As per case facts, M/s. Co-operation Corporation challenged a show cause notice and a speaking order issued by the Municipal Corporation under Section 351(1)(a) of the MMC Act regarding unauthorized ...
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FA-218-2026 (final).doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL NO. 218 OF 2026
M/s. Co-operation Corporation,
A proprietary concern of
Mr. Sayed Dadpeer Qadri,
Having its industrial address at
Bhutta’s Estate, Opp. Liberty Chemicals,
Mogra Village Road, Andheri (East),
Mumbai – 400 069.
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]...Appellant
Versus
1.The Municipal Corporation of Greater
Mumbai,
a body corporate constituted under the
Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888,
having its office at Mahapalika Marg,
Opp. CST, Fort, Bombay 400 001.
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
2.The Designated Officer – K/East South
Ward,
K/East South Ward Office Building,
Azad Road, Gundavali, Andheri (East),
Mumbai 400 069.
]
]
]
]
]...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 3217 OF 2026
IN
FIRST APPEAL NO. 218 OF 2026
Smt. Kantadevi Gupta
Age : Adult, Occ. : Nil,
Through her constituted attorney
Mr. Rishabh Shorewala
Age : Adult, Occ : Business,
R/a 12 – Miami Apartment,
70/A, Bhulabhai Desai Road,
Breach Candy, Mumbai 400026.
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
...Applicant/Intervenor
Sairaj 1 of 18 2026:BHC-AS:29562
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
In the matter between :
M/s. Co-operation Corporation,
A proprietary concern of
Mr. Sayed Dadpeer Qadri,
Having its industrial address at
Bhutta’s Estate, Opp. Liberty Chemicals,
Mogra Village Road, Andheri (East),
Mumbai – 400 069.
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]...Appellant
Versus
1.The Municipal Corporation of Greater
Mumbai,
a body corporate constituted under the
Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888,
having its office at Mahapalika Marg,
Opp. CST, Fort, Bombay 400 001.
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
2.The Designated Officer – K/East South
Ward,
K/East South Ward Office Building,
Azad Road, Gundavali, Andheri (East),
Mumbai 400 069.
]
]
]
]
]...Respondents
——————
Mr. Amogh Singh for Appellant.
Mr. Pradeep Patil for Respondent-Corporation.
——————
Coram : Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.
Reserved on : 14
th
July, 2026.
Pronounced on : 20
th
July, 2026.
Judgment :
1.Heard. Admit. With consent, taken up for final hearing forthwith.
2.The First Appeal is at the instance of the original Plaintiff being
aggrieved by the order below Exhibit-1 dated 23
rd
February, 2026
passed by the City Civil Court rejecting the plaint in L. C. Suit No. 320 of
2026 for want of jurisdiction in view of the bar under Section 515A of
Sairaj 2 of 18
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 [for short, “MMC Act”].
3.L.C. Suit No. 320 of 2026 came to be filed challenging the
impugned show cause notice issued by the Respondent-Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai [for short, “Corporation”] under
Section 351(1) (a) of MMC Act and the impugned speaking order dated
2
nd
February, 2026 and for permanent injunction restraining the
Defendants from acting on the impugned notice and the speaking
order. Upon the suit being filed, the Court directed the Plaintiff to
satisfy on the point of maintainability of the suit in view of express bar
under Section 515A of the MMC Act.
4.By the impugned order, the Trial Court held that the plaint does
not disclose that the Plaintiff has exhausted the statutory remedies
provided to them. It noted that as the Grievance Redressal Committee
has already been constituted by the Corporation to address the
complaints against unauthorized construction, such committee must
have the authority to deal with grievance against such complaints or
orders passed by the Designated Officer. It further held that the
Plaintiff has not pointed out that the Designated Officer who has
issued the impugned order was not competent to pass such order and
held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction in view of Section 515A of
the MMC Act.
