ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 1 of 18

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on:16

th

January, 2026

Pronounced on:19

th

January, 2026

+ ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026, I.A. 1249/2026, I.A. 1250/2026 & I.A.

1251/2026

M/S R. K. ASSOCIATES AND HOTELIERS PVT. LTD.

.....Appellant

Through: Mr. Sandeep Sethi and Mr. Sudhir

Makkar, Sr. Advs. with Mr. Jasmeet

Singh, Mr. Mahinder Singh Hura, Mr.

Saif Ali, Mr. Pushpendra S.

Bhadoriya, Mr. Vijay Sharma, Mr.

Krisna Gambhir, Ms. Shreya Sethi,

Ms. Riya Kumar, Mr. Akhilesh

Kumar, Ms. Aadhya Shrotriya, Ms.

Sanya C. Oberoi, Mr. Pranav Menon,

Mr. Saurav and Mr. Ajith Willyams,

Advocates

Mob: 9910159955

Email: aor.jasmeetsingh@gmail.com

versus

INDIAN RAILWAY CATERING AND T OURISM

CORPORATION LIMITED (IRCTC) .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Saurav Agrawal and Mr. Rajat

Malhotra, Advocates with Mr.

Saksham Gupta, Ms. Madhu K.

Singh, Ms. Kiran Devrani, Mr.

Anshuman Chowdhary, Ms. Nikita

Rathi and Mr. Parmeet Singh,

Advocates

Mob: 9953769317

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 2 of 18

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA

JUDGMENT

1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 37 (2)(b) of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) against the

interim order dated 12

th

January, 2026 (“impugned order”) passed by the

learned Sole Arbitrator in Delhi International Arbitration Centre (“DIAC”)

Case Ref No. DIAC/12174/12-25. By way of the impugned order, the

learned Arbitrator has dismissed the application of the appellant filed under

Section 17 of the Arbitration Act.

2. The facts, as canvassed before this Court, are as follows:

2.1 Tender bearing no. 2024/IRCTC/P&T/CLUSTER/FEB/ECoR/

CLT/A-1 came to be floated by the respondent, i.e., Indian Railway Catering

& Tourism Corporation Limited (“IRCTC”), which also contained the

provisions relating to Master License Agreement. The services contemplated

under the said tender consisted of two parts, which are as follows:

Part A- Dealing with the construction and operation of base kitchens at

locations specified by the respondent.

Part B- Dealing with the provision of onboard catering services in cluster

trains bearing cluster no. ECoR/CLT/A-1 run by the respondent, for a period

of five years, further extendable upto two years.

2.2 The cluster included Train no. 12801-02, PURI-NDLS Purushottam

Express (“subject train”), running up and down between New Delhi and Puri

in Orissa.

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 3 of 18

2.3 The appellant came to be declared as the successful bidder for the

aforesaid cluster, and by way of Letter of Award dated 01

st

May, 2024, the

appellant was awarded the license for the commissioning and operation of

base kitchens along with provision of on-board catering services in all trains

of the said cluster for a period of five years, further extendable to two years.

2.4 Subsequently, on 22

nd

July, 2024, an agreement came to be entered

into by the parties for the provision of services as mentioned under Part A of

the tender.

2.5 Thereafter, on 31

st

August, 2024, a Letter of Commencement came to

be issued by the respondent in favour of the appellant, vide which the

appellant was inter alia intimated to operate the base kitchens at the four

places as notified in the tender and to commence the provision of on-board

catering services in the subject train, with effect from 12

th

September, 2024

till 11

th

September, 2029.

2.6 Subsequent to the Letter of Commencement, from 12

th

September,

2024, the agreement qua the services mentioned under Part B of the tender,

came into force and the same was to remain valid till 11

th

September, 2029.

2.7 Thereafter, disputes arose between the parties. The appellant raised

grievances, complaints and wrote several letters regarding presence of

unauthorized food venders on the train, due to which the appellant was

unable to enjoy the full benefits of the agreement. The respondent on the

other hand, issued two Show Cause Notices dated 03

rd

April 2025 and 08

th

April, 2025 to the appellant highlighting the complaints about service

deficiencies against the appellant on the subject train. The appellant filed

replies dated 14

th

April, 2025 and 18

th

April, 2025 to the said Show Cause

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 4 of 18

Notices and also requested for personal hearing.

2.8 Accordingly, a personal hearing was granted to the appellant on 30

th

April, 2025. Subsequently, the respondent issued a Termination Order dated

02

nd

May, 2025, thereby, terminating the license for the subject train, on

account of unsatisfactory response and continued breaches.

2.9 Since the agreement between the parties contained an arbitration

clause for resolving the disputes and the respondent had floated a fresh

limited E-tender dated 05

th

May, 2025, the appellant herein filed a petition,

i.e., OMP.(I)(COMM) 162/2025 under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act,

seeking interim relief against the Termination Order.

2.10 While issuing notice vide order dated 05

th

May, 2025, in the said

petition, this Court after recording that the appellant was continuing to

provide catering services in the subject train, directed the parties to maintain

status quo, till the next date of hearing. The said interim protection

continued to operate till passing of the judgment in the said case.

2.11 Vide judgment dated 12

th

December, 2025, the said petition under

Section 9 of the Arbitration Act filed by the appellant was dismissed, and

the interim protection earlier granted vide order dated 05

th

May, 2025, was

vacated. However, seven days‟ time was granted to the appellