Page 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1517 OF 2013

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.2490 of 2008)

M/s A.S. Motors Pvt. Ltd. …Appellant

Versus

Union of India & Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal by special leave arises out of an order dated 8

th

August, 2007, passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur whereby Writ Appeal No.491 of 2007

filed by the appellant has been dismissed and the order passed by the

learned Single Judge dismissing Writ Petition No.720 of 2007

affirmed. Multiple rounds of litigation between the parties have been

aptly recapitulated in the order passed by the Single Judge of the

High Court in Writ Petition No.720/2007 and refreshed by the Division

Page 2 Bench of the High Court while dismissing the writ appeal filed against

the same. It is in that view unnecessary for us to recount the entire

factual background in which the controversy in this appeal arises

except to the extent it is absolutely necessary for us to do so for the

disposal of this appeal.

3. National Highway Authority of India Ltd. (NHAI for short)

invited tenders for award of a contract for collection of fee for the use

of National Highways from Km. 61.00 to Km.103 on Morena-Gwalior

Section of National Highway No.3. Appellant too among others made

an offer which was accepted by the NHAI in terms of its letter dated

14

th

March, 2006 asking the appellant to submit a demand draft for a

sum of Rs.2,20,00,125/- towards performance security and a bank

guarantee for a similar amount to be valid for a period of 15 months

for the due observance of the terms and conditions contained in the

contract. Both these requirements were satisfied by the appellant

with the result that a contract for collection of user fee commencing

from 1

st

April, 2006 to 31

st

March, 2007 was finally allotted in its

favour. It is not in dispute that pursuant to the said allotment the

appellant started collecting the prescribed fee as per the terms and

conditions of the agreement and also started depositing monthly

instalments stipulated under the same.

4. Certain violations were in due course noticed by the NHAI

Page 3 including complaints to the effect that the appellant was collecting

excess fee from vehicles passing through Toll Plaza. This resulted in

the termination of the collection contract by the competent authority

in terms of a letter dated 27

th

July, 2006, and forfeiture of the

performance security of Rs.2,20,00,125/-. Termination ordered by

the respondent triggered litigation between the parties that took

several rounds before the High Court. We are not immediately

concerned with the nature of those proceedings and the orders

passed in the same from time to time. What is important is that the

termination of the contract had once been quashed by the High Court

whereupon the same was terminated for a second time after a show-

cause notice and a personal hearing to the appellant in compliance

with the direction issued by the High Court in its order dated 25

th

January, 2007.

5. Aggrieved by the fresh termination of the contract as also the

forfeiture ordered by the competent authority, the appellant filed Writ

Petition No.720 of 2007 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. By

his order dated 18

th

June, 2007, a Single Judge of the High Court

allowed the said petition in part and while upholding imposition of

penalty and forfeiture of performance guarantee, quashed the

revocation of the bank guarantee by the respondent, as unfair and

unreasonable having regard to the fact that the respondent had

Page 4 already received Rs.7,33,33,750/- towards collection charges,

Rs.2,20,00,125/- towards forfeiture of the performance security and

a penalty amount of Rs.2,41,097/- making a total of

Rs.9,55,74,970/- which was more than Rs.8,80,00,500/- the amount

contracted to be paid to the respondent. The High Court held that

the termination of the contract and the forfeiture of the performance

security for the breaches committed by the appellant were perfectly

justified in the light of the report submitted by the agency deployed

by the respondent to collect material regarding overcharging of fee

and other violations committed by the appellant.

6. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Single Judge of

the High Court the appellant preferred Writ Appeal No.491 of 2007

which was heard and dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court

by its order dated 8

th

August, 2007. The present appeal assails the

correctness of the said order.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length

who have taken us through the record including the orders passed by

the High Court from time to time.

8. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that termination of

the contract between the parties was legally bad not only because the

principles of natural justice requiring a fair hearing to the appellant

were not complied with but also because there was no real basis for

Page 5 the respondent-authority to hold that the appellant had committed

any breach of the terms and conditions of the contract warranting its

termination. We find no merit in either one of the contentions. The

reasons are not far to see. Rules of natural justice, it is by now fairly

well settled, are not rigid, immutable or embodied rules that may be

capable of being put in straitjacket nor have the same been so

evolved as to apply universally to all kind of domestic tribunals and

enquiries. What the Courts in essence look for in every case where

violation of the principles of natural justice is alleged is whether the

affected party was given reasonable opportunity to present its case

and whether the administrative authority had acted fairly, impartially

and reasonably. The doctrine of audi alteram partem is thus aimed

at striking at arbitrariness and want of fair play. Judicial

pronouncements on the subject have, therefore, recognised that the

demands of natural justice may be different in different situations

depending upon not only the facts and circumstances of each case

but also on the powers and composition of the Tribunal and the rules

and regulations under which it functions. A Court examining a

complaint based on violation of rules of natural justice is entitled to

see whether the aggrieved party had indeed suffered any prejudice

on account of such violation. To that extent there has been a shift

from the earlier thought that even a technical infringement of the

Page 6 rules is sufficient to vitiate the action. Judicial pronouncements on the

subject are a legion. We may refer to only some of the decisions on

the subject which should in our opinion suffice.

9. In Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala , AIR

1969 SC 198, this Court while examining the content and the sweep

of the rules approved the view expressed in Russel v. Duke of

Norfolk, [1949] 1 All ER 109 in the following words:

“7. … … The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules.

The question whether the requirements of natural justice have

been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must

depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of

the case in point, the constitution of the Tribunal and the rules

under which it functions.

8. In Russel v. Duke of Norfolk, [1949] 1 All ER 109 at p.118,

Tucker, L.J., observed:

“There are, in my view, no words which are of universal

application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of domestic

tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on

the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the

rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject matter

that is being dealt with, and so forth. Accordingly, I do not

derive much assistance from the definitions of natural justice

which have been from time to time used, but, whatever

standard is adopted, one essential is that the person

concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting

his case.”

10. In Keshav Mills Co Ltd. v. Union of India , (1973) 1 SCC

380 this Court extracted with approval the observations of Lord Reid

in Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963) 2 W.L.R. 935 and said:

“8. … … We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to

lay down any fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner. The

concept of natural justice cannot be put into a straight-jacket.

It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of

natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply

them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point

that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person

Page 7 concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting

his case and that the administrative authority concerned

should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where

administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much

to act judicially as to act fairly. See, for instance, the

observations of Lord Parker in In re H.K. (an infant), (1967) 2

QB 617. It only means that such measure of natural justice

should be applied as was described by Lord Reid in Ridge v.

Baldwin case (supra) as “insusceptible of exact definition but

what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in

particular circumstances”. However, even the application of

the concept of fair-play requires real flexibility. Everything will

depend on the actual facts and circumstances of a case. As

Tucker, L.J., observed in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, [1949] 1

All ER 109:

“The requirements of natural justice must depend on the

circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry,

the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-

matter that is being dealt with and so forth.”

11. Reference may also be made to P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank

of India, (2006) 8 SCC 776 , where this Court approved the

observations made by Mukharji, J. in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of

India, (Bhopal Gas Disaster) (1990) 1 SCC 613 , in the following

words:

“30. The principles of natural justice cannot be put in a

straitjacket formula. It must be seen in circumstantial

flexibility. It has separate facets. It has in recent time also

undergone a sea change.

31. In Ajit Kumar Nag v. G.M. (PJ), Indian Oil Corprn.

Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 764 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court

opined: (SCC pp.785-86, para 44)

“44. We are aware of the normal rule that a person must have

a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked to be

satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair appeal. We are also

conscious of the general principle that pre-decisional hearing

is better and should always be preferred to post-decisional

hearing. We are further aware that it has been stated that

apart from laws of men, laws of God also observe the rule of

audi alterem partem. It has been stated that the first hearing

in human history was given in the Garden of Eden. God did

not pass sentence upon Adam and Eve before giving an

opportunity to show cause as to why they had eaten the

forbidden fruit. (See R. v. University of Cambridge [1723] 1

Str 557) But we are also aware that the principles of natural

Page 8 justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be

imprisoned in a straitjacket. They must yield to and change

with exigencies of situations. They must be confined within

their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been

stated: “ ‘To do a great right’ after all, it is permissible

sometimes ‘to do a little wrong’.” [Per Mukharji, C.J. in Charan

Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (Bhopal Gas Disaster) (1990) 1

SCC 613, at 705, para 124.] While interpreting legal

provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard

realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the court in

dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than

pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather

than formal and practical rather than ‘precedential’.”

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

39. Decision of this Court in S.L. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC

379, whereupon Mr Rao placed strong reliance to contend that

non-observance of principle of natural justice itself causes

prejudice or the same should not be read “as it causes

difficulty of prejudice”, cannot be said to be applicable in the

instant case. The principles of natural justice as noticed

hereinbefore, have undergone a sea change. In view of the

decisions of this Court in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma,

(1996) 3 SCC 364 and Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P.,

(1996) 5 SCC 460 the principle of law is that some real

prejudice must have been caused to the complainant. The

Court has shifted from its earlier concept that even a small

violation shall result in the order being rendered a nullity. To

the principle/doctrine of audi alteram partem, a clear

distinction has been laid down between the cases where there

was no hearing at all and the cases where there was mere

technical infringement of the principle. The Court applies the

principles of natural justice having regard to the fact situation

obtaining in each case. It is not applied in a vacuum without

reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case.

It is no unruly horse. It cannot be put in a straitjacket

formula. (See Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd.

(2005) 5 SCC 337 and State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi, (2006)

1 SCC 667. See also Mohd. Sartaj v. State of U.P., (2006) 2

SCC 315)

(emphasis supplied)

12. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher

Education v. K.S. Gandhi & Ors. , (1991) 2 SCC 716, this Court

while reiterating the legal position observed:

“22. … … The omnipresence and the omniscience (sic) of the

Page 9 principle of natural justice acts as deterrence to arrive at

arbitrary decision in flagrant infraction of fair play. But the

applicability of the principles of natural justice is not a rule of

thumb or a strait-jacket formula as an abstract proposition of

law. It depends on the facts of the case, nature of the inquiry

and the effect of the order/decision on the rights of the person

and attendant circumstances.”

13. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher

Secondary Education & Anr. v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth

& Ors. (1984) 4 SCC 27, this Court reiterated the the observations

made by Matthew, J. in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Kapoor,

(1973) 2 SCC 836 that it was not expedient to extend the horizons

of natural justice involved in the audi alteram partem rule to the

twilight zone of mere expectations, however great they might be.

14. We may finally refer to the decision of this Court in Aligarh

Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan , (2000) 7 SCC 529 ,

where this Court with approval quoted the following observations of

Sir Willam Wade (Administrative Law, 9

th

Edn. pp.468-471)

“… … it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the

principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope

and extent… There must also have been some real prejudice

to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely

technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of

natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of

the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the

tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with and so

forth.”

15. Coming to the case at hand we find that the termination of the

contract between the parties was preceded by a show-cause notice

issued to the appellant and a hearing provided to it by the competent

Page 10 authority. The show-cause notice issued to the appellant on 24

th

November, 2006 enclosed with it all relevant documents including the

complaints received against the appellant from various quarters and a

copy of the report submitted by the agency engaged for verifying the

allegations against the appellant. The appellant had unsuccessfully

challenged the show-cause notice in Writ Petition No.6338 of 2006,

before the High Court. The High Court had while refusing to interfere

in the matter directed the appellant to submit a reply to the notice.

The appellant had accordingly appeared before the authority on 12

th

January, 2007, submitted its written statement and was heard in

support of its case that it had not committed any default. In the reply

or at the hearing, the appellant had not alleged any mala fide, bias or

prejudice against the officers dealing with the matter or the agency

employed by them for collecting and verifying facts. Principles of

natural justice thus stood substantially complied with. The contention

that the appellant should have been given an opportunity to cross-

examine the persons whose statements had been recorded by the

agency in the course of its inquiry and verification was rightly

rejected by the High Court keeping in view the nature of the inquiry

which was primarily in the realm of contract, aimed at finding out

whether the appellant had committed any violation of the contractual

stipulations between the parties. Issue of a show-cause notice and

Page 11 disclosure of material on the basis of which action was proposed to be

taken against the appellant was in compliance with the requirement

of fairness to the appellant who was likely to be affected by the

proposed termination. Absence of any allegation of mala fides

against those taking action as also the failure of the appellant to

disclose any prejudice, all indicated that the procedure was fair and in

substantial, if not strict, compliance with the requirements of Audi

Alteram Partem. The first limb of the challenge mounted by the

appellant, therefore, fails and is hereby rejected.

16. Coming then to the question whether the respondent-

Authority had material enough to justify termination of the contract.

The High Court has referred in detail to the report submitted by the

agency deployed for collection of evidence and verification of the

allegations and come to the conclusion that the respondent was

perfectly justified in adopting the method and the procedure adopted

by it in the instant case for collection of information and evidence

regarding the alleged malpractices being committed by the appellant.

The Single Judge of the High Court has while dealing with this aspect

observed:

“There is no allegations of mala fide, personal prejudice or

bias against any of the members of agency which conducted

the discreet inquiry. In the facts and circumstances of the

case I am of the considered view that the method adopted by

the National Highway Authority to detect the illegalities being

committed by the petitioner is a fair and reasonable method

and it has not caused any prejudice or bias to the petitioner.

Page 12 There is no material available on record on the basis of which

the report submitted by the agency as contained in Annexure

R/7 can be discarded by this Court, this report cannot be

rejected merely on the ground that it is collected behind the

back of the petitioner. The nature of irregularity committed

by the petitioner can be detected only if a discreet enquiry in

the manner as done by the respondents have acted in a

manner which is violative of the principle of natural justice.

The report submitted was placed before the petitioner he was

given opportunity of submitting his defence and explanation

both in writing and personally. Records indicated that

petitioner was unable to produce any cogent material to show

that this report is unsustainable and cannot be relied upon.”

17. In the appeal preferred against the above order, the appellant

had made a grievance only in regard to two aspects covered by

question nos. (III) and (V) , formulated by the Single Judge in the

following words:

(III) Whether the action for termination of the contract is

done by the competent authority and whether cancellation of

the contract is based on proof of breach committed by the

petitioner?

(V)Whether the provision of Section 74 of the Contract Act

applies in the present case and forfeiture of the performance

security and revocation of bank guarantee is arbitrary and

unfair warranting interference by this Court?”

18. While dealing with question No.III above, the Division Bench

held:

“In respect of issue No. III, the learned Writ Court while

relying upon various facts brought on record gave a

categorical finding in paragraph 21 that the modus operandi

adopted by the petitioner of charging higher rate from road

was a clear breach of contract and under clause 18(a) of the

Contract Agreement, the same was determined, and also

entitled the national Highway Authority of India to impose and

realize the penalty for such breach as stipulated therein. In

our considered opinion the Writ Court did not faulter in

recording the aforesaid finding.”

19. There is, in our opinion, no error of law, nor is there any

perversity in the appreciation of the material available before the

Page 13 respondents. The reports submitted by the agency employed by the

respondent-Authority was damning for the appellant and clearly

showed that the appellant was indulging in malpractices like charging

excess fee from the owners/drivers of the vehicles using the stretch

of road covered by the contract. Nothing in particular has been

pointed out to us to persuade us to take a contrary view. If the report

submitted by the agency against whom the appellant has no

allegation of malice or other extraneous considerations to make are

accepted, we see no reason why the same could not furnish a safe

basis for the respondent to take action especially when the appellant

was abusing its position as a contractor, putting the public at large to

unnecessary harassment and exaction of money not legally

recoverable from them. The material collected could and was rightly

made a basis for the termination of contract by the competent

authority.

