[2026:RJ-JP:31695]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5846/2012

CNR: RJHC020332132012 | URN: CW / 9652U / 2012

M/s Ajit Service Station near Power House, Malviya Nagar, Jaipur

through its partner Shri Naresh Kumar Arora son of Shri Bihari Lal,

resident of C-242, Krishna Marg, Malviya Nagar, Jaipur

----Petitioner

Versus

1. State of Rajasthan through the Secretary, Urban & Housing

Development Department, Jaipur

2. Jaipur Development Authority, through the Secretary, J.D.A.

building , J.L.N. Marg, Jaipur

3. The Director (Finance) Jaipur Development Authority, J.D.A.

building J.L.N. Marg, Jaipur

----Respondents

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Gunjan Pathak, Advocate

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Amit Kuri, Standing Counsel for the

Jaipur Development Authority with

Mr. Dharma Ram, Advocate

Mr. Ayush Sharma, Advocate

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR BHARWANI

Order

Reserved on ::: 31/08/2026

Pronounced on ::: 10/09/2026

***

Instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India has been filed on behalf of the petitioner-firm with the following

prayer:-

“It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the writ petition be

allowed and the impugned decision of the respondent No.2

dt.30.09.2003 (Annexure-16), decision of the J.D.A. Appellate

Tribunal dt.10.07.2009 (Annexure-27) and decision of the

State Government dt. 06.02.2012 (Annexure-28) and the

decision of the State Government dt.24.07.2015 (Annexure-

31) and the order dt.07.08.2014 (Annexure-33) be quashed

and set aside.

By further writ, order or direction, the respondents may be

directed to issue correct lease deed by incorporating the period

of lease as 99-years.

Any other appropriate writ, order or direction, which this

Hon’ble Court deems just and proper in the facts and

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circumstances of this case, may kindly be passed in favour of

the petitioner.

Cost of the litigation may also be awarded to the petitioner.”

Facts of the present case, in brief, are that the petitioner is

a partnership firm. The dispute pertains to land measuring 843.99 sq.

metres situated at Malviya Nagar, Jaipur, which was intended for the

construction of a petrol pump.

Earlier to the present auction, subject land was allotted to

M/s. Guru Nanak Tubewell Pvt. Ltd. being the highest bidder @

Rs.2,705/- per sq. meter; however, its bid was not approved by the

JDA. Thereafter, the JDA recommended allotment of the same petrol-

pump site to one Shri Mohan Lal Sharma under the Government Policy

dt.04.07.1989. Accordingly, an allotment letter was issued to him on

11.05.1994 at the market rate @ Rs.3,100/- per sq. meter for a lease

period of 99 years.

M/s. Guru Nanak Tubewell Pvt. Ltd. challenged the allotment

by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2726/1994. The petitioner-firm’s

application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for impleadment was rejected,

and the writ petition was dismissed by ld. Single Judge on 28.10.1994.

Thereafter, the petitioner & M/s. Guru Nanak Tubewell Pvt. Ltd.

preferred Special Appeals, which were allowed by the Division Bench

vide judgment dt.19.05.1995.

The Jaipur Development Authority issued an advertisement

in the newspaper inviting bids for the auction of the said land stating

that the terms & conditions of the auction would be disclosed at the

time of the auction. On 21.07.1995, the petitioner, alongwith other

interested persons was present & participated in the auction. At the

outset, the petitioner & other participants raised an objection to

Condition No.1 of the terms & conditions, under which the lease period

was prescribed as 25 years.

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Thereupon, the Officers of the JDA present at the site and

the members of the auction committee held discussions with the higher

Officials of the JDA. It was thereafter communicated to all the

participants that the lease period would be considered for 99 years.

Acting on the said representation and under the bona-fide belief that

the lease period would be 99 years, the petitioner participated in the

auction. The petitioner emerged as the highest bidder and was

accordingly, declared the successful bidder.

Thereafter, the petitioner deposited the auction amount,

lease money and other miscellaneous charges, total amounting to Rs.

