No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
Reserved Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UT TARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition No. 227 of 2018 (M/S)
M/s Hero Motocorp Limited …………. Petitioner
Versus
Lakhan Juyal …………. Respondent
with
Writ Petition No. 222 of 2018 (M/S)
M/s Hero Motocorp Limited …………. Petitioner
Versus
Pradeep Kumar …………. Respondent
with
Writ Petition No. 224 of 2018 (M/S)
M/s Hero Motocorp Limited …………. Petitioner
Versus
Surendra …………. Respondent
with
Writ Petition No. 225 of 2018 (M/S)
M/s Hero Motocorp Limited …………. Petitioner
Versus
Ankit Kumar Chauhan …………. Respondent
with
Writ Petition No. 226 of 2018 (M/S)
M/s Hero Motocorp Limited …………. Petitioner
Versus
Sandeep Kumar Sharma …………. Respondent
with
2
Writ Petition No. 229 of 2018 (M/S)
M/s Hero Motocorp Limited …………. Petitioner
Versus
Prem Singh …………. Respondent
with
Writ Petition No. 230 of 2018 (M/S)
M/s Hero Motocorp Limited …………. Petitioner
Versus
Ramesh Singh …………. Respondent
Mr. Pankaj Miglani, Advocate for the petitioner(s).
Mr. M.C. Pant, Advocate for the respondents.
List of cases referred:
1. (2015) 5 SCC 423, Radhey Shyam vs Chhabi Nath
2. (2008) 5 SCC 554, Mazdoor Sangh vs Usha Breco Ltd.
3. (1999) 1 SCC 517, Neeta Kaplish vs Presiding Officer, Labour
Court
4. (1983) 4 SCC 293, D.P. Maheshwari vs Delhi Administration
and others
5. Hussainara Khatoon (IV) Vs Home Secretary, State of Bihar,
(1980) 1 SCC 98
6. (1975) 2 SCC 661, Cooper Engineering Ltd. vs P.P. Mundhe.
7. (1973) 1 SCC 813, Workmen vs Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co.
of India (P) Ltd.
8. 1972 (1) SCC 595, Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. vs Ludh
Budh Singh
9. AIR 1964 SC 1344, Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and
others,
Hon’ble Lok Pal Singh, J.
Since common questions of law and facts
are involved in the aforementioned writ petitions,
therefore, the same are taken up together and are
being decided by this common judgment for the
sake of brevity and convenience.
2) By means of aforementioned writ
petitions, the petitioner M/s Hero Motocorp Ltd. is
3
seeking writ of certiorari for quashing / setting
aside the impugned orders dated 24.07.2017 and
12.01.2018, passed in adjudication case no. 06 of
2017, Lakhan Juyal Vs M/s Hero Moto Corp Ltd.,
pending before the Labour Court, Haridwar. A
further prayer has been made to direct the Labour
Court, Haridwar to frame a preliminary issue with
regard to the fairness and propriety of the
disciplinary inquiry against the respondent, as a
consequence of allowing the application of
petitioner.
3) Heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the material brought on record.
4) Writ Petition no. 227 (M/S) of 2018 shall
be the leading case.
5) Brief facts of the case, as mentioned in
the writ petition, are that respondent / workman
Lakhan Juyal was offered training as ‘Team
Member” vide letter da ted 06.06.2008. On
completion of training period of two years, he was
offered probationary employment for one year as
Team Member vide letter of offer of probation at the
Haridwar Factory dated 01.07.2010. Thereafter, he
was confirmed in the services from 01.07.2011.
During the course of employment, the respondent /
workman was suspended from service on
06.09.2013. In furtherance to the letter of
suspension, a charge sheet was supplied to him. In
the charge sheet, the respondent / workman was
4
charged for committing twelve (12) misconducts as
per the Standing Order Clause no. 27 of the
Certified Standing Orders, as applicable upon the
Factory and was asked to submit his explanation in
writing. The respondent / workman submitted his
written explanation on 22.10.2013 to the employer.