5.Mr. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant has taken
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this Court through the specific pleadings in the plaint about the
impugned notice and order being nullity for the reason that the notice
structure was occupied by the Plaintiff since the year 1961, the copy of
the “Register of Building Plans” for the year 1961-1962 records the
application by the owner Shri B. D. Bhuta for proposed repairs to the
existing store room at subject plot, the Intimation of Disapproval was
issued on 19
th
December, 1961 along with approved plan and
commencement certificate was issued on 16
th
April, 1962. He submits
that it was specifically pleaded that the suit structure was in existence
prior to datum line, which was duly recognized by the authorities. He
would point out the pleadings in paragraph 14 of the plaint that the
impugned notice was issued entirely without application of mind and
in arbitrary and mala fide manner. He would further point out the
challenge to the impugned order was on the basis that there is no
material or basis on which the Defendant No. 2 formed the opinion or
reached the conclusion that the notice structure is unauthorized as
there is no reference to sanction plan, no panchnama and the notice
was issued in gross violation of the principles of natural justice.
6.He would point out the pleading in the plaint dealing with the
bar under Section 515A of MMC Act and that the impugned notice and
speaking order have not been issued in pursuance of Section 351 of the
MMC Act and is wholly without jurisdiction, violates the principles of
Sairaj 4 of 18
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
natural justice, are void ab initio and therefore, bar under Section 515A
does not apply.
7.He would further submit that various decisions have recognized
the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit challenging the
actions under Section 351 of MMC Act where the challenge is founded
on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice,
nullity or mala fides. He submits that despite the specific pleadings and
documents which were part of the record, the Trial Court has cursorily
dismissed the suit in view of the bar under Section 515A of the MMC
Act. He would submit that there is no discussion on the documents
produced along with the plaint to demonstrate the existence of the
suit structure which included the copy of IOD, commencement
certificate and approved plan. He submits that there is no absolute bar
on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 515A and where it is
demonstrated that the notice in question is a nullity, the Civil Court
would have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
8.Mr. Singh would further submit that during the pendency of the
present proceedings, the suit premises has been demolished, however,
the right to challenge the impugned order survives as it is open for the
Plaintiff to seek reconstruction of the structure, upon restoration of
suit, which cannot be done without a challenge to the impugned notice
under Section 351 and the speaking order. In support, he relies upon
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the following decisions :
Snehdeep Krida Mandal vs. Maharashtra Housing
and Area Development Authority
1
Swaroop Aditya Developers vs. Municipal
Corporation of Mumbai
2
Suneet Narindersingh Chadha alias Romi Chadha
vs. MCGM
3
Jadavji Deraj Chheda vs. Brihan Mumbai Municipal
Corporation
4
Abdul Razzaq Sunesra vs. MCGM
5
Abdul Karim Ahmed Mansoori vs. MCGM
6
Ramesh Laxman Sonkamble vs. MCGM
7
Yogesh Megaji Gada vs. MCGM
8
MCGM vs. Rajendra Phulchand Gupta
9
Laxman Barkya Wadkar vs. Mumbai Municipal
Corporation of India
10
Commissioner, Akola Municipal Corporation vs.
Bhalchandra s/o Govind Mahashabde
11
9.Per contra, Mr. Patil, learned counsel appearing for Respondent-
Corporation would submit that as the suit premises has been
1 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 1495.
2 First Appeal No. 147 of 2026, decided on 12
th
February, 2026 by Bombay High Court.
3 Writ Petition (L) No. 18910 of 2025 with Writ Petition (L) No. 18908 of 2025, decided by Bombay
High Court on 27
th
June, 2025.
4Appeal from Order No. 124 of 2025 along with batch of Appeals, decided on 15
th
April, 2025.
5 (2013) SCC OnLine Bom 832.
6 (2013) SCC OnLine Bom 1218.
7 Writ Petition (L) No. 1967 of 2013, decided on 30
th
August, 2013.
8 Writ Petition No. 2243 of 2013 with batch of Petitions, decided on 10
th
April, 2014.
9 2022 SCC OnLine BOM 398.
10 First Appeal No. 1635 of 2010 with batch of Appeals decided on 5
th
May, 2011.
