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PETITIONER:

MR. V. NARAYANASWAMY

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

MR. C.P.THIRUNAVUKKARASU

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/01/2000

BENCH:

Dr. A.S.Anand, Mr. D.P.Wadhawa, Mr. S.Rajandra Babu

JUDGMENT:

D.P. Wadhwa, J.

This appeal is directed against the judgment dated

August 18, 1998 of the Madras High Court allowing the

miscellaneous application (Original Application No. 298/98)

filed by the respondent under Order 6 Rule 16 and Order 7

Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the

'Code') and thus holding that the election petition filed by

the appellant under Section 100 (1)(b) and (d) of the

Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short the 'Act')

stands dismissed under Section 83(1) of the Act read with

the Code. In the election petition appellant had challenged

the election of the respondent to the Council of States

(Rajya Sabha) from the Pondicherry Legislative Assembly.

On September 16, 1997 Election Commission issued a

notification calling upon the Legislative Assembly of the

Union Territory of Pondicherry to fill up the vacancy on the

completion of the term of the appellant in the Rajya Sabha.

The notification also stipulated the election schedule. By

the same notification the Secretary, Pondicherry Legislative

Assembly was appointed as Returning Officer for the

election. On September 26, 1997 the Election Commission

released the list of contesting candidates. These were the

appellant belonging to the Indian National Congress (INC)

and the respondent belonging to Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

(DMK). On October 23, 1997 election was held and results

declared the same day. Out of the total electorate of 29

members of the Legislative Assembly 27 cast their votes.

Respondents polled 15 votes, the appellant 12. On October

7, 1997 notification dated October 6, 1997 to this effect

was published in the Government Gazette. On November 17,

1997 appellant filed the election petition in the High Court

challenging the election of the respondent. He alleged that

election of the respondent was vitiated due to corrupt

practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(B)(b) and

Section 100 (1)(d) of the Act, committed by the respondent,

his agents and other persons with the consent of the

respondent.

The appellant alleged the following corrupt practices

committed by the respondent: --

1. Respondent was proposed by Mr. R.V. Janakiraman,

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Chief Minister belonging to DMK. For the second set of

application the name of respondent was proposed by Mr. C.

Jayakumar, Minister in the Government of Pondicherry. The

proposals were seconded respectively by Mr. M. Kandaswamy,

Deputy Speaker and Mr. K. Rajasekheran, Parliamentary

Secretary to the Chief Minister. All these four persons

acted as agents for the respondent in the election. (para 6

of the election petition)

2. After the commencement of the election process on

September 26, 1997 Government of Pondicherry announced

appointment of Chairmen for five State owned corporations.

It was published in the daily newspaper Daily Jhanthi on

September 27, 1997. None of the nominees was from Congress.

This amounted to exercise of undue influence to secure the

votes of the MLAs, particularly the MLAs who were nominated

as Chairmen. The Government of Pondicherry was headed by

Mr. R.V. Janakiraman, who acted as agent of the

respondent. Announcement of the notification materially

affected the result of the election. (para 11 of the

election petition)

3. After the date of the election was fixed for

October 3, 1997 the appellant wanted to meet all the MLAs at

Pondicherry. However, MLAs belonging to DMK, Tamil Manila

Congress, Communist Party of India, Pattali Makkel Katchi,

Janata Dal and also an independent MLA were not available in

Pondicherry. The MLAs were taken out of Pondicherry,

entertained there and were brought back to Pondicherry on

October 2, 1997. Similarly except two Ministers, Mr. S.P.

Sivakumar and Mr. R. Viswanathan, no other Minister was

available in Pondicherry. The Chief Minister Mr. R.V.

Janakiraman took the MLAs and kept them at Hotel Ashok,

Pondicherry by providing all facilities to them from

September 25, 1997 to September 27, 1997. Thereafter the

MLAs were shifted to Mahabalipuram and entertained in five

star hotels. Complaint to this effect was sent by the

appellant to the Election Commission on October 2, 1997.

(para 7 of the election petition)

4. Mr. C. Jayakumar, who had proposed the name of

the respondent, took Mr. Kandaswamy and Mr. K.

Rajasekheran to Goa with a view to influence them. They

were taken there in a Government vehicle bearing

registration No. PY-01-C-2345 and PY-01-D-9289 on September

27, 1998, returning on October 1, 1997. In Goa all the

three stayed in Government Guest House. Entire expenses for

their travel and stay at Goa were met by the Government of

Pondicherry. Both Mr. Kandaswamy and Mr. Rajasekheran

were taken to Goa and entertained there as a reward for

voting in favour of the respondent. They were influenced to

cast their votes in favour of the respondent. This conduct

of Mr. C. Jayakumar, who was agent of the respondent,

amounted to corrupt practice. Both Mr. C. Jayakumar and

Mr. R.V. Janakiraman, the Chief Minister, did the corrupt

practice with the consent of the respondent, which

materially affected the election result in so far as it

concerned the respondent.

5. Mr. N. Keshavan, another agent of the

respondent, also influenced Mr. R. Rajaraman, Janata Dal

MLA. Mr. N. Keshavan, MLA is the Government whip

belonging to DMK. Mr. R. Rajaraman was kept at Ashok

Hotel at Pondicherry and then taken to Kovalam, Chengleput

District, then to Tirupati in a Government vehicle bearing

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registration No. PY-01-6667 and then brought back to

Pondicherry on October 2, 1997. Entire expenses of this

trip were borne by the Government of Pondicherry headed by

Mr. R.V. Janakiraman, an agent of the respondent.

In the counter affidavit filed by the respondent on

May 25, 1998 he denied all the allegations made against him.

It was submitted that the allegations of corrupt practices

alleged in the election petition were vague and unspecific

and bereft of material facts and particulars. It was also

submitted that the election petition be dismissed under

Order 6 Rule 16 and Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. On the

same day the respondent also filed a miscellaneous

application (Original Application No. 298 of 1998) praying

for striking out the paragraphs 5 to 11, 13 and 14 of the

election petition on the ground that material facts were not

stated in the election petition and praying for dismissal of

the election petition to that score. Respondent also raised

objection to the validity of the verification to the

petition and to the affidavit in support of the allegations

of corrupt practices. The appellant filed rejoinder to the

counter affidavit and reply to the miscellaneous application

reaffirming what he had said in the election petition. He

said the election petition was duly verified as per law and

the affidavit legally correct.

