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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.13075 OF 2025

M/s. Prabhodhan Prakashan Private Ltd. ....Petitioner

V/S

1. Disha Shantaram Salvi

2. State of Maharashtra ....Respondents

_________

Mr. Vachan Bodke with Ms. Kanchan Kojage i/b V & M Legal for the

Petitioner.

Mr. K.P. Anilkumar with Ms. Priyanka Kumar and Mr. Chinmay Apte for

Respondent No.1.

Mr. A.C. Bhadang, AGP for Respondent/State.

__________

CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.

RESERVED ON: 21 JULY 2026.

PRONOUNCED ON : 28 JULY 2026.

J U D G M E N T :

1. By this Petition, the Petitioner-Employer has challenged the

Award dated 7 April 2025 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, 8

th

Labour Court, Mumbai in Reference (IDA) No.102 of 2022. The Labour

Court has directed the Petitioner to reinstate Respondent No.1 with

continuity of service and full backwages from the date of termination till

her reinstatement.

2.Petitioner is engaged in the field of publication of newspapers and

journals in Marathi and Hindi languages in the State of Maharashtra.

Respondent No.1 was appointed as Accounts Officer in the Accounts

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Department of the Petitioner-Employer by appointment order dated 7

March 2013. She was confirmed in service by office order dated 28

January 2015. According to the Petitioner-Employer, Respondent No.1

was working under National Head, Finance and she was performing work

of administrative nature. She was later posted as Accounts Officer-

Recovery. Petitioner-Employer contends that four subordinates were

working under her and reporting to her. That she used to sign the

conveyance vouchers of her subordinates as well as sanction leaves to

them. Respondent No.1 was proceeded on sanctioned medical leave from

4 December 2020 to 31 March 2021. According to the Petitioner, when

she reported back to work, Respondent No.1 was not in a position to

perform her official duties satisfactorily. Therefore, by notice dated 14

May 2021, services of Respondent No.1 were terminated.

3.At the instance of Respondent No.1, the appropriate Government

made a Reference to 8

th

Labour Court, Mumbai for adjudication of

demand of Respondent No.1 for reinstatement, continuity and

backwages. Respondent No.1 filed her Statement of Claim, which was

resisted by the Petitioner by filing its Written Statement. Respondent

No.1 examined herself. Petitioner-Employer examined its witnesses Mr.

Vivek Tatojirao Kadam, Director. After considering the pleadings,

documentary and oral evidence, the Labour Court has answered the

Reference in the affirmative directing reinstatement of Respondent No.1

with continuity of service and full backwages from the date of

termination till the date of reinstatement. Aggrieved by the Award dated

7 April 2025, the Petitioner has filed the present Petition.

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4.Mr. Bodke, the learned counsel appearing for Petitioner has

submitted that the Labour Court has grossly erred in upholding the

status of Respondent No.1 as a workman under Section 2(s) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act). He submits that Respondent No.1

was working as Accounts Officer and was in charge of the Accounts

Department and that therefore, her employment was in managerial and

supervisory capacity. That she had subordinates working under her. That

she had authority to sanction conveyance allowance to them. That she

has sanctioned leave of various workers from time to time. That she has

also functioned as Recovery Officer of the Petitioner-Employer. He relies

on letters written by her to the customers of the Petitioner-Employer

seeking recovery of amounts due for advertisement in the newspapers.

He takes me through the cross-examination of Respondent No.1 to

demonstrate that there are admissions of subordinates working under

Respondent No.1 and she taking decisions for payment of conveyance

expenses. He therefore submits that Respondent No.1 does not satisfy

the tests for being a workman under Section 2(s) of the ID Act. That

therefore, direction for reinstatement and backwages granted by the

Industrial Court are expressly erroneous. He further submits that

Respondent No.1 was required to be terminated from service on account

of her inability to perform the work after recovery from the medical

ailments. That Respondent No.1 did not lead any evidence of absence of

gainful employment. That the Labour Court has not recorded any

reasons for awarding backwages to her.

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5.Mr. Bodke relies on judgment of the Apex Court in Lenin Kumar

Ray vs. Express Publications (Madurai) Ltd.

1

in support of his

contention that an Assistant Engineer supervising work of Junior

Engineers is held to be not a workman. He also relies on judgment of this

Court in Standard Chartered Bank vs. Vandana Joshi and Anr.

