re+rement of a partner from a firm, he and the part-

ners con+nue to be liable as partners to third par+es for any act done by any of

them which would have been an act of the firm if done before the re+rement,

un+l public no+ce is given of the re+rement:

Provided that a re+red partner is not liable to any third party who deals

with the firm without knowing that he was a partner.

(4) No+ces under sub-sec+on (3) may be given by the re+red partner or by any

partner of the recons+tuted firm.

43. Dissolu6on by no6ce of partnership at will.—(1) Where the partnership is

at will, the firm may be dissolved by any partner giving no+ce in wri+ng to all

the other partners of his inten+on to dissolve the firm.

(2) The firm is dissolved as from the date men+oned in the no+ce as the date of

dissolu+on or, if no date is so men+oned, as from the date of the communica-

+on of the no+ce.”

Page 8 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

20. Sec+on 32(1)(c) makes it clear that in case of a partnership at will,

by giving no+ce in wri+ng to all other partners of his inten+on to re+re, a part-

ner may re+re from the firm. The re+rement of a partner in itself does not

amount to dissolu+on of the firm and the other partners may con+nue. On the

other hand, as per Sec+on 43, where the partnership is at will, the firm may be

dissolved by any partner by giving no+ce in wri+ng to all other partners of inten-

+on to dissolve the firm and the firm is dissolved from the date as men+oned in

the no+ce with respect to the date of dissolu+on, or if no such date is men-

+oned, from the date of the communica+on of the no+ce.

21. In the present case, the perusal of the no+ce dated 22.08.2008

(Ex.P4) would reveal that aCer referring to the terms of the partnership deed

dated 01.04.2002, in which plain+ff and defendants were equal partners, the

plain+ff men+oned in paragraph number 4 and 5 of the no+ce as under:-

“4. That due to your un-business aOtude my client is not willing to con+nue the

Partnership business with both of you any more w.e.f. 30-9-2008. My client is

en+tled to the share of profits and salary of working partner, interest on Capital

and share in the movable and immovable proper+es and assets of the firm. The

firm has the property at Banjar Bagh Hoshiarpur and my client is also en+tled

to his share in said property.

5. That under these circumstances I here call upon both of you through this no-

+ce to se8le the accounts of my client as stated above of the said firm with in

15 (fiCeen days) of the receipt the of this no+ce; otherwise my clients instruc-

+ons are to ini+ate the legal proceedings in this regard against both of you in

the Court of law.”

22. A close reading of above paragraphs of Ex.P4 show that the plain+ff

did not express any wish to merely re+re; rather, he clearly stated that he was

“not willing to con nue the partnership business w.e.f. 30.09.2008”. He further

demanded se8lement of his en+re en+tlement in the firm’s assets, profits, and

proper+es and required the defendants to se8le his accounts within 15 days,

failing which legal ac+on would follow.

Page 9 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

23. These asser+ons leave no doubt that the plain+ff’s inten+on was

not re+rement, but complete dissolu+on of the partnership. Consequently, the

Trial Court’s finding that Ex.P4 reflected only a willingness to re+re is untenable,

and the First Appellate Court too failed to examine this aspect.

24. As the defendants did not dispute receipt of the no+ce before

30.09.2008, the firm must be held to have stood dissolved from that date in

terms of Sec+on 43(2).

25. Even if no+ce Ex.P4 were assumed insufficient to effect dissolu+on,

dissolu+on would s+ll be deemed to have occurred upon service of summons

accompanied by the plaint, as held in Banarsi Das v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1963 SC

1165, where the Supreme Court ruled that service of summons in a suit seeking

dissolu+on of a partnership at will itself operates as a no+ce of dissolu+on.

26. Thus, the concurrent findings of the courts below are modified only

to the extent that the partnership stood dissolved w.e.f. 30.09.2008, the date

expressly men+oned in Ex.P4.

27. Whether Firm a necessary Party : The conten+on that the firm was

a necessary party deserves to be rejected. This Court has previously held, in

Mohinder Singh v. Ram Nath (1991 (2) PLR 60), that a suit for dissolu+on and

rendi+on of accounts is maintainable without impleading the firm itself, since a

partnership firm is not a juris+c en+ty separate from its partners.

28. hGFsAUDYU-DHc&F2TOA& EDHUP The objec+on raised regarding the

maintainability of the suit due to non-registra+on of the firm is equally unten-

able. Sec+on 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 reads as under:

“69. Effect of non-registra6on.—(1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a

contract or conferred by this Act shall be ins+tutes in any Court by or on behalf

of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged

to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the

person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the

firm.

Page 10 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

(2) No suit to enforce a +ght arising from a contract shall be ins+tuted in any

Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is regis-

tered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as

partners in the firm.

(3) The provisions of sub-sec+ons (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-

off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not

affect—

(a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolu+on of a firm or for ac-

counts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dis-

solved firm, or

(b) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

(4) xxxxxxxxxxx.”

29. The perusal of the aforesaid provision would reveal that ordinarily

no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be ins+tuted in any court

by or on behalf of the firm against any third party unless the firm is registered

and the person suing or have been shown in the register of the firm as partner

of the firm. However, there are certain excep+ons to the said rule. Sub-Sec+on 3

of sec+on 69 makes out such excep+ons and one of the excep+on is when the

suit is for enforcement of any right to sue for dissolu+on of a firm or for ac-

counts of a dissolved firm or any right or power to realize the property of a dis-

solved firm.

30. In view of the said specific provision contained in Sec+on 69(3)(a),

it is clear that courts below have rightly held the suit to be maintainable.

Reliance in this regard can also be placed upon “Kamalji Singh v. Jarnail Singh”,

2002 (2) RCR (Civil) 79, wherein this court referred to “Hem Lata vs. M/s Ishar

Dass Chamanlal and Others”, 1995 (2) 314; and “Bhartesh Chandra Jain vs.

Shoaib Ullah and Others, (2004), 13 SCC 358 and held that it cannot be

disputed that for enforcement of any right to sue for dissolu+on of a firm or for

accounts of a dissolved firm, the firm need not be registered. As such, the

conten+on of counsel for the appellant in this regard is rejected.

Page 11 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

31. jkk2&rplr“3i t3shpSrD/s2k&ro Although Clause 9 of the partnership

deed contains an arbitra+on clause, the deed is admi8edly unregistered. As ex-

plained by the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das Goyal v. Pyare Krishan Aggar-

wal, 2019 (5) RCR (Civil) 345, relying on Krishna Motor Service v. H.B. Vitala

Kamath, (1996) 10 SCC 88, it was held that an arbitrator cannot be appointed

under an arbitra+on clause contained in an unregistered partnership deed.

Therefore, the arbitra+on clause cannot bar the maintainability of the civil suit.

32. Moreover, as pleaded by the plain+ff and not denied by the de-

fendant, the par+es had in fact a8empted arbitra+on earlier but without suc-

cess. Hence, the existence of the clause does not operate as a bar to the juris-

dic+on of the Civil Court.

33. The decisions in 3; Se2ktsSrM&t3p/&2”rDp3gp3shpSr< ” t&erbk9

M/s Pink City Midway Petroleum”, 2003, AIR (Supreme Court) 2881; “V. H.

Patel & Co. vs. Heru Bhai, Hima Bhai Patel, 2000, (4), SCC 368, “Rajendra

Prashad Goyal vs. Royal Orchid Company and others”, 2011, (3) PLR 266 do not

assist the appellant, as those cases did not concern an unregistered partnership

deed.

34. Consequently, the findings of the Courts below are upheld and the

suit is correctly held to be maintainable notwithstanding the arbitra+on clause.

35. “gg/ cshpS r lp3 r “ee hpSs/ r b e&Sc& r o Lastly, coming to the

applica+on under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, as per the conten+on of Ld. counsel

for the applicant-appellant, an agreement inter se the par+es was executed on

20.09.2020 (copy Annexure A-2) and based upon that agreement, applica+on

was moved before Ld. Civil Judge to decide the applica+on of passing of the final

decree based upon the same. Applica+on (Annexure A-2) was also moved to

dispose of the final decree applica+on in terms of Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC and

wri8en statement was also moved by the appellant, which is Annexure A-3.

36. The alleged agreement dated 20.09.2020, is purported to have

been executed between appellant-defendant No.1 Smt. Moksh Lata and plain-

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RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

+ff-respondent No.1, namely Shri Manohar Lal Sood. As rightly pointed out by

counsel for respondent-plain+ff that though the suit was decreed by the trial

Court on 21.03.2016, but the appeal was disposed of by the first Appellate

Court on 26.11.2021. In case any such agreement dated 20.09.2020, as is al-

leged by the appellant, had come into existence, the same must have been re-

ferred by the appellant before the first Appellate Court during the pendency of

the first appeal decided on 26.11.2021.