On the pleadings of the parties High Court framed the

issues. However by the impugned judgment dated August 18,

1998 High Court allowed the miscellaneous application of the

respondent and dismissed the election petition without

holding any trial. Aggrieved appellant got leave to appeal

and this is how the matter is before us.

Mr. Murli Bhandare, learned senior counsel for the

appellant, confined his submissions to corrupt practices

alleged in paras 6, 7, 8, 9 & 11 of the election petition,

which have been noted above. He submitted that High Court

was in error in dismissing the election petition without

trial on the ground that material facts were not set out

when High Court itself had framed issues on the basis of the

material facts set out in the election petition. He said

High Court failed in appreciating the crucial distinction

between material facts and material particulars and that

High Court also failed to take notice of the decision of

this Court in D. Ramachandran vs. R.V. Janakiraman and

others (1999 (3) SCC 267) holding that the court cannot

dissect the pleadings into several parts to consider whether

each one of them disclosed a cause of action. Mr. Bhandare

said following questions arose for consideration by this

Court: -

(i) Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing

the election petition without trial although material facts

were set out in the petition and issues were framed for

trial.

(ii) Whether the High Court was justified in

entertaining a miscellaneous application on behalf of the

returned candidate for striking out paragraphs 5 to 11, 13

and 14 of the election petition after framing issues for

trial on the basis of the pleadings and after hearing the

parties.

(iii) Whether the High Court was justified in

dissecting the pleadings into several parts to consider

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whether each one of them discloses a cause of action.

(iv) Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting

the election petition without trial without appreciating the

crucial distinction between material facts and material

particulars.

We may refer to the verification to the election

petition and also to the affidavit, which is required to be

filled, in the form prescribed, by the appellant: --

"VERIFICATION I, Mr. V. Narayanasamy, son of Sri

Velu, residing at No. 5, Ellaiamman Koil Street,

Pondicherry-1, the petitioner herein do hereby declare that

what all stated in the above paragraphs 1 to 15 are all true

to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Verified at Chennai this 17th day of November, 1997.

Petitioner."

"AFFIDAVIT OF V. NARAYANASAMY I, Mr. V.

Narayanasamy, son of Velu, Hindu, aged about 50 years,

residing at No. 5, Ellaiamman Koil Street, Pondicherry-1

now temporarily come down to Chennai, the petitioner in the

Election Petition calling in question the Election of Shree

C.P. Thirunavukkarasu, the respondent in the Election

Petition, makes solemn affirmation/Oath and say: --

a) that the statements made in paragraphs 7 to 10 of

the accompanying Election Petition about the commission of

the corrupt practice of gratification as a motive or reward

for securing votes and undue influence as referred under

Section 123(1)(B) and (2) of the particulars of such corrupt

practice mentioned in paragraphs 7 to 10 of the same

petition are true to my knowledge.

b) That the statements made in paragraph 7 to 10 of

the accompanying Election Petition about the Commission of

the corrupt practice of gratifications a motive or reward

for securing votes and undue influence as referred under

Section 123(1)(b) and (2) of the Representation of the

People Act, 1951 and the particulars of such corrupt

practice mentioned in paragraphs 7 to 11 of the same

petition are true to my information;

c) That the statements made in paragraph 11 of the

accompanying Election Petition about the Commission of

corrupt practice of gratification as a motive or reward for

securing votes and undue influence as referred under Section

123(1)(B) and (2) of the Representation of the People Act,

1951 and the particulars of such corrupt practice mentioned

in paragraph 11 of the same petition are true to my

information."

Both the verification and the affidavit do not meet

the requirement of law.

In the counter affidavit filed to the election

petition, the respondent had specifically prayed for

striking out paras 5 to 11, 13 and 14 of the election

petition on the ground that in those paragraphs there were

no material facts and that material facts necessary to

constitute cause of action had not been pleaded. He had

also prayed for dismissal of the election petition under

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Order 6 Rule 16 and Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. Appellant,

it appears, filed his rejoinder denying that the material

facts had not been stated or that the petition had not been

verified properly or the affidavit in support of corrupt

practice did not conform to the requirements of law. In the

miscellaneous application (Original Application No.298/98),

the respondent had again prayed for striking out the

paragraphs 5 to 11, 13 and 14 of the election petition as

well as for dismissal of the election petition on the

grounds that the averments pleaded in those paragraphs did

not give rise to (i) any triable issue and (ii) the election

petition suffered from lack of valid verification and the

affidavit. Again in reply to this, the appellant denied

that there were no material facts and that the verification

in the petition was not proper or that the affidavit was not

in accordance with the Rules.

The question, therefore, before us, is - what is the

effect of lack of material facts, material particulars,

proper verification to the election petition and the

defective affidavit required to be filed in the form

prescribed? The respondent says that when the petition

lacked even material facts and since the petition did not

disclose cause of action for having committed any corrupt

practice, for all these reasons High Court was justified in

dismissing the petition at the threshold without going for a

trial.

In support of their rival contentions various

decisions of this Court were cited at the Bar. We may refer

to some of them.

In Ch. Subbarao vs. Member, Election Tribunal,

Hyderabad [(1964) 6 SCR 213] (CB) election petition was type

written and the copies which accompanied the petition were

carbon copies of the type written script, so there was no

question of the copies being other than true copies. The

copies bore two signatures in original of the petitioner

authenticating both the contents of the petition as well as

the verification thereof. The petitioner, however, did not

insert the words "true copy" before or above the signatures.

High Court considered that this rendered the petition filed

not in accordance with Section 81(3) of the Act and on that

ground the petition was dismissed. The view of the High

Court was challenged before this Court. While explaining

the proposition that an election petition was not to be

equated to an action at law or in equity but that as the

rights were purely the creature of statute, if the statute

rendered any particular requirement mandatory, the courts

possessed and could exercise no dispensing power to waive

non-compliance. This Court held that the alleged defect in

the petition did not constitute non-compliance with the

provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act as there was

substantial compliance with those provisions. In coming to

this conclusion, the Court relied on its earlier

Constitution Bench decision in the case of Murarka Radhey

Shyam Ram Kumar vs. Roop Singh Rathore & Ors. [(1964) 3

SCR 573].

In Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar's case [(1964) 3 SCR

573] (CB) this Court held that defect in verification which

is to be made in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 for the verification of pleadings as

required by clause (c) of Section 81(3) is not fatal to the

maintainability of the election petition. The Court then

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considered the arguments relating to the affidavit which

accompanied the election petition in respect of corrupt

practice alleged in the petition. The argument was that the

affidavit was neither in the prescribed form nor was it

properly sworn as required by the Rules under the Conduct of

Election Rules, 1961. Therefore, there was a failure to

comply with the provisions of Section 83(1) of the Act.

Further argument was that an election petition under Section

81 must comply with the provisions of Section 83 and unless

it complies with those provisions, it is not an election

petition under Section 81. The Court approved the view of

the Election Tribunal that the affidavit was in the

prescribed form but due to inexperience the Oath

Commissioner had made a mistake in the verification portion

of the affidavit. This Court did not think that the defect

in the verification due to the inexperience of the Oath

Commission was such a fatal defect as to require the

dismissal of the election petition.

In Daulat Ram Chauhan vs. Anand Sharma [AIR 1984 SC

621 = (1984) 2 SCC 64] (2J), this Court laid two

propositions: --

"1. A person may, due to sympathy or on his own,

support the candidature of a particular candidate but unless

a close and direct nexus is proved between the act of the

person and the consent given to him by the candidate or his

election agent, the same would not amount to a pleading of

corrupt practice as contemplated by law. It cannot be left

to time, chance or conjecture for the court to draw an

inference by adopting an involved process of reasoning. In

fine, the allegation must be so clear and specific that the

inference of corrupt practice will irresistibly admit of no

doubt or qualm.

2. Where the allegation of fraudulent practice is

open to two equal possible inferences the pleadings of

corrupt practice must fail. For instance, A, or in this

case Sood or Batish, joined or participated or was present

in an election rally or crowd and may have shouted slogans

on his own without taking the consent of the candidate

concerned, this would not be a corrupt practice within the

meaning of Section 123(2) because the element of consent is

wholly wanting."

In F.A. Sapa & Ors. vs. Singora & Ors. [(1991) 3

SCC 375] (3J) the question before the High Court was whether

the election petition was in conformity with the

requirements of Sections 81 and 83 of the Representation of

the People Act, 1951 and the Rules framed thereunder.

Preliminary objection raised by the appellant, the

successful candidate, about the maintainability of the

petition, was negatived by the High Court. Against that

order he came to this Court. One of the questions before

this Court was: if the election petition was liable to be

dismissed under Section 83 of the Act primarily on the

ground that the affidavit filed by the original petitioner

was not strictly in conformity with Form 25, inasmuch as the

verification as regards the averments based on knowledge and

the averments based on information had not been made

separately as required by the said Form prescribed by Rule

95-A of the Rules. This Court considered various provisions

of the Act, particularly Part VI entitled "Disputes

Regarding Elections" and said that it constituted a self-

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contained code. It was submitted by the appellant in that

case that there was failure to comply with even the basic

requirements of an affidavit and as a matter of fact it was

a case of no compliance. This Court held that where several

paragraphs of the election petition remain unaffirmed under

the verification clause as well as the affidavit, the

unsworn allegation could have no legal existence and the

Court could not take cognizance thereof. It was further

submitted in that case that proof of allegation of corrupt

practice would visit the returned candidate with certain

serious consequences and must, therefore, be viewed

seriously. It was further held by this Court that inquiry

being quasi-criminal in nature, the Court must always insist

on strict compliance with the provisions of law in that

behalf and failure to do so must prove fatal. This Court

said: -

"It is fairly well settled that our election law being

statutory in character must be strictly complied with since

an election petition is not guided by ever changing common

law principles of justice and notions of equity. Being

statutory in character it is essential that it must conform

to the requirements of our election law. But at the same

time the purity of election process must be maintained at

all costs and those who violate the statutory norms must

suffer for such violation. If the returned candidate is

shown to have secured his success at the election by corrupt

means he must suffer for his misdeeds."

This Court observed that where the petitioner has

alleged corrupt practice that is not enough, proviso to

Section 83 demands that the petition shall be accompanied by

an affidavit in the prescribed form supporting the

allegation of such corrupt practice and particulars thereof.

The Court said:

"Therefore, an election petition in which corrupt

practice is alleged stands on a different footing from an

election petition which does not carry such an allegation.

The legislature has taken special care to ensure that

ordinary verification will not suffice, it must be supported

by an affidavit in the prescribed form. Form 25 has been

prescribed for such an affidavit under Rule 94-A of the

Rules. That rule says that the affidavit referred to in the

proviso to Section 83(1) shall be in Form 25. The form of

the affidavit requires the deponent to state which of the

paragraphs of the election petition in which allegations of

corrupt practice are made are based on his own knowledge and

which are based on his information. Section 86(1) then

mandates that the High Court "shall' dismiss an election

petition which does not comply with the provisions of

Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the R.P. Act.

The language of this sub-section is quite imperative and

commands the High Court, in no uncertain terms, to dismiss

an election petition which does not comply with the

requirements of Section 81 or Section 82. This mandate is,

however, qualified by section 86(5) referred to earlier."

The Court then observed that the procedural

precautions intended to ensure that the person making the

allegation of corrupt practice realizes the seriousness

thereof as such a charge would be akin to a criminal charge

since it visits the party indulging in such practice with a

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twofold penalty and that is why this Court described it as

quasi-criminal in nature. It is, therefore, equally

essential that the particulars of the charge or allegation

are clearly and precisely stated in the election petition to

afford a fair opportunity to the person against whom it is

levelled to effectively counter the same (see K.M. Mani vs.

P.J. Anthony (1979 (2) SCC 221). This Court then said: --

"Section 83(1)(a) stipulates that every election

petition shall contain a concise statement of the 'material

facts' on which the petitioner relies. That means the

entire bundle of facts which would constitute a complete

cause of action must be concisely stated in an election

petition. Section 83(1)(b) next requires an election

petitioner to set forth full 'particulars' of any corrupt

practice alleged against a returned candidate. These

'particulars' are obviously different from the 'material

facts' on which the petition is founded and are intended to

afford to the returned candidate an adequate opportunity to

effectively meet with such an allegation. The underlying

idea in requiring the election petitioner to set out in a

concise manner all the 'material facts' as well as the 'full

particulars', where commission of corrupt practice is

complained of, is to delineate the scope, ambit and limits

of the inquiry at the trial of the election petition."

Then the Court held as under: --

"From the text of the relevant provisions of the R.P.