11 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 615.
Sairaj 6 of 18
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
demolished, the Plaintiff can file fresh suit as it gives rise to fresh cause
of action. He submits that the Trial Court, has exercised the powers
under Order VII, Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in view of
the bar under Section 515A of Corporation Act, the plaint has been
rejected which is in accordance with the law and in consonance with
the judicial pronouncements on the subject. He submits that it is not
the case of the Plaintiff that no hearing was given by the Corporation
and after issuing show-cause notice, filing of the reply and after giving
an opportunity of hearing, a well-reasoned order has been passed by
the Corporation and the principles of natural justice stands fully
complied. He submits that in view thereof, nullity cannot be pleaded as
a ground. He submits that it is well-settled that it is not enough to
merely use the expression “nullity” without pointing out how the
notice and the speaking order is nullity. He submits that in the plaint,
the Plaintiff has termed the notice and the speaking order as nullity
whereas the order was passed after giving proper opportunity to the
Plaintiff. He submits that there is no case of jurisdictional error as the
Designated Officer was competent to pass the impugned order. He
submits that the pleadings in the plaint constitute challenge to the
validity of the order and does not demonstrate that the notice and the
speaking order are nullity and therefore, the bar under Section 515A
would apply. In support, he relies upon the decision in the case of
Sairaj 7 of 18
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
Nashik Municipal Corporation vs. Sunil Baburao Kshirsagar (since
deceased, through LRs)
12
.
10.There is an application for intervention which was filed by the
Applicant claiming to be owner of the entire premises having
purchased the same under Indenture of Conveyance dated 1993. The
application pleads that the suit was filed without impleading the
Applicant as a party, the Applicant had decided to file the Chamber
Summons which was duly affirmed on 17
th
February, 2026, however,
before the Chamber Summons could be lodged, the plaint in the suit
came to be rejected by the impugned order and therefore, the present
application for intervention in the present proceedings has been filed.
11.The submissions canvassed are in the context of the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court to entertain and try the suit under Section 515A of
the MMC Act. In event, the Appeal succeeds, the order would be set
aside and suit will be restored to file in which case, the Applicant will
be at liberty to file the Chamber Summons and in event, the Appeal
does not succeed then the intervention is immaterial. Perusal of the
Interim Application would also indicate that the Applicant supports the
impugned notice and speaking order passed by the Corporation on
merits.
12.The issue which arises for consideration in the present case is
12 Civil Revision Application No. 153 of 2016 with 679 of 2016, decided on 21
st
November, 2025.
Sairaj 8 of 18
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
whether the Trial Court was right in holding that the bar under Section
515A of the MMC Act applies and the Civil Court will not have the
jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit.
13.The Trial Court had taken the suit immediately upon lodging on
the point of the maintainability in view of the express bar provided
under Section 515A of the MMC Act, which reads as under :
“515A. Bar of jurisdiction.— Save as otherwise provided
in this Act, any notice issued, order passed or direction
issued by the Designated Officer, under section 351 or
354A shall not be questioned in any suit or other legal
proceedings.”
14.The provisions of Section 515A of the MMC Act has been the
recurring subject-matter of various judicial pronouncements, which
would provide guidance as to the applicability of the bar under Section
515 A of MMC Act when the challenge is to the notice under Section
351 or Section 354A of MMC Act.