2

in

support of his contention that if key responsibilities assigned include

areas of generating new business, participation in branch sales etc., the

employee cannot be treated as a workman within the meaning of Section

2(s) of the ID Act. He therefore prays for setting aside the impugned

Award.

6.Mr. Anilkumar, the learned counsel appearing for Respondent

No.1 opposes the Petition. He submits that the Labour Court has rightly

upheld the status of Respondent No.1 as a workman. That designation of

Accounts Officer given to Respondent No.1 cannot decide her status and

that the Labour Court has rightly taken into consideration the nature of

duties performed by her for upholding her status as workman. He takes

me through the admissions given in the cross-examination of the

Petitioner’s witness to demonstrate that Respondent No.1 did not have

any independent authority to sanction conveyance expenses or leaves.

That there are express admissions given by the witness that Respondent

No.1 used to function strictly in accordance with directions given by the

Director. That Respondent No.1 used to mainly perform clerical work

relating to accounts without having any independent authority to take

decisions relating to the establishment of the Petitioner. That therefore,

1

2024 SCC OnLine SC 2987

2

2010 (2) Mh.L.J. 22

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there is no material on record to infer employment of Respondent No.1

in managerial, administrative or supervisory capacities. Mr. Anilkumar

relies on judgment of Apex Court in National Engineering Industries

Ltd. vs. Shri Kishan Bhageria and others

3

in support of his contention

that internal auditor of the Company with duties mainly to report or

check up without any authority to take decision and bind the Company

thereby is held to be a workman. He also relies on judgment of this Court

in Kulwant Singh vs. Reliance Petrochemical Ltd. and Another

4

in

support of his contention that nomenclature of the post is irrelevant and

that what needs to be seen is the nature of duties performed by the

employee. He prays for dismissal of the Petition.

7.Rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties now fall for my

consideration.

8.Respondent No.1-employee was engaged as Accounts Officer in

the Accounts Department of Petitioner-Publication by appointment

order dated 7 March 2013. After completion of period of probation, she

was confirmed in service with effect from 28 January 2015. Her last

drawn salary was Rs.35,500/ per month. Respondent No.1 availed

medical leave for the purpose of knee surgery from 4 December 2020 and

she reported back for work on 31 March 2021. By letter dated 4 May

2021, the Petitioner informed Respondent No.1 that as she was not

physically fit there were limitations on her working and in that situation,

there was no work available to be assigned to her. Respondent No.1

3

1988 (Supp) SCC 82

4

2000 (3) LLN 887

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submitted a reply thereto by letters dated 10 May 2021 and 12 May 2021.

Thereafter, Petitioner was terminated by letter dated 14 May 2021.

Validity of termination order dated 14 May 2021 was subject matter of

challenge in Reference (IDA) No.102 of 2022 made to the Labour Court at

the instance of the Respondent-Employee.

9.The main defence of Petitioner before the Industrial Court was

that Respondent No.1 was not a workman within the meaning of Section

2(s) of the ID Act. Since no enquiry is conducted before terminating the

services of Respondent No.1, answer to issue about status of Respondent

No.1 became the key for deciding the Reference by the Labour Court.

Labour Court has answered issue No.1 relating to status of Respondent

No.1 as a workman in the affirmative.

10.According to the Petitioner, Respondent No.1 was appointed as

Accounts Officer (

लेखा अधिकारी

) by letter dated 7 March 2013. Her

consolidated wages at the time of her initial appointment were

Rs.30,000/- per month in addition to reimbursement of amount of

Rs.1,000/- towards mobile phone expenditure. She was confirmed in

service as Accounts Officer by letter dated 28 January 2015 w.e.f. 1

January 2015 and her monthly wages were increased to Rs.31,500/- in

addition to reimbursement of expenditure of Rs.1,000/- for mobile

phone. From 1 February 2017, the consolidated wages of Respondent

No.1 were increased to Rs.34,000/- and w.e.f. 1 September 2018, the

same were increased to Rs.34,500/-. Letter dated 31 October 2019

indicates that Respondent No.1 was transferred from Accounts

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Department to Recovery Department and her designation was changed

to ‘Accounts Officer-Recovery’.