27,37,295/-. Subsequently, in terms of Clause 4 of the terms &

conditions of the auction, the petitioner-firm applied for issuance of the

licence deed & deposited the requisite fees and stamp duty with the

JDA. The JDA, accordingly, issued a licence-deed dt.23.08.1995 for a

period of 99 years containing certain terms & conditions.

The petitioner-firm thereafter, requested the JDA to issue

the lease-deed and also deposited the requisite stamp papers. However,

despite the passage of considerable time, the lease-deed was not

issued. The petitioner submitted several representations & reminders

requesting the issuance of the lease-deed for a period of 99 years and

also sought a one-time lease exemption certificate, as the petitioner

had already deposited the one-time lease amount. After a long delay,

lease-deed was issued on 16.08.2003 but the same was issued only for

25 years instead of 99 years. Against the aforesaid illegality, the

petitioner-firm preferred a representation.

Initially, the J.D.A. rejected the petitioner’s representation

without assigning any reasons. Subsequently, the matter was

considered by the Core Committee of the J.D.A. During the course of

consideration, the Director (Finance) sought an explanation as to why

[2026:RJ-JP:31695] (4 of 18) [CW-5846/2012]

the lease period for the petrol-pump land had been fixed for 25 years

when commercial land was generally leased for a period of 99 years.

Thereafter, considering the petitioner’s contention, the J.D.A. referred

the matter to the Urban Development & Housing Department (UDH) for

an appropriate decision.

The petitioner also filed a complaint before the Lokayukta

regarding the action of the J.D.A. In response thereof, the JDA informed

the Lokayukta that the Commissioner had referred the matter to the

State Government for a decision regarding correction of the lease

period.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a reference before the JDA

Tribunal. In its reply, the JDA contended that all previous allotments/

sales had been made for a period of 25 years and, therefore, the

auction in the petitioner’s case had also been correctly conducted for a

lease period of 25 years. The JDA Tribunal ultimately dismissed the

reference preferred by the petitioner.

On the petitioner’s representation, an opinion was also

sought from the Law Department. The Officer of the Law Department

opined in favour of the petitioner stating that the JDA had agreed to

issue the lease-deed for a period of 99 years. However, by order

dt.06.02.2012, the Law Minister rejected the said opinion and held that

the lease-deed for a period of 25 years was correct.

Subsequently, by letter dt.07.08.2014, the UDH Department

admitted that the lease period had wrongly been reduced from 99 years

to 25 years without obtaining prior permission from the State

Government. The UDH Department also directed the JDA not to commit

such a mistake in future.

During the pendency of the present petition, the petitioner

once again approached the State Government seeking correction of the

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lease period from 25 years to 99 years. However, the said request was

rejected by the UDH Department vide letter dt.24.07.2015.

The contentions advanced by learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner-firm are that earlier to the present dispute, the same

land was allotted to Shri Mohan Lal Sharma on a 99-year-leasehold-

basis. However, the said allotment was set aside by the Division Bench

of this Court on the ground that the land can only be allotted by public

auction. There was no decision to reduce the lease period; nevertheless,

Condition No.1 of the terms & conditions prescribed a lease period

contrary to law. When the bidders raised objections at the auction site,

the Chief Revenue Officer (CRO), representing the JDA, clearly

announced that the auction would be conducted for a lease period of 99

years. Accordingly, the licence-deed dt.23.08.1995 was issued by the

CRO Cell for a period of 99 years. Therefore, mentioning the lease

period as 25 years was arbitrary & illegal and ought to have been

rectified.

It has further been contended that the JDA could not

prescribe lease terms contrary to the Rajasthan Municipalities (Disposal

of Urban Land) Rules, 1974 (herein-after referred as Rules,1974). The

prior approval of the State Government was mandatory for fixing a

lease period of less than 99 years, but no such approval was obtained.