15. Section 515A of the MMC Act was brought In the statute book
by Maharashtra Act No. 2 of 2012 and the Act received the assent of
the President and was published in Gazette on 30
th
March, 2012. The
constitutional validity of Section 515A of the MMC Act was challenged
in the case of Abdul Razzaq Sunesra vs. Municipal Corporation of
Greater Mumbai (supra). The Hon’ble Division Bench while considering
the constitutional validity of Section 515A examined the statutory
scheme to hold that the provisions of Section 351 and Section 354A
Sairaj 9 of 18
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
contain adequate safeguards, both procedural and substantive, to
ensure due notice, an opportunity to represent, the consideration of
the cause shown and an application of mind to relevant and germane
circumstances and that there is an urgent need of taking expeditious
action against unauthorized constructions, which does not get lost in a
maze of dilatory remedies in Civil Courts. The Hon’ble Division Bench
negated the challenge to the constitutional validity and also adverted
briefly to the grounds on which the ad-interim relief was refused by the
trial Court, observing as under in paragraph 20 :
“20. Before concluding it would be necessary to note
that in the present case, the ad-interim relief was refused
by the City Civil Court primarily in view of section 515-A,
but also on the ground that corrective machinery is
available in the form of a representation before the
Grievance Redressal Committee. The circular that has
been issued by the Commissioner of the Mumbai
Municipal Corporation on 4 June, 2013 for the setting up
of a Grievance Redressal Committee was as a result of
the directions issued by this Court to the effect that
there should be an appropriate mechanism for redressal
of grievances pertaining to unauthorized constructions.
The aim of the circular is to redress grievances received
from a complainant in respect of action/non-action on
unauthorized constructions. The circular provides in
Clause-2.3 that the zonal committee shall not pass any
order which will stop/stay the notice action initiated by
the designated officer and the on going notice action will
continue and be brought to its logical conclusion.
Similarly, clause-6.5 requires the owner/occupier against
whom a complaint is made to be called to attend the
hearing. The circular, therefore, provides a remedy to
citizens to complain against unauthorized structures. Be
that as it may, the City Civil Court was on its
interpretation of section 515-A justified in coming to the
conclusion as it did on the bar of jurisdiction.”
Sairaj 10 of 18
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
16. The Hon’ble Division Bench took note of the circular issued by
the Corporation on 4
th
June, 2013 for setting up of a grievance
redressal committee for redressal of grievances pertaining to
unauthorized construction. One of the reasons why the Trial Court in
the present case has declined to exercise the jurisdiction is by reason
of the Grievance Redressal Committee mechanism available which has
not been exhausted by the Plaintiff. Paragraph 20 of the decision in the
case of Abdul Razzaq Sunesra (supra) describes the aim of the
Government circular as a mechanism to redress the grievances
received from a complainant in respect of action/non-action on
unauthorized construction, which provides a remedy to citizens to
complaint against unauthorized structures.
17.In the case of Snehdeep Krida Mandal vs. MHADA (supra), the
decision in the case of Abdul Razzaq Sunesra vs. MCGM (supra) was
noted and the Hon’ble Division Bench held that when the Civil Court
receives a plaint and application for interim relief such as a stay or
status quo order challenging notices issued by the Municipal
Corporation under Section 351 or Section 354 of MMC Act, it must first
determine that the parties have exhausted the statutory remedy
available to them which includes pursuing appropriate mechanism for
grievance redressal before seeking judicial intervention.
18.In the case of Jadavji Deraj Chheda vs. Brihan Mumbai
Sairaj 11 of 18
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
Municipal Corporation (supra), the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has
noted the stand of the Corporation that the Grievance Redressal
Committee has been formed only for the purpose of considering the
grievance against unauthorized constructions and there is no
committee formed by the Corporation for redressal of grievance of the
occupants. Before this Court also, it is not demonstrated that the
Grievance Redressal Committee which has been set up by the
Corporation would address the grievances of the occupants insofar as
the proposed action under Section 351 or Section 354 is concerned.
19.The Hon’ble Division Bench in the case of Abdul Razzaq Sunesra
(supra) had considered the various clauses of the circular to conclude
that the circular provides a remedy to citizens to complain against
unauthorised structures.
