Writ Petition, Delhi High Court, Labour Court, jurisdiction, industrial dispute, M/S IBP Company Limited, Shailendra Kumar, res judicata, judicial discipline, Industrial Dispute Act 1947, Article 226, Article 227
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M/s Ibp Company Limited Vs. MR Shailendra Kumar & Anr

  Delhi High Court W.P.(C) 5844/2005
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Case Background

As per case facts, M/S IBP Company Limited, a Central Government undertaking, dismissed its Fitter, Mr. Shailendra Kumar, for alleged misconduct at its Lucknow establishment. The domestic enquiry and dismissal ...

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W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 1 of 15

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 09.02.2026

Date of decision: 15.04.2026

Uploaded on: 15.04.2026

+ W.P.(C) 5844/2005 & CM APPL. 4367/2005

M/S IBP COMPANY LIMITED .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Sauresh Rai, Mr. Neeraj Kumar

and Ms. Upasna Singh, Advs.

versus

MR SHAILENDRA KUMAR & ANR .....Respondents

Through: None

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

JUDGMENT

SHAIL JAIN, J

1. The present Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 /227 of the

Constitution of India, inter-alia, assailing the Order dated 05.08.2004

(hereinafter ‘Impugned Order’) passed by the learned Labour Court X,

Karkardooma Courts, Delhi under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947

(hereinafter ‘the Act’).

2. The Learned Labour Court dismissed the application filed by

Petitioner challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts at Delhi inter

alia on the ground that the Petitioner cannot agitate and press same point

already raised before parallel Court. Further holding that if, the

management was aggrieved of the said order they should have approached

to the Higher Court.

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 2 of 15

BRIEF FACTS:

3. The Petitioner is a Government (Central) company under the

administrative control of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, having

establishments across India.

4. The Respondent No. 1 was appointed as a Fitter on 01.09.1984 and

was subsequently transferred to the Petitioner’s Lucknow Division on

01.09.1985, where he continued to discharge his duties.

5. In April 1986, certain acts of alleged misconduct were attributed to

the Respondent No. 1 during the course of his employment at Lucknow.

Pursuant thereto, Charge-Sheets were issued in the years 1987 and 1988. A

domestic enquiry was conducted at Lucknow in which the Respondent

participated.

6. The Enquiry Officer, by Report dated 22.12.1989, found the

Respondent guilty of the charges leveled against him. After considering the

reply to the Show Cause Notice, the Petitioner passed an Order dated

19.07.1990 dismissing the Respondent from service with effect from

23.07.1990.

7. Aggrieved by his dismissal, the Respondent raised an industrial

dispute before the Conciliation Officer at Delhi in the year 1991. The

Petitioner herein contested the maintainability of the proceedings inter alia

on the ground that the entire cause of action had arisen at Lucknow and that

the authorities at Delhi lacked jurisdiction to decide the dispute. The

conciliation proceedings culminated in failure, and a report under Section

12(4) of the Act, was submitted.

8. Thereafter, by Order dated 08.07.1992, the Delhi Administration,

referred the dispute to the Labour Court, Delhi for adjudication on the

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 3 of 15

question as to whether the dismissal of the Respondent was illegal and/or

unjustified and to what relief he was entitled. The terms of reference is

extracted as under:

"Whether the dismissal of services of Shri Shailendra

Kumar is illegal and/or unjustified and if so, to what relief

is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this

regard?"

9. The Respondent filed his Statement of Claim before the Labour

Court, to which the Petitioner filed its written statement raising, inter alia,

objections regarding territorial jurisdiction as well as the competency of the

appropriate Government under Section 2(a) of the Act.

10. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Labour Court on

06.01.1997 framed issues, including the questions of jurisdiction and

validity of the enquiry. The issues framed are as following:

“1. Whether Secretary (Labour) NCT of Delhi is the

competent authority to make the present reference. In view

of the objection taken on behalf of the Management

regarding territorial jurisdiction?

2. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the

present reference?

3. Whether the enquiry conducted by the Management was

not fair and proper? and

4. As in terms of reference.”

11. After hearing the parties at length and considering the various

judgments relied upon by the Petitioner, the Ld. Labour Court (LABOUR

COURT X, TIS HAZARI, DELHI ) vide Order dated 21.09.1999, rejected the

Petitioner’s objection regarding the competence of the appropriate

Government. The said Order reads as under:

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 4 of 15

“7. The reference was made on 8.7.92. Delhi is a Union

Territory. It is clear that Secretary(Labour), exercised his

powers delegated to him by the Central Government under

provision of Sec. 39 of the Act. The legality of Notification

was questioned before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in

case of M/s Leela Separators Pvt. Ltd. 1981(43) FLR 171,

wherein the validity of the aforesaid notification was

upheld.