Upon perusal and examination of the explanation so
furnished by him, the explanation was found
unsatisfactory. Thereafter, opportunity was
afforded to the respondent / workman to put up his
defence and proceedings of domestic enquiry was
conducted in the matter of charge sheet dated
28.09.2013. It is stated in the writ petition that full
opportunity to cross examine the Management
witnesses, to produce documents, witnesses, if any,
in his defence and also to adduce his own evidence
was provided to him. Respondent / workman was
also given opportunity to take the help and
assistance of his co-worker to help, assist and
represent him as his representative. The
respondent / workman participated in the domestic
enquiry. Respondent / workman produced 14
documents and had also examined himself in
defence. After conclusion of domestic enquiry
proceedings, the Enquiry Officer submitted his
report / findings dated 27.10.2014 and found and
held the respondent / workman guilty of
committing all the 12 acts of misconduct as levelled
against him in the charge sheet dated 28.09.2013.
6) The employer vide show cause notice
dated 03.11.2014 supplied the copy of said report /
5
finding to the respondent / workman. An
opportunity was given to him that, in case, he
wanted to submit any ex planation in writing in
respect to report / finding of the Enquiry Officer
and the proposed punishment as contained therein,
he could submit the same. Respondent / workman
submitted his written explanation dated 14.11.2014
to the employer. The same was also not found
satisfactory. Finally, the respondent / workman
was dismissed from services of the employer vide
letter dated 25.11.2014. One month’s wages were
also paid to him and for full and final settlement he
was called upon to contact the Accounts
Department of the employer.
7) Feeling aggrieved, the respondent /
workman raised an industrial dispute which was
referred for adjudication by the State Government
through the Dy. Labour Commissioner, Uttarakand,
Dehradun. The point of determination to be
adjudicated by the Labour Court is as under:
“Whether the termination of services of the
skilled workman Sri Lakhan Juyal s/o Sri Pitambar
Juyal by the employer, who was dismissed on
25.11.2014, is proper and / or justifiable? If not,
then to what benefit / relief the workman is entitled?
8) The reference was referred to the Labour
Court, Haridwar for adjudication, which was
registered as Adjudication Case no. 06 of 2017,
Lakhan Juyal vs M/s Hero Moto Corp Ltd. After
summons were issued to the petitioner, M/s Hero
Moto Corp. Ltd. filed its written statement. In
paragraph no. 18 of the written statement it has
6
been specifically prayed that a preliminary issue
with regard to the proceedings of domestic enquiry
held in the matter of the respondent / workman
were just, fair and proper. The respondent /
workman also filed his written statement, alleging
therein, that it is established principle of natural
justice that if a charge sheet is filed against any
workman in respect of misconduct, the same should
not be vague, but should be detailed and clear and
the person charge sheeted should necessarily be
provided copies of entire proofs / documents /
evidence along with the charge sheet on the basis of
which charges were levelled against him, so that
there should be no difficulty in presenting his case
and to prove his innocence. The proceedings of
domestic enquiry should be transparent and the
Enquiry Officer should not be biased. It is
contended in the written statement that the entire
proceedings of domestic enquiry is biased against
the workman and the objections raised by the
workman from time to time were overlooked. It is
also contended that the employer has already make
up its mind to dispense with the services of the
workman along with others and the second cause
notice issued to the workman was simply a
formality. In other words, the workman has
challenged the legality of the domestic enquiry in
paragraphs nos. 9, 12 and 17 in its written
statement.
9) It is alleged in the writ petition that since
no preliminary issue was framed by the Labour
7
Court, the petitioner moved an application no. D-17
with regard to the framing of preliminary issue
regarding the fairness and propriety of the domestic
enquiry. Labour Court vide its order dated
24.07.2017, rejected the said application. The
petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated
24.07.2017, passed by the Labour Court, to the
extent of rejection of his application D-17. It is
further alleged in the writ petition that the learned
Labour Court has erred in law in rejecting the
application moved by the petitioner holding that
since the preliminary issue raised by the petitioner
is inherent in the reference, hence there is no
requirement to frame the same separately. It is also
alleged that the Labour Court proceeded in the
matter treating it as a civil suit where strict
principles of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are
attracted and completely lost sight of the fact that
the matter before it is an industrial dispute. It is
contended that the recall / review application
moved by the petitioner for recalling the order dated
24.07.2017 was also dismissed by the Labour Court
vide its order dated 12.01.2018 without proper
application of mind. It is further contended that the
term ‘issue’ include the term ‘preliminary issue’ and
the meaning of preliminary issue is that it has to be
decided at the preliminary stage. Lastly, it is
contended that the impugned orders are totally
against the fact of the case and the laws on the
subject and hence deserve to the set aside on that
score alone.