20. In the case of Yogesh Megaji Gada (supra), which was group of
Petitions filed challenging the notice issued by the Corporation under
Sections 351/354 of the MMC Act, a preliminary objection was raised
that the writ jurisdiction of the Court seeking adjudication of seriously
disputed questions of fact would result in nullifying the bar of Section
515A by expanding the scope of the writ jurisdiction. The contention
was that the bar under Section 515A is not absolute and civil suit will
be maintainable if the action of designated officer is nullity or there is
a jurisdictional error. The co-ordinate Bench considered the various
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FA-218-2026 (final).doc
judicial pronouncements and rendered a detailed judgment and
concluded that the scope of challenge to the orders passed by the
Corporation under the relevant sections has been narrowed down to
jurisdictional error in the order of the authority and there is no scope
of unlimited challenge to the orders and that the Petitioners will have
to bring their case within the limited area. The co-ordinate Bench
recognized that the bar under Section 515A is not an absolute bar and
will have to be decided in facts of each case within the narrow scope of
challenge.
21.In the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai vs.
Rajendra P. Gupta (supra), which is a subsequent decision, the learned
Single Judge culled out limited grounds on which notice under Section
351 or Section 354A may be questioned in the suit, when :
“(a) act of issuance of notice is nullity,
(b) the authority issuing such a notice, has not acted in
conformity with the fundamental judicial procedure,
(c) notice has been issued by misusing the power,
(d) offending act has not been done in good faith.”
22.In Laxman Barkya Wadekar vs. Mumbai Municipal Corporation
of India (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court considered the
effect of bar created by Section 149 of the Maharashtra Regional and
Town Planning Act, 1966 which is a pari materia with Section 515A.
After considering the law on the subject, the learned Single Judge held
Sairaj 13 of 18
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
that notwithstanding the finality clause and express ouster of the
jurisdiction, if there is an allegation made in the plaint of nullity or
order being without jurisdiction, express exclusion of jurisdiction of
Civil Court will not come in a way of the Civil Court entertaining the suit
however, the Court will have to be prima facie satisfied that the action
appears to be a nullity or without jurisdiction.
23.In the context of considering the bar of jurisdiction under Section
433-A of Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 in the case of
Commissioner, Akola Municipal Corporation vs. Bhalchandra G.
Mahashabde (supra), the learned Single Judge has reiterated the
limited grounds on which the notice can be challenged despite the
express bar.
24.No authority has been cited before this Court, which strikes a
dissent and the judicial pronouncements reiterate the well-settled
proposition of law that despite express ouster of Civil Court under
Section 515A of the MMC Act, there is scope for challenge to the
orders passed under Section 351 or Section 354A of the MMC Act
within the narrow area, within which the Plaintiff has to fit its case.
The plaint must disclose all such material facts as are necessary to
demonstrate that the impugned order is a nullity or there is a mala fide
exercise of power or authority in issuing such notice or the authority
has not acted in conformity with the fundamental judicial procedure.
Sairaj 14 of 18
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
25. Though Mr. Patil would contend that as hearing was given to the
Plaintiff and reasoned order is passed, there is no ground of nullity
available, it is not only conformity with the facets of principles of
natural justice, which is a relevant factor to be considered in order to
determine whether the impugned order is a nullity or without
jurisdiction. In event the pleadings and the documents on record
demonstrates that the structure is authorised or tolerated, the order
of demolition would be wholly without jurisdiction in view of the
statutory provisions of MMC Act.
26.I have minutely gone through the pleadings in the plaint. In
paragraph 5, it is specifically pleaded that the Plaintiff has been in
continuous use, occupation and peaceful possession of the suit
premises since the year 1961 and has annexed the certificate of
registration as small-scale industrial unit issued by the Government of
Maharashtra on 25
th
September, 1961 in respect of factory located at
Bhuta’s Estate, Mogra, Andheri, Mumbai – 400 069 and the industrial
premises is located at Bhuta’s estate. In paragraph 9, the Plaintiff has
pleaded about the permissions granted for carrying out repairs to the
then existing store room on the same location. It is also pleaded that
the IOD issued on 19
th
December, 1961 along with the approved plan
and the commencement certificate issued on 16
th
April, 1962 which are
annexed at Exhibit-C of the plaint. The intimation of disapproval of
Sairaj 15 of 18
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
1961 is in respect of structure to be constructed at CTS No. 118 (1 to
15) at Bhuta’s estate and Commencement Certificate of 16
th
April, 1962
is in respect of development work of repairs to the existing store on
the same property along with the approved plan of 19
th
December,
1961.