11.By now, it is well-settled position that mere nomenclature of the

post does not decide status of a person as a workman. The crucial test to

be applied is about the nature of work performed by the concerned

employee. Reliance by Mr. Anilkumar on judgment of this Court in

Kulwant Singh (supra) in this regard is apposite. According to the

Petitioner-Employer, Respondent No.1 had certain workers employed

under her whose work she used to supervise. This aspect is admitted by

Respondent No.1 in her cross-examination in which she stated that “It is

true that; Mr. Sanjay Lanjekar, Mr. Mahesh Bandawalkar, Mr. Rajan

Shigwan and Mr. Milind Sarfare were working as my subordinates and were

reporting to me. It is true to say that; without my approval, they were not

getting conveyance expenses.”

12.Petitioner has relied upon leave applications submitted by the

concerned staff working under the Respondent No.1. It appears that in

the leave application form, Respondent No.1 signed as Head of the

Department. However, though signature of Respondent No.1 is reflected

on various leave applications, it is difficult to draw a definitive

conclusion that she had authority to sanction leaves. This is clear from

the fact that the leave application is in two parts. The first part is to be

filled in and signed by the applicant with Respondent No.1 endorsing her

signature as Head of Department. However, second part of the

application contained space for decision of the leave application. It is

difficult to infer on the basis of leave applications that Respondent No.1

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had the exclusive authority to sanction the leaves. The Labour Court has

correctly appreciated this position and has held that there was no

evidence of Respondent No.1 sanctioning or rejecting the leave

applications and that Respondent No.1 was not vested powers in respect

of sanction of leave.

13.Mr. Bodke has strenuously relied on certain vouchers by which

conveyance allowance was sanctioned to the workers. On those vouchers,

Respondent No.1 has signed in capacity of Head of the Department. Here

again the Labour Court has held that there is space for signature of

authorized signatory who apparently had the power to sanction the

conveyance allowance. The admission given by the Respondent No.1 in

her cross-examination that without her approval the four employees

were not getting conveyance expenses cannot be read to mean as if

Respondent No.1 had independent power to sanction payment of

conveyance expenses.

14.I am in broad agreement with findings recorded by the Labour

Court with regard to absence of authority in Respondent No.1 to

sanction leave or to sanction payment of conveyance allowance.

15.Though an admission appears to have been given by Respondent

No.1 that without her approval, the four employees were not receiving

conveyance expenses, there also appears to be a direct admission by

Petitioner’s witness that Respondent No.1 used to work as per his

instructions. Thus, far from proving that Respondent No.1 had

independent authority to take decisions and to bind the Petitioner-

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Employer with her decisions, an express admission was given by

Petitioner’s witness that Respondent No.1 used to work as per his

instructions. It therefore cannot be held that Respondent No.1 was

engaged in managerial, administrative or supervisory capacity. Though

she carried designation of Accounts Officer and Accounts Officer-

Recovery, the predominant nature of her duties was clerical.

16.In National Engineering Industries Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court

has dealt with the issue of status of Internal Auditor engaged in the

company. The Apex Court found that the employee was mainly reporting

and checking up on behalf of the management. The Apex Court held in

paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of the judgment as under:

6. In Burmah Shell Storage & Distribution Co. of India v. Burmah Shell

Management Staff Association [(1970) 3 SCC 378] this Court observed that a

workman must be held to be employed to do that work which is the main work

he is required to do, even though he may be incidentally doing other types of

work. Therefore, in determining which of the employees in the various

categories are covered by the definition of “workman” one has to see what is

the main or substantial work which he is employed to do. In  Punjab

Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. R.S. Bhatia [(1975) 4 SCC 696] it was held that the

accountant was supposed to sign the salary bills of the staff even while

performing the duties of a clerk. That did not make the respondent employed

in a managerial or administrative capacity. The workman was, therefore, in

that context rightly held as a clerk.

7. In D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration [(1983) 4 SCC 293] the question

whether a person was performing supervisory or managerial work was the

question of fact to be decided bearing in mind the correct principle. The

principle therefore is, one must look into the main work and that must be

found out from the main duties. A supervisor was one who could bind the

company to take some kind of decision of behalf of the company. One who was

reporting merely as to the affairs of the company and making assessment for

the purpose of reporting was not a supervisor. See in this connection Black's

Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe, Fifth Edition. At Page 1290, “Supervisor” has

been described, inter alia, as follows:

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“In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend

and direct.