37. Besides above, though the applica+on for passing of the final de-

cree was moved by plain+ff/decree-holder namely Manohar Lal Sood on

02.09.2022 as evident from the covering page of Annexure A-1, the applica+on

so as to decide the final decree applica+on on the basis of the alleged agree-

ment was moved by the appellant/defendant No.1 on 29.10.2024, as evident

from Annexure A-2. In the mean+me, Manohar Lal Sood had expired on

04.05.2022. During his life+me, no such agreement allegedly executed on

20.09.2020 was even referred by the appellant/defendant No.1.

38. It is further important to no+ce the contents of the alleged agree-

ment dated 20.09.2020, which reads as under:

“AGREEMENT

This agreement, dated 20-09-2020, is wri8en today in the presence of re-

spectable persons and family members between Manohar Lal, son of Shankar Das,

resident of House No. 423, New Abadi, Hoshiarpur (First Party), and Moksha Lata,

wife of Late Shri Ravinder Kumar, resident of House No. 426, New Abadi, Hoshiarpur

(Second Party), at District Courts, Hoshiarpur, under the terms and condi+ons men-

+oned below:

1. That approximately 35-40 years ago, our ancestral firm M/s Shankardas Sood and

Sons was running at Pahari Gate, Hoshiarpur. The partners of this firm were the First

Party Manohar Dass, the Second Party Moksha Lata Sood, and the third partner

Sunita Devi. A partnership deed was executed between the First Party, Second Party,

and Sunita Devi on 01-04-2002.

2. That from the aforemen+oned firm, the First Party set up two +mber trade busi-

Page 13 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

nesses for his two sons, Rajneesh Sood and Rajiv Sood, namely Ganesh Dharam Kanda

at Mughalpura, Hoshiarpur, and Gur Kripa Dharam Kanda at Bhikhowal village,

Hoshiarpur. In addi+on, the First Party built a house, House No. 423, New Abadi,

Hoshiarpur, and acquired other immovable proper+es from this firm. Furthermore,

the First Party, Manohar Lal, performed the marriage of his four children with great

pomp and sent his elder son Munish Sood to America, all with resources from this

firm.

3. That the younger brother of the First Party and the husband of the Second Party,

Ravinder Kumar Sood, passed away on 30-01-1998. Consequently, the responsibility

of the younger brother's household came on the shoulder of First Party.

4. That due to some misunderstandings, the First Party filed a civil suit under pressure

from his children against his widowed sister-in-law, the Second Party, for claiming his

1/3rd share in the land and accounts of the said firm. The case was +tled "Manohar

Lal Sood vs. Moksha Lal Sood, etc." I deeply regret this ac+on.

5. That, in accordance with the spirit of the aforemen+oned agreement, I, the First

Party, wish to state that I, the First Party, do not want any share of the land or ac-

counts from the firm M/s Shankar Das Sood and Sons. None of my heirs shall have any

objec+ons to this. Furthermore, from today onwards, neither I nor any of my heirs

shall have any right, claim, or interest in the movable or immovable property of the

said firm M/s Shankar Das Sood and Sons, located at Bazar Bagh and Pahari Gate, Dis-

trict Hoshiarpur.

The aforemen+oned civil suit shall stand dismissed aCer the death of the First

Party because the First Party cannot withdraw the said suit during his life+me due to

fear that if he does so, his children may become displeased with him and might not

take care of him in his old age.

6. This agreement has been entered into between both par+es without any fear or

pressure, and aCer being read and understood, both par+es have signed it in the

presence of witnesses to confirm its validity.

This agreement shall come into effect aCer the death of the First Party, and

the aforemen+oned civil suit shall be dismissed aCer my death.”

Page 14 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

39. First of all, bare perusal of the vernacular copy of Annexure A-1

would reveal that on the leC side of the purported signature of Manohar Lal,

there is a +ck mark. Said +ck mark is normally men+oned, when a person is

given a blank document and asked to sign the same near the +cked place. De-

spite specific query put to counsel for the appellant, he was at loss of words re-

garding the presence of this +ck mark on the side of the signature of Manohar

Lal, clearly indica+ng that these signatures were obtained from Manohar Lal on

a blank paper.

