As per case facts, petitioners, members of Bramha Suncity Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., challenged resolutions by the society concerning land entitlement. The promoter, Respondent No.4, sought impleadment in this dispute, ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
Neeta Sawant WP-15261-2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 15261 OF 2023
Mr. Shreesh Kumar and Others. ...Petitioners
V/s.
Bramha Suncity Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd. And Others.
...Respondents
________________
Mr. Sitesh Sharma with Mr. Vijay Upadhyay & Ms. Sakshi Upadhyay, for
the Petitioners.
Mr. Shailendra S. Kanetkar with Mr. Pranay Kothari, for Respondent
No. 4.
________________
CORAM: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
JUDGMENT RESD. ON : 29 June 2026.
JUDGMENT PRON. ON: 8 JULY 2026
JUDGMENT :
1) The issue that arises for consideration in this petition is
whether the powers of a Co-operative Court to implead parties under
Section 94(3)(c) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960
(MCS Act) is restricted to impleadment of only persons enumerated
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under Section 91(1)(a) to (e) and pendente-lite purchasers or is it
permissible to implead to the dispute other persons as well.
2) The issue arises in the light of challenge raised by the
Petitioners to the order dated 19 August 2023 passed by the Co-operative
Appellate Court, Pune dismissing Revision Application No. 27 of 2023
and con�rming the order dated 14 March 2023 passed by the Co-
operative Court on Application at Exh.15. By order dated 14 March 2023,
the Co-operative Court has allowed the Application at Exh.15 �led by
Respondent No.4 and has directed impleadment of Respondent No.4 as
party to the Dispute. Petitioners are thus aggrieved by impleadment of
Respondent No.4 to Dispute No.106/2021 �led by them and have
accordingly �led the present petition.
3) Petitioners are members of Bramha Suncity Co-operative
Housing Soc. Limited which is formed by the purchasers of �ats in the
complex known as ‘Bramha Suncity’ and registered under the provisions
of MCS Act. The Society is formed in respect of 26 buildings comprising
of 1277 members. The buildings of the Society are situated on vast tract
of land at Wadgaonsheri, Pune. According to the Petitioners, the FSI
consumed for construction of 26 buildings of the Society is about
96,196.30 sq.mtrs. Respondent No.4-Bramha Corporation Ltd. is the
promoter, who has constructed the buildings of the Society. The Society
called upon the promoter to convey the land and thereafter �led Deemed
Conveyance Application No.227 of 2013 before the Competent Authority
under Section 11 of Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the
Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963
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(MOFA) which was initially returned to the society. A fresh Application
for deemed conveyance was �led by the society, which was again rejected
by Order dated 12 August 2017 on the ground of non-completion of
layout development. The Society �led Writ Petition in this Court
challenging the order of rejection dated 12 August 2017. Additionally, the
Society also �led Regular Civil Suit No. 69 of 2018 against the Promoter
and land owners seeking injunction from revising the sanctioned
building plans, alteration of amenities, etc.
4) In the background of the aforesaid disputes between the
Society and the promoter, compromise/settlement talks took place
between the Society and the promoter. Towards such compromise, the
General Body of the Society adopted Resolution in the Special General
Body meeting held on 14 October 2018 accepting the settlement
proposal of the promoter. Similarly, the Managing Committee of the
society adopted Resolution in the meeting dated 20 October 2018
towards acceptance of the settlement proposal of the developer.
According to the Petitioners, acceptance of settlement proposal by the
General Body and Managing Committee of the Society has grossly
reduced the land entitlement of the Society. The Petitioners have
accordingly instituted Dispute No. 106 of 2021 challenging the
Resolution adopted in Special General Body Meeting dated 14 October
2018 and Resolution adopted by the Managing Committee i n the
meeting of 20 October 2018. In the Dispute, Petitioners impleaded only
the Society through its Chairman and Secretary and two other
individuals, being the ex-chairman and ex-secretary. The Promoter
(Respondent No.4) �led application at Exh.15 seeking its impleadment as
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a party opponent to the dispute. The Application was resisted by the
Petitioners by �ling reply. The Co-operative Court has however allowed
the Application �led by Respondent No.4 at Exh.15 by order dated 14
March 2023. The Co-operative Court directed impleadment of
Respondent No.4 as Opponent No.4 to the dispute.
5) Petitioners got aggrieved by impleadment of Respondent
No.4 by order dated 14 March 2023 and accordingly �led Revision
Application No. 27 of 2023 before the Co-operative Appellate Court. By
judgment and order dated 19 August 2023, the Co-operative Appellate
Court has dismissed the Revision preferred by the Petitioners.
Accordingly, Petitioners have �led the present petition challenging the
order passed by the Co-operative Court dated 14 March 2023 and the
order passed by the Co-operative Appellate Court dated 19 August 2023.
By order dated 6 February 2024, this Court directed that no coercive
steps be taken against the Petitioner for non-compliance with the order
dated 14 March 2023.
6) Mr. Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the
Petitioners submits that the Co-operative Court and the Co-operative
Appellate Court have grossly erred in directing impleadment of
Respondent No.4 to the Dispute, as Respondent No.4 is a rank stranger
to the Dispute which needs to be adjudicated strictly in terms of
provisions of Section 91 of the MCS Act. That no adjudication is
permissible by the Co-operative Court of a Dispute beyond the �ve
categories speci�ed in Section 91 and in respect of those who are not the
enumerated persons in Section 91(1)(a) to (e) of the MCS Act. That Co-
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operative Court is a creature of statute and its functions like jurisdiction
are to be governed strictly by the provisions of Section 91 to 97 of the
MCS Act. That Respondent No.4 is not covered by the list of persons
enumerated in Section 91(1)(a) to (e) of the MCS Act. That only
exception to the enumerated persons in to be found in Section 94(3)(a)
which permits addition of third-party acquiring interest in the property
of the person who is party to the Dispute. That for being quali�ed as
such person, acquisition of interest must happen pendente-lite of such
Dispute. That Respondent No.4 does not answer the requirement of
Section 94(3)(a) of the MCS Act.