The JDA & the Rajasthan Housing Board had allotted petrol-pump sites

on 99-year leasehold basis in accordance with the Rules. The JDA had

neither followed the statutory Rules nor complied with the instructions

issued by the State Government. The directions issued by the Division

Bench had also not been followed in their true spirit. The JDA failed to

decide the matter by passing a speaking & reasoned order. The JDA

Appellate Tribunal also failed to consider the provisions of the Rules

1974 and the similar allotments made in favour of one Ashish Saraf.

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In the present case, the petitioner had offered a bid

substantially higher than the commercial reserve price, and the

petitioner-firm had also deposited one-time lease amount for 99 years

and the petitioner had offered a substantially higher amount in the open

auction. In these circumstances, the lease period could not legally be

restricted to 25 years. On the petitioner’s representation, the matter

was also examined by the Administrative Department & the Law

Department of the State Government.

It has also been submitted that the petitioner-firm was not

afforded an opportunity of hearing & the relevant material available on

record was not duly considered while passing the impugned order. The

impugned order was, therefore, contrary to the principles of natural

justice and is liable to be quashed.

Further submission is that the auction had been conducted

pursuant to the judgment of the Division Bench dt.09.05.1995 and the

Government instructions dt.04.07.1989. Therefore, any condition

inconsistent with the terms of the auction was illegal, void & contrary to

law.

Lastly, it was contended that the land had been auctioned

on a 99-year leasehold basis, with the bidding commencing @

Rs.2,730/- per square metre, being the commercial reserve price.

Consequently, the lease period could not subsequently be reduced from

99 years to 25 years. The Officers of the Law Department had also

opined that in the absence of prior permission from the State

Government, the JDA had no authority to reduce the lease period from

99 years to 25 years.

In support of his contentions, learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner-firm, has placed reliance upon the following judgments:-

(i) Jal Mahal Resorts (P) Ltd. Vs. K.P. Sharma, (2014) 8 SCC 804, (ii)

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Y. Mahaboob Sheriff & Sons Vs. Mysore State Transport Authority, AIR

1960 SC 321, (iii) State of Rajasthan Vs. Harishanker Rajendrapal,

AIR 1966 SC 296, (iv) Harishanker Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1962 RLW

672 and (v) M/s. Kardhani Fuel Centre Vs. State of Rajasthan &

Others, SB CWP No.15876/2015 decided on 18.01.2017 respectively.

Per-contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent

Nos.2 & 3, has submitted that at the very out set the petitioner’s claim

deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay & latches, the

petitioner participated in the public auction in 1995, executed the

registered lease-deed in 2003, submitted its first objection after an

eight years silence and approached the J.D.A. Tribunal in Reference

No.455/2008 only after an unexplained lapse of 13 years. The land in

question was auctioned on 21.07.1995 subject to the terms &

conditions contained in Annexure-10. The foremost condition, i.e.,

Condition No.1, provided for a lease period of 25 years. The petitioner

willingly accepted the said condition by signing the terms & conditions

of the auction, without raising any objection & with full knowledge of its

implications. Accordingly, a lease-deed for a period of 25 years was

executed & registered in favour of the petitioner on 16.08.2003. The

petitioner voluntarily signed the said lease-deed without any objection

and subsequently, deposited the lease amount for the entire lease

period i.e. up to 25.07.2020.

Learned counsel for the JDA further submitted that merely

mentioning a period of 99 years in the licence did not create any right in

favour of the petitioner to seek execution of a lease deed for 99 years.

The lease-deed was executed subsequently in strict accordance with the

terms & conditions of the auction and, being the subsequent &

operative document, superseded the licence.

[2026:RJ-JP:31695] (8 of 18) [CW-5846/2012]

It was further contended that the general provisions

contained in Rule 4 of the Rules, 1974 stood superseded and excluded

by the specific proviso to Rule 5, which mandated compliance with the

policy directives issued by the State Government in respect of allotment

of land for petrol pumps. According to the respondents, the said policy

directives uniformly prescribed a lease tenure of 25 years.

