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 20 Aug, 2025
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M/S Ethnic Hotels Private Limited Vs M/S Hari Kirpa Infrastructure Private Limited And Others

  Punjab & Haryana High Court CR-3019-2025 (O&M)
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Case Background

As per case facts, the plaintiff filed a civil suit regarding a collaboration agreement for land development. Disputes arose, and the defendant alienated part of the suit property during pendency. ...

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Document Text Version

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  1                   

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)

Reserved on : 25.07.2025

Pronounced on : 20.08.2025

M/s Ethnic Hotels Private Limited ...... Peti tioner

Versus

M/s Hari Kirpa Infrastructure Private Limited and others ...... Respondents

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM AGGARWAL

 

***

Argued by : Mr. Divanshu Jain, Advocate

Mr. Minkal Rawal, Advocate

Mr. Abhinav Goel, Advocate and

Mr. Arjun Sangwan, Advocate

for the petitioner.

Mr. Sumeet Jain, Advocate

for respondent No.1.

***

VIKRAM AGGARWAL , J

The instant revision petition, preferred under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India, assails the order dated 04.02.2025 (Annexure P-9), passed

by   the   Court   of   Civil   Judge   (Senior   Division),   Gurugram   vide   which   the

application preferred by respondent No.1-plaintiff under Order 1 Rule 10 and

under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘CPC’)

was allowed.

2(i). The facts, as emanating from the revision petition, are that a civil suit

(Annexure P-2) was instituted by respondent No.1-plaintiff (M/s Hari Kirpa

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  2                   

Infrastructure Private Limited) against the present petitioner (M/s  Ethnic Hotels

Private Limited) and proforma respondents No.2 and 3 for declaration and

permanent injunction.

2(ii). The petitioner-defendant No.1 was the owner in possession of land

measuring 5.3 acres, situated at Village Bilaspur, Tehsil, Manesar, District

Gurgaon (Gurugram). A collaboration agreement was executed between the

petitioner-defendant No.1 and respondent No.1-plaintiff on 22.08.2008 for

development of the said land. Respondent No.1-plaintiff is stated to have paid

Rs.1.22 crores to the petitioner and respondents No.2 and 3 (defendants) apart

from other expenses incurred on applying for the licence.

2(iii). However, CLU (Change of Land Use) permission was not granted on

account of certain objections which, as per respondent No.1-plaintiff, the

petitioner-defendant No.1 had failed to remove. Certain disputes erupted between

the parties, as a result of which the suit was instituted. Notably, while the heading

of the suit mentions it to be a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, the

prayer is for the issuance of a decree of mandatory injunction directing the

defendant to remove the objections raised by the authorities. Consequential relief

of permanent injunction and alternate relief of mandatory injunction directing

respondents No.2 and 3 to transfer their 50% shareholding in favour of respondent

No.1-plaintiff or for recovery of Rs.1,24,21,985/- was also made.

3. The suit was opposed by way of written statement (Annexure P-4).

Replication (Annexure P-5) was filed. Issues were framed on 15.07.2016.

4(i). An application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC and under Order 6 Rule

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  3                   

17 read with Section 151 CPC (Annexure P-7) came to be filed by respondent

No.1-plaintiff in September, 2017. It was averred that during the pendency of the

suit, the petitioner-defendant No.1 had alienated land measuring 8 kanals 19

marlas out of the suit land in favour of some Mukesh Gupta and Dushyant Gupta

vide sale deed dated 28.06.2017.

4(ii). An amendment was also sought in the plaint as regards declaration

qua the collaboration agreement, GPA and SPA being valid and subsisting.

Accordingly, amendments were sought to be made in the plaint, paragraph No.13-

A (insertion of paragraph 13-A in the plaint) and consequential amendments in the

prayer clause were sought to be introduced.