8
10) Before further discussion it would be
worthwhile to mention here Order XIV of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, which stipulates settlement
of issues and determination of suit on issue of law
or on issues agreed upon. The same reads as
under:
“1. Framing of issues
(1) Issues arise when a material proposition of
fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by
the other.
(2) Material propositions are those propositions
of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to
show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order
to constitute his defence.
(3) Each material proposition affirmed by one-
party and denied by the other shall form the subject of
distinct issue.
(4) Issues are of two kinds:
(a) issues of fact,
(b) issues of law.
(5) At the first hearing of the suit the Court
shall, after reading the plaint and the written
statements, if any, and [after examination under rule 2
of Order X and after hearing the parties or their
pleaders], ascertain upon what material propositions
of fact or of law the parties are at variance, and shall
thereupon proceed to frame and record the issues on
which the right decision of the case appears to depend.
(6) Nothing in this rule requires the Court to
frame and record issues where the defendant at the
first hearing of the suit makes no defence.
[2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues
(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on
a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the
provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all
issues.
(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the
same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or
9
any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law
only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to-
(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for
the time being in force,
and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the
settlement of the other issues until after that issue has
been determined, and may deal with the suit in
accordance with the decision on that issue.]
3. Materials from which issues may be framed
The Court may frame the issues from all or any of the
following materials :-
(a) allegations made on oath by the parties, or by
any persons present on their behalf, or made by the
pleaders of such parties;
(b) allegations made in the pleadings or in
answers to interrogatories delivered in the suit;
(c) the contents of documents produced by
either party.
4. Court may examine witnesses or documents
before framing issues
Where the Court is of opinion that the issues
cannot be correctly framed without the examination of
some person not before the Court or without the
inspection of some document not produced in the suit,
it may adjourn the framing of the issues to a future
day, and may (subject to any law for the time being in
force) compel the attendance of any person or the
production of any document by the person in whose
possession or power it is by summons or other
process.
5. Power to amend and strike out, issues
(1) The Court may at any time before passing a decree
amend the issues or frame additional issues on such
terms as it thinks fit, and all such amendments or
additional issues as may be necessary for determining
the matters in controversy between the parties shall be
so made or framed.
(2) The Court may also, at any time before passing a
decree, strike out any issues that appear to it to be
wrongly framed or introduced.
10
6. Questions of fact or law may by agreement be
stated in form of issues
Where the parties to a suit are agreed as to the
question of fact or of law to be decided between them,
they may state the same in the form of an issue, and
enter into an agreement in writing that, upon the
finding of the Court in the affirmative or the negative
of such issue,-
(a) a sum of money specified in the agreement or
to be ascertained by the Court, or in such manner as
the Court may direct, shall be paid by one of the
parties to the other of them, or that are of them be
declared entitled to some right or subject some liability
specified in the agreement:
(b) some property specified in the agreement and
in dispute in the suit shall be delivered by one of the
parties to the other of them, or as that other may
direct; or
(c) one or more of the parties shall do or abstain
from doing some particular act specified in the
agreement and relating to the matter in dispute.
7. Court, if satisfied that agreement was
executed in good faith, may pronounce judgement
Where the Court is satisfied, after making such
inquiry as it deems proper,-
(a) that the agreement was duly executed by the
parties;
(b) that they have a substantial interest in the
decision of such question as aforesaid, and
(c) that the same is fit to be tried and decided,
it shall proceed to record and try the issue and state
its finding or decision thereon in the same manner as
if the issue had been framed by the Court.
and shall, upon the finding or decision on such issue,
pronounce judgment according to the terms of the
agreement; and, upon the judgment so pronounced a
decree shall follow.
11) Learned counsel for the petitioner drew
attention of this Court toward the judgment
rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth
11
and General Mills Co.
8
, wherein it has been held
that when a domestic enquiry has been held by the
management and the management relies on the
same, it is open to the latter to request the
opportunity to adduce evidence before the Tribunal,
if the finding of the preliminary issue is against the
management. However, elaborate and cumbersome
the procedure may be under such circumstances, it
is open to the Tribunal to deal, in the first instance,
as a preliminary issue the validity of the domestic
enquiry.
12) Learned counsel for the petitioner placed
reliance upon a judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India
7
,
wherein it has been held as under:
32. From those decisions, the following principles
broadly emerge:
“(1) The right to take disciplinary action and to decide
upon the quantum of punishment are mainly managerial
functions, but if a dispute is referred to a Tribunal, the
latter has power to see if action of the employer is
justified.