20. The upshot of the findings recorded by the High Court which

we have affirmed in the foregoing paragraphs is that the appellant

was not entitled to claim any relief in exercise of its extra ordinary

writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court could have

relegated the appellant to seek redress in an appropriate civil action

before a competent civil Court, whether for damages or recovery of

the amount forfeited by the respondent. The High Court has not

Page 14 done so. It has given partial relief to the appellant to the extent of

holding that the invocation of the bank guarantee was not justified in

the light of the forfeiture of performance security and the amount of

penalty. In any event we see no room for interfering with the order

passed by the High Court in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article

136 of the Constitution of India which too is both extraordinary and

discretionary in nature. We may in this connection refer to the

following passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England Fourth

Edition Vol.-16 pages 874-876, which sums up the legal position in

England as to the right of a party who has not come to the Court with

perfect propriety of conduct and with clean hands, to claim an

equitable relief.

1305. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.

A court of equity refuses relief to a plaintiff whose conduct in

regard to the subject matter of the litigation has been

improper. This was formerly expressed by the maxim "he who

has committed iniquity shall not have equity", and relief was

refused where a transaction was based on the plaintiff's fraud

or misrepresentation, or where the plaintiff sought to enforce a

security improperly obtained, or where he claimed a remedy

for a breach of trust which he had himself procured and

whereby he had obtained money. Later it was said that the

plaintiff in equity must come with perfect propriety of conduct,

or with clean hands. In application of the principle a person will

not be allowed to assert his title to property which he has dealt

with so as to defeat his creditors or evade tax, for he may not

maintain an action by setting up his own fraudulent design.

The maxim does not, however, mean that equity strikes at

depravity in a general way; the cleanliness required is to be

judged in relation to the relief sought, and the conduct

complained of must have an immediate and necessary relation

to the equity sued for; it must be depravity in a legal as well

as in a moral sense. Thus, fraud on the part of a minor

deprives him of his right to equitable relief notwithstanding his

disability. Where the transaction is itself unlawful it is not

Page 15 necessary to have recourse to this principle. In equity, just as

at law, no suit lies in general in respect of an illegal

transaction, but this is on the ground of its illegality, not by

reason of the plaintiff's demerits."

21. Judged in the light of the above, the appellant had breached

the contractual stipulations, harassed innocent citizens to cough up

more than what they were in law required to pay and thus

undeservedly enriched itself before it turned to the Court to claim

relief in the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court on

equitable considerations. Such an attempt could and ought to have

been frustrated by the High Court, as indeed has been done, no

matter only partially.

22. That brings us to the only other ground of challenge relating

to invocation of the Bank Guarantee by the National Highway

Authority of India which according to the appellant was arbitrary and

unfair in the facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court has

taken the view that apart from a penalty of Rs.2,41,097/-, National

Highway Authority had already recovered a sum of Rs.2,20,00,125/-

out of the bank drafts furnished by the appellant towards

performance security. The total amount, thus, received by the

authority was more than the amount payable to it under the contract

if the same had been performed diligently till the end of the contract

Page 16 period. Invocation of the bank guarantee for recovery of any further

amount was in that view held to be unjustified by the High Court.

23. There is no appeal by the Authority against that part of the

judgment, although it was argued on behalf of the Authority that in

terms of clause 18(b) of the contract, the Authority had the right to

estimate the excess of collection by the appellant-contractor and

recover the same from it. Clause 18 may be extracted in extenso at

this stage:

“18. Penalty for charging excess fee :

(a)In case, it is observed and/or established to the

satisfaction of the Authority that the Contractor has

charged fee in excess of the prescribed rate, the

Authority may terminate the contract forthwith and/or

may impose a penalty of Rs. One lakh or an amount

equivalent of one day’s fee receivable by the Authority,

which ever is higher and may provide the Contractor

another opportunity of continuing the Fee Collection.