Act, Rule 94-A and Form 25 as well as Order 6 Rule 15 and

Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code and the resume of the case law

discussed above it clearly emerges (i) a defect in the

verification, if any, can be cured (ii) it is not essential

that the verification clause at the foot of the petition or

the affidavit accompanying the same should disclose the

grounds or sources of information in regard to the averments

or allegations which are based on information believed to be

true (iii) if the respondent desires better particulars in

regard to such averments or allegations, he may call for the

same in which case the petitioner may be required to supply

the same and (iv) the defect in the affidavit in the

prescribed Form 25 can be cured unless the affidavit forms

an integral part of the petition, in which case the defect

concerning material facts will have to be dealt with,

subject to limitation, under Section 81(3) as indicated

earlier. Similarly, the court would have to decide in each

individual case whether the schedule or annexure referred to

in Section 83(2) constitutes an integral part of the

election petition or not; different considerations will

follow in the case of the former as compared to those in the

case of the latter."

In Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat and another vs. Dattaji

Raghobaji Meghe and others [AIR 1995 SC 2284 = (1995) 5 SCC

347], this Court again said: --

"1. Section 83 of the Act provides that the election

petition must contain a conscise statement of the material

facts on which the petitioner relies and further that he

must set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice that

he alleges including as full a statement as possible of the

name of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt

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practices and the date and place of the commission of each

of such corrupt practice. This section has been held to be

mandatory and requires first a concise statement of material

facts and then the full particulars of the alleged corrupt

practice, so as to present a full picture of the cause of

action.

2. A petition levelling a charge of corrupt practice

is required, by law, to be supported by an affidavit and the

election petitioner is also obliged to disclose his source

of information in respect of the commission of the corrupt

practice. This becomes necessary to bind the election

petitioner to the charge levelled by him and to prevent any

fishing or roving enquiry and to prevent the returned

candidate from being taken by a surprise. (see : Sampat N.

Balkrishna v. George Fernandez [(1969) 3 SCC 238].

In T.M. Jacob vs. C. Poulose and others (1999 (4)

SCC 274) a Constitution Bench of this Court was considering

a judgment in the case of Dr. Shipra vs. Shanti Lal

Khoiwal (1996 (5) SCC 181) wherein on the basis of

non-compliance of Section 81(3) the election petition was

dismissed at the threshold under Section 86(1) of the Act.

Then considering the provisions of Sections 81, 82, 83,

86(1) and 86(5) of the Act the Court said:-

"(That apart), to our mind, the legislative intent

appears to be quite clear, since it divides violations into

two classes those violations which would entail dismissal

of the election petition under Section 86(1) of the Act like

non-compliance with Section 81(3) and those violations which

attract Section 83(1) of the Act, i.e., non-compliance with

the provisions of Section 83. It is only the violation of

Section 81 of the Act which can attract the application of

the doctrine of substantial compliance as expounded in

Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kmar vs. Roop Singh Rathore (1964

(3) SCR 573) and Ch. Subbarao vs. Member, Election

Tribunal, Hyderabad (1964 (6) SCR 213) cases. The defect of

the type provided in Section 83 of the Act, on the other

hand, can be dealt with under the doctrine of curability, on

the principles contained in the Code of Civil Procedure."

In D. Ramachandran vs. R.V. Janakiraman and others

(1999 (3) SCC 267) a three Judge Bench of this Court

observed: -

"It is well settled that in all cases of preliminary

objection, the test is to see whether any of the reliefs

prayed for could be granted to the appellant if the

averments made in the petition are proved to be true. For

the purpose of considering a preliminary objection, the

averments in the petition should be assumed to be true and

the court has to find out whether those averments disclose a

cause of action or a triable issue as such. The court

cannot probe into the facts on the basis of the controversy

raised in the counter."

The Court said that under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code

the court is to reject the plaint where it does not disclose

the cause of action. But there is no question of striking

out any portion of the pleadings under this Rule. The Court

said: -

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"The application filed by the first respondent in OA

No. 36 of 1997 is on the footing that the averments in the

election petition did not contain the material facts giving

rise to a triable issue or disclosing a cause of action.

Laying stress upon the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(a),

learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent took us

through the entire election petition and submitted that the

averments therein do not disclose a cause of action. On a

reading of the petition, we do not find it possible to agree

with him. The election petition as such does disclose a

cause of action which if unrebutted could void the election

and the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC cannot

therefore be invoked in this case. There is no merit in the

contention that some of the allegations are bereft of

material facts and as such do not disclose a cause of

action. It is elementary that under Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC,

the court cannot dissect the pleading into several parts and

consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of

action. Under the Rule, there cannot be a partial rejection

of the plaint or petition."

The case of Dr. Shipra (Smt) and others vs. Shanti

Lal Khoiwal and others [(1996) 5 SCC 181] was considered by

the Constitution Bench in the case of T.M. Jacob vs. C.

Poulose and others [(1999) 4 SCC 274]. In Dr. Shipra's

case a preliminary objection was raised that copy of the

notice together with the affidavit in support of the

election petition on the allegation of corrupt practices did

not contain the verification by the Notary and hence the

election petition was not maintainable in accordance with

Section 83(1)(c) of the Act. The objection was upheld by

the High Court and appeal against that was dismissed by this

Court. The question thus raised before this Court for its

consideration was whether the copy of the election petition

accompanied by supporting affidavit served on the respondent

along with Form 25 prescribed under Rule 94-A of the Conduct

of Elections Rules, 1961 without attestation part duly

verified by the District Magistrate/Notary/Oath Commissioner

could be said to be "true and correct copy" of the election

petition as envisaged in Section 81(3) of the Act.

Explaining the judgment in Dr. Shipra's case the

Constitution Bench in T.M. Jacob's case observed:-

"The defect found in the 'true copy' of the affidavit

in Dr. Shipra case was not merely the absence of the name

of the Notary or his seal and stamp but a complete absence

of "notarial endorsement" of the verification as well as

absence of an "affirmation" or "oath" by the election

petitioner. It was in that context that the Bench had found

in Dr. Shipra case that the returned candidate would have

got the impression, on a perusal of the "true copy" of the

affidavit, that there was no duly sworn and verified

affidavit filed in support of the allegations of corrupt

practice by the election petitioner. It was precisely on

account of this "fatal" defect that K. Ramaswamy, J.

opined that "the principle of substantial compliance cannot

be accepted in the fact situation". Thus the judgment in

Dr. Shipra case is confined to the "fact situation" as

existing in that case................"