(2) Before imposing the punishment, an employer is
expected to conduct a proper enquiry in accordance with
the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and
principles of natural justice. The enquiry should not be an
empty formality.
(3) When a proper enquiry has been held by an
employer, and the finding of misconduct is a plausible
conclusion flowing from the evidence, adduced at the said
enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment
over the decision of the employer as an appellate body.
The interference with the decision of the employer will be
justified only when the findings arrived at in the enquiry
are perverse or the management is guilty of victimisation,
unfair labour practice or mala fide.
(4) Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer
or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the
Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and
validity of the order, had to give an opportunity to the
employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is
open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first
12
time justifying his action, and it is open to the employee
to adduce evidence contra.
(5) The effect of an employer not holding an enquiry is
that the Tribunal would not have to consider only whether
there was a prima facie case. On the other hand, the
issue about the merits of the impugned order of dismissal
or discharge is at large before the Tribunal and the latter,
on the evidence adduced before it, has to decide for itself
whether the misconduct alleged is proved. In such cases,
the point about the exercise of managerial functions does
not arise at all. A case of defective enquiry stands on the
same footing as no enquiry.
(6) The Tribunal gets jurisdiction to consider the
evidence placed before it for the first time in justification
of the action taken only, if no enquiry has been held or
after the enquiry conducted by an employer is found to be
defective.
(7) It has never been recognised that the Tribunal
should straightaway, without anything more, direct
reinstatement of a dismissed or discharged employee,
once it is found that no domestic enquiry has been held or
the said enquiry is found to be defective.
(8) An employer, who wants to avail himself of the
opportunity of adducing evidence for the first time before
the Tribunal to justify his action, should ask for it at the
appropriate stage. If such an opportunity is asked for, the
Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an
opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the
first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of both the
management and the employee and to enable the
Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged
misconduct.
(9) Once the misconduct is proved either in the
enquiry conducted by an employer or by the evidence
placed before a Tribunal for the first time, punishment
imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except
in cases where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest
victimisation.
(10) In a particular case, after setting aside the order
of dismissal, whether a workman should be reinstated or
paid compensation is, as held by this Court in
Management of Panitole Tea Estate v. Workmens within
the judicial decision of a Labour Court or Tribunal.”
13) Reliance is also placed upon a judgment
in the case of Mazdoor Sangh
2
, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in para 28 of said judgment has
categorically laid down the law as under:
“28. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co.
7 must be
understood in the context in which it was rendered. Section
11-A of the Act as interpreted by Firestone Tyre and Rubber
13
Co. must be applied at different stages. Firstly, when the
validity or legality of the domestic enquiries is in question;
secondly, in the event, the issue is determined in favour of
the Management, no fresh evidence is required to be
adduced by it whereas in the event it is determined in
favour of the workmen, subject to the request which may be
made by the Management in an appropriate stage, it will be
permitted to adduce fresh evidence before the Labour
Court.”
14) Placing further reliance upon Cooper
Engineering Ltd.
6
, it has been stated that in said
judgment Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that
when a case of dismissal or discharge of an
employee is referred for industrial adjudication the
Labour Court should first decide as a preliminary
issue whether the domestic enquiry has violated the
principles of natural justice. When there is no
domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by
the employer, there will be no difficulty. But when
the matter is in controversy between the parties
that question must be decided as a preliminary
issue. On that decision being pronounced it will be
for the management to decide whether it will adduce
any evidence before the labour court. If it chooses
not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter
permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue.
Para 21 and 22 of said judgment are excerpted
hereunder:
“21. Propositions (4), (6) and (7) set out above
are well-recognised. Is it, however, fair and in accordance
with the principles of natural justice for the Labour Court
to withhold its decision on a jurisdictional point at the
appropriate stage and visit a party with evil consequences
of a default on its part in not asking the court to give an
opportunity to adduce additional evidence at the
commencement of the proceedings or, at any rate, in
advance of the pronouncement of the order in that
behalf? In our considered opinion it will be most unnatural
and impractical to expect a party to take a definite stand
when a decision of a jurisdictional fact has first to be
14
reached by the Labour Court prior to embarking upon an
enquiry to decide the dispute on its merits. The inference
involves determination of the larger issue of discharge or
dismissal and not merely whether a correct procedure had
been followed by the management before passing the
order of dismissal. Besides, even if the order of dismissal
is set aside on the ground of defect of enquiry, a second
enquiry after reinstatement is not ruled out nor in all
probability a second reference. Where will this lead to?
