2026:HHC:11138

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MP (M) No. 2738 of 2025

Reserved on: 30.03.2026

Date of Decision: 09.04.2026

Mridul ...Petitioner

Versus

State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the Petitioner : M/s. Ravi Tanta and Shakti

Bhardwaj, Advocates.

For the Respondent : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Additional

Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking

regular bail in FIR No. 112 of 2024 dated 27.10.2024, registered for

the commission of offences punishable under Sections 103(1) and

3 (5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 at Police Station

Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla, H.P.

2. It has been asserted that the petitioner is a young

person aged 19 years belonging to a respectable family. He was

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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falsely implicated without any evidence. The investigation is

complete and nothing is to be recovered from the petitioner. F.I.R.

No. 111 of 2024, dated 26.10.2024, was registered against the

petitioner arising out of the same incident, which is pending

before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kinnaur, at Rampur

Bushahr. The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court

and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the

petitioner in custody. He would abide by all the terms and

conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that

the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on

bail.

3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report

asserting that the police were informed about the recovery of a

dead body on 26.10.2024. The police went to the spot and found a

semi-naked dead body at a distance of 100 meters beneath the

road in Bangla. The deceased was identified as Santosh Ram. It

appeared from the examination of the dead body that the cause of

death was a fall from a height, and multiple injuries were present

on the dead body. The police conducted the inquest report and

recorded the statement of Raju, the roommate of the deceased,

who disclosed that he and the deceased had consumed liquor on

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25.10.2024. The deceased was heavily intoxicated, and he abused

Raju. Raju went away to his room and took the mobile phone of

the deceased with him. Subsequently, the dead body was found.

Raju disclosed afterwards that he had come to know that Rafi,

Mridul (the present petitioner), Rahul and Sachin had given

beatings to the deceased. The police interrogated them, and they

revealed that they had an altercation with the deceased and had

given him beatings. They threw him in the field in an injured

condition. They had also taken the liquor from the vend after

threatening the salesmen with a gun. The police investigated the

matter and took the samples. The dead body was sent to IGMC ,

Shimla for post-mortem examination. The police checked the

mobile phones of the accused and found the photograph of

Santosh Ram in an injured condition, which was taken on

25.10.2024. The police seized the mobile phone and the silver

Kada, which was used to inflict the injuries. The accused identified

the place where they had given beatings to the deceased. The

police checked the CCTV footage and found the accused going

towards the liquor vend Bahali at 7:37 p.m. and returning towards

Bangla Chowk at 7:40 p.m. The accused were again seen going

towards the liquor vend at 10:14 p.m. and returning towards

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Bangla Chowk at 10:27 p.m. Rafi and Mridul were seen going

towards the liquor vend at 12:18 a.m. and returning at 12:21 a.m. on

26.10.2024. They were seen coming towards Bangla Chowk on

26.10.2024 at 12:36 a.m. The police checked the mobile phone of

Rafi and found a video of twenty seconds, which was sent to his

WhatsApp account from the petitioner’s mobile phone at 8:09

p.m. One person was kicking the face and the chest of the

deceased. The police checked the petitioner’s mobile phone, but

he had deleted the data from his mobile phone. Police seized the

mobile phones of Rafi, Mridul and Sachin. Rafi also got recovered

a motorcycle. The material objects were sent to SFSL, Junga, and

as per the report, the blood stains were detected on the pants and

shoe of Rahul. The blood was detected in traces on the

petitioner’s shoes, but it was insufficient for further analysis. The

DNA analysis showed that the DNA taken from Rahul’s pants and

the petitioner’s shoe matched the DNA profile of the deceased.

The DNA from Rahul’s shoe yielded highly degraded DNA that did

not show amplification. As per the report of the Medical Officer,

the cause of death was blunt injuries sustained to the head and

neck region in a case where the blood ethyl alcohol concentration

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at the time of death was 158.55 MG/DL. The report of the analysis

of the mobile phone is awaited. Hence, the status report.