The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual having authority, in the

interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,

promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or

responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or

effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the

foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or

clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.”

9. In the instant case the evidence has been summarised by the Division

Bench. Reference may be made to pp. 65, 73, 80, 84 to 94, 95,96 and 97 of the

paper book which indicate the nature of duties performed by respondent 1,

herein. His duties were mainly, reporting and checking up on behalf of the

management. A reporter or a checking clerk is not a supervisor. The

respondent herein does not appear to us to be doing any kind of supervisory

work. He was undoubtedly checking up on behalf of the employer but he had

no independent right or authority to take decision and his decision did not

bind the company. In that view of the matter keeping the correct principle of

law in mind the Division Bench has come to the conclusion taking into

consideration the evidence recorded before the Labour Court that the

respondent is a workman and not a supervisor. That conclusion arrived at in

the manner indicated above cannot, in our opinion, be interfered with under

Article 136 of the Constitution. It is not necessary for our present purpose to

set out in extenso the evidence on record as discussed by the Division Bench.

Our attention was, however, drawn by the counsel for the respondent to

certain correspondence, for instance the letter at page 65 of the paper book

bearing the date May 14, 1976 where the respondent reported that certain

materials were lying in stores department in absence of any decision. It was

further reiterated that on inspection of the pieces those pieces were found

cracked. Similarly, our attention was drawn to several other letters and we

have perused these letters. We are of the opinion that the Division Bench was

right that these letters only indicated that the report was being made of the

checking done by the respondent. A checker on behalf of the management or

employer is not a supervisor.

17.In the present case as well, it is difficult to conclude that

Respondent No.1 had any independent power to make decision on behalf

of the Petitioner-Employer. Merely because she has written letters to

persons publishing advertisements in newspapers, the same would not

ipso facto convert nature of her duties into managerial or supervisory. In

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one of the letters, Respondent No.1 mentioned that "

सदर थकीत र

कमेबाबत

व

रिष्ठांकडून

वारंवारविचारणा होत आहे

". This indicates that she was writing

letters on the basis of instructions received by her from superior officer.

18. Reliance by Mr. Bodke on judgment of the Apex Court in Lenin

Kumar Ray (supra) is misplaced. In that case, an Assistant Engineer was

found to be supervising the work of two Junior Engineers working under

him. The employees therein had given admission of supervisory nature

of duties. The employee was an executive of the management. In the

light of these peculiar facts, the Apex Court did not treat him as a

workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID Act. Mr. Bodke has

relied on judgment of this Court in Standard Chartered Bank vs.

Vandana Joshi (supra) in which the employee therein was found to be

involved in achieving allocated business targets, ensuring high quality

customer service, ensuring external and internal compliance of branch

transactions, handling difficult customer situations and contributing to

overall achievement of the business growth. In the present case, there is

no material to infer that Respondent No.1 had any authority to

contribute to any business growth of the establishment. She was mainly

performing clerical work as per instructions of her superiors.

19.Considering the above position, I am not inclined to disturb the

finding recorded by the Labour Court that Respondent No.1 is a

workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID Act.

20.Once the status of Respondent No.1 as a workman is upheld, the

termination would automatically be rendered illegal. Since termination

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is effected without conducting enquiry and without following provisions

of Section 25F of the ID Act, the same is rendered illegal. The Petitioner-

Employer did not even pay retrenchment compensation or notice wages

to Respondent No.1. It also appears that the termination is stigmatic in

nature. Therefore, termination of Respondent No.1 is rightly held to be

illegal by the Labour Court.

21.Coming to the nature of relief that can be granted to Respondent

No.1, it is seen that she attained the age of superannuation shortly after

passing of the impugned judgment and order dated 7 April 2025 by the

Labour Court. She was terminated on 14 May 2021 and has crossed the

age of retirement on 30 July 2025. Thus, the intervening period is about

four years. The Labour Court has awarded full backwages to Respondent

No.1. However, for doing so, no reasons are recorded by the Labour

Court. No enquiry is conducted by the Labour Court about any gainful

employment by Respondent No.1. Respondent No.1 is terminated from

service when she was at the advanced stage of retirement. Her last drawn

wages were Rs.35,500/- per month. The total backwages for a period of

four years and two months would be in the range of Rs.17,75,000/-. It

appears that Respondent No.1 was not keeping good health in the year

2018 wherein she was required to undergo uterus surgery. During

December 2020 to March 2021, she was on leave for performance of knee

surgery. In the termination letter dated 14 May 2021, the Petitioner

accused Respondent No.1 of the work getting affected on account of long

leave availed by her. Petitioner apparently appointed another person in

place of Respondent No.1. Petitioner was required to terminate

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Respondent No.1 services on account of non-availability of any work for

her.