27.There are specific pleadings dealing with the bar under Section
515 A of MMC Act and averments as regards the impugned notice and
order being wholly without jurisdiction and nullity. It is not a case
where the word “nullity” or “without jurisdiction” etc are recited as
mantra. There are documents produced with the plaint to substantiate
the existence of the notice structure prior to the datum line, which if
proved, would render the impugned order wholly without jurisdiction
as not action can be taken by the designated officer in view of the
Corporation’s policy of tolerating structures in existence prior to the
datum line and the statutory provisions of Section 351 of MMC Act.
28. Upon reading of the plaint, in my view, there are necessary
averments as regards the existence of the structure prior to the datum
line and the specific averment that the issuance of notice in light of
such documents is a nullity to sustain the allegation of the impugned
order being a nullity and to vest the Civil Court with the jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the bar under Section 515A of the MMC Act. Perusal
of the impugned order does not indicate a detailed examination and
Sairaj 16 of 18
FA-218-2026 (final).doc
discussion on the averments in the plaint and documents appended
and the inquiry is restricted to the competency of the designated
officer.
29.The other reason why the Trial Court has declined to exercise
jurisdiction is that the Plaintiff has not exhausted the statutory
remedies which according to the Trial Court was the Grievance
Redressal Committee. The decision of Abdul Sunesra (supra) clarifies
that the Committee is formed for redressing the complaints against
unauthorised construction. Clause 2.3 of the circular as noted in the
decision prohibits the zonal committee against passing any order which
will stop/stay the notice/action initiated by designated officer. Despite
the circular and stand of the Corporation, the Trial Court has held that
the committee has the authority to deal with the grievance against the
order passed by the Designated Officer.
30.In so far as the contention that the notice structure has already
been demolished and fresh suit can be filed, without demonstrating
that the demolition carried out pursuant to the impugned notice and
order is bad in law and illegal, no relief of reconstruction would be
granted to the Plaintiff. If the suit is restored, the Plaintiff would be in
a position to amend the plaint to seek appropriate relief.
31.In my view, the averments in the plaint and the documents
produced on record, if proved, would render the impugned notice and
Sairaj 17 of 18
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order illegal and null and void. In the facts, the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court is therefore not barred under Section 515A of MMC Act. Hence
the following order is passed:
: O R D E R :
(a) First Appeal is allowed.
(b) The impugned judgment and order dated 23
rd
February, 2026
passed by the Trial Court below Exhibit -1 is hereby quashed and
set aside.
(c) L. C. Suit No. 320 of 2026 is restored to the file of the Civil
Court to be tried in accordance with law and on its own merits.
32.It is open for the intervenor to file its application for intervention
before the Trial Court, which will be decided by the Trial Court on its
own merits and in accordance with law. Interim Application No. 3217
of 2026 is disposed of.
33.Nothing survives for consideration in pending Interim/Civil
applications, if any, and the same stand disposed of.
[Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.]
Sairaj 18 of 18
In a significant ruling concerning municipal law, the Bombay High Court recently addressed the intricate balance of Civil Court Jurisdiction MMC Act and the express bar under Section 515A MMC Act Bar. This case, now available on CaseOn, provides crucial insights into when a Civil Court can entertain a suit challenging actions taken by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) under Sections 351 and 354A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The judgment, delivered on 20th July 2026 by Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh, highlights the limitations of the statutory bar when claims of nullity or jurisdictional error are adequately pleaded and supported by documents.
The First Appeal stemmed from a suit filed by M/s. Co-operation Corporation (the Appellant/Original Plaintiff) challenging a show cause notice and a subsequent speaking order issued by the Respondent-Municipal Corporation for alleged unauthorized construction under Section 351(1)(a) of the MMC Act. The Plaintiff also sought a permanent injunction to prevent the Defendants from acting on these impugned orders.