Learned counsel also referred to the State Government's

order dt.07.08.2014, whereby it was stated that the lease period of the

plot had been fixed for 25 years in accordance with the conditions of the

auction and that it was not possible to extend the same to 99 years.

The said order further observed that reducing the lease-period from 99

years to 25 years without obtaining prior approval of the State

Government was improper and directed that such a mistake should not

be repeated in future.

It was, however, submitted that at the time when the plot

was auctioned in 1995, Rule 4 of the Rules 1974 did not contain any

requirement for obtaining prior approval of the State Government. The

requirement of prior State Government sanction to deviate from the 99

years Rule was only inserted into Rule 4 via a gazetted notification on

15.01.2002 and cannot be applied retrospectively to invalided a public

auction completed in 1995. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim for

the lease for the period of 99 years in respect of land in question and

present writ petition be dismissed.

The registered lease-deed expired naturally by efflux of time

on 20.08.2020, extinguishing all rights of the petitioner in the absence

of any renewal covenant. Following the expiration, the petitioner’s

status was reduced to a tenant at sufferance, and the Jaipur

Development Authority resumed actual physical possession of the land

on 21.08.2020 via a formal Possession Memo. In view of the

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unchallenged possession proceedings and the State Government’s

binding circular dt.14.08.2015 barring the extension of expired 25-year

commercial leases, the writ petition has been rendered completely

infructuous and is liable to be dismissed with costs.

In support of their submissions, learned counsel appearing

for the respondent/JDA Nos.2 & 3, has placed reliance upon the

following judgements:- (i) Syndicate Bank Vs. R. Veeranna & Others,

2003 (2) SCC 15, (ii) Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & Another Vs. N.

Raju Reddiar & Another, 1996 (4) SCC 551, (iii) State Bank of

Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers India Private Limited, 2011 (11)

SCC 524, (iv) UP Jal Nigam & another Vs. Jaswatn Singh & Another,

2006 (11) SCC 464, (v) State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar, 1994 (4)

SCC 683, (vi) Union of India & Others Vs. Har Dayal, 2010 (1) SCC

394, (vii) Sudha Parhar Vs. Jaipur Development Authority, SB CWP

5778/2006, decided on 20.11.2014 RHCB Jaipur, (viii) Jaipur

Development Authority Vs. M/s. Boutique Hotels India Pvt. Ltd. &

Others, SB CWP 2593/2009 decided on 13.04.2023 RHCB Jaipur, (ix)

Krishan Pal Dheer Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, SB CWP 4679/2017

decided on 31.08.2022 RHCB Jaipur and (x) Union of India & Another

Vs. Kartick Chandra Mondal & Another, 2010 (2) SCC 422 respectively.

In the case of U.P. Jal Nigam (supra), the Hon’ble Apex

Court, in Para 12 held as under:-

“The statement of law has also been summarized in Halsbury's

Laws of England, Para 911, pg. 395 as follows :-

"In determining whether there has been such delay as to

amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are :

(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and

(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's

part.

Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the

violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation

has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it.

It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his

conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as

[2026:RJ-JP:31695] (10 of 18) [CW-5846/2012]

equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and

neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other

party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place

him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such

cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these

considerations rests the doctrine of laches."

In the case of State of Maharashtra (supra), the Hon’ble

Apex Court, in Para 14 held as under:-

“How a person who alleges against the State of deprivation of

his legal right, can get relief of compensation from the State by

invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of

the Constitution even though, he is guilty of laches or undue

delay is difficult to comprehend, when it is well settled by

decisions of this Court that no person, be he a citizen or

otherwise, is entitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article

226 of the Constitution if his conduct is blame-worthy because

of laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like.

Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief

under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be

relieved of his obligation to establish his unblameworthy

conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which

relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to

comprehend. Where the relief sought under Article 226 of the

Constitution by a person against the welfare State is founded

on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need to

explain laches or undue delay on his part to obtain such relief,

should, if anything, be more stringent than in other cases, for

the reason that the State due to laches or undue delay on the

part of the person seeking relief, may not be able to show that

the executive action complained of was legal or correct for want

of records pertaining to the action or for the officers who were

responsible for such action not being available later on. Further,

where granting of relief is claimed against the State on alleged

unwarranted executive action, is bound to result in loss to the

public exchequer of the State or in damage to other public

interest, the High Court before granting such relief is required

to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen

or any other person in approaching for relief under Article

226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation of his legal

right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances,

instead of ignoring the same or leniently considering it. Thus, in

our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article

226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot

get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully

satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the

case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in

approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief.

Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any

other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any

person including the State without considering his blame-

worthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or

waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the

relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal

right by the State.”

In the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (supra), the

Hon’ble Apex Court, in Para 7 held as under:-

“At the outset it must be borne in mind that the agreement

between the parties was a written agreement and therefore the

parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the agreement.

Once a contract is reduced to writing, by operation of Section

91 of the Evidence Act it is not open to any of the parties to seek

to prove the terms of the contract with reference to some oral or

[2026:RJ-JP:31695] (11 of 18) [CW-5846/2012]

other documentary evidence to find out the intention of the

parties. Under Section 92 of the Evidence Act where the written

instrument appears to contain the whole terms of the contract

then parties to the contract are not entitled to lead any oral

evidence to ascertain the terms of the contract. It is only when

the written contract does not contain the whole of the agreement

between the parties and there is any ambiguity then oral

evidence is permissible to prose the other conditions which also

must not be inconsistent with the written contract. The case in

hand has to be adjudged bearing in mind the aforesaid principles

and the plaintiffs being conscious of this position along with the

tender appended a letter and in that letter inserted certain terms

by writing in ink to establish the case that the acceptance of the

plaintiffs' tender would tantamount to the acceptance to the

terms contained in the letter in which there was insertion in

writing to the effect that it was on multi slab basis. It is in this

context the question whether such hand written portion was

originally there or was subsequently inserted assumes great

significance. We are unable to accept the stand taken by the

learned counsel for the respondents that there was no such issue

on this question inasmuch as this question was considered by

the learned Trial Judge while discussing Issue No. 1 on the basis

of evidence laid and the Trial Judge had given a finding in favour

of the plaintiffs. The said finding, however, on the face of it

appears to us to be wholly unsustainable. As has been stated

earlier there was no signature either by the persons submitting

the tender or by the persons receiving the same on the hand

written portion of the letter. The learned Trial Judge had noticed

that the certified copy which was issued by the Board on

11.7.1978 of the aforesaid letter clearly contains the hand

written portion and therefore he came to the conclusion that the

hand written portion was there at the time of submission of the

tender. The tender itself was submitted on 12.7.1978 and we fail

to understand how the Board could grant a certified copy of the

letter on 11.7.1978 when the plaintiffs' case itself is that along

with the tender he had appended the letter in question. On this

ground alone it can be safely held that hand written portion in

Exhibit P-1 was not there at the time of submission of the tender

but was subsequently inserted obviously with the connivance of

the officers of the Board. The Board in its rejoinder affidavit filed

in this Court has stated that the attested copy was actually

received on 28.12.1978, much later than the finalization of the

tenders and agreement and in order to build up a case the

aforesaid interpolation has been made. In the facts and

circumstances of the present case the aforesaid stand of the

Board appears to us to be wholly justified and at any rate we

have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the hand

written portion in Exhibit P-1 was not there initially and has been

inserted subsequently. The main basis of the plaintiffs' case on

which a multi slab rate was claimed therefore fails. The written

agreement between the parties nowhere indicates that the rate

to be paid to the plaintiffs was on multi slab basis and the terms

and conditions of the written contract is not susceptible of such a

construction.”

Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. Perused

the impugned orders/letter and the case-laws cited herein-above by

both the parties as well as the material made available on record.

In the present case, in the year 1995, an advertisement was

published in the newspaper with regard to the subject land, wherein the

duration of the lease was not disclosed. Subsequently, at the time of

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bidding, the terms & conditions were disclosed, and under Condition

No.1, the duration of the lease was initially fixed for 25 years. However,

on objections being raised by the bidders, the respondent-JDA assured

the bidders that the period of the lease-deed would be 99 years and,

accordingly, they should participate in the bidding process. The

petitioner-firm also participated in the auction and, being the highest

bidder, was declared successful and the subject land was allotted to

him. Pursuant to the auction conducted in year 1995, the respondent-

JDA issued a demand-note to the petitioner requiring him to deposit the

one-time lease payment for a period of 99 years. Upon deposit of the

requisite payment, a licence-deed dt.23.08.1995 was issued by the

respondent-JDA in favour of the petitioner-firm for a period of 99 years.

However, the respondent-JDA contended that a licence is merely a

revocable permission and does not create any estate or proprietary

interest in favour of the licensee, and that the same stood entirely

superseded by the formal registered lease-deed dt.16.08.2003. Since

the JDA asserted that the lease-deed had rightly been executed for a

period of 25 years, during the pendency of the present petition, this

Court, vide its order dt.27.04.2017, required the respondent-JDA to

inform the Court as to the additional amount, if any, that would be

payable by the petitioner, if the lease were to be treated as being for a

period of 99 years. In compliance with the order dt.27.04.2017, the

respondent-JDA submitted an affidavit stating therein that the JDA was

willing to refund the excess amount deposited by the petitioner-firm.

The formal lease-deed was only a document meant to

officially record and confirm an agreement that had already been

finalized between the parties. It could not unilaterally reduce, change,

or weaken the 99-year tenure that had already been granted to the

petitioner-firm under the 99-year licence-deed. Having put the

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petitioner in possession for 99 years through, a formal legal instrument,

the JDA was functus-officio regarding the duration of the grant. It could

not, seven years later in 2003, downgrade the estate into a 25 years

tenure.

Significantly, in its affidavit filed in compliance with the

order dt.27.04.2017, the JDA itself admitted that the petitioner had

deposited the one-time lease premium for a period of 99 years. The fact

that the minimum bid amount was to be determined with reference to a

99 years tenure lends further support to the petitioner’s contention that

the economic and contractual basis of the transaction was the grant of a

99 years lease. If the bid had, in fact, been invited for a tenure of only

25 years, the financial consideration would necessarily have required

determination with reference to that shorter tenure, subject of course to

the applicable rules. The JDA's contention that it is willing to refund the

excess money is legally impermissible. An authority cannot after the

economic basis of a transaction decades after retaining the citizen's

capital, refunding with nominal interest while stripping away 74 years of

lease hold rights amount to expropriatory state action. A statutory

authority cannot hold public money for years and offer an exit route

that severely penalizes the citizen while rewarding its own

administrative lapse.

Rules 4 & 31 of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Disposal of

Urban Land) Rules, 1974 are relevant to quote here as under:-

“4. Tenure of lease.- Sale of lease hold rights in land shall

be for a period of 99 years.

Provided that the trust may with the previous sanction of

the State Govt. grant lease for lessor period of such terms and

conditions as may be determined by the State Govt.

31.Power to relax rules.- In exceptional cases where the

State Government is satisfied that operation of these rules

causes hardship in any particular case or where the State

Government is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient

in public interest to do so, may relax the provisions of these

rules in respect of the price, [penalty, conditions imposed in

relation to any allotment and] size of plot/strip of land to such

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extent and subject to such conditions as it may consider

necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable

manner.”