5. The application was opposed by way of a reply (Annexure P-8).

Alienation of land measuring 8 kanals 19 marlas on 29.06.2017 in favour of

Mukesh Gupta and Dushyant Gupta was admitted. The amendment of plaint was

opposed so was the impleadment of Mukesh Gupta and Dushyant Gupta.

6. Vide the impugned order dated 04.02.2025, both applications were

allowed, leading to the filing of the instant revision petition.

7. Learned counsel for the parties were heard.

8(i). It was strenuously urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the

impugned order is not sustainable. It was submitted that two applications, the first

being an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC and the second being an

application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC were decided together which itself makes

the impugned order unsustainable.

8(ii). As regards the impleadment of parties pursuant to the application

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  4                   

under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC having been allowed, it was submitted that the

subsequent purchasers had no right to be impleaded as parties and that Section 52

of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Transfer of

Property Act’) would be applicable. It was further submitted that it is settled law

that subsequent purchasers cannot, as a matter of right, be impleaded in a suit

since, they are not privity to the contract between the parties and essentially, no

relief is sought against them.

8(iii). As regards the amendment, it was submitted that nowhere in the

original suit had the relief of declaration been sought and that by praying for the

said relief, the nature of the suit had changed. It was also submitted that the

applications remained pending for eight years and allowing them at this stage does

not make any sense. Learned counsel referred to the interlocutory orders which

have been placed on record and submitted that a perusal of the said orders would

show that deliberately, no arguments were addressed on the applications.

8(iv). It was also contended that the impugned order is also completely non-

speaking as, no reasons, whatsoever were detailed while allowing the applications.

It was submitted that under the circumstances, the matter deserves to be remitted

to the trial Court for a decision afresh on the applications. In support of his

contentions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgments of Supreme

Court of India in the cases of H.Anjanappa & Ors. versus A.Prabhakar & Ors.

2025 AIR SC 924 (Law Finder Doc Id # 2688345), Kasturi versus Iyyamperumal

& Ors. 2005 (2) RCR (Civil) 690 (Law Finder Doc Id # 82744), the judgments of

Coordinate Benches of this Court in the cases of Satnam Singh versus Jasvir

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  5                   

Kaur and Others 2011 (54) RCR (Civil) 29 (Law Finder Doc Id # 605967),

Lachhami Devi versus Pala Singh 1996 (1) RRR 678 (Law Finder Doc Id #

38424), Mehar Singh versus Hardeep Kaur and others 2005 (1) RCR (Civil) 82

(Law Finder Doc Id # 79607) and the judgment of Orissa High Court in the case

of Sasmita Nayak versus Anita Pattnaik and others 2024 (138) CutLT 945 (Law

Finder Doc Id # 2652399).

9(i). Per contra, learned counsel representing respondent No.1 defended

the impugned order. It was submitted that there is no illegality in the same and,

therefore, the same deserves to be upheld.

9(ii) Referring to the application (Annexure P-7), it was submitted that the

same was a composite application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC and under Order 6

Rule 17 CPC, for after impleading the subsequent purchasers i.e. Mukesh Gupta

and Dushyant Gupta as defendants, the amendments sought to be made were only

consequential. It was submitted that neither is there any bar in moving a

composite application nor is there any bar in deciding both applications by way of

one order.

9(iii) As regards the subsequent purchasers have been impleaded as

defendants, it was submitted that the plaintiff is the dominus litis of the case and it

would be for him to decided as to which parties are to be impleaded. It was

submitted that the parameters for allowing an application for impleadment of a

subsequent purchaser which has been moved by the defendant or by the

subsequent purchaser are different from the parameters that are to be adopted in

case such an application is moved by the plaintiff. Learned counsel submitted

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  6                   

that even the legal position takes note of this essential difference.

9(iv) As regards amendment, it was submitted that the amendments sought

to be made were only consequential upon impleadment of the subsequent

purchasers as defendants and, therefore, were essential for the just decision of the

case.