This is neither going to achieve the paramount object of
the Act, namely, industrial peace, since award in that
case will not lead to a settlement of the dispute. The
dispute, being eclipsed, pro tempore, as a result of such
an award, will be revived and industrial peace will again
be ruptured. Again another object of expeditious disposal
of an industrial dispute (see Section 15) will be clearly
defeated resulting in duplication of proceedings. This
position has to be avoided in the interest of labour as well
as of the employer and in furtherance of the ultimate aim
of the Act to foster industrial peace.
22. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when
a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is
referred for industrial adjudication the Labour Court
should first decide as a preliminary issue whether the
domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural
justice. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective
enquiry is admitted by the employer, there will be no
difficulty. But when the matter is in controversy between
the parties that question must be decided as a
preliminary issue. On that decision being pronounced it
will be for the management to decide whether it will
adduce any evidence before the labour court. If it chooses
not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter
permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue. We
should also make it clear that there will be no justification
for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute
by the Labour Court by questioning its decision with
regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if
worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will
be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to
intervene at this stage. We are making these
observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay
in industrial adjudication.”
15) Learned counsel for the petitioner has
also cited a case law pronounced in the case of
Neeta Kaplish
3
, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court has
held thus:
“18. In Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh
Singh
8
the Court held that where no enquiry was conducted by
an employer or the enquiry itself was found to be defective, the
employer shall have to be given a chance to adduce evidence
15
before the Tribunal for justifying his action provided the
employer asks for the permission of the Tribunal to adduce fresh
evidence to justify its action. Such request has to be made
“while the proceedings are pending ” and not after the
proceedings had come to an end. The following propositions
were laid down:
“(1) If no domestic enquiry had been held by the
management, or if the management makes it clear that it
does not rely upon any domestic enquiry that may have
been held by it, it is entitled to straightaway adduce
evidence before the Tribunal justifying its action. The
Tribunal is bound to consider that evidence so adduced
before it, on merits, and give a decision thereon. In such
a case, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to consider the
validity of the domestic enquiry as the employer himself
does not rely on it.
(2) If a domestic enquiry had been held, it is open to the
management to rely upon the domestic enquiry held by it,
in the first instance, and alternatively and without
prejudice to its plea that the enquiry is proper and
binding, simultaneously adduce additional evidence
before the Tribunal justifying its action. In such a case no
inference can be drawn, without anything more that the
management has given up the enquiry conducted by it.
(3) When the management relies on the enquiry conducted
by it, and also simultaneously adduces evidence before
the Tribunal, without prejudice to its plea that the enquiry
proceedings are proper, it is the duty of the Tribunal, in
the first instance, to consider whether the enquiry
proceedings conducted by the management are valid and
proper. If the Tribunal is satisfied that the enquiry
proceedings have been held properly and are valid, the
question of considering the evidence adduced before it on
merits, no longer survives. It is only when the Tribunal
holds that the enquiry proceedings have not been
properly held, that it derives jurisdiction to deal with the
merits of the dispute and in such a case it has to consider
the evidence adduced before it by the management and
decide the matter on the basis of such evidence.
(4) When a domestic enquiry has been held by the
management and the management relies on the same, it
is open to the latter to request the Tribunal to try the
validity of the domestic enquiry as a preliminary issue
and also ask for an opportunity to adduce evidence before
the Tribunal, if the finding on the preliminary issue is
against the management. However elaborate and
cumbersome the procedure may be under such
circumstances, it is open to the Tribunal to deal with, in
the first instance, as a preliminary issue, the validity of
the domestic enquiry. If its finding on the preliminary
issue is in favour of the management, then no additional
evidence need be cited by the management. But if the
finding on the preliminary issue is against the
management, the Tribunal will have to give the employer
an opportunity to cite additional evidence and also give a
similar opportunity to the employee to lead evidence
contra, as the request to adduce evidence had been made
by the management to the Tribunal during the course of
16
the proceedings and before the trial has come to an end.