In respect of the above Rules, the respondent/JDA

contended that the proviso to Rule 4 came into force only in the year

2002 and, therefore, cannot be applied to the present case and prior

approval of the State Government was not required. The said contention

is not sustainable. As per Rule 4 of the Rules, 1974, a lease-deed can

only be issued for 99 years and, for issuance of a lease-deed for a

period of less than 99 years, prior approval of the State Government is

mandatory under Rule 31 of Rules, 1974, whereas in the present case,

no prior approval from the Government in accordance with Rules 4 & 31

of the Rules, 1974, has been taken. Neither in letter dt.04.07.1989

issued by the State Government nor in the order dt.19.05.1995 passed

by the Division Bench of this Court contains any stipulation that the

land was to be allotted for a period of less than 99 years, nor have any

other documents in this regard been submitted, which can reflect that

prior approval of the State Government was taken.

Even assuming that the proviso to Rule 4 introduced in 2002

was not applicable to the auction conducted in 1995, the substantive

mandate contained in Rule 4, supports the conclusion that the disposal

of urban land by local authorities on a leasehold basis was intended to

be for a period of 99 years, unless a shorter tenure was specifically

sanctioned by the competent authority under Rule 31. In this regard

Rule 31 of the Rules, 1974 specifically states about the relaxation of

rules by the State Government. The State and its instrumentalities were

under an obligation to ensure that the documentation faithfully reflected

the substantive rights created in favour of an allottee, who had duly

discharged the entire financial obligation prescribed for a 99-year lease.

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The substantive provision of Rule 4 expressly contemplates

that the urban land disposed of by local authorities on a leasehold basis

shall be granted for a period of 99 years. A subordinate local authority

cannot, in the absence of any specific statutory or administrative

authorization, prescribe an arbitrary shorter tenure so as to defeat the

uniform 99-year leasehold framework contemplated under the

Rajasthan Urban Land Policy. The Rules did not confer upon the

respondent-JDA any unfettered discretion to depart from this prescribed

tenure or to unilaterally curtail the period of lease.

The conduct of the respondent-JDA is, in any event, wholly

inconsistent with its present stand. On the one hand, the JDA issued a

licence-deed dt.23.08.1995 expressly providing for a tenure of 99 years

after accepting the entire consideration payable for such tenure; on the

other hand, it subsequently executed the formal lease-deed

dt.16.08.2003 for a period of only 25 years. The J.D.A. cannot be

permitted to adopt two mutually inconsistent positions in respect of the

same transaction, particularly when the petitioner had already fulfilled

its entire financial obligation on the basis of the 99-year tenure.

The subsequent execution of a 25-year lease-deed could

not, therefore, lawfully override or extinguish the substantive rights that

had already accrued to the petitioner pursuant to the auction, payment

of the full consideration, and the 99-year grant made by the JDA itself.

Learned counsel for respondent-JDA also contended that the

lease-deed executed in the year 2003 is a registered instrument, and

any modification, alteration or rectification of its terms can only be

adjudicated by a competent Civil Court. In this regard, counsel for the

petitioner submitted that in identical matters concerning other petrol

pumps, the respondent-JDA itself, at its own level, altered the duration

of the lease-deed from 25 years to 99 years. Thus, the JDA cannot

[2026:RJ-JP:31695] (16 of 18) [CW-5846/2012]

adopt two different stands on the very same subject matter.

Furthermore, the State Government, vide letter dt.07.08.2014, has

acknowledged that the said lease-deed was issued for a period of 25

years instead of 99 years without the prior approval of the State

Government, which is improper. Relevant portion of the aforesaid order

dt.07.08.2014 reads as under:-

“^mijksDr fo"k;kUrxZr funsZ'kkuqlkj ys[k gS fd iz'uxr izdj.k esa yht vof/k

uhykeh dh 'krksZa ds vuqlkj 25 o"kZ dh xbZ gS] ftls 99 o"kZ fd;k tkuk laHko ugha

gSA

mDr izdj.k esa jkT; ljdkj dh iwoZ vuqefr ds fcuk gh yht vof/k 99 o"kZ ds

LFkku ij 25 o"kZ dh xbZ gS] tks mfpr ugha gSA vr% bl laca/k esa ;g Hkh funsZ'k

iznku fd;s tkrs gSa fd Hkfo"; esa bl rjg dh xyrh ugha dh tkosaA^“

This admission by the competent department of the State

Government materially supports the petitioner's case and contradict the

subsequent stand of the J.D.A. that the 25-year tenure was legally

granted.