In Dr. Shipra's case this Court held: --

"Sections 81, 83(1)(c) and 86 read with Rule 94-A of

the Rules and Form 25 are to be read conjointly as an

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integral scheme. When so read, if the court finds on an

objection, being raised by the returned candidate, as to the

maintainability of the election petition, the court is

required to go into the question and decide the preliminary

objection. In case the court does not uphold the same, the

need to conduct trial would arise. If the court upholds the

preliminary objection, the election petition would result in

dismissal at the threshold, as the court is left with no

option except to dismiss the same."

In R.P. Moidutty vs. P.T. Kunju Mohammad & Anr.

[JT 1999 (7) SC 457] (3J) this Court was considering the

question regarding nature of particulars required to be

pleaded in support of an averment of corrupt practice. It

said that heavy onus lies on the petitioner seeking setting

aside of the election of a successful candidate to make out

a clear case for such relief both in the pleadings and at

the trial. The mandate of the people is one as has been

truly, freely and purely expressed. And further that "as

the consequences flowing from the proof of corrupt practice

at the election are serious, the onus of establishing

commission of corrupt practice lies heavily on the person

who alleges the same". In this case, the corrupt practice

alleged was screening of a video film by the successful

candidate which according to the petitioner materially

affected the result of the election and vitiated by the

commission of corrupt practice within the meaning of

sub-section (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Act. It was

alleged that the film was exhibited throughout the

constituency during the election. The photo-contents of the

video film as also the speeches contained therein were

highly objectionable and inflammatory. This Court also

referred to the verification to the election petition as

well as to the affidavit required to be filled in Form No.25

appended to the Rules. The verification was as under:

"I, R.P. Moidutty, S/o Abubakker Haji, aged 54,

petitioner in the above election petition do hereby declare

that the averments in para 1 to 17 are true and made from

personal knowledge and on the basis of personal enquiry I

believe that all the averments made in para 1 to 17 is true.

Signed and verified in this the 21st day of June,

1996. PETITIONER"

This Court then said :

"Application of the abovenoted well settled principles

to the case at hand raises a gloomy picture indeed. The

petition is bereft of some material facts and particulars.

It does not set out names of even a few persons who viewed

the film and/or in whose presence it was exhibited though it

was not necessary for the petitioner to have alleged the

names of each and every person who had viewed the video

film. However, the names of a few persons who had viewed

the film and in whose presence it was exhibited were

expected to have been alleged in the election petition so as

to put respondent No.1 on notice that these were the persons

who were proposed to be examined by the petitioner in

support of his averments. The petitioner's pleading in this

regard fails to satisfy the requirements of proviso to sub

section (1) of Section 83 of the Act as explained in Azhar

Hussain vs. Rajiv Gandhi [(1986) 2 SCR 782]."

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"The affidavit filed by the petitioner in support of

the election petition as required by Rule 94 A also does not

satisfy the requirement of proviso to sub- section (1) of

Section 83 of the Act and Form No.25 appended to the Rules.

The several averments relating to commission of corrupt

practice by the first respondent as contained in paragraphs

4 to 12 and 16 of the petition have been verified as true to

the best of "my knowledge and information" both, without

specifying which of the allegations were true to the

personal knowledge of the petitioner and which of the

allegations were based on the information of the petitioner

believed by him to be true. Neither the verification in the

petition nor the affidavit gives any indication of the

source of information of the petitioner as to such facts as

were not in his own knowledge."

"All the averments made in paras 1 to 17 of the

petition have been stated to be true to the persoal

knowledge of the petitioner and in the next breath the very

same averments have been stated to be based on the

information of the petitioner and believed by him to be

true. The source of information is not disclosed. As

observed by the Supreme Court in F.A. Sapa etc. etc. v.

singora and others JT 1991 (2) SC 503, the object of

requiring verification of an election petition is to clearly

fix the responsibility for the averments and allegations in

the petition on the person signing the verification and, at

the same time, discouraging wild and irresponsible

allegations unsupported by facts. However, the defect of

verification is not fatal to the petition; it can be cured

[see : Murarka Radhey Sham Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore

and Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1545, A.S. Subbaraj v. M. Muthiah 5

ELR 21]. In the present case the defect in verification was

pointed out by raising a plea in that regard in the written

statement. The objection was pressed and pursued by arguing

the same before the Court. However, the petitioner

persisted in pursuing the petition without proper

verification which the petitioner should not have been

permitted to do. In our opinion, unless the defect in

verification was rectified, the petition could not have been

tried. For want of affidavit in required form and also for

lack of particulars, the allegations of corrupt practice

could not have been enquired into and tried at all. In

fact, the present one is a fit case where the petition

should have been rejected at the threshold for

non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of law as to

pleadings."

In L.R. Shivaramagowda & Ors. vs. T.M.

Chandrashekar (Dead) By LRs. & Ors. [(1999) 1 SCC 666]

(3J) this Court again considered the importance of pleadings

establishing in an election petition alleging corrupt

practice falling within the scope of Section 123 of the Act

and said :

"This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of

pleadings in an election petition and pointed out the

difference between "material facts" and "material

particulars". While the failure to plead material facts is

fatal to the election petition and no amendment of the

pleading could be allowed to introduce such material facts

after the time-limit prescribed for filing the election

petition, the absence of material particulars can be cured

at a later stage by an appropriate amendment. In Balwan

Singh v. Lakshmi Narain [AIR 1960 SC 770 = (1960) 3 SCR 91]

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the Constitution Bench held that an election petition was

not liable to be dismissed in limine merely because full

particulars of corrupt practice alleged were not set out.

On the facts of the case, the Court found that the alleged

corrupt practice of hiring a vehicle for the conveyance of

the voters to the polling station was sufficiently set out

in the pleading. The Court pointed out that the corrupt

practice being hiring or procuring of the vehicle for the

conveyance of the electors, if full particulars of conveying

by a vehicle of electors to or from any polling stations

were given, Section 83 was duly compiled with, even if the

particulars of the contract of hiring, as distinguished from

the fact of hiring were not given."