9(v) As regards a period of eight years having been spent in decision of

the application, it was submitted that no delay had been caused at the instance of

the respondent-plaintiff and a perusal of the interlocutory orders would show that

the matter had simply been adjourned repeatedly for arguments on the

applications.

9(vi) It was also submitted that alienation of a part of the suit property had

taken place after the framing of the issues and, therefore, the application for

impleadment and amendment could have been moved only thereafter and under no

circumstances, could it have been moved prior to the framing of issues.

9(vii) As regards the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner

that the impugned order is non-speaking, it was submitted that this in itself would

not be a ground to remit the matter for a fresh decision. It was submitted that

already eight years were spent in deciding the application and if now the matter is

remitted, more time would be wasted. It was submitted that this Court can itself

appreciate the controversy and take a decision. In support of his contentions,

learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgments of Supreme Court of India in

the cases of Gurmit Singh Bhatia versus Kiran Kant Robinson and others 2019

AIR SC 3577 (Law Finder Doc Id # 1540656), Kasturi versus Iyyamperumal &

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  7                   

Ors. 2005 AIR SC 2813 (Law Finder Doc Id # 82744), Robin Rambjibhai Patel

versus Anandibai Rama @ Rajaram Pawar and Ors. 2017 (1) RCR (Civil) 170

(Law Finder Doc Id # 805593), M/s J.N.Real Estate versus Shailendra Pradhan

& Ors. in SLP (C) Nos.12205-12206 of 2024, decided 22.04.2025 (Law Finder

Doc Id # 2725586), H.Anjanappa & Ors. versus A.Prabhakar & Ors. 2025 AIR

SC 924 (Law Finder Doc Id # 2688345), the judgments of Coordinate Benches of

this Court in the cases of Sarup Chand versus Nagar Palika, Sangrur and others

1980 AIR Punjab and Haryana 114 (Law Finder Doc Id # 85195), Pirthi versus

Santu and Others 2013 (33) RCR (Civil) 32 (Law Finder Doc Id # 541075) and

Kamal Singh versus M/s Raitani Buildcom Pvt. Ltd. and others in Civil Revision

No.4566 of 2017, decided on 17.07.2017 (Law Finder Doc Id # 906652).

10(i). I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the

parties and have perused the paper book. In the case of H.Anjanappa & Ors.

versus A.Prabhakar & Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court of India was examining

the issue of impleadment of a transferee pendente lite as also the principles

governing the grant of leave to appeal. As regards the first question i.e.

impleadment of a transferee pendente lite, the Supreme Court of India, after

examining the entire law on the subject viz. Nagubai Ammal & Ors. v. B. Shama

Rao & Ors., AIR 1956 SC 593, Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1,

Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders & Investors P. Ltd., [2013] 2 SCR

74, Smt. Saila Bala Dassi v. Sm.Nirmala Sundari Dassi and Anr., [1958] SCR

1287, Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University, reported in (2001) 6

SCC 534 and Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon, AIR 2005 SC 2209, laid

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  8                   

down the following principles which would have to be kept in mind when a

transferee pendente lite is sought to be impleaded:-

58. From a conspectus of all the aforesaid judgments, touching

upon the present aspect, broadly, the following would emerge:

i. First, for the purpose of impleading a transferee pendente lite, the

facts and circumstances should be gone into and basing on the

necessary facts, the Court can permit such a party to come on

record, either under Order I Rule 10 CPC or under Order XXII

Rule 10 CPC, as a general principle;

ii. Secondly, a transferee pendente lite is not entitled to come on

record as a matter of right;

iii. Thirdly, there is no absolute rule that such a transferee pendente

lite, with the leave of the Court should, in all cases, be allowed to

come on record as a party;

iv. Fourthly, the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite would

depend upon the nature of the suit and appreciation of the material

available on record;

v. Fifthly, where a transferee pendente lite does not ask for leave to

come on record, that would obviously be at his peril, and the suit

may be improperly conducted by the plaintiff on record;

