Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3269-3270 OF 2007

MONTFORD BROTHERS OF

ST. GABRIEL & ANR. ... APPELLANTS

VS.

UNITED INDIA INSURANCE & ANR. ETC. ... RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

SHIVA KIRTI SINGH,J.

Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned

counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company.

Page 2 2.The facts relevant for deciding this appeal are not

in dispute and hence noted only in brief.

3.The appellant No.1 is a charitable society

registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960.

It runs various institutions as a constituent unit of

Catholic Church. It is running various orphanages,

industrial schools and other social service activities

besides number of educational schools/institutions.

Its members after joining the appellant society

renounce the world and are known as “Brother”. Such a

`Brother’ severs his all relations with the natural

family and is bound by the constitution of the society

which includes Article 60 quoted in paragraph 3 of the

order dated 10.12.2003 passed in Review Petition No.4

of 2002 and in annexure P.5 as such:

“Whatever the `Brother’ receives by way of

salary, subsidies, gifts, pension or from

insurance or other such benefits belongs to

the community as by right and goes into the

common purse.”

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Page 3 4.Appellant No.2 is Principal of St. Paul’s Higher

Secondary School, Aizawal, Mizoram and represents

appellant no.1 as well.

5.One `Brother’ of the Society, namely, Alex Chandy

Thomas was a Director-cum-Head master of St. Peter High

School and he died in a motor accident on 22.06.1992.

The accident was between a Jeep driven by the deceased

and a Maruti Gypsy covered by insurance policy issued

by the respondent Insurance Company. At the time of

death the deceased was aged 34 years and was drawing

monthly salary of Rs.4,190/-. The claim petition

bearing No.55 of 1992 was filed before M.A.C.T.,

Aizawal by appellant no.2 on being duly authorized by

the appellant no.1-the society. The owner of the Gypsy

vehicle discussed in his written statement that vehicle

was duly insured and hence liability, if any, was upon

the Insurance Company. The respondent-Insurance

Company also filed a written statement and thereby

raised various objections to the claim. But as is

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Page 4 clear from the written statement under Annexure P.2 it

never raised the issue that since the deceased was a

`Brother’ and therefore without any family or heir, the

appellant could not file claim petition for want of

locus standi. The issue no.1 regarding maintainability

of claim petition was not pressed by the respondents.

The Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs.2,52,000/- in

favour of the claimant and against the opposite parties

with a direction to the insurer to deposit

Rs.2,27,000/- with the Tribunal as Rs.25,000/- had

already been deposited as interim compensation. The

Tribunal also permitted interest at the rate of 12% per

annum, but from the date of judgment dated 14.07.1994

passed in MACT case Nos. 55 and 82 of 1992.

6.Instead of preferring appeal against the order of

the Tribunal, the respondent-Company preferred a writ

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

before the Gauhati High Court and by the impugned order

under appeal dated 20.08.2002, the High Court allowed

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Page 5 the aforesaid writ petition (C) No.20 of 2002 ex-parte,

and held the judgment and order of the learned Tribunal

to be invalid and incompetent being in favour of

person/persons who according to the High court were not

competent to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicle

Act. This was the only ground of challenge to the

judgment and Award of the Tribunal. The High Court,

however, did not disturb the Award of Rs.25,000/-

already made as interim compensation. Review Petition

preferred by the appellants was also rejected on

10.12.2003 but after noticing the relevant facts

relating to locus of the appellants.

7.From the facts noted above, it is evident that

there is no dispute between the parties with regard to

the quantum of compensation determined by the Tribunal

and the only issue is whether the High Court was

correct in law in holding that the appellants are not

competent to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicle

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Page 6 Act for the accidental death of `Brother’ belonging to

the appellant-society.

8.The only issue noted above requires to look into

Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,

(hereinafter referred to as `The Act’). Sub-section

(1) of Section 166 is relevant for the purpose. It

provides thus:

“166. Application for compensation:- (1) An

application for compensation arising out of an

accident of the nature specified in sub- section

(1) of section 165 may be made—

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury;

or

(b) by the owner of the property; or

(c) where death has resulted from the accident,

by all or any of the legal representatives of

the deceased; or

(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person

inured or all or any of the legal

representatives of the deceased, as the case

may be:

Provided that where all the legal

representatives of the deceased have not joined in

any such application for compensation, the

application shall be made on behalf of or for the

benefit of all the legal representatives of the

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Page 7 deceased and the legal representatives who have

not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents

to the application. “

9.The Act does not define the term “legal

representative” but the Tribunal has noted in its

judgment and order that clause (C) of Rule 2 of the

Mizoram Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1988,

defines the term `legal representative’ as having the

same meaning as assigned to it in clause (11) of

Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which

is as follows:

“Section 2(11)`Legal representative’ means a

person who in law represents the estate of a

deceased person and includes any person who

intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and

where a party sues or is sued in a representative

character the person on whom the estate devolves On

the death of the party so suing or sued”.

10.From the aforesaid provisions it is clear that in

case of death of a person in a motor vehicle accident,

right is available to a legal representative of the

deceased or the agent of the legal representative to

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Page 8 lodge a claim for compensation under the provisions of

the Act. The issue as to who is a legal representative

or its agent is basically an issue of fact and may be

decided one way or the other dependent upon the facts

of a particular case. But as a legal proposition it is

undeniable that a person claming to be a legal

representative has the locus to maintain an application

for compensation under Section 166 of the Act, either

directly or through any agent, subject to result of a

dispute raised by the other side on this issue.

11.Learned counsel for the Insurance Company tried to

persuade us that since the term `legal representative’

has not been defined under the Act, the provision of

Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, should be

taken as guiding principle and the claim should be

confined only for the benefit of wife, husband, parent

and child, if any, of the person whose death has been

caused by the accident. In this context, he cited

judgment of this Court in the case of Gujarat State

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Page 9 Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad vs. Raman Bhai

Prabhatbhai & Anr.

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. In that case, covered by the

Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, the claimant was a brother

of a deceased killed in a motor vehicle accident. The

Court rejected the contention of the appellant that

since the term `legal representative’ is not defined

under the Motor Vehicles Act, the right of filing the

claim should be controlled by the provisions of Fatal

Accident Act. It was specifically held that Motor

Vehicles Act creates new and enlarged right for filing

an application for compensation and such right cannot

be hedged in by the limitations on an action under the

Fatal Accidents Act. Paragraph 11 of the report

reflects the correct philosophy which should guide the

courts interpreting legal provisions of beneficial

legislations providing for compensation to those who

had suffered loss.

“11. We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat

High Court is in consonance with the principles of

justice, equity and good conscience having regard

to the conditions of the Indian society. Every

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AIR 1987 SC 1690

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Page 10 legal representative who suffers on account of the

death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident

should have a remedy for realisation of

compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A

to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in

consonance with the principles of law of torts that

every injury must have a remedy. It is for the

Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the

compensation which appears to it to be just as

provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify

the person or persons to whom compensation shall be

paid. The determination of the compensation payable

and its apportionment as required by Section 110-B

of the Act amongst the legal representatives for

whose benefit an application may be filed under

Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in

accordance with well-known principles of law. We

should remember that in an Indian family brothers,

sisters and brothers’ children and some times

foster children live together and they are

dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and

if the bread-winner is killed on account of a motor

vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny

them compensation relying upon the provisions of

the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have

already held has been substantially modified by the

provisions contained in the Act in relation to

cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents. We

express our approval of the decision in Megjibhai

Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai , (AIR 1977

Guj.195) and hold that the brother of a person who

dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to

maintain a petition under Section 110-A of the Act

if he is a legal representative of the deceased.”

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Page 11 12.From the aforesaid quoted extract it is evident

that only if there is a justification in consonance

with principles of justice, equity and good conscience,

a dependant of the deceased may be denied right to

claim compensation. Hence, we find no merit in the

submission advanced on behalf of the respondent-

Insurance Company that the claim petition is not

maintainable because of the provisions of the Fatal

Accidents Act.