Then this Court referred to the various judgments of

this Court drawing distinction between the "material fact"

and "material particulars" holding that if petition suffers

from lack of material facts, it is liable to be summarily

rejected for want of cause of action and if the deficiency

is only of material particular, the Court has a discretion

to allow the petitioner to supply the required particulars

even after the expiry of limitation. With regard to the

affidavit to be filed along with the election petition in

the prescribed Form No.25, the Court observed that the

defect in such affidavit could be cured unless it formed the

integral part of the petition in which case, the defect

concerning material facts will have to be dealt with subject

to limitation under Section 81 of the Act. In this case,

the Court observed that "if the above well settled

principles are applied in this case, there is no doubt

whatever that the election petition suffers from a very

serious defect of failure to set out material facts of the

alleged corrupt practice. The defect invalidates the

election petition in that regard and the petitioner ought

not to have been permitted to adduce any evidence with

reference to the same." The affidavit filed along with the

petition does not disclose the source of information. Nor

does it set out which part of the election petition was

personally known to the petitioner and which part came to be

known by him on information. The Court said that the

affidavit was not in conformity with the prescribed Form

No.25 and, thus, there was a failure to comply with Rule

94-A of the Conduct of Elections Rules and that it is a very

serious defect.

In H.D. Revanna vs. G. Puttaswamy Gowda and Others

[(1999) 2 SCC 217] (2J) appeal was filed by the candidate

who had succeeded in the election and whose application for

dismissal of the election petition in limine was rejected by

the High Court. This Court noticed that it has been laid

down by this Court that non-compliance with the provisions

of Section 83 may lead to dismissal of the petition if the

matter falls within the scope of Order 6 Rule 16 and Order 7

Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Two of the grounds

on which dismissal of the election was sought were that (1)

allegations of corrupt practice were vague and did not

contain material facts or particulars and (2) affidavit in

support of the allegations of corrupt practice was not in

conformity with Rule 94A or Form 25 as prescribed. On

facts, this Court held that contents were not vague and that

there had been substantial compliance with the provisions of

law. The Court noticed that the body of the petition itself

mentioned the matters which were within the knowledge of the

petitioner himself and the matters of which he got

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information from others and believe them. The Court

distinguished the judgments of this Court in Dr. Shipra

(Smt.) & Ors. vs. Shanti Lal Khoiwal and Ors. [(1996) 5

SCC 181]; L.R. shivaramagowda & Ors. vs. T.M.

Chandrashekar (dead) by LRs & Ors. [(1999) 1 SCC 666] and

Dharamvir vs. Amar Singh & Ors. [(1996) 3 SCC 158].

It will be thus seed that an election petition is

based on the rights, which are purely the creature of

statute, and if the statute renders any particular

requirement mandatory, the court cannot exercise dispensing

powers to waive non-compliance. For the purpose of

considering a preliminary objection as to the

maintainability of the election petition the averments in

the petition should be assumed to be true and the court has

to find out whether these averments disclose a cause of

action or a triable issue as such. Sections 81, 83(1)(c)

and 86 read with Rule 94-A of the Rules and Form 25 are to

be read conjointly as an integral scheme. When so read if

the court finds non-compliance it has to uphold the

preliminary objection and has no option except to dismiss

the petition. There is difference between "material facts"

and "material particulars". While the failure to plead

material facts is fatal to the election petition the absence

of material particulars can be cured at a later stage by an

appropriate amendment. "Material facts" mean the entire

bundle of facts, which would constitute a complete cause of

action and these must be concisely stated in the election

petition, i.e., clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83.

Then under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 the

election petition must contain full particulars of any

corrupt practice. These particulars are obviously different

from material facts on which the petition is founded. A

petition levelling a charge of corrupt practice is required

by law to be supported by an affidavit and the election

petitioner is obliged to disclose his source of information

in respect of the commission of corrupt practice. He must

state which of the allegations are true to his knowledge and

which to his belief on information received and believed by

him to be true. It is not the form of the affidavit but its

substance that matters. To plead corrupt practice as

contemplated by law it has to be specifically alleged that

the corrupt practices were committed with the consent of the

candidate and that a particular electoral right of a person

was affected. It cannot be left to time, chance or

conjecture for the court to draw inference by adopting an

involved process of reasoning. Where the alleged corrupt

practice is open to two equal possible inferences the

pleadings of corrupt practice must fail. Where several

paragraphs of the election petition alleging corrupt

practices remain unaffirmed under the verification clause as

well as the affidavit, the unsworn allegation could have no

legal existence and the Court could not take cognizance

thereof. Charge of corrupt practice being quasi-criminal in

nature the court must always insist on strict compliance

with the provisions of law. In such a case it is equally

essential that the particulars of the charge of allegations

are clearly and precisely stated in the petition. It is the

violation of the provisions of Section 81 of the Act which

can attract the application of the doctrine of substantial

compliance. The defect of the type provided in Section 83

of the Act on the other hand can be dealt with under the

doctrine of curability, on the principles contained in the

Code of Civil Procedure. Non- compliance with the

provisions of Section 83 may lead to dismissal of the

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petition if the matter falls within the scope of Order 6,

Rule 16 and Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Where neither the verification in the petition nor the

affidavit gives any indication of the sources of information

of the petitioner as to the facts stated in the petition

which are not to his knowledge and the petitioner persists

that the verification is correct and affidavit in the form

prescribed does not suffer from any defect the allegations

of corrupt practices cannot be inquired and tried at all.

In such a case petition has to be rejected on the threshold

for non- compliance with the mandatory provisions of law as

to pleadings. It is no part of duty of the court suo moto

even to direct furnishing of better particulars when

objection is raised by other side. Where the petition does

not disclose any cause of action it has to be rejected.

Court, however, cannot dissect the pleadings into several

parts and consider whether each one of them discloses a

cause of action. Petition has to be considered as a whole.

There cannot be a partial rejection of the petition.

We may also note Rule 2 of the Rules of the Madras

High Court, 1967, which is as under:-

"2. Every Election Petition shall be in the form of

Original Petition, in the English Language and shall be

verified in the manner provided for under the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908."

Clause (d) of Section 79 of the Act defines "electoral

right" to mean the right of a person to stand or not to

stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being, a

candidate, or to vote or refrain from voting at an election.

Under Section 123 "corrupt practice" in so far it is

relevant in the present case means "Bribery", that is to say

The receipt of, or agreement to receive, any

gratification, whether as a motive or a reward by (any

person whomsoever for himself or any other person) (a) for

voting or refrain from voting, or (b) inducing or attempting

to induce any elector to vote or refrain from voting, or any

candidate to withdraw or not to withdraw his candidature.

The term gratification has been explained and it includes

all forms of entertainment.