7) Mr. Sharma further submits that both the Courts have
erroneously relied on the provisions of Section 94(3)(c) of the MCS Act
for permitting impleadment of third-party intervenor. That Section 94(3)
(c) is an enabling provision solely to facilitate the impleadment of a
plaintiff or a defendant who ought to have been joined at the time of
�ling of the Dispute. That reference to the expression 'whose presence
before the Court may be necessary' appearing in Section 94(3)(c) of the Act
must necessarily be to a person who otherwise quali�es in the list
enumerated under Section 91(1)(a) to (e) or at the highest persons
satisfying the requirement of Section 94(3)(a) of the MCS Act. That
Section 94(3)(c) cannot override the non-obstante provision contained in
Section 91(1) of the Act and cannot be resorted to enlarge the
jurisdiction of Co-operative Court to bring within its purview strangers
to the society.
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8) Mr. Sharma further submits that Respondent No.4 is neither
an agent for being covered under Section 91(1)(a) to (e) nor a person
�tting into the description of Section 94(3)(a) of the Act. That Co-
operative Court is constituted as a special forum with an objective of
resolution of disputes directly affecting internal affairs or functioning of
Co-operative Societies by a specialized forum familiar with such matters.
That adopting interpretation of provisions of Section 94(3)(c) to rope
within the ambit of jurisdiction of Co-operative Court total strangers
would defeat the legislative object. That the legislature has not
contemplated liberal interpretation of provisions of Section 94(3)(c) of
the MCS Act. That impleadment of Respondent No.4 would cause severe
prejudice to the Disputants and would enlarge the scope of the Dispute
which would not be capable of being adjudicated by the Co-operative
Court. Mr. Sharma invokes the maxim 'dura lex sed lex' meaning 'law is
hard but is the law' and submits that even if a statutory provision causes
hardship to some people, it is not for the Court to amend the law.
9) Mr. Sharma relies on judgment of the Apex Court in the case
of Margret Almeida & Ors. Versus. Bombay Catholic CHS Ltd. & Ors.
1
and submits that the Apex Court has recognized the principle that it is
permissible to segregate causes of action relating to challenges of
resolution and causes of action relating to conveyance. That adopting
the law enunciated in Margret Almeida, the challenge to conveyance can
be taken to Civil Court while maintaining a challenge to the Society's
Resolutions before the Co-operative Court. He also relies on judgment of
this Court in Parimal Solanki (Applicant) in the matter of Bhoumik
1 (2012) 5 SCC 642
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CHS Ltd. & Ors. Versus. Vina A. Sisawala and Ors.
2
. He also relies on
judgment of this Court in Komal Arvind Vesavkar & Ors. Versus.
Vesawa Koli Sarvoday Sahakari Society Ltd. & Ors.
3
in support of his
contention that anything apart from Resolution cannot be a subject
matter of challenge before the Co-operative Court. On above
submissions, Mr. Sharma would pray for setting aside the order passed by
the Co-operative Court and the Co-operative Appellate Court.
10) Mr. Kanetkar, appearing for Respondent No.4, opposes the
Petition. He submits that Respondent No.4 is correctly impleaded as a
party opponent to the Dispute in view of the fact that the Petitioners
have made serious allegation of collusion against Respondent No.4 in
the Dispute. That the Dispute therefore cannot be decided without
affording an opportunity of defence to Respondent No.4.
11) Mr. Kanetkar submits that Section 94(3)(c) of the MCS Act
empowers the Co-operative Court to add any person with or without
application, at any stage, whose presence before the Court is necessary in
order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon
all questions involved in Dispute. That power under Section 94(3)(c) of
the MCS Act is therefore wide and the provision confers wi der
jurisdiction and discretion upon the Co-operative Court to add parties to
Dispute. That provisions of Section 94(3)(c) of the MCS Act are akin to
the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
That persons enumerated in Section 91 are different than the ones who
can be joined under Section 94(3)(a) as well as under Section 94(3)(c) of
2 I.A. (L) No. 25993 of 2022 in Suit No. 1190 of 2019 decided on 6 October 2022
3 WP No. 8254 of 2022 decided on 15 January 2023
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the MCS Act. That therefore the provisions of Section 94(3)(c) of the Act
must be read to give its fullest meaning and interpretation and must be
read independent of Sections 91(1) and 94(3)(a). To read Section 91(1)
into Section 94(3)(c) would amount to introduction of something into
Section 94(3)(c) which legislature did not intend.
12) Mr. Kanetkar submits that the judgment of the Apex Court
in Margret Almeida does not deal with the issue as to who can be added
or joined as necessary or proper parties to the Dispute before the Co-
operative Court. That the judgment essentially deals with the issue of
jurisdiction of Civil Court vis-a-vis Co-operative Court from the point of
view of the subject matter of the Dispute, which is one of the tests for
determining jurisdiction under Section 91. That therefore the judgment
is not an authority or proposition of law on the issue as to who can be
joined as parties to a Dispute before the Co-operative Court. He relies on
judgment of this Court in Eknath Namdev Lashkare & Ors. Versus.
Pancharatna Properties & Ors.