8. Even otherwise the rule 2(f) of the Industrial Disputes

(Central) Rules, 1957, contemplated that in relation to the

industrial dispute in an Union Territory for which the

appropriate government is the Central Government

reference to the Central Government of the Government of

India shall be construed as a reference to the Administrator

to the Territory and the reference to the Chief Labour

Commissioner (Central) and the Asstt. Labour

Commissioner (Central) shall be construed as reference to

the appropriate authority, appointed in that behalf by the

Administrator of the Territory. On the strength of the above

rule, it is clear that the Secretary (Labour), Delhi was

competent to refer the dispute for adjudication to this

Tribunal.

…………..

10. For the reasons stated above, the application is

dismissed. File be consigned to record room.”

12. Subsequently, the Petitioner moved an application dated 21.08.2003

before another Labour court (LABOUR COURT X: KARKARDOOMA: DELHI )

seeking adjudication of the issue of territorial jurisdiction as a preliminary

issue. The said application came to be dismissed by the Labour Court vide

order dated 05.08.2004, holding that the Petitioner could not be permitted

to re-agitate the very issue once it has been dealt with and rejected. The said

Order reads as under:

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 5 of 15

“Once it was held by Sh. A.S. Yadav, the then Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, in this matter, it does not upon the

management to agitate and press same point. If the

management was aggrieved of the said order they should

have approached to the Higher Court.”

13. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Impugned order dated 05.08.2004, the

Petitioner has preferred the present Writ Petition, inter alia, seeking

quashing and setting aside of the same.

ISSUES INVOLVED:

14. The sole question before this Court at present is:

● Whether the Learned Labour Court was justified in rejecting the

plea of Petitioner regarding competence of jurisdiction, thereby

upholding the reference?

SUBMISSIONS OF PARTIES:

15. As for the submissions of the parties, ld. Counsel for the Petitioner

urged that the Petitioner/Company, being an establishment, has its

branches/offices in different states including branches at Delhi, Lucknow

and Kolkata.

16. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has raised the plea that the sole

question involved in the present Writ is whether the Delhi Administration

who made the reference and the Labour Court at Delhi who had passed the

Impugned Order, were the competent authorities in the present case or not.

In support of his arguments, the Petitioner has placed reliance on Section 2

of the Act, stating that, from this provision it is evident that the appropriate

Government is the Central Government in present case; consequently, the

reference ought to be from an authority appointed by the Central

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 6 of 15

Government and not by the Delhi Government. Therefore, it is submitted

that the Impugned Order suffer from inherent lack of jurisdiction which

can be rectified at the stage of Writ Petition only. Hence, it is prayed that

the Impugned Order be set aside.

17. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment

rendered by a co-ordinate bench of this Court in D.L.F. Universal Ltd. Vs.

Govt. Of National Capital Territory, Delhi and Ors.

MANU/DE/0386/2002 to support his contention with reference to the

competent authority.

18. Since none appears on behalf of the Respondent(s) despite ample

opportunity, this Court is left with no other option but to proceed with the

matter ex parte.

19. Respondents have not been appearing before this Court for a

considerable period and have remained unrepresented on several dates of

hearing. Accordingly, their stand is noticed only on the basis of the counter

affidavit and other documents filed on record. (As Emerging from the

Counter Affidavit on Record)

20. The Respondent submits that the present Petition is wholly

misconceived and amounts to an abuse of the process of law, being directed

against an interlocutory order where no final award has been passed by the

Labour Court.

21. It is contended that the issue of jurisdiction already stood concluded

vide Order dated 21.09.1999 passed by the learned Labour Court, which

was not challenged by the Petitioner and thus attained finality. The

subsequent Application dated 21.08.2003, raising identical objections, was

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 7 of 15

rightly dismissed on 05.08.2004. The present Petition, founded on the same

grounds, is merely a device to delay the proceedings.

22. The Respondent further submits that the Petitioner has suppressed

material facts and placed a distorted record before this Court to obtain

interim relief, and reserves the right to place the correct documents on

record.

23. It is also contended that the Petitioner has consistently adopted

dilatory tactics, despite evidence having commenced as far back as 1998,

and has prolonged the adjudication by repeated adjournments and belated

applications.

24. On merits, it is submitted that the Respondent was appointed at Delhi

and continued to remain under the control and supervision of the Delhi

office. The salary was disbursed from Delhi, and both the Charge-Sheet and

the Order of termination were issued from Delhi. In these circumstances,

the Labour Court at Delhi rightly exercised jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS & FINDING:

25. Having considered the rival submissions, it is evident that the

controversy lies within a narrow compass. The principal grievance of the

Petitioner is not with respect to the entitlement of the Respondent to any

relief per se, but rather concerns the very competence and jurisdiction of the

authorities that have entertained the dispute and are seized of adjudicating

the claim.