The City Civil Court initially rejected the plaint, citing a lack of jurisdiction due to the express bar under Section 515A of the MMC Act and the Plaintiff's alleged failure to exhaust statutory remedies, specifically the Grievance Redressal Committee.
The primary issue before the High Court was whether the Trial Court was correct in holding that the bar under Section 515A of the MMC Act applied, thereby depriving the Civil Court of jurisdiction to entertain the suit. More broadly, the High Court examined the circumstances under which a Civil Court can exercise jurisdiction despite an express statutory bar, particularly when the challenge to a municipal action is based on allegations of nullity, mala fides, or jurisdictional errors.
Section 515A of the MMC Act, introduced by Maharashtra Act No. 2 of 2012, states: "Save as otherwise provided in this Act, any notice issued, order passed or direction issued by the Designated Officer, under section 351 or 354A shall not be questioned in any suit or other legal proceedings."
However, judicial pronouncements have consistently carved out exceptions to such express ouster clauses. The High Court referenced several key decisions, including:
These rulings collectively establish that while the bar is significant, it does not preclude judicial review when fundamental procedural irregularities, jurisdictional defects, or mala fide actions are alleged and demonstrated.
The High Court meticulously examined the pleadings in the Appellant's plaint. It noted specific averments that the Plaintiff had been in continuous use and possession of the premises since 1961, substantiated by a certificate of registration as a small-scale industrial unit from 1961. Crucially, the plaint pleaded permissions for repairs, an Intimation of Disapproval (IOD) from 19th December 1961, an approved plan, and a commencement certificate from 16th April 1962, all annexed as Exhibit-C. These documents, if proven, would indicate the structure's existence and authorization prior to the "datum line"—a critical point for determining legality under municipal policies.
The Court highlighted that the plaint explicitly stated the impugned notice and order were "wholly without jurisdiction and nullity." This was not a mere recitation, but a contention backed by documented evidence that, if true, would render the Corporation's action illegal. The Court found that the Trial Court had erred by not undertaking a detailed examination of these averments and appended documents, restricting its inquiry primarily to the designated officer's competency.
Legal professionals know that analyzing such rulings can be time-consuming. This is where CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs become invaluable, offering quick, precise summaries that help in grasping the core arguments and judicial reasoning of complex judgments like this one, ensuring legal practitioners and students stay updated efficiently.
Furthermore, the High Court addressed the Trial Court's reliance on the Grievance Redressal Committee. Citing the Abdul Razzaq Sunesra decision and the Corporation's own circular, the High Court clarified that this committee is primarily for addressing complaints *against* unauthorized constructions by citizens, not for staying or stopping actions initiated by the designated officer. Therefore, it was not an appropriate or exhaustive statutory remedy for the Plaintiff in this context.
Lastly, the Court rejected the Respondent's argument that demolition rendered the appeal infructuous. It held that if the impugned order were found illegal and null, the Plaintiff could amend the plaint to seek reconstruction relief.
The Bombay High Court concluded that the specific averments in the plaint, coupled with the supporting documents, if proved, would indeed render the impugned notice and order illegal and null and void. In such a scenario, the Civil Court Jurisdiction MMC Act is not barred by Section 515A MMC Act Bar.
Accordingly, the First Appeal was allowed, and the Trial Court's judgment rejecting the plaint was quashed and set aside. L. C. Suit No. 320 of 2026 was restored to the file of the Civil Court to be tried on its own merits. The intervenor was also granted liberty to file their application before the Trial Court.
This judgment serves as a critical precedent for understanding the interplay between express statutory bars to jurisdiction and the inherent powers of Civil Courts. For lawyers, it clarifies the specific grounds—nullity, mala fides, jurisdictional error, and violation of natural justice—that can allow a civil suit to proceed against municipal actions, even when a statutory bar like Section 515A exists. It underscores the importance of precise pleading and documentary evidence to establish these exceptions. For law students, it is an excellent case study on the principles of judicial review, interpretation of ouster clauses, and the nuances of civil procedure in the context of administrative law, particularly in municipal disputes.
Disclaimer: All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are encouraged to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances.
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