However, in no case, the authority shall afford more

than one opportunity to the Contractor.

(b)The Authority also, reserves the right to estimate the

excess collection of fee made by the Contractor and

recover the same, which will be over and above the

penalty imposed and to be recovered from the

Contractor.

(c)The termination under this clause shall make the

Contractor liable for unconditional forfeiture of the

Performance Security.”

24. It is evident from a simple reading of the above that the

Authority was competent to terminate the contract if the appellant

was found charging in excess of the prescribed rate of fee. Apart from

Page 17 termination of the contract any violation in the nature of excess fees

being charged could result in imposition of a penalty in terms of

clause 18(a) (supra). What is significant is that in terms of clause 18

(b) besides termination of the contract and levy of penalty the

Authority was also entitled to estimate the excess collection made by

the appellant and recover the same from it. There is nothing on

record before us whether any such estimation was made by the

Authority and if so the basis on which that was done. The failure of

the Authority to estimate accurately could jeopardise its claim for

recovery by a simple invocation of the bank guarantee. It may have

been a different matter if the Authority had estimated the excess

amount accurately and sought to recover the same by invocation of

the bank guarantee but without a proper estimation of the excess

received by the appellant, it was not open to the respondent to

invoke the bank guarantee and recover the entire amount of

Rs.2,20,00,125/- covered by the same. The High Court was, in that

view, correct in holding that invocation of bank guarantee was not

justified having regard to the fact that the Authority had already

recovered the penalty levied by it and also forfeited the performance

security amount of Rs.2,20,00,125/- in the form of bank drafts

furnished by the appellant.

Page 18 25. Insofar as the recovery of the performance security of

Rs.2,20,00,125/- from out of the bank drafts furnished by the

appellant is concerned, we have no difficulty in holding that such a

forfeiture was available to the respondent-Authority under the terms

of the contract and the provisions of Section 74 of the Contract Act

did not forbid the same. The scope of Section 74 has been the subject

matter of several pronouncements of this Court including the

Constitution Bench decisions in Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Das

AIR 1963 SC 1405, Union of India v. Ramam Iron Foundry

(1974) 2 SCC 231 and SAIL v. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes

(2009) 10 SCC 63 . The common thread that runs through all these

pronouncements is that an aggrieved party is entitled to receive

compensation from the party who has broken the contract whether or

not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused by the

breach and that the Court has, subject to the outer limit of the

penalty stipulated, jurisdiction to award such compensation as it

deems reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case.

This would essentially be a mixed question of law and fact that a Writ

Court could not possibly decide. The appellant could and indeed

ought to have sought its remedies in a proper civil action if it

questioned the reasonableness of the amount recoverable by the

appellant in terms of the contractual stipulations.

Page 19 26. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed but in the facts

and circumstances, without any order as to costs.

……… ……………….…..…J.

(T.S. Thakur)

…………………………… ..…J.

(Gyan Sudha Misra)

New Delhi

February 21, 2013

Page 20 ITEM NO.1B COURT NO.9 SECTION IVA

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

C.A. No........../2013 @

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).2490/2008

(From the judgement and order dated 08/08/2007 in WA No.491/2007 of

The HIGH COURT OF M.P AT JABALPUR)

M/S. A.S. MOTORS PVT. LTD. Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

U.O.I. & ORS. Respondent(s)

Date: 21/02/2013 This Petition was called on for JUDGMENT today.

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Niraj Sharma,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Praveen Jain,Adv.

Mr. T.S. Sidhu,Adv.

Ms. Pallavi Mohan,Adv.

Mr. Ganesh Kamath,Adv. For

M/S. M.V. Kini & Associates

The Court made the following

J U D G M E N T

Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur pronounced Judgment of the

Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Gyan

Sudha Misra.

Leave granted.

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed judgment.

(N.K. Goel)

Court Master

(Veena Khera)

Court Master

(Signed “Reportable” Judgment is placed on the file)