When the preliminary issue is decided against the
management and the latter leads evidence before the
Tribunal, the position, under such circumstances, will be
that the management is deprived of the benefit of having
the finding of the domestic tribunal being accepted as
prima facie proof of the alleged misconduct. On the other
hand, the management will have to prove, by adducing
proper evidence, that the workman is guilty of misconduct
and that the action taken by it is proper. It will not be
just and fair either to the management or to the workman
that the Tribunal should refuse to take evidence and
thereby ask the management to make a further
application, after holding a proper enquiry, and deprive
the workman of the benefit of the Tribunal itself being
satisfied, on evidence adduced before it, that he was or
was not guilty of the alleged misconduct.
(5) The management has got a right to attempt to sustain
its order by adducing independent evidence before the
Tribunal. But the management should avail itself of the
said opportunity by making a suitable request to the
Tribunal before the proceedings are closed. If no such
opportunity has been availed of or asked for by the
management before the proceedings are closed, the
employer can make no grievance that the Tribunal did not
provide such an opportunity. The Tribunal will have before
it only the enquiry proceedings and it has to decide
whether the proceedings have been held properly and the
findings recorded therein are also proper.
(6) If the employer relies only on the domestic enquiry and
does not simultaneously lead additional evidence or ask
for an opportunity during the pendency of the
proceedings to adduce such evidence, the duty of the
Tribunal is only to consider the validity of the domestic
enquiry as well as the finding recorded therein and decide
the matter. If the Tribunal decides that the domestic
enquiry has not been held properly, it is not its function
to invite suo motu the employer to adduce evidence
before it to justify the action taken by it.
(7) The above principles apply to the proceedings before the
Tribunal, which have come before it either on a reference
under Section 10 or by way of an application under
Section 33 of the Act.”
19. These principles were adopted in Workmen v.
Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd.
7
which was
decided after the introduction of Section 11-A in the Act. In
Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe
6
in which Workmen v.
Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd.
7
was followed, the
Court observed:
“In our considered opinion it will be most unnatural and
impractical to expect a party to take a definite stand when a
decision of a jurisdictional fact has first to be reached by the
labour court prior to embarking upon an enquiry to decide
the dispute on its merits. The reference involves
determination of the larger issue of discharge or dismissal
and not merely whether a correct procedure had been
17
followed by the management before passing the order of
dismissal.”
The Court further observed:
“22. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when a
case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for
industrial adjudication, the labour court should first decide as
a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has
violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no
domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the
employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is
in controversy between the parties, that question must be
decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being
pronounced, it will be for the management to decide whether
it will adduce any evidence before the labour court. If it
chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter
permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue.”
16) Per contra, learned counsel for the
workman/respondent drew attention of this Court
towards a judgment rendered by three Judges of
Hon’ble Apex Court in D.P. Maheshwari
4
, wherein
in the opening paragraph of said judgment it has
been held as under:
“It was just the other day that we were bemoaning
the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to
avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits. We
noticed how they would raise various preliminary
objections, invite decision on those objections in the first
instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article
136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real
dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade.
Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in
the meanwhile. We have now before us a case where a
dispute originating in 1969 and referred for adjudication
by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at
the stage of decision on a preliminary objection. There
was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy
to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to
have arrived for a reversal of that Policy. We think it is
better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the
task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead
to misery and jeopardize industrial peace, should decide
all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some
of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in
the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution stop proceedings before a tribunal so that a
preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who
18
can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can
ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from court to court
for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on
issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are
not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen
in this fashion. Tribunals and courts who are requested
to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask
themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is
really necessary and whether it will not lead to other
woeful consequences. After all tribunals like industrial
tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special
kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not
to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and
journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile
remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under
Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that
under Article 136 is primarily supervisory but the court
may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do
substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction
neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too
astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by
special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on
preliminary issues.”
17) Having gone through the judgments
(supra), this Court is of the view that the three
judges bench of Hon’ble Apex Court has considered
the framing of preliminary issue elaborately and has
observed that certain employers in order to avoid
decision of industrial disputes on merits, has a
tendency to raise various preliminary objections,
invite decision on those objections at the first
instance and then carry the matter to the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
and thereafter to the Apex Court, which
unnecessarily delay the disposal of the matters.
Since the ratio of the three judges judgment is that
the matter should be decided at once, therefore, the
principle of law laid down in D.P. Maheshwari’s
4
case has preponderance over the other judgments.