40. Not only above, the contents of alleged agreemen t dated

20.09.2020 would reveal that it is absolutely not clear as to whether it is a ‘Will’

of Manohar Lal, or whether it is a relinquishment deed of his 1/3 share in the

partnership firm. In case, it is considered to be a relinquishment deed, then it

was required to be registered; and in case, it is considered to be a Will, as it was

to come into effect aCer the death of Manohar Lal Sood, then it was required to

be a8ested by at least two a8es+ng witnesses, but it is not the case.

41. Besides, it is absolutely beyond any reasons or logic, as to why

Manohar Lal Sood, who bi8erly fought the li+ga+on against appellant/defen-

dant No.1 Smt. Moksh Lata during his life+me, will relinquish his 1/3 share in

the firm, merely by sta+ng that he was afraid of his children and so, had filed

the suit for dissolu+on of the firm. Such an applica+on under Order XLI Rule 27

CPC without pleading any of the founda+onal facts is absolutely not permissible.

42. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon “Iqbal Ahmed (dead)

by LRs. vs. Abdul Shukoor” 2025 INSC 1027, wherein it was held by Hon'ble

Supreme Court as under:

“In our opinion, before undertaking the exercise of considering whether a party

is en+tled to lead addi+onal evidence under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the Code, it

would be first necessary to examine the pleadings of such party to gather if the

case sought to be set up is pleaded so as to support the addi+onal evidence

that is proposed to be brought on record. In absence of necessary pleadings in

that regard, permiOng a party to lead addi+onal evidence would result in an

Page 15 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

unnecessary exercise and such evidence, if led, would be of no consequence as

it may not be permissible to take such evidence into considera+on. Useful ref-

erence in this regard can be made to the decisions in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima

Mandal and Anr., AIR 2009 SC 1103 and Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and

Anr., (2012) 8 SCC 148. Thus, besides the requirements prescribed by Order XLI

Rule 27(1) of the Code being fulfilled, it would also be necessary for the Appel-

late Court to consider the pleadings of the party seeking to lead such addi+onal

evidence. It is only thereaCer on being sa+sfied that a case as contemplated by

the provisions of Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the Code has been made out that such

permission can be granted. In absence of such exercise being undertaken by the

High Court in the present case, we are of the view that it commi8ed an error in

allowing the applica+on moved by the defendant for leading addi+onal evi-

dence.”

43. Apart from above, in “N. Kamlalam v. Ayyaswami” 2001 AIR

(Supreme Court) 2802, it has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that Court

should be cau+ous while dealing with the claim for addi+onal evidence at the

appellate stage aCer a long lapse of +me.

44. The conten+on of Ld. counsel for the appellant to the effect that

as the said applica+on was also moved before the Trial Court, where the appli-

ca+on for passing of the final decree is pending and so, the same can be consid-

ered by the Trial Court is concerned, it also has no merit because the appellant

moved the present applica+on under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC before this Court so

as to take it into considera+on the documents i.e. Annexures A1 to A3.

45. It is thus clear that appellant wants to introduce documents includ-

ing an alleged agreement of 20.09.2020, which surfaced only aCer death of

plain+ff and which bears suspicious features, including a +ck mark next to the

plain+ff’s signatures, sugges+ve of signatures obtained on a blank paper. The

plain+ff had contested the case vigorously throughout his life+me but never re-

ferred to any such agreement. Besides, the document do not sa+sfy the re-

quirements of either a relinquishment deed, which must be registered; or a

valid Will, which requires two a8es+ng witnesses under Sec+on 63 of the Suc-

Page 16 of 17

RSA-774-2022 (O&M)

cession Act. The addi+onal evidence cannot be received unless the founda+onal

facts are pleaded.

46. Having regard to the aforesaid factual matrix and the legal posi-

+on, it is held that the applica+on under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is absolutely not

permissible and so, the same is hereby rejected.

47. Conclusion : Having considered all the submissions, the concurrent

findings of the Courts below are found to be based on correct apprecia+on of

law and evidence, and do not suffer from any perversity. The only modifica+on

warranted is with respect to the date of dissolu+on of the firm, which is held to

be 30.09.2008, the date clearly indicated in the plain+ff’s no+ce (Ex. P4). Apart

from this modifica+on, the decree of the Courts below stands affirmed. The ap-

peal is accordingly dismissed with costs throughout. All other pending applica-

+ons, if any, stands disposed of.

(DEEPAK GUPTA)

JUDGE

12.12.2025

Nee ka Tuteja

Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes

Whether reportable? Yes

Uploaded on.: 12.12.2025

Page 17 of 17