vi. Sixthly, merely because such transferee pendente lite does not

come on record, the concept of him (transferee pendente lite) not

being bound by the judgment does not arise and consequently he

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  9                   

would be bound by the result of the litigation, though he remains

unrepresented;

vii. Seventhly, the sale transaction pendente lite is hit by the

provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act; and,

viii. Eighthly, a transferee pendente lite, being an assignee of

interest in the property, as envisaged under Order XXII Rule 10

CPC, can seek leave of the Court to come record on his own or at

the instance of either party to the suit.

10(ii). As regards amendment of pleadings, in  Revajeetu   Builders   &

Developers versus Narayanaswamy & Sons & Others 2009 (10) SCC 84, the

Supreme Court of India examined the entire law starting from the decision of the

privy council in Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo Hnaung, AIR 1922 Privy Council

249 wherein it was observed as under:-

"All rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the

proper administration of justice, and it is therefore essential that

they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, so

that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always

be liberally exercised, but nonetheless no power has yet been given

to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another,

nor to change, by means of amendment, the subject-matter of the

suit."

10(iii). A perusal of the aforesaid observations of the privy council as far

back as in 1922 would show that it is the same law which is holding the field even

today.  It is not in doubt that powers of amendment should be exercised liberally

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  10        

but by means of the amendment, the nature and subject matter should not change.

The Supreme Court then examined various judgments rendered by the English

Courts, the Supreme Court, the Bombay High Court etc. and certain principles

were culled out which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or

rejecting an application for amendment;

“On critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some

basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration

while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment.

(1) Whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper

and effective adjudication of the case ?

(2) Whether the application for amendment is bona fide or

mala fide ?

(3) The amendment should not cause such prejudice to the

other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms

of money;

(4) Refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or

lead to multiple litigation;

(5) Whether   the   proposed  amendment  constitutionally  or

fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case?

And

(6) As a general rule, the court should decline amendments if

a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by

limitation on the date of application.

10(iv). The said view of the Supreme Court of India has recently been

reiterated in the case of  Basavaraj versus Indira And Others 2024 (4) RCR

(Civil) 115 also.  Reference can also be made to the judgment of the Supreme

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  11        

Court of India in Life Insurance Corporation of India versus Sanjeev Builders

Private Limited & Anr. 2022 AIR (Supreme Court) 4256 wherein also, the law as

regards amendment of pleadings was summed up;

(i)  Order II Rule 2 CPC operates as a bar against a subsequent

suit if the requisite conditions for application thereof are satisfied

and  the  field  of  amendment  of pleadings  falls  far  beyond  its

purview. The plea of amendment being barred under Order II Rule

2 CPC is, thus, misconceived and hence negatived.

(ii)  All amendments are to be allowed which are necessary for

determining the real question in controversy provided it does not

cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as

is apparent from the use of the word "shall", in the latter part of

Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC.

(iii) The prayer for amendment is to be allowed

(i) if the amendment is required for effective and proper

adjudication of the controversy between the parties, and

(ii) to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided

(a) the amendment does not result in injustice to the

other side,

(b) by the amendment, the parties seeking amendment

does not seek to withdraw any clear admission made by

the party which confers a right on the other side and

(c) the amendment does not raise a time barred claim,

resulting in divesting of the other side of a valuable

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  12        

accrued right (in certain situations).

(iv) A prayer for amendment is generally required to be allowed

unless

(i) by the amendment, a time barred claim is sought to be

introduced, in which case the fact that the claim would be

time barred becomes a relevant factor for consideration,

(ii) the amendment changes the nature of the suit,

(iii) the prayer for amendment is malafide, or

(iv) by the amendment, the other side loses a valid defence.

(v) In dealing with a prayer for amendment of pleadings, the court

should avoid a hypertechnical approach, and is ordinarily required

to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated

by costs.