This Court is of the view further that since the
legality of the disciplinary proceedings is to be
19
answered by the Labour Court at the time of
adjudication of the reference made to it, the same
reference cannot be splitted by framing a
preliminary issue which ultimately would result in
causing injustice to the poor workman.
18) A perusal of the order impugned rejecting
the (paper no. D-17) moved by the petitioner for
framing of preliminary issue regarding fairness and
validity of domestic enquiry proceedings and for
deciding the same in a preliminary manner in
accordance with law would show that the revisional
court has assigned reasons for rejecting the
application that the said application has been
moved to prolong the proceedings and is an attempt
to escape proving its own case, which is not
justifiable in the eyes of law and is not in
consonance with the principles of natural justice.
There should not be two times trial by the Labour
Court, otherwise, it will waste the valuable time of
the Court and would result in unnecessary delay in
hearing of the case in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
19) Though the provisions contained in the
Code of Civil Procedure are strictly not applicable,
but as the Labour Court or Tribunal adjudicate the
rights of the parties at their respective pleadings
and evidence after framing the issues, therefore, the
provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure
and Evidence Act does apply. The criteria of
deciding a preliminary issue in view of the
provisions contained under Order 14 Rule 1 of CPC
20
is that the Court or Tribunal can decide an issue as
preliminary issue, when the issue is to be decided
without taking evidence of the parties which is
purely a legal issue, but when the Court or Tribunal
cannot decide a preliminary issue without taking
evidence of the parties, on whom the burden of
proof lies, the Court should refrain itself from
deciding the preliminary issue. In other words, if
the Court or Tribunal starts to decide a preliminary
issue in regard to finding out the factum or
truthfulness or correctness of the enquiry
conducted by the employer and decide the
preliminary issue against the employer and
thereafter direct the workman to adduce the
evidence in support of his claim, then certainly it
would lead unnecessary delay in adjudicating the
lis.
20) Therefore, this court is of the firm view
that deciding a preliminary issue will not only waste
the valuable time of the Court, but it will lead to
unnecessary delay in the disposal of cases, which is
against the constitutional mandate envisaged under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
21) Speedy justice is one of the fundamental
rights of a person guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. Hon’ble Apex Court in
Hussainara Khatoon (IV)
5
, has observed thus:
“Speedy trial is an essential ingredient of
“reasonable, fair and just” procedure guaranteed by
Article 21 and it is the constitutional obligation of the
State to device such a procedure as would ensure
21
speedy trial to the accused. The State cannot be
permitted to deny the constitutional right of speedy
trial to the accused on the ground that the State has
no adequate financial resources to incur the
necessary expenditure needed for improving the
administrative and judicial apparatus with a view to
ensuring speedy trial.”
22) A Division Bench of this Court while
deciding Review Application MCC No. 1276 /2018,
arising out of Writ Petition No. 438 (S/B) of 2016,
Tara Nath Pandey vs.Union of India & others,
decided on 17.06.2019 , has relied upon the
principle of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in
Syed Yakoob
9
and observed that the scope of
interference in certiorari proceedings is extremely
limited. The relevant paragraphs of said judgment
are excepted hereunder:
“3. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction such as in cases where the order is
passed without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result
of failure to exercise jurisdiction or where, in exercise of the
jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts
illegally or improperly. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is supervisory and not appellate. An error of law
which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected
by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may
appear to be. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence, and
the inference of fact to be drawn therefrom, cannot be
agitated in certiorari proceedings (Syed Yakoob
9
) as it is in
the province of a court of appeal.
4. If the tribunal has erroneously refused to admit
admissible and material evidence, or has erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence, or if a finding of fact is based
on no evidence, it would be an error of law which can be
22
corrected by a writ of certiorari. Where the conclusion of law
by the Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of
the relevant statutory provisions, or in ignorance of it or even
in disregard of it or is expressly founded on reasons which are
wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ
of certiorari. Whether or not an error is an error of law, and an
error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must
always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case,
and upon the nature and scope of the legal provisions which is
alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened. (Syed
Yakoob
9
).