4
in support of his contention that a
developer who claims rights in the Development Agreement can be
joined as a party to the Dispute before the Co-operative Court. That the
judgment holds that the developer who claims rights in the Development
Agreement is an agent and not an independent party unlike a purchaser
in the case of Margret Almeida. By judgment of this Court in Parimal
Solanki relied upon by the Petitioners again does not deal with the issue
of joinder of necessary or proper parties and therefore the judgment has
no application for deciding the issue involved in the present case. He
prays for dismissal of the Petition.
4 2025 SCC Online Bom 4345
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13) Rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties now fall for
my consideration.
14) Petitioners are the Disputants in Dispute No. 106 of 2021
�led before the Co-operative Court, Pune and are aggrieved by
impleadment of Respondent No.4-Developer as a party opponent to the
Dispute. Petitioners have challenged Special General Body Meeting
Resolution dated 14 October 2018 and Managing Committee Resolution
dated 20 October 2018. Petitioners contend that since only the
resolutions adopted by the society are subject matter of challenge in the
Dispute, Respondent No.4-Developer cannot be impleaded as party to
the same. Petitioners have also contended that Respondent No.4
otherwise does not �t in the list of the persons enumerated in Section
91(1)(a) to (e) nor answers the requirement of Section 94(3)(a) or (c) of
the MCS Act and that therefore he cannot be impleaded as party to the
Dispute. In their Dispute, Petitioners have sought following prayers:
36. In view of the above, it is most respectfully prayed before this
Hon'ble Court by the Disputants, as under
a) The present Dispute may kindly be allowed.
b) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to set quash and set aside the
Impugned Resolution No. 01 passed by the Opponent Society on 14th
October 2018 in the Special General Body Meeting.
c) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the Impugned
Resolution No. 02 passed by the Managing Committee of the Opponent
Society in the Managing Committee meeting held 20th October 2018.
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d) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass necessary order of injunction
restraining the Opponent Society from taking any action in terms of
any such resolutions passed in said arbitrary and collusive Special
General Body Meeting dated 14th October 2018.
e) Ex-parte ad-interim and ad-interim reliefs in terms of prayer clause
(b) & (c) may kindly be passed.
f) Interim reliefs in terms of prayer clause (b) & (c) may kindly be
passed.
g) Cost of the dispute be awarded to the Disputants.
h) Such further Orders as this Hon'ble Court shall deem �t in the
interest of justice and equity may kindly be passed.
15) In their Dispute, Petitioners have impleaded the Society
through its Chairman and Secretary as Opponent No. 1 and Mr. Rajiv
Kumar Gupta and Mr. S. Subramanyan, Ex-Chairman and Ex-Secretary of
the Society as Opponent Nos. 2 and 3 respectively. The Dispute thus is
broadly con�ned to the internal working of the Society. As observed
above, both the impugned resolutions dated 14 October 2018 and 20
October 2018 essentially relate to Society's entitlement in respect of the
conveyance of the land. Mr. Sharma has contended that the impugned
resolutions adopted by the Society thereby effecting compromise with
Respondent No.4-developer has resulted in gross reduction of land
entitlement of the Society about 96,196 sq.mtrs to only 69,222 sq.mtrs.
Thus, the main grouse of the Petitioners, who appear to be the minority
members and who could not convince the general body not to accept the
compromise proposal, in society agreeing for conveyance of lesser area
than its alleged entitlement. Considering the narrow issue involved in
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the present Petition, it is not necessary to delve deeper into the factual
and legal controversy involved in the Dispute.
16) For deciding the issue of impleadment of Respondent No.4-
developer as party opponent to the Dispute, it would be necessary to
make reference to the provisions of Section 91 of the MCS Act, which
deals with the issue of adjudication of Disputes touching the
constitution, conduct of general meetings, business or management of
the Society. Section 91 of the MCS Act provides thus:
91. Disputes.—
(1) Notwithstanding [anything contained] in any other law for the time
being in force, any dispute touching the constitution, [election of the
committee or its of�cers] [* *] conduct of general meetings,
management or business of a society shall be referred by any of the
parties to the dispute, or by a federal society to which the society is
af�liated, or by a creditor of the society, [to a Co-operative Court], if
both the parties thereto are one or other of the following :
(a) a society, its committee, any past committee, any past or present
of�cer, any past or present agent, any past or present servant or
nominee, heir or legal representative of any deceased of�cer, deceased
agent or deceased servant of the society, or the Liquidator of the society
[or the Of�cial Assignee of a de-registered society] ;
(b) a member, past member or a person claiming through a member,
past member or a deceased member of a society, or a society which is a
member of the society [or person who claims to be a member of the
society] ;
[(c) a person other than a member of the society, with whom the society
has any transactions in respect of which any restrictions or regulations
have been imposed, made or prescribed under section 43, 44 or 45, and
any person claiming through such person ;
(d) a surety of a member, past member or deceased member, or surety of
a person other than a member with whom the society has any
transactions in respect of which restriction have been prescribed under
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section 45, whether such surety or person is or is not a member of the
society] ;
(e) any other society, or the Liquidator of such a society [or deregistered
society or the Of�cial Assignee of such a de-registered society]:
[Provided that, an industrial dispute as de�ned in clause (k) of section 2
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or rejection of
nomination paper at the election to a committee of any society [* *] or
refusal of admission to membership by a society to any person quali�ed
therefor, 12[or any proceeding for the recovery of the amount as arrear
of land revenue on a certi�cate granted by the Registrar under sub-
section (1) or (2) of section 101 or sub-section (1) of section 137 or the
recovery proceeding of the Registrar or any of�cer subordinate to him
or an of�cer of society noti�ed by the State Government, who is
empowered by the Registrar under sub-section (1) of section 156,] 1 [or
any orders, decisions, awards and actions of the Registrar against which
an appeal under section 152 or 152A and revision under section 154 of
the Act have been provided,] shall not be deemed to be a dispute for the
purposes of this section.]
[* * * * * * * * *]
(3) Save as otherwise provided under 3 [sub-section (2) of section 93],
no Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other
proceeding in respect of any dispute referred to in sub-section (1).
Explanation 1.— A dispute between the Liquidator of a society [or an
Of�cial Assignee of a deregistered society] and [the members (including
past members, or nominees, heir or legal representative of deceased
members)] of the same society shall not be referred [to the Co-operative
Court] under the provisions of sub-section (1).
Explanation 2.— For the purposes of this sub-section, a dispute shall
include—
(i) a claim by or against a society for any debt or demand due to it from
a member or due from it to a member, past members or the nominee,
heir or legal representative of a deceased member, or servant for
employee whether such a debt or demand be admitted or not ;
(ii) a claim by a surety for any sum or demand due to him from the
principal borrower in respect of a loan by a society and recovered from
the surety owing to the default of the principal borrower, whether such
a sum or demand be admitted or not ;
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(iii) a claim by a society for any loss caused to it by a member, past
member or deceased member, by any of�cer, past of�cer or deceased
of�cer, by any agent, past agent or deceased agent, or by any servant,
past servant or deceased servant, or by its committee, past or present,
whether such loss be admitted or not ;
(iv) a refusal or failure by a member, past member or a nominee, heir or
legal representative of a deceased member, to deliver possession to a
society of land or any other asset resumed by it for breach of conditions
of the assignment.
17) Section 91 of the M.C.S. Act opens with a non-obtstante
clause and confers jurisdiction on Co-operative Courts in respect of the
enumerated disputes. Sub-section (1) of Section 91 is in two parts. The
�rst part of the sub-section enumerates the subject matter of disputes
over which Co-operative Court can exercise jurisdiction. The second part
of sub-section (1) enumerates the parties who can be impleaded to the
Dispute. Thus, a Dispute would lie before a Co-operative Court only if the
subject matter falls in the list enumerated in the �rst part and if both the
parties fall in any of the categories enumerated in the second part. So far
as Dispute �led by the Petitioners is concerned, the same answers both
the requirements and the debate between the parties is not about
maintainability of the Dispute. The issue here is whether Respondent
No.4 can be impleaded to that Dispute as a party Opponent.
18) As observed above, though Co-operative Court is vested with
jurisdiction to decide the enumerated subject matters in �rst part of sub-
section (1) of Section 91, it cannot exercise jurisdiction over every person
even qua those subject matters. Exercise of jurisdiction by Co-operative
Court over subject matters enumerated in the �rst part of Section 91(1)
is further circumscribed by providing that exercise of jurisdiction cannot
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exceed the category of persons enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e) of
Section 91(1). The provision is thus peculiar and controls both the
'subject matter' of dispute as well as 'persons' over whom jurisdiction can
be exercised. If any of the two requirements in the �rst and second part
of Section 91(1) are not satis�ed, the Co-operative Court would lose its
jurisdiction. To paraphrase, even if a subject matter falling in the list
enumerated in the �rst part of Section 91(1) is brought before the Co-
operative Court but one of the parties does not answer the description
under clauses (a) to (e) of Section 91(1), the Co-operative Court would
not have jurisdiction to decide even that subject matter.
19) It is on account of these peculiar provisions of Section 91(1)
that Mr. Sharma has strenuously contended that impleadment of
Respondent No.4 to the Dispute would take the Dispute out of
jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court. He has contended tha t
Respondent No.4 admittedly does not fall in the list enumerated in
clauses (a) to (e) of Section 91(1) of the MCS Act. This position is also not
seriously disputed by Mr. Kanetkar. Thus, parties are ad-idem that
Respondent No.4 does not fall in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 91(1) of the
MCS Act.
20) Faced with the situation that Respondent No.4 is not one of
the persons enumerated in Section 91(1)(a) to (e), the Co-operative
Court has taken recourse to the provisions of Section 94 of the MCS Act
for ordering impleadment of Respondent No.4. Section 94 prescribes
procedure for settlement of Disputes and power of Co-operative Courts
and provides thus :
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94. Procedure for settlement of disputes and power of Co-
operative Court.—
(1) The Co-operative Court, hearing a dispute under the last preceding
section, shall hear the dispute in the manner prescribed, and shall have
power to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses including the
parties interested or any of them and to compel them to give evidence
on oath, af�rmation or af�davit, and to compel the production of
documents by the same means and as far as possible in the same
manner, as is provided in the case of a Civil Court by the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908).
(1A) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, every dispute in relation to
any election shall be heard and decided by the Co-operative Court as
expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the
hearing and decision within six months from the date on which the
dispute is �led before it.
(2) Except with the permission of the Co-operative Court no party shall
be represented at the hearing of a dispute by a legal practitioner.
(3) (a) If the Co-operative Court is satis�ed that a person, whether
he be a member of the society or not, has acquired any interest in
the property of a person who is a party to a dispute, it may order,
that the person who has acquired the interest in the property may
join as a party to the dispute ; and any decision that may be
passed on the reference by the Co-operative Court shall be binding
on the party so joined, in the same manner as if he were a n
original party to the dispute.
(b) Where a dispute has been instituted in the name of the wrong
person, or where all the defendants have not been included, the Co-
operative Court may, at any stage of the hearing of the dispute, if
satis�ed that the mistake was bona �de, order any other person to be
substituted or added as a plaintiff or a defendant, upon such terms as it
thinks just.
(c) The Co-operative Court may, at any stage of the proceedings,
either upon or without the application of either party, and on such
terms as may appear to the Co-operative Court, to be just, order
that the name of any party improperly joined whether as plaintiff
or defendant, be struck out, and the name of any person who
ought to have been joined whether as plaintiff or defendant or
whose presence before [the Co-operative Court], may be necessary
in order to enable the Co-operative Court effectually and
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completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions
involved in the dispute, be added.
(d) Any person who is a party to the dispute and entitled to more than
one relief in respect of the same cause of action may claim all or any of
such reliefs; but if he omits to claim for all such reliefs, he shall not
forward a claim for any relief so omitted, except with the leave of the
Co-operative Court.
(3A) If the disputant is present and the opponent is absent, when the
dispute is called out for hearing, the Co-operative Court may decide the
dispute ex-parte, and pass an award. The Co-operative Court, may set
aside the ex-parte, award upon such terms as to the payment of costs,
to the court or otherwise as it thinks �t, if the opponent makes an
application within thirty days from the date of the award, and satis�es
the court that there was suf�cient cause for his failure to appear, when
the dispute was called out for hearing and appoint a day for hearing and
deciding the dispute on merits.
(3B) If the opponent is present and the disputant is absent, when the
matter is called out for hearing, the Co-operative Court may dismiss the
dispute for default, and pass an award accordingly. The Co-operative
Court may restore the dispute which is dismissed for default and restore
the same, upon such terms as to the payment of costs, as it thinks �t, if
the disputant makes an application within thirty days from the date of
its dismissal, and satis�es the court that there was suf�cient cause for
his failure to appear, when the dispute was called for hearing and
appoint a day for hearing and deciding the dispute on merits.
(4) Save as otherwise directed by the State Government in any case or
class of cases, every dispute shall be decided in such summary manner
as may be prescribed and as expeditiously as possible.
(emphasis added)
21) Sub-section (3) of Section 94 confers power on the Co-
operative Court to add or strike off parties. The power to add or strike off
parties is to be exercised by the Co-operative Court in three distinct
circumstances enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 94(3). Under
Section 94(3)(a), a Co-operative Court can direct impleadment of a
person who has acquired interest in the property of a person who is a
party to the Dispute. Thus, Section 94(3)(a) restricts power of the Co-
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operative Court only to join that person, who acquires interest in the
property of a person who is party to the Dispute. In Margret Almeida
(supra) the Apex Court has interpreted clause (a) of Section 94(3) to
mean that the power of impleadment can be exercised only when such
acquisition of interest takes place during pendency of the Dispute.
Section 94(3)(b) deals with a situation where Dispute is instituted in the
name of a wrong person or where all the Defendants are not included
and in such a case, Co-operative Court can direct addition or substitution
of Plaintiff or Defendant. Section 94(3)(c) confers wider power on the Co-
operative Court to strike off a wrong Plaintiff/Defendant or to add any
person as Plaintiff or Defendant whose presence is considered necessary
for effective and complete adjudication of settlement of questions
involved in the Dispute.
22) The Co-operative Court has referred to the provisions of
Section 94(3)(c) of the MCS Act for directing impleadment of Respondent
No.4 to the dispute holding that he is a proper party to the dispute and
that his presence is necessary for settlement of all questions involved in
the Dispute.
23) Mr. Sharma has contended that the provisions of Section
94(3)(c) cannot be interpreted to mean conferment of unbridled power
on the Co-operative Court to implead a person to the Dispute who does
answer the description under Section 91(1)(a) to (e) or Section 94(3)(a). I
am unable to agree. In fact, Section 94(3)(c) empowers the Court to
implead a person as a party to the Dispute who is not included in
categories enumerated in Section 91(1)(a) to (e) or who does not answer
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the requirement of Section 94(3)(a). Careful reading of the language of
Clause-(c) of sub-section (3) of Section 94 would indicate that the
provision is meant to confer a wider discretion on the Co-operative Court
to bring before it any party whose presence is considered necessary to
assist the Court in effective adjudication of particular question involved
in the Dispute. Mr. Sharma is not right in submitting that Section 94(3)
(c) refers to only persons enumerated in Section 91(1)(a) to (e). This is
clear from the fact that the said power is already recognised in Section
94(3)(b) of the Act. To illustrate, if Co-operative Court forms an opinion
that an of�ce bearer of the Society ought to be joined as party to the
Dispute, the power under Section 94(3)(c) can be exercised and in that
situation, of�ce bearer of the Society is a person enumerated under
Section 91(1)(a) of the MCS Act. However, Clause (c) of Section 94(3) is
not intended by the Legislature to confer power upon Co-operative Court
of impleadment of only those persons who are enumerated in Section
91(1)(a) to (e). This is because it uses the expression 'the name of any
person….' whose presence before the Co-operative Court is necessary to
enable the Co-operative Court to effectively and completely adjudicate
upon and settle all questions involved in the dispute.
24) Also, if a comparative analysis of the clauses (a) to (c) of
Section 94(3) is made, following position emerges:
(a) If the Co-operative Court is satis�ed that a
person, whether he be a member of the society or
not, has acquired any interest in the property of a
person who is a party to a dispute, it may order,
that the person who has acquired the interest in
the property may join as a party to the dispute ;
Purchaser pendente lite who is
not enumerated in Section
91(1)(a) to (e) can be
impleaded so as to bind
him/her with the decision in
Dispute.
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and any decision that may be passed on the
reference by the Co-operative Court shall be
binding on the party so joined, in the same manner
as if he were an original party to the dispute.
(b) Where a dispute has been instituted in the
name of the wrong person, or where all the
defendants have not been included, the Co-
operative Court may, at any stage of the hearing of
the dispute, if satis�ed that the mistake was bona
�de, order any other person to be substituted or
added as a plaintiff or a defendant, upon such
terms as it thinks just.
Only person enumerated in
Section 91(1)(a) to (e) can be
impleaded as the clause
applies in case of a mistake in
not impleading such
enumerated persons as
Plaintiff or Defendant.
(c) The Co-operative Court may, at any stage of the
proceedings, either upon or without the
application of either party, and on such terms as
may appear to the Co-operative Court, to be just,
order that the name of any party improperly joined
whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out,
and the name of any person who ought to have
been joined whether as plaintiff or defendant or
whose presence before the Co-operative Court,
may be necessary in order to enable the Co-
operative Court effectually and completely to
adjudicate upon and settle all the questions
involved in the dispute, be added.
Both persons enumerated and
not enumerated in Section
91(1)(a) to (e) can be directed
to be joined as parties.
25) As can be seen from the language employed in clause (c) of
Section 94(3), the provision encompasses within its ambit two category
of persons viz. (i) the name of any person who ought to have been joined
whether as plaintiff or defendant and (ii) the name of any person whose
presence before the Co-operative Court is considered necessary. This is
on account of use of the words 'or' in Section 94(3)(c). Thus, someone
who ought not be joined as Plaintiff or Defendant can also be directed to
be joined by the Co-operative Court. The person the �rst category viz.
‘who ought to have been joined whether as plaintiff or defendant’ would
necessarily mean one of the persons falling in clauses (a) to (e) of
Section 91(1). However, the person in the second category viz. ‘whose
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presence before the Co-operative Court may be necessary’ need not answer
the description under clauses (a) to (e) of Section 91(1).
26) Faced with the situation that Section 94(3)(c) seeks to
include within its ambit even persons other than those enumerated
under Section 91(1)(a) to (e), Mr. Sharma has suggested that the
expression 'any person' used under Section 94(3)(c) must necessarily have
reference to the person who answers the description under Section 94(3)
(a). In other words, Mr. Sharma has contended that in addition to having
power to implead persons enumerated under Section 91(1)(a) to (e), the
Co-operative Court can only direct addition of person who has acquired
an interest in the property pendente-lite the Dispute. Here again, I am
unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Sharma. If the intention of
the Legislature was to restrict the powers of impleadment to only the
pendente-lite purchaser, there was no necessity of using the expression
'the name of any person whose presence before the Co-operative Court made
be necessary to enable the Co-operative Court to effectively and completely
adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the dispute’ in Section
94(3)(c). This is because the power of impleadment of pendente-lite
purchaser is already conferred under Section 94(3)(a) on the Co-
operative Court and it was unnecessary to recognise that power once
again in Section 94(3)(c). This effectively means that the expression 'any
person' used in Section 94(3)(c) is necessarily a person otherwise than a
pendente-lite purchaser.
27) Court must attempt to make plain reading of a statutory
provision if the language is clear and unambiguous and if it’s plain
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reading bears out the exact meaning of the provision. It is not for the
Courts to read into the statute something which the Legislature did not
intend. Sections 94(3)(a) and 94(3)(c) clearly operate in different �elds
and are intended to cater to different situations. Therefore, Courts
cannot give narrow or restrictive meaning to language used in Section
94(3)(c) so as to circumscribe power of impleadment conferred on a Co-
operative Court to only such persons who are enumerated under Section
91(1)(a) to (e) or only a pendente-lite purchaser.
28) Provisions of Section 91(1) seek to restrict jurisdiction of a
Co-operative Court only to enumerated subject matters and only in
respect of the enumerated persons. Provisions of Section 91(1) are thus
aimed at restricting adjudicatory power of Co-operative Court in respect
of subject matters and persons. On the other hand, provisions of Section
94(3)(c) are intended at an altogether different objective. The person
who can be impleaded under Section 94(3)(c) is not necessarily a person
whose right is adjudicated by the Co-operative Court. Section 94(3)(c)
would include a person whose right will not be adjudicated by the Co-
operative Court but whose presence is felt necessary for effective
adjudication of the Dispute. To illustrate, in a given circumstance, the
Co-operative Court may require presence of a municipal corporation, a
statutory authority, a lessor of land, etc. for effective adjudication of
disputes before it, though those entities may not answer the description
of Section 91(1)(a) to (e) or Section 94(3)(a). By impleading such
entities, Co-operative Court may not adjudicate dispute between a party
already in dispute and the impleaded party. However, presence of the
impleaded party becomes necessary for effective adjudication of
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questions involved in the dispute. Thus by impleading the enumerated
parties under Section 91(1)(a) to (e) or Section 94(3)(a), the Co-operative
Court makes adjudication of rights qua them whereas the impleadment
under Section 94(3)(c) can be of such person whose presence is felt
necessary without adjudication of rights or liabilities of that person.
29) In view of the above discussion, I am unable to accept the
submission made on behalf of the Petitioners that Section 94(3)(c) refers
to only those persons who are enumerated in Section 91(1)(a) to (e) or a
person who answers the description under Section 94(3)(a) of the MCS
Act.
30) Mr. Sharma has strenuously relied on judgment of the Apex
Court in Margret Almeida and has contended that the Co-operative
Court, as well as the Co-operative Appellate Court, have grossly misread
the ratio of the said judgment in favour of Respondent No.4. He contends
that Margret Almeida recognizes segregation of disputes relating to
general body resolutions and disputes relating to conveyance. He has laid
emphasis on the observations made by the Apex Court in paras-46 and
47 of the judgment, which read thus:
46. We do not propose to examine the correctness of the legal premise
that the general body resolution and the conveyance could be
segregated in a dispute such as one on the hand. For the sake of
argument, we presume that it is possible for the plaintiffs, the
appellants herein, to challenge only the general body resolution. We
also presume that the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that if
the general body resolution is set aside, the same will impair the
validity of the conveyance even without an appropriate declaration by a
competent judicial body. (We emphasise that we only presume so
without examining the said conclusion for the limited purpose.)
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47. If the resolution dated 6-12-2009 alone is challenged before the
Cooperative Court, in view of our conclusion recorded earlier,
Respondents 22 and 23 (the bene�ciaries of the resolution) could not be
made parties before the Cooperative Court. In such a situation, even if
the Cooperative Court came to the conclusion that the resolution is
illegal, it would always be open for Respondents 22 and 23 to ignore
such a determination as they are not parties to the proceedings and
assert their title on the basis of the conveyance dated 7-12-2009. If any
party such as the plaintiffs (the appellants herein) disputes the validity
of the title conveyed thereunder, necessarily such a dispute would have
to be adjudicated by a competent court under Section 9 of the Code of
Civil Procedure wherein, necessarily, the question whether a valid title
was conveyed in favour of Respondents 22 and 23 by the society would
arise for determination. The legality of the resolution would still have
to be gone into again. Therefore, in our opinion, the premise in which
the High Court commenced its enquiry itself is wrong.
31) It appears that in para-47 of the judgment in Margret
Almeida, the Apex Court had considered a hypothetical situation, where
general body resolution alone is challenged before the Co-operative
Court without raising a challenge to the conveyance. However factually
both resolutions as well as conveyance were challenged before civil court
in Margret Almeida. Therefore, the observations in paras-46 and 47 of
the judgment refer to a mere hypothetical situation which was not
involved in the case before the Apex Court. The issue before the Apex
Court was entirely different, it related to jurisdiction of a civil court to
maintain a composite challenge to society resolution and conveyance. In
Margret Almeida, the Society had adopted a Resolution to sell land in
favour of Respondent Nos. 22 and 23 (purchasers) and in furtherance of
the said Resolution, the sale deed/conveyance was executed. Two Suits
were instituted in this Court challenging both the Resolution, as well as
the Deed of Conveyance. Jurisdiction of this Court to try and entertain
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the Suits was questioned by the defendants therein by referring to the
provisions of Section 91 of the MCS Act. Therefore, the issue before the
Apex Court was whether Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide a Suit
involving a composite challenge to General Body Resolution adopted by
the Society, as well as the Deed of Conveyance executed in pursuance of
that resolution. The Apex Court upheld the jurisdiction of this Court to
try and entertain the suit.
32) Thus, in Margret Almeida the issue involved before the
Apex Court was in respect of subject matter over which only Co-
operative Court can have exclusive jurisdiction. The Apex Court has
answered that issue holding that since conveyance was also challenged,
the dispute would not lie in jurisdiction of Co-operative Court and that
the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the composite challenge to the
Resolution and conveyance. The issue before the Apex Court was not
about impleadment of any party. Therefore, the observations made by
the Apex Court in paras-46 and 47 of the judgment cannot be quoted out
of context to mean as if it is impermissible to add to a Dispute any party
other than the one enumerated under Section 91(1)(a) to (e) or 94(3)(a)
when challenge is restricted only to resolutions adopted by the Society.
It is well settled principle that judgment is an authority for what it
decides and not what can be logically deduced therefrom. [SEE:
Commissioner Of Customs (Port), Chennai Versus. Toyota Kirloskar
Motor Pvt. Ltd.
5
and Secunderabad Club and Others Versus. CIT-V and
Another
6
]. Therefore the judgment of the Apex Court in Margret
5 2007(5) SCC 371
6 2024 (18) SCC 310
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Almeida is not an authority on the proposition that once challenge is
restricted to only resolution (without challenging the conveyance), only
persons enumerated in Section 91(1)(a) to (e) can be impleaded to the
Dispute. In my view therefore the judgment of the Apex Court in
Margret Almeida provides little assistance for deciding the issue
involved in the present case.
33) Mr. Sharma has also relied upon judgment of this Court in
Parimal H. Solanki which makes reference to the judgment of the Apex
Court in Margret Almeida and holds in para-63 of the judgment as
under :
63. This Court in Maya Developers (supra) has considered the decision
of the Supreme Court in Margret Almeida (supra). In Margret Almeida
(supra) the Supreme Court has referred to the Sections 43, 44 and 45
and in that context held that where Section 91(1)(c) speaks of persons
other than the members of the Society, it is actually referring to persons
other than the members of the Society, who have deposited money with
the Society or who have either lent or borrowed the money from the
Society in accordance with the provisions of Sections 43 and 44 and
subject to such restrictions and limitations as if any prescribed with
reference to such lending or borrowing from to the Society. Thus, the
persons other than the members of the Society has been narrowly
de�ned and in my view, will not include the Plaintiff No. 2-
Developer, apart from the fact that there are no speci�c
restrictions and regulations as envisaged under Section 45 of MCS
Act for making Section 91(1)(c) applicable.
(emphasis added)
34) Mr. Sharma has laid emphasis on the above emphasized
observations in para-63 of the judgment in Parimal H. Solanki in
support of his contention that persons other than the members of
Society are narrowly de�ned and that therefore a developer cannot be
included in Section 91(1)(c) of the MCS Act. Again, in Parimal H.
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Solanki, the issue before this Court was about jurisdiction of Civil Court
vis-a-vis Co-operative Court and the judgment provides little assistance
for deciding the issue of impleadment of a party involved in the present
case. The observations made in para-63 of the judgment cannot be read
to mean as if the Co-operative Court does not have power to implead
persons other than those noti�ed in Section 91(1)(a) to (e) as parties to
the Dispute.
35) Mr. Sharma has also relied upon judgment of this Court in
Komal Arvind Vesavkar in which again the issue before this Court was
about jurisdiction of Co-operative Court to entertain challenge to the
Development Agreement. After referring to the judgment of the Apex
Court in Margret Almeida, this Court has held that the Dispute involving
challenge to a Development Agreement would not fall under Section 91
of the MCS Act. The judgment cannot be read to mean as if a developer
cannot be joined as a party to a Dispute involving a challenge only to the
Resolutions adopted by the Society. If impleadement of Respondent
No.4-developer was aimed at bringing in the net challenge to the
conveyance, reliance on judgment in Komal Arvind Vesavkar would have
been relevant and this Court would not have permitted his impleadment
which would have thrown the Dispute out of jurisdiction of the Co-
operative Court.
36) Mr. Kanetkar has relied on judgment of this Court in Eknath
Namdev Lashkare in support of his contention that a developer can also
be joined as a party to the Dispute �led under Section 91(1) of the MCS
Act. In my view, however the judgment in Eknath Namdev Lashkare
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again deals with the issue of jurisdiction of Co-operative Court under
Section 91 vis-a-vis subject matter. The issue involved before this Court
was in respect of jurisdiction of the Civil Court versus the jurisdiction of
the Co-operative Court, where in a Dispute �led before the Co-operative
Court, while challenging the resolution, a declaration was also sought
that the development agreement and power of attorney executed in
favour of a developer were null and void. This Court applied the principle
of agency and held that the developer answered the description of the
word 'agent' used under Section 91(1)(a) of the MCS Act and that
therefore Co-operative Court would have jurisdiction to try and entertain
the dispute involving even challenge to the Development Agreement.
The judgment thus does not deal with the issue of Co-operative Court’s
power to implead parties to a Dispute under Section 94(3)(c) of the MCS
Act. As observed above, there is no challenge to the conveyance and mere
impleadment of Respondent No.4 would not raise the issue of
jurisdiction of Co-operative Court to try the dispute.
37) Thus, none of the judgments relied upon by rival parties
provide any answer to the issue involved in the present case. However,
as observed above, plain reading of provisions of Section 94(3)(c)
provides a clear answer to the issue involved in the present case.
38) Conspectus of the above discussion is that since Co-
operative Court is a specialised forum for resolution of disputes relating
to the internal working of societies, ordinarily no dispute concerning
third-parties, who are not the enumerated entities under Section 91(1)(a)
to (e) or who do not answer description under Section 94(3)(a) of the
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MCS Act, can be adjudicated by that Court. It is only when a Co-operative
Court considers that presence of a person falling beyond the enumerated
list under Section 91(1)(a) to (e) or a pendente lite purchaser is necessary
for effective adjudication of the Dispute that such person can be added
as party to the Dispute. However the impleadment granted under Section
94(3)(c) of the Act is not for adjudication of rights between the parties to
the Dispute and the impleaded person. The impleadment is only for
effective decision of the questions involved in the Dispute. While
upholding powers of a Co-operative Court to direct impleadment of a
person other than those enumerated in Section 91(a) to (e) or 94(3)(a) of
the Act, this Court would add a word of caution that the power under
Section 94(3)(c) though wide, is not unbridled. Under the guise of
exercise of power under Section 94(3)(c), the Co-operative Court cannot
bring within the scope of the dispute the subject matters which are
incapable of being adjudicated under Section 91. The power under
Section 94(3)(c) needs to be used sparingly when presence of a person is
felt necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute. Impleadment
under Section 94(3)(c) must be refused where such impleadment may
result in throwing the dispute out of jurisdiction of the Co-operative
Court. The provisions of Section 94(3)(c) is not a window for entry of
persons in the pending dispute who would ultimately open the exit door
of Co-operative Court for ensuring that the dispute is thrown out of
jurisdiction.
39) In the present case, Petitioners have leveled serious
allegations against Respondent No.4 of colliding with the Society. The
have alleged that the impugned Resolutions are adopted by the Society
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at the behest of Respondent No.4. In that view of the matter, the Co-
operative Court and Co-operative Appellate Court have considered it
necessary to have the presence of Respondent No.4 for effective
adjudication of the dispute. It is not that the Co-operative Court is going
to adjudicate any rights between the Petitioners and Respondent No.4 in
the Dispute. Impleadment of Respondent No.4 as party opponent to the
Dispute is neither aimed at nor would result in adjudication of issue
relating to validity of conveyance. The nature of Dispute would continue
to be a plain vanilla challenge to the Resolution even after impleadment
of Respondent No.4.
40) The apprehension expressed by Mr. Sharma that
impleadment of Respondent No.4 may throw the Dispute out of
jurisdiction of Co-operative Court is misplaced. As observed above,
impleadment of Respondent No.4 is not for the purpose of adjudication
of any relief in favour of or against Respondent No.4. Co-operative Court
has thought it appropriate to implead Respondent No.4 only for the
purpose of effective adjudication of the Dispute. It is not even the case of
Respondent No.4 that since he is not one of the persons enumerated in
the list under Section 91(1)(a) to (e), the Co-operative Court does not
have jurisdiction over subject matter involved in the dispute. Respondent
No.4 has not sought his impleadment for the purpose of taking the
Dispute outside the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court.
41) In view of the above discussion, I do not �nd any in�rmity in
the orders passed by the Co-operative Court, as upheld by the Co-
operative Appellate Court. The impugned orders appear, to my mind, to
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be unexceptional. The Writ Petition is devoid of merits. It is accordingly
dismissed with no order as to cost.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE , J.]
PAGE NO. 30 of 30
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NEETA
SHAILESH
SAWANT
Digitally
signed by
NEETA
SHAILESH
SAWANT
Date:
2026.07.08
19:36:02
+0530
Legal Notes
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