4. I have heard M/s Ravi Tanta and Shakti Bhardwaj,

learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma,

learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

5. Mr Ravi Tanta, learned counsel for the petitioner,

submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely

implicated. Raju was last seen with the deceased , and he had

taken the mobile phone of the deceased. The police did not

interrogate his role in the commission of the crime. The initial

possibility that the deceased had fallen in a state of intoxication

was not completely ruled out during the investigation, and the

name of the person who had disclosed the involvement of the

petitioner and other co-accused was also not found after the

investigation. All these aspects made the prosecution's case

highly suspect. The police have filed the charge-sheet, and no

fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in

custody; hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and

the petitioner be released on bail.

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6. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate

General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner

and co-accused were seen going towards the place of the incident

in the CCTV footage. Photographs of the deceased in an injured

condition and a video showing a person kicking the deceased were

found on the mobile phone of the co-accused. The petitioner’s

shoe contained the DNA of the deceased. All the circumstances,

prima facie, show that the petitioner was involved in the

commission of a crime. The offence is heinous and punishable

with capital punishment. Therefore, he prayed that the present

petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314:

2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:

(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1

SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while

elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution

of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under

trial, has laid down the key factors that should be

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considered while granting bail, which are extracted as

under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the

vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also

pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be

liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also

bears upon the issue.

8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice

would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant

jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.

[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”

(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern

Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court

considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with

witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the

process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in

this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is

applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,

particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to

commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to

habituals, it is part of criminological history that a

thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the

opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of

society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the

criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in

irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)

57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4

SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various

aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing

with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted

as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the

basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the

circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.

While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the

nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support

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thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will

entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the

accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused,

reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused

at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being

tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and

similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind

that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has

used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead

of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the

grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there

is a genuine case against the accused and that the

prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in

support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,

(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through

Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion

in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In

highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of

course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as

follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,

however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a

judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for

bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.

Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is

dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being

dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to

case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it

may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the

matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled

with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The

nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for

the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the

greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though,

however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.”

(emphasis supplied)

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59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC

528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is

established that a court considering a bail application

cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an

elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court

is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the

grant of bail.

60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14

SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that

where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said

order would suffer from the vice of non -application of

mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with

regard to the circumstances under which an order granting

bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to

have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also

been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere

with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting

bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon

the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously,

cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic

principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court

on the point. It is well settled that, among other

circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while

considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground

to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if

released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of

the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being

influenced; and

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(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant

of bail.” (emphasis supplied)

xxxxxxx

62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of

application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise

of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the

accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :

(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this

Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order

(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and

Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of

the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as

follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :

(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)

“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an

individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while

considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight

of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused

and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,

when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or

vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material

brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie

conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of

bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons

and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts

of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be

given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal

antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of

punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the

offence(s) alleged against an accused .” (emphasis

supplied)

9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.

Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC

261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the

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gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests

otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail,

except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing

from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating

other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or

intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who

seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend

to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely

to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and

must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.

So also, the heinousness of the crime….”

10. The present petition has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

11. The status report mentions that the police had found

the photograph of the dead body of the deceased and a twenty-

second video showing someone kicking the deceased on the

mobile phone of the co-accused. The petitioner’s shoe contained

the DNA of the deceased. The CCTV footage showed the movement

of the petitioner and the co-accused around the place of the

incident. The time stamp on the photograph and video recording

shows that the petitioner and co-accused saw the deceased alive in

an injured condition. Their further conduct of not informing

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anyone about the discovery of the injured, prima facie, points to

their involvement in the commission of the crime.

12. The submission that the deceased had fallen in a state

of intoxication cannot be accepted at this stage, as it is not

supported by the conduct of the petitioner and the co-accused.

They would have informed someone about the discovery of the

injured person, or at least they would not have taken the

photographs and the video of the injured person being kicked.