Exercise of undue influence is also deemed to be a

corrupt practice. Under sub-section (2) of Section 123

"undue influence" means any direct or indirect interference

or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate or his

agent, or of any other person with the consent of the

candidate or his election agent, with the free exercise of

any electoral right.

Material facts and material particulars certainly

connote two different things. Material facts are those

facts which constitute the cause of action. In a petition

on the allegation of corrupt practices cause of action

cannot be equated with the cause of action as is normally

understood because of the consequences that follow in a

petition based on the allegations of corrupt practices. An

election petition seeking a challenge to the election of a

candidate on the allegation of corrupt practices is a

serious matter. If proved not only that the candidate

suffers ignominy, he also suffers disqualification from

standing for election for a period that may extend to six

years. Reference in this connection may be made to Section

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8A of the Act. It was for this purpose that proviso to sub-

section (1) of Section 83 was inserted by Act 40 of 1961

(w.e.f. September 20, 1961) requiring filing of the

affidavit in the prescribed form where there are allegations

of corrupt practice in the election petition. Filing of the

affidavit as required is not a mere formality. By naming a

document as an affidavit it does not become an affidavit.

To be an affidavit it has to conform not only to the form

prescribed in substance but has also to contain particulars

as required by the Rules.

It is contended by Mr. Bhandare that all the material

facts have been stated in the election petition and that for

lack of material particulars, the petition could not have

been thrown out at the threshold. He said opportunity

should have been given to the appellant to supply the

material particulars. It is really of strange proposition

to advance. Till the date of the impugned judgment,

appellant had persisted that the petition did not lack

material particulars and that the verification was in

accordance with the Code and the affidavit in support of the

corrupt practice in the form prescribed. Admittedly, the

petition lacked material particulars, verification to the

petition was not in accordance with the Code and the

affidavit did not conform to the form prescribed. At the

first opportunity, the respondent raised objection that the

petition lacked both material facts and the material

particulars and that the verification to the petition and

the affidavit were not in accordance with law. This was

repeated in the miscellaneous application (Original

Application No.298/98). In the counter affidavit and in the

reply to the miscellaneous application, the appellant

persisted in his stand and termed the objections raised by

the respondent as irrelevant. It is not that the appellant

did not have opportunity to correct his mistake which he

could have easily done in the rejoinder filed by him to the

counter affidavit of the respondent or even his reply to the

miscellaneous application (O.A. No. 298/98). He had every

opportunity even at that stage to supply the material

particulars which admittedly were lacking and also to amend

the verification and to file the affidavit in the form

prescribed but for the reasons best known to him, he failed

to do so. The existence of material facts, material

particulars, correct verification and the affidavit are

relevant and important when the petition is based on the

allegation of corrupt practice and in the absence of those,

the Court has jurisdiction to dismiss the petition. High

Court has undoubtedly the power to permit amendment of the

petition for supply of better material particulars and also

to require amendment of the verification and filing of the

required affidavit but there is no duty cast on the High

Court to direct suo moto the furnishing of better

particulars and requiring amendment of petition for the

purpose of verification and filing of proper affidavit. In

a matter of this kind the primary responsibility for

furnishing full particulars of the alleged corrupt practices

and to file a petition in full compliance with the

provisions of law is on the petitioner. [See in this

connection Constitution Bench decision in Bhikaji Keshao

Joshi & Anr. vs. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani & Ors. (AIR 1955

SC 610 = (1955) 2 SCR 428(444)].

Grievance of the appellant is that he wanted to meet

the MLAs other than MLAs of the Congress party to which he

belonged but those MLAs were kept first in Hotel Ashoka at

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Pondicherry and then taken to five star hotels at

Mahabalipuram. Appellant alleged that MLAs were "kept" in

Hotel Ashoka but he has not given particulars as to what he

meant by the word "kept". "Kept" is certainly not

"confined". What entertainment was provided to those MLAs

in Hotel Ashoka, Pondicherry or in five star hotels in

Mahabalipuram has also not been specified. It is not his

case that he was prevented in any way from meeting any of

those MLAs. It was a material fact to allege which he

failed to do so. This is apart from the fact that the

material particulars as to when the MLAs were taken to Hotel

Ashoka and to other places, the names of the MLAs and names

of the hotels in Mahabalipuram, who took them there, who

paid their bills and who brought them back are lacking.

Appellant does not show as to whey he could not meet all

those MLAs on October 2, 1997. Apart from one independent

MLA other MLAs belonged to various other political parties

like DMK, TMC, CPI, PMK and Janata Dal. Rather it can be

assumed that the MLAs voted according to their political

affiliations. It has come on record that out of total

number of 29 MLAs who constituted Legislative Assembly of

Pondicherry, two belonged to AIDMK, another political party.

AIDMK had taken decision not to vote for any candidate and

that is how the two MLAs of this party did not participate

in the election and total votes polled were 27. There was

only one independent MLA and his casting of vote either way

would not have at all affected the result of the election

considering the number of votes polled by each of the

candidates. It is not the case of the appellant that he was

barred from meeting any of the MLAs in order to solicit

their votes. There is no allegation if there is any

complaint by any MLA that he was kept out of circulation by

respondent or with his consent by any other person for the

purpose of not being accessible to the appellant.

Appellant in his petition said that when C.

Jayakumar, Minister and K. Kandasamy, Deputy Speaker and K.

Rajasegaran, Parliamentary Secretary to the Chief Minister,

were the agents of the respondent. He then alleged that C.

Jayakumar took Kandasamy and Rajasegaran to Goa with a view

to influence them to get their votes in favour of the

respondent. Is it not paradoxical where one agent

influences the other agent to vote in a particular way? It

certainly could not be a corrupt practice. Appellant then

alleged that N. Kesav, MLA belonging to DMK and also a

Government whip kept independent MLA Rajaraman first in

Hotel Ashoka, Pondicherry and then took them to Kovalam,

Chingleput District, then to Tirupathi in a Government

vehicle and then brought back to Pondicherry on October 2,

1997. It is not the case of the appellant that N. Kesav

did so with the consent of the respondent or any of his

agent or otherwise. This is a material fact which the

appellant failed to allege. Lastly, notification regarding

appointments of Chairmen to various committees came out much

later after the results were declared. It is correct that

none of the nominees belonged to the Congress party.