13.On behalf of the appellants it has been rightly

contended that proceeding before the Motor Vehicle

Claims Tribunal is a summary proceeding and unless

there is evidence in support of such pleading that the

claimant is not a legal representative and therefore

the claim petition be dismissed as not maintainable, no

such plea can be raised at a subsequent stage and that

also through a writ petition. The objection filed on

behalf of the Insurance Company, contained in annexure

P.2, does not raise any such objection nor there is any

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Page 12 evidence led on this issue. As noted earlier, the

Tribunal did frame any issue regarding maintainability

of the claim petition on law and fact as issue no.1 but

the findings recorded by the Tribunal at page 41 of the

paper book show that this issue together with issue

nos. 2 and 3 were not pressed by the opposite parties

during trial and were accordingly decided in favour of

the claimants.

14.In the aforesaid circumstances, the order under

appeal dated 20.8.2002 allowing the writ petition

suffers from apparent mistake in not noticing the

relevant issue decided by the Tribunal and also the

fact that the Insurance Company, which was the writ

petitioner, had not pressed this issue. It had neither

raised pleadings nor led evidence relevant for the said

issue.

15.On coming to know about the High Court judgment the

appellants filed a review petition in which they gave

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Page 13 all the relevant facts including the constitution of

the society appellant no.1 in support of their claim

that a `Brother’ of the Society renounced his relations

with the natural family and all his earnings and

belongings including insurance claims belonged to the

society. These facts could not have been ignored by the

High Court but even after noticing such facts the

review petition was rejected.

16.A perusal of the judgment and order of the Tribunal

discloses that although issue no.1 was not pressed and

hence decided in favour of the claimants/appellants,

while considering the quantum of compensation for the

claimants the Tribunal adopted a very cautious approach

and framed a question for itself as to what should be

the criterion for assessing compensation in such case

where the deceased was a Roman Catholic and joined the

church services after denouncing his family, and as

such having no actual dependants or earning? For

answering this issue the Tribunal relied not only upon

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Page 14 judgments of American and English Courts but also upon

Indian judgments for coming to the conclusion that even

a religious order or organization may suffer

considerable loss due to death of a voluntary worker.

The Tribunal also went on to decide who should be

entitled for compensation as legal representative of

the deceased and for that purpose it relied upon the

Full Bench judgment of Patna High Court reported in AIR

1987 Pat. 239, which held that the term `legal

representative’ is wide enough to include even

“intermeddlers” with the estate of a deceased. The

Tribunal also referred to some Indian judgments in

which it was held that successors to the trusteeship

and trust property are legal representatives within the

meaning of Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

17.In the light of the aforesaid discussions, we have

no hesitation in holding that the High Court erred in

law in setting aside the judgment of the learned

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Page 15 Tribunal by ignoring the fact that the respondent-

Insurance Company had not pressed issue no.1 nor it had

pleaded and led evidence in respect to the said issue.

The Court explained that the appellants were the legal

representatives of the deceased. Such an issue of

facts could not be decided by the High Court for the

first time in a writ petition which could only be

entertained under Article 227 of the Constitution for

limited purpose.

18.Accordingly, orders of the High Court dated August

20, 2002 and December 10, 2003 are set aside and the

judgment and order of the Tribunal dated July 14, 1994,

is restored. The dues of compensation including

interest, as per judgment of the Tribunal, shall be

deposited by the respondent-Insurance Company with the

Tribunal within eight weeks from the date of this

order. The Tribunal shall permit the claimants to

withdraw the same in the light of its order.

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Page 16 19.The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated

above. No costs.

…………………………………………… C.J.I.

(P. SATHASIVAM)

…………………………………………………J.

(RANJAN GOGOI)

…………………………………………………J.

(SHIVA KIRTI SINGH)

New Delhi,

January 28,2014.

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