(vi) Where the amendment would enable the court to pin-pointedly

consider the dispute and would aid in rendering a more satisfactory

decision, the prayer for amendment should be allowed.

(vii)   Where   the   amendment   merely   sought   to   introduce   an

additional or a new approach without introducing a time barred

cause of action, the amendment is liable to be allowed even after

expiry of limitation.

(viii) Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is intended to

rectify the absence of  material particulars in the plaint.

(ix) Delay in applying for amendment alone is not a ground to

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  13        

disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of delay is arguable, the

prayer for amendment could be allowed and the issue of limitation

framed separately for decision.

(x) Where the amendment changes the nature of the suit or the

cause of action, so as to set up an entirely new case, foreign to the

case set up in the plaint, the amendment must be disallowed.

Where, however, the amendment sought is only with respect to the

relief in the plaint, and is predicated on facts which are already

pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily the amendment is required to be

allowed.

(xi) Where the amendment is sought before commencement of trial,

the court is required to be liberal in its approach. The court is

required to bear in mind the fact that the opposite party would have

a chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As such, where the

amendment does not result in irreparable prejudice to the opposite

party, or divest the opposite party of an advantage which it had

secured   as   a   result   of   an   admission   by   the   party   seeking

amendment, the amendment is required to be allowed. Equally,

where the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively

adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between the parties,

the amendment should be allowed. (See Vijay Gupta v. Gagninder

Kr. Gandhi & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1897)

10(v). Further in the cases of Gurmit Singh Bhatia versus Kiran Kant

Robinson and others (supra) and Kasturi versus Iyyamperumal & Ors. (supra),

the Supreme Court of India was examining the question of impleadment of

subsequent purchasers as parties. Though, in both these cases, applications for

impleadment of subsequent purchasers were rejected, they had been moved by the

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  14        

defendants and not by the plaintiffs. In both cases, it was observed that the

applications had not been moved by the plaintiffs and the position would be

different when the plaintiff submits an application to implead the subsequent

purchaser as a party and when the plaintiff opposes such an application for

impleadment.

10(vi). Reverting to the facts of the case, concededly, a part of the suit

property measuring 8 kanals 19 marlas was alienated by the petitioner-defendant

in favour of Mukesh Gupta and Dushyant Gupta vide registered sale deed dated

28.06.2017. The said fact was duly admitted in the reply submitted to the

application moved by the plaintiff under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC and under Order 6

Rule 17 CPC.

10(vii). Still further, it is an admitted fact that the suit was instituted in 2015

and issues were framed on 15.07.2016 i.e. prior to the execution of the sale deed.

The interlocutory orders which have been placed on record show that in fact the

case was pending for the evidence of the plaintiff and certain hearings had gone by

for the said purpose when the application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC and under

Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was moved on 04.09.2017 i.e. less than 03 months after the

execution of the sale deed. Reply to the application was submitted promptly but

thereafter, for reasons unexplained, the matter remained pending for consideration

on the said application till it was finally decided by way of the impugned order.

Shockingly, the time taken for decision of the application is about eight years.

One is unable to comprehend as to why this kind of an application was kept

pending for so long. Though, apparently, it must have been at the instance of the

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  15        

parties, for they kept on jointly making requests for adjournment. However, the

Court should also not have been a mute spectator to the friendly match being

played between the parties and was expected to have taken a pro-active role in

deciding the pending applications rather than simply adjourning it for

consideration for a period of eight years. Such litigants coupled with the casual

approach adopted in certain matters by Courts have plagued the legal system and

is largely responsible for the huge backlog of cases that is staring at us today.

10(viii). Be that as it may, in the considered opinion of this Court, no error was

committed in allowing the applications, though by way of a non-speaking order.

For once, this Court was set thinking on the lines of remitting the matter for a

fresh decision but keeping in view the period of eight years already spent in

deciding the applications, this Court does not deem it appropriate to remit the

matter for a fresh decision.

10(ix). Concededly, the application for impleadment was moved by the

plaintiff. It has to be borne in mind that the plaintiff is a dominus litis of the case.

Further, the defendant itself had admitted the alienation of the suit land during the

pendency of the suit. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff would not be expected

to not implead the subsequent purchasers and face the uncertainty which the

plaintiff may be confronted with at the time of the decision of the suit. If one goes

through the principles culled out by the Supreme Court of India in the case of

H.Anjanappa & Ors. versus A.Prabhakar & Ors. (supra), there remains no doubt

in the mind of this Court that it would be essential to allow the application under

Oder 1 Rule 10 CPC moved by the plaintiff.

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  16        

10(x). As regards the amendments that were sought to be made, no doubt,

there was no prayer for declaration earlier. The heading and the prayer of the

unamended suit are as under:-

“Heading of the unamended suit

“SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Prayer of the unamended suit

It is, therefore, most humbly prayed that a Decree for

Mandatory Injunction may kindly be passed in favour of Plaintiff

and against Defendants directing Defendants to remove the

objections as raised by DTCP vide letters dated 11-05-09 & 18-06-

2010 with Decree for Permanent Injunction restraining

Defendants/ their agents/ their assigns from alienating/transferring

or creating any sort of charge over the suit land in favour of any

stranger and they may also be restrained from cancelling/ revoking

the aforesaid Collaboration agreement as well as GPA/SPA as these

documents still stand enforceable, in the interest of justice.

Alternatively, in case this Hon’ble Court comes to the conclusion

that the aforesaid defects can’t be cured by Defendants and without

curing the abovesaid objections, the CLU can’t be issued, in that

case, A Decree for Mandatory Injunction may be passed directing

Defendants No.2 & 3 to transfer their 50% shareholding in the

Defendant No.1 company, in favour of Plaintiff on alternatively, if

& only if, Court comes to the conclusion that such relief cannot be

granted, to pass a decree for recovery of amount of Rs.1,24,21,985/-

paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendants at the time of execution of

Collaboration agreement along with interest @ 24% per annum

along with damages, may be passed in favour of Plaintiff and

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  17        

against Defendants.”

10(xi). The amendments sought to be made were as under:-

“6. That as such following amendments are required to be

incorporated in the amended plaint:-

i) In title of the amended plaint, following ingredients may be

allowed to be inserted below the name and address of Defendant

No.4 & 5:-

4. Mukesh Gupta son of Late Sh. Bhagwan Sahai Gupta

resident of A-1/247B, Keshavpuram, New Delhi.

5. Dushyant Gupta son of Late Sh. Bhagwan Sahai Gupta

resident of A-1/247B, Keshavpuram, New Delhi.

ii) After the Para No.13 of the plaint, following Para No.13-A

may be allowed to be inserted:-

13-A That Plaintiff company has come to know that

Defendant No.1 company, during the pendency of present

suit, has allegedly sold out land bearing Khewat/Khata

No.42/55 min Rect No.25 Killa No.4/2/2/2/2 (1-13), 5/2(7-6)

measuring 8 Kanal 19 Marla out of suit land i.e. land bearing

Khewat/Khata No.35/56, Rect No.6 Killa No.25/2/2/2, Rect

No.7, Killa No.21 Rect No.24, Killa No.1, Rect No.25 Killa

No.4/2/2/2 & 5, Khewat/Khata No.168/215, Rect No.24, Killa

No.10 Khewat/Khata No.169/216, Rect No.24 Killa No.11/1

total measuring 42 Kanal 15 Marlas (5.3 acres approx)

situated within revenue estate of Village Bilaspur, Tehsil

Manesar District Gurgaon; in favour of Defendants Nos. 4

& 5 vide alleged sale deed bearing Vasika No.987 dated 28-

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  18        

06-2017. However, it is submitted that the present suit was

filed on 28-08-2015 and Defendants Nos.1 to 3 filed their

written statement on 22-12-2015 admitting the due execution

of collaboration agreement dated 22-08-2008. As such, the

alleged sale deed executed & got registered by the Defendants

Nos.1 to 3 in favour of Defendants No.4 & 5 is bad under law

and hit by principles of Lis pendens and is nothing but a

smart tactic on part of Defendants Nos.1 to 3 to entangle the

land in further litigation. Particularly when Defendants Nos.

1 to 3 were very well aware that Plaintiff has sought a Decree

for Injunction qua alienation/transfer of suit property as well.

But inspite of all that, Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 malafidely

executed the aforesaid sale deed to hit upon the legal rights of

Plaintiff over the suit property. As such, the alleged sale deed

is a null, void & non binding document which is required to

be set aside.

iii) That the Prayer clause of the amended plaint be amended

and read as under:-

“I is, therefore, most humbly prayed that a Decree for

Declaration may kindly be passed in favour of Plaintiff

and against Defendants declaring sale deed bearing

Vasika No.987 dated 28-06-2017 as null & void

document not binding upon the rights of the Plaintiff

and that Collaboration agreement dated 22-08-2008,

GPA dated 22-08-2008 & SPA dated 22-08-2008 are

legal, valid & subsisting documents binding upon

Defendants. Along with it, a Decree for Mandatory

Injunction may kindly be passed in favour of Plaintiff

and against Defendants directing Defendants to remove

the objections as raised by DTCP vide letters dated 11-

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  19        

5-09 & 18-06-2010 with Decree for Permanent

Injunction restraining Defendants/their agents/their

assigns from alienating/transferring or creating any

sort of charge over the suit land in favour of any

stranger and they may also be restrained from

cancelling/revoking the aforesaid Collaboration

agreement as well as GPA/SPA as these documents still

stand enforceable, in the interest of justice.

Alternatively, in case this Hon’ble Court comes to the

conclusion that the aforesaid defects can’t be cured by

Defendants and without curing the abovesaid

objections, the CLU can’t be issued, in that case, A

Decree for Mandatory Injunction may be passed

directing Defendants No.2 & 3 to transfer their 50%

shareholding in the Defendant No.1 company, in

favour of Plaintiff or alternatively, if & only if, Court

comes to the conclusion that such relief cannot be

granted, to pass a decree for recovery of amount of

Rs.1,24,21,985/- paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendants

at the time of execution of Collaboration agreement

along with interest @ 24% per annum along with

damages, may be passed in favour of Plaintiff and

against Defendants.”

10(xii). A perusal of the aforesaid shows that the amendments would be

essential for the just decision of the case, for they pertained to events that took

place pursuant to the alienation of a portion of the suit land by the defendant

during the pendency of the suit. Still further, the suit is at its initial stage and in

any case, the application could not have been moved prior to the framing of the

CR-3019-2025 (O&M)  20        

issues as the land was alienated after the framing of the issues, which was duly

noticed in the preceding paragraphs. If one applies the principles laid down by the

Supreme Court of India in the cases of Revajeetu Builders & Developers versus

Narayanaswamy & Sons & Others  and  Life Insurance Corporation of India

versus Sanjeev Builders Private Limited & Anr. (supra),  there remains no doubt

in the mind of this Court that the amendment was rightly allowed.

10(xiii). However, keeping in view the fact that parties intentionally delayed

the decision of the application, they deserve to be burdened with costs which are

assessed at Rs.50,000/-. Out of the said costs of Rs.50,000/-, Rs.25,000/- shall be

paid by the plaintiff and Rs.25,000/- by the defendants. The same shall be

deposited in the District Legal Services Authority, Gurugram.

In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the revision

petition is found to be devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.

20.08.2025 (VIKRAM AGGARWAL)

mamta JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No

Whether Reportable Yes/No

 

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