It will be thus seen that election petition not only

lacked the material facts, it lacked material particulars,

defective verification and the affidavit filed was not in

the form prescribed. Moreover, ingredients of corrupt

practices, as defined in Section 123(1)(B) and 123(2) of the

Act are also lacking. It is also not the case of the

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appellant that any MLA whom the appellant could not meet,

received any gratification, as defined, whether as a motive

or a reward for voting or refraining from voting, or there

was any inducement or attempt to induce any such MLA to vote

or refrain from voting. Also it is not the case of the

appellant that any undue influence was exercised with the

free exercise of any electoral right of any MLA which right,

as noted above, has been defined in clause (d) of Section 79

of the Act. There is no allegation if any particular MLA

was induced to vote or not to vote in a particular way

because he was entertained or otherwise. The allegation is

that appellant himself could not meet the MLAs and he

believed if he had been given a chance to meet them he would

have influenced their vote in his favour and against their

party of affiliations. There is no allegation that the MLAs

were prevented or influenced from freely exercising their

electoral right. As stated earlier appellant did not show

as to why he could not meet the MLAs on October 2, 1997 when

they were available in Pondicherry. Material fact must be

that the appellant was prevented from meeting the MLAs which

he did not allege and as to how he was so prevented would

constitute material particulars.

The election petition read as a whole did not disclose

any cause of action or triable issue. Considering the facts

of the case and the principles of law applicable, the

election petition was rightly dismissed by the High Court in

limine.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.

....................................CJI.

.........................................J. [D.P.

WADHWA]

.........................................J. [S.

RAJENDRA BABU] New Delhi; January 19, 2000

"16. Striking out pleadings.The Court may at any

stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended

any matter in any pleading (a) which may be unnecessary,

scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or (b) which may tend to

prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or

(c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the

Court."

"Rejection of plaint.The plaint shall be rejected in

the following cases: -- (a) where it does not disclose a

cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is

undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the

Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by

the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is

properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper

insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff on being required

by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a

time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where

the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be

barred by any law: Provided that the time fixed by the

Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of

the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the

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Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the

plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional

nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the

requisite stamp-papers, as the case may be, within the time

fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time

would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff."

"123. Corrupt practices. The following shall be

deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this

Act;-- (1) "Bribery", that is to say (A) ........... (B)

the receipt of, or agreement to receive, any gratification,

whether as a motive or a reward- (a) by a person for

standing or not standing as, or for withdrawing or not

withdrawing from being, a candidate; or (b) by any person

whomsoever for himself or any other person for voting or

refraining from voting, or inducing or attempting to induce

any elector to vote or refrain from voting, or any candidate

to withdraw or not to withdraw his candidature."

Explanation.For the purposes of this clause the term

"gratification" is not restricted to pecuniary

gratifications or gratifications estimable in money and it

includes all forms of entertainment and all forms of

employment for reward but it does not include the payment of

any expenses bona fide incurred at, or for the purpose of,

any election and duly entered in the account of election

expenses referred to in section 78. (2) Undue influence,

that is to say, any direct or indirect interference or

attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate or his

agent, or of any other person with the consent of the

candidate or his election agent, with the free exercise of

any electoral right: Provided that .................."

"100. Grounds for declaring election to be void.(1)

Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High

Court is of opinion (a) ............ (b) that any corrupt

practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his

election agent or by any other person with the consent of a

returned candidate or his election agent; or (c)

............. (d) that the result of the election, in so

far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially

affected (i) ........... (ii) by any corrupt practice

committed in the interests of the returned candidate by an

agent other than his election agents, or (iii) ...........

(iv) ........... the High Court shall declare the election

of the returned candidate to be void. (2) If in the opinion

of the High Court, a returned candidate has been guilty by

an agent, other than his election agent of any corrupt

practice but the High Court is satisfied (a) that no such

corrupt practice was committed at the election by the

candidate or his election agent, and every such corrupt

practice was committed contrary to the orders, and without

the consent, of the candidate or his election agent; (b)

Omitted. (c) that the candidate and his election agent took

all reasonable means for preventing the commission of

corrupt practices at the election; and (d) that in all

other respects the election was free from any corrupt

practice on the part of the candidate or any of his agents,

then the High Court may decide that the election of the

returned candidate is not void." 81. Presentation of

petitions.(1) An election petition calling in question any

election may be presented on one or more of the grounds

specified in sub-section (1) of section 100 and section 101

to the High Court by any candidate at such election or any

elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier than

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the date of election of the returned candidate or if there

are more than one returned candidate at the election and

dates of their election are different, the later of those

two dates. Explanation.- In this sub-section, "elector"

means a person who was entitled to vote at the election to

which the election petition relates, whether he has voted at

such election or not. (2) ........... (omitted by Act 47

of 1966, s. 39 (w.e.f. 14.12.1966)) (3) Every election

petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as

there are respondents mentioned in the petition, and every

such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own

signature to be a true copy of the petition.

83. Contents of petition. (1) An election petition

(a) shall contain a consice statement of the material

facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth

full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner

alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the

names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt

practice and the date and place of the commission of each

such practice; and (c) shall be signed by the petitioner

and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of

pleadings: Provided that where the petitioner alleges any

corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by

an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the

allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars

thereof. (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall

also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same

manner as the petition.

86. Trial of election petitions. (1) to (4) .....

(5) The High Court may, upon such terms as to costs and

otherwise as it may deem fit, allow the particulars of any

corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or

amplified in such manner as may in its opinion be necessary

for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition, but

shall not allow any amendment of the petition which will

have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt

practice not previously alleged in the petition. (6) ......

(7) ...... 8A Disqualification on ground of corrupt

practices.(1) The case of every person found guilty of a

corrupt practice by an order under section 99 shall be

submitted, as soon as may be after such order takes effect,

by such authority as the Central Government may specify in

this behalf, to the President for determination of the

question as to whether such person shall be disqualified and

if so, for what period : Provided that the period for which

any person may be disqualified under this sub-section shall

in no case exceed six years from the date on which the order

made in relation to him under section 99 takes effect. (2)

Any person who stands disqualified under section 8A of this

Act as it stood immediately before the commencement of the

Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 (40 of 1975), may, if

the period of such disqualification has not expired, submit

a petition to the President for the removal of such

disqualification for the unexpired portion of the said

period. (3) Before giving his decision on any question

mentioned in sub-section (1) or on any petition submitted

under sub-section (2), the President shall obtain the

opinion of the Election Commission on such question or

petition and shall act according to such opinion.

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