22.It appears that even after reporting for duty, Respondent No.1 was

unable to perform her job efficiently. This may have resulted on account

of long medical treatment availed by her in addition to the advanced age.

It would be apposite to reproduce the letter dated 4 May 2021 which

reads thus:

महोदया

आपण वसूलीविभागात काम करीत असताना आपल्या वैयक्तिक कामानिमित्त अनेकदादिर्घमुदतीच्या

बऱ्याच रजा आपणघेतल्यात

.

आपल्या अनुपस्थितीत वसुलीवर फारच गंभीर परिणाम झाला

. आ

र्थिक

स्थिती सुधारण्यासाठी त्वरीत नवीन व्यक्तीची आपल्या जागेवरनियुक्ती करण्यात आली

. आपल्या

गैरहजेरीत आपल्या कामाची जबाबदारीघेतलेल्या व्यक्तीने ती कामे योग्यरित्या पार पाडूनविभागही

चांगल्यारितीने हाताळला आहे

.

त्यामुळे यास्थितीत काही बदल के ला जाणार नाही

.

आपण कामावर हजर झाल्यानंतर आपणांसदिलेली इतर कामे आपल्याकडून मुदतीत पूर्णझाली

नाहीत,

तसेच व्यवस्थापनास हवा असलेलारिझल्ट आपणाकडूनमिळाला नाही

.

आपणांस आजपर्यंत

कं पनीने सांभाळूनघेण्याचा पूर्णप्रयत्न के ला आहे

.

आपण अजूनही शारीरीक दृष्टया तंदुरुस्त नसल्याने आपल्या कामावर मर्यादा येत आहेत

,

आणिया

स्थितीत कं पनीकडे आपणांस देण्यास कुठल्याहीविभागात काम उपलब्धनाही

.

या सर्वबाबींचा आपण योग्य तोविचार करुन त्यानुसार आपलानिर्णय लेखी कळवावा

.

23.There is letter of Respondent No.1 on record submitted by her

requesting for 15 days leave on 12 May 2021, in which she has admitted

that she was facing problem of blood pressure fluctuations and needed

rest. In these circumstances, Respondent No.1 was required to be

discharged from service on 14 May 2021.

24.Thus, Respondent No.1 was on a long leave from 4 December 2020

to 31 March 2021. She reported fro duty on 1 April 2021 and upon being

informed about her incapacity to work by letter dated 4 May 2021, she

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again requested for 15 days’ paid leave from 12 April 2021. Thus,

Respondent No.1 has also contributed in her own termination. The

termination is rendered illegal mainly due to technicalities of not

following the prescribed procedure. While awarding the compensation it

would be necessary to bear in mind the fact that the Petitioner is in the

print publication business.

25.Considering the above circumstances, in my view, Respondent

No.1 cannot be awarded full backwages. Instead, it would be appropriate

to award lumpsum compensation to Respondent No.1 in lieu of

reinstatement and backwages. Considering the facts and circumstances

of the present case, the lumpsum compensation is fixed at Rs.6,00,000/-.

26.I accordingly proceed to pass the following order:

i)The Award dated 7 April 2025 passed by the Labour Court,

Mumbai in Reference (IDA) No.102 of 2022 is modified by

directing that the Petitioner shall pay to Respondent No.1

lumpsum compensation of Rs.6,00,000/- in lieu of reinstatement

and backwages within a period of two months.

ii)Beyond the lumpsum compensation so awarded,

Respondent No.1 shall not be entitled to any other service-related

benefits from the Petitioner.

iii) If lumpsum compensation is not paid within the stipulated

period, the same shall carry simple interest at the rate of 8% per

annum from the date of expiry of period of two months.

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27.With the above directions, Writ Petition is partly allowed and

disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

(SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.)

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