26. The sole and consistent objection raised by the Petitioner throughout

the proceedings is that neither the Conciliation Officer nor the Labour

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 8 of 15

Court accorded even minimal consideration to the foundational issue of

jurisdiction.

27. It is the specific case of the Petitioner that the Company, being a

Public Sector Undertaking under the administrative control of the Ministry

of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, and having oil depots

and installations across various parts of the country, would fall within the

purview of the Central Government, as the “appropriate Government” in

terms of Section 2(a) of the Act, for the purposes of any industrial dispute is

Central Government and not state government.

28. The Petitioner has further contended that the industrial dispute raised

by the Workman is otherwise not maintainable in law, inasmuch as the

entire cause of action arose at Lucknow. It is submitted that the alleged

misconduct was committed at Lucknow, the Charge-Sheet was issued there,

the domestic enquiry was conducted at Lucknow, the Enquiry Officer is

based there, and the Workman was employed and continued to discharge

his duties at the Lucknow establishment of the Company. In these

circumstances, the institution of the industrial dispute at New Delhi is

without jurisdiction, and consequently, the Reference Order issued by the

Labour Secretary, Delhi Administration, is liable to be held as

unsustainable in law.

29. The record reveals that the issue of jurisdiction had already been

raised earlier before the learned Labour Court and was adjudicated vide

Order dated 21.09.1999. The said order rejected the Petitioner’s objection

regarding the competence of the appropriate Government. The relevant

reasoning recorded by the Labour Court was that the reference had been

made in Delhi, which is a Union Territory, and that the Secretary (Labour)

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 9 of 15

had exercised powers delegated by the Central Government under Section

39 of the Act. The Labour Court further relied upon the Industrial Disputes

(Central) Rules, 1957, to hold that the Secretary (Labour), Delhi was

competent to refer the dispute for adjudication. The aforesaid reasoning,

being supported by the applicable statutory provisions and judicial

precedent, cannot be said to suffer from perversity or illegality.

30. Subsequently, the Petitioner moved another Application dated

21.08.2003 before the learned Labour Court at Karkardooma seeking

adjudication of the same issue of territorial jurisdiction as a preliminary

issue. The said Application came to be dismissed vide Order dated

05.08.2004. The reasoning assigned by the learned Labour Court while

rejecting the Petitioner’s application is that the Petitioner had already

exhausted its remedy by raising the very same objection before the another

court, with the same supporting case law, and therefore, the issue could not

be permitted to be re-agitated. The Labour Court observed that if the

Petitioner was aggrieved by the earlier Order, the proper remedy was to

approach the higher Court. The relevant extract of the impugned order reads

as under:

“Once it was held by Sh. A.S. Yadav, the then Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, in this matter, it does not upon the

management to agitate and press same point. If the

management was aggrieved of the said order they should

have approached to the Higher Court.”

31. In essence, the learned Labour Court has declined to entertain the

Application on the ground that the issue had already been adjudicated

earlier, and that the appropriate remedy for the Petitioner, if aggrieved, was

to challenge the said Order before a superior forum rather than seeking

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 10 of 15

reconsideration before the same court.

32. The reasoning of the learned Labour Court is legally sustainable and

can be justified on well-settled principles governing judicial discipline and

finality of proceedings.

33. The settled position of law is that, once an issue particularly one

relating to jurisdiction has been specifically raised, argued, and adjudicated

by a competent court, the same cannot be permitted to be re-agitated at the

instance of the same party in the course of the same proceedings. In the

case at hand, the predecessor Presiding Officer had already applied his

mind to the objection of jurisdiction and rendered a reasoned decision. In

such circumstances, the Successor Court is bound by the earlier

determination, and entertaining the same objection again would amount to

sitting in appeal over a Coordinate Bench’s Order, which is impermissible

in law.

34. The principle underlying this approach is akin to finality of judicial

decisions and the doctrine of constructive res judicata, which prevents

parties from repeatedly raising the same issue once it has been decided.

Even though strict rules of res judicata may not apply with full rigour to

industrial adjudication, the broader principle namely that there must be an

end to litigation applies with equal force. Permitting repeated challenges on

the same ground would lead to procedural uncertainty and protract

adjudication. It will be apposite to extract Section 11 of Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908:

“ 11. Res judicata.—No Court shall try any suit or issue

in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has

been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit

between the same parties, or between parties under whom

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 11 of 15

they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in

a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in

which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has

been heard and finally decided by such Court.

…….

…….

…….

Explanation IV.—Any matter which might and ought to

have been made ground of defence or attack in such former

suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and

substantially in issue in such suit.”

35. Section 11 of the Code embodies the principle that a matter once

directly and substantially in issue between the same parties, and finally

adjudicated by a competent court, cannot be reopened in subsequent

proceedings. By virtue of Explanation IV, even those grounds which ought

to have been raised in the earlier proceedings are deemed to have been in

issue, thereby precluding parties from re-agitating the same or related issues

at a later stage. Accordingly, the Petitioner cannot be permitted to reopen

the same grievance at that stage, even assuming that the earlier objection

was not elaborately considered by the predecessor, an assumption which, in

any event, does not arise in the present case.