13. It was submitted that the role of Raju was not

investigated by the police. This submission will not help the

petitioner. The circumstances showed that the petitioner and co-

accused were seen near the injured when he was alive. There is

nothing on record to show that Raju had injured the deceased,

whereas the presence of the photograph and video recording on

mobile phones of the co -accused, prima facie, shows the

connection of the petitioner and the co-accused with the deceased.

14. It was submitted that there are discrepancies in the

statements of the witnesses recorded by the learned Trial Court.

This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan

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MANU/SC/1267/2024 that ordinarily, in serious offences Trial

Court or the High Court should not entertain the bail application of

the accused after the commencement of the trial and grant bail

because of some discrepancy in the testimony. It was observed: -

“14. Ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder,

dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution

starts examining its witnesses, the Court, be it the Trial

Court or the High Court, should be loath to entertain the

bail application of the Accused.

15. Over a period of time, we have noticed two things, i.e., (i)

either bail is granted after the charge is framed and just

before the victim is to be examined by the prosecution

before the trial court, or (ii) bail is granted once the

recording of the oral evidence of the victim is complete by

looking into some discrepancies here or there in the

deposition and thereby testing the credibility of the victim.

16. We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct

practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial

commences, it should be allowed to reach its conclusion,

which may either result in the conviction of the Accused or

the acquittal of the Accused. The moment the High Court

exercises its discretion in favour of the Accused and orders

the release of the Accused on bail by looking into the

deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on the

pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral

evidence of the victim. It is only if the trial gets unduly

delayed and that, too, for no fault on the part of the

Accused, the Court may be justified in ordering his release

on bail on the ground that the right of the Accused to have a

speedy trial has been infringed.”

15. Similarly, it was held by this Court in Suraj Singh v.

State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 268 that the Court exercising bail

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jurisdiction cannot appreciate the contradictions in the evidence.

It was observed:

10. Petitioner has placed reliance on the statements of

witnesses already recorded by the learned Special Judge, in

support of his argument to the effect that, from perusal of

these statements, reasonable grounds can be entertained

for concluding prima facie innocence of the petitioner. The

arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner deserve to be

rejected for the reason that this Court, while dealing with

the bail application, will not appreciate the evidence being

recorded during the trial. Undisputedly, only some of the

witnesses out of the entire list of witnesses relied upon by

the prosecution have been examined. In these

circumstances, it is not prudent to form any opinion as to

the innocence or guilt of the petitioner on the basis of such

partial evidence.

16. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail

because of discrepancies in the statements of the prosecution’s

witnesses during the trial.

17 The police have collected sufficient material to prima

facie connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime under

Section 103(1) of BNS, which is punishable with death or life

imprisonment; thus, the penalty is severe. It was laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public

Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115:

1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the

person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244:

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“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true

principle around which other relevant factors must revolve.

When the case is finally disposed of and a person is

sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different

footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and

the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to

secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be

liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the

event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In

this perspective, the relevance of considerations is

regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the

applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible

in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged

(of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest

magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of

extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some

evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure

the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should

he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1]

Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case,

and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows:

[Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51]

“I do not think that an accused party is detained in

custody because of his guilt, but because there are

sufficient probable grounds for the charge against

him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and

because the detention is necessary to ensure his

appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in

considering whether the party, if admitted to bail,

would appear to take his trial; and I think that in

coming to a determination on that point three

elements will generally be found the most important:

the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is

supported, and the punishment to which the party

would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the

charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains

an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the

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charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law,

death.”

7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital

factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The

punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or

conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

18. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of

the trial and the petitioner is entitled to bail. This submission will

not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129:

(2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of

incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a crime

like murder. It was observed at page 141:

“24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant

of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions

Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In

crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in

custody for more than one year may not be a relevant

consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of

Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was

observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not

entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was

reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,

(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688”

19. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail

because of the delay in the progress of the trial.

20. No other point was urged.

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21. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is

dismissed.

22. The observation made herein before shall remain

confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no

bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

09

th

April, 2026.

(ravinder)