A public authority cannot apply two different Rules to the

same situation. The J.D.A. extended the lease duration from 25 years to

99 years for other petrol-pumps at its own administrative level. It

cannot grant the same relief to others while refusing to do so for the

petitioner on identical facts. Doing so would be discriminatory and

would violate the principle of equality before law.

The respondent-JDA has also raised an objection regarding

the maintainability of the writ petition, contending that the petition is

barred by gross delay & laches. Counsel further submitted that auction

was conducted in the year 1995, the reference before the JDA Appellate

Tribunal was filed in the year 2008 and after an unexplained delay of

nearly nine-years from the date of the execution of the lease-deed

dt.16.08.2003, the petitioner is disentitled to invoke the extraordinary

jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the

[2026:RJ-JP:31695] (17 of 18) [CW-5846/2012]

lease-deed was issued on 16.08.2003 for a period of 25 years. Being

aggrieved by the said lease-deed, the petitioner-firm continuously

submitted representations before the J.D.A. and the State Government.

Subsequently, in the year 2008, the petitioner-firm approached the JDA

Appellate Tribunal by way of Reference No.455/2008. Therefore, in the

aforesaid circumstances, it was submitted that the cause of action had

not arisen prior to the year 2003.

In this regard, it is trite law that the doctrine of delay &

laches under article 226 of the Constitution is a rule of judicial prudence

and self imposed restraint, not an absolute rule of limitation. In

adjudicating the question of laches, the Court must consider the nature

of the right infringed and the status of possession. The petitioner was

put into physical possession of the land under an operative licence-deed

dt.23.08.1995 executed for 99 years, having discharged the entirety of

the financial liability demanded. The chronology of events demonstrates

that the petitioner was not sleeping over his rights. Following the

execution of the 2003 lease-deed, representations were submitted,

culminating in a formal reference proceeding instituted before the JDA

Tribunal in the year 2008. A citizen, who bonafide pursues

administrative or statutory remedies before the concerned authority to

resolve an internal discrepancy cannot be penalized for not rushing

immediately to the High Court.

Thus, even on the JDA's own interpretation of the applicable

rules, there was no justification for reducing the petitioner's tenure from

99 years to 25 years, particularly after the petitioner had paid the entire

consideration for the 99-year lease-deed and the J.D.A. had itself issued

a licence-deed dt.23.08.1995. Further, the lease-deed was issued for a

period of 25 years instead of 99 years without the prior approval of the

State Government. The error, if any, was entirely attributable to the

[2026:RJ-JP:31695] (18 of 18) [CW-5846/2012]

respondent-authority and could not lawfully be used to the detriment of

the petitioner.

Consequently, the issuance of the lease-deed dt.16.08.2003

for a term of only 25 years, despite the deposit of the entire auction

consideration & the statutory requirement and/or understanding that

the lease would be for 99-year, is liable to be set aside.

Resultantly, the present petition stands allowed. The

impugned orders dt.30.09.2003 (Anx-16), dt.10.07.2009 (Anx-27),

dt.06.02.2012 (Anx-28), letter dt.24.07.2015 (Anx-31) as well as the

letter dt.07.08.2014 (Anx.33) (only to the extent of finding that the

lease period from 25 years to 99 years cannot be extended), are hereby

quashed & set aside.

The respondent-JDA is directed to rectify the lease period

from 25 years to 99 years and to issue a fresh/corrected lease-deed

incorporating the lease period of 99 years commencing from the original

date of allotment in 1995. It is made clear that the respondent/JDA

shall complete the execution & registration formalities of the rectified

lease-deed within a period of one month from the date of receipt of

certified copy of this order.

Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.

(VINOD KUMAR BHARWANI),J.

ASHOK