36. Further, the Labour Court correctly observed that if the Petitioner

was aggrieved by the earlier Order passed by the predecessor Presiding

Officer, the appropriate course of action was to challenge the same before a

higher forum not before the same forum and an officer equal in rank to that

of the officer who had passed the previous Order. Having failed to do so,

the Petitioner was not at all just in indirectly reopening the issue by filing a

fresh Application before the same Court. Such a course would defeat the

hierarchy of remedies and undermine judicial discipline.

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 12 of 15

37. Additionally, allowing repeated objections on jurisdiction at different

stages would disrupt the continuity of proceedings and delay the

adjudication of the substantive dispute, which, regrettably, has happened in

the instant case. The Labour Court, therefore, acted within its jurisdiction in

declining to revisit an issue already decided and in directing the parties to

proceed on the basis of the earlier determination.

38. Accordingly, the impugned reasoning reflects a proper exercise of

judicial restraint, adherence to procedural propriety, and respect for the

finality of orders passed by a Coordinate Bench.

39. It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226

and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court does not act as a Court of

Appeal over the findings recorded by the Labour Court. The scope of

judicial review is limited and interference is warranted only where the

Impugned Order suffers from patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional

error, or where material evidence has been ignored or irrelevant

considerations have been taken into account.

40. It is also reflected from the records placed on record, particularly

Order dated 21.09.1999 that the issue concerning the competence and

jurisdiction of the Labour Court had already been framed and was sub

judice before the learned Labour Court. In such circumstances, this Court is

of the considered view that no interference was warranted at the

interlocutory stage.

41. Once issues have been duly framed by the adjudicating authority, it is

both the right and the obligation of the parties to lead evidence and advance

submissions in support of their respective stands so as to enable the Court

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 13 of 15

to arrive at a just and reasoned determination.

42. Interference with interlocutory orders, particularly when the matter is

actively under adjudication, ought to be exercised sparingly. Entertaining

such challenges at a premature stage would unnecessarily impede the

progress of proceedings and defeat the very purpose of expeditious

adjudication under the Act.

43. The question of jurisdiction in the present case is not a pure question

of law, but a mixed question of law and fact, which necessarily requires

appreciation of evidence and factual determination. Such an issue is best

left to be decided by the Labour Court upon culmination of the trial.

44. It is further evident that the Petitioner had earlier raised an identical

objection before the learned Labour Court, which stood duly considered

and rejected. The said determination having not been assailed before any

superior forum has attained finality.

45. The subsequent attempt by the Petitioner to re-agitate the very same

issue by filing another application before successor court having same

jurisdiction amounts to an abuse of process. Such conduct partakes the

character of forum shopping, which cannot be countenanced in law.

46. The proper course available to the Petitioner was to challenge the

earlier Order before an appropriate forum. Having failed to avail of such

remedy, the Petitioner cannot now be permitted to indirectly reopen the

same issue at a later stage.

“At times, within the judicial system, the process itself tends

to assume the character of a punishment, which ought not to

occur on account of abstinence, whether on the part of

counsel or from the Bench.”

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 14 of 15

47. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no infirmity,

illegality, or jurisdictional error in the Impugned Order passed by the

learned Labour Court.

48. Accordingly, the present Writ Petition is devoid of merit and is

hereby dismissed. The parties are directed to appear before the learned

Labour Court for expeditious adjudication of the dispute on merits.

49. In cases such as the present one, where a party has repeatedly sought

to reopen settled issues and has indulged in dilatory tactics, the Court would

ordinarily be justified in imposing exemplary costs so as to deter such

conduct and to set a precedent. The record reveals that the present dispute

has remained pending for nearly twenty-six years, a delay which cannot be

countenanced and which is, to a considerable extent, attributable to the

conduct of the Petitioner in repeatedly raising objections that stood

conclusively decided. Such actions, evidently calculated to prolong

proceedings, not only defeat the object of expeditious adjudication under

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but also result in grave prejudice to the

workman, who is deprived of timely relief.

50. This Court cannot remain oblivious to the fact that, in several cases,

such tactics are employed by managements to delay the outcome of

industrial disputes and to evade their legal obligations, thereby causing

undue hardship to the workman. The present case is a telling example of

such misuse of process.

51. While this Court is strongly inclined to impose exemplary costs upon

the Petitioner for abuse of the process of law, it refrains from doing so at

this stage due to absence of Respondent/workman.

W.P.(C) 5844/2005 Page 15 of 15

52. Dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed off. No

order as to cost.

SHAIL JAIN

JUDGE

APRIL 15, 2026/PT/HP

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