5. Unlike an appellate authority which can re-
appreciate the evidence on record, the High Court, in the
exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, would not substitute its
views for that of the Tribunal, nor would it re-appreciate the
evidence on record to arrive at a conclusion different from
that of the Tribunal whose order is impugned before it. Even
if two views are possible, and the Tribunal has taken one of
the possible views, the High Court would not interfere, in the
exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, even if it were to be
satisfied that the other possible view, canvassed before it, is
more attractive. A finding of fact reached, on the appreciation
of evidence, cannot be reopened or questioned in writ
proceedings save a finding of fact which is either perverse or
is based on no evidence. If a provision is reasonably capable
of two constructions, and one construction has been adopted
by the authority, its conclusion may not always be open to
correction in writ proceedings. (Syed Yakoob
9
).
6. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior tribunals. A writ
can similarly be issued where, in exercise of the jurisdiction
conferred on it, the tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as,
for instance, it decides a question without giving an
opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or
where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is
23
opposed to principles of natural justice. (Assistant
Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot Vs. Saurashtra Kutch
Stock Exchange Ltd. : (2008) 14 SCC 171 ; Syed Yakoob
vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others : AIR 1964 SC 1344).
A writ of certiorari can be issued in the case of illegal
exercise of jurisdiction, and also to correct errors of law
apparent on the face of the record, even though they do not go
to jurisdiction. It is only errors of law apparent on the face of
the record, and not errors of fact though they may be apparent
on the face of the record, which can be corrected, (Shri
Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. S.B. Bhatt and Ors : AIR 1961
SC 970 ; Rex vs Northumberland Compensation Appeal
Tribunal : (1952) 1 KB 338; and Nagendra Nath Bora and
Ors. Vs. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals,
Assam and Ors : AIR 1958 SC 398), and not every error
either of law or fact which can be corrected by a Court of
appeal or revision. (T. Prem Sagar Vs. The Standard
Vacuum Oil Company Madras and Ors.: AIR 1965 SC
111; Bachan Singh and Ors. Vs. Gauri Shankar Agarwal
and Ors : (1972) 4 SCC 257; Nagendra Nath Bora and
Ors. Vs. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals,
Assam and Ors : AIR 1958 SC 398).
7. Further an error of law, which can be corrected
by a writ of certiorari, must be self-evident. It should not need
an elaborate examination of the record (Shri Ambica Mills
Co. Ltd. Vs. S.B. Bhatt and Ors : AIR 1961 SC 970), or
require a detailed examination or an elaborate argument to
establish it (Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot
Vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. : (2008) 14
SCC 171; Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Respondent:Syed
Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. : AIR 1955 SC 233 ; Batuk K.
Vyas Vs. Surat Borough Municipality and Ors : AIR 1953
Bom. 133). An error cannot be said to be apparent if one has
to travel beyond the record to see whether the judgment is
correct or not. It is an error which strikes on the mere looking,
24
and does not need a long-drawn out process of reasoning on
points where there may conceivably be two opinions. Such an
error would not require any extraneous matter to show its
incorrectness. To put it differently, it should be so manifest
and clear that no court would permit it to remain on record.
(Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot Vs.
Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. : (2008) 14 SCC
171 ; Sant Lal Gupta and Ors. Vs. Modern Co-operative
Group Housing Society Ltd. and Ors. : (2010) 13 SCC
336).
23) The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India is a limited jurisdiction. In
Radhey Shyam
1
, it has been held by Hon’ble Apex
Court that proceedings under Article 227 of the
Constitution are not original but only supervisory.
Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions
of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915
excepting that the power of superintendence has
been extended by this article to tribunals as well.
Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary
court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is
intended to be used sparingly and only in
appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the
subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds
of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.
The power may be exercised in cases occasioning
grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i)
the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction
which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction which it does have, such failure
occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the
jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a
25
manner which tantamounts to overstepping the
limits of jurisdiction.
24) Unless the petitioner succeeds in
convincing this Court in regard to the three
ingredients as mentioned above necessary to invoke
the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India as held by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in Radhey Shyam
1
, Court should be
loath to exercise such jurisdiction to differ with the
reasons and the conclusion arrived at by the
competent authority or court of law. In the case in
hand, no prejudice has been caused to the
petitioner by the impugned order as the petitioner
will always be at liberty to adduce evidence before
the Labour Court on all the issues framed by it,
including the reference.
25) In view of the above discussion, the
aforementioned writ petitions lacks merit and are
hereby dismissed. Parties shall bear their own
costs.
(Lok Pal Singh, J.)
Dt. July 16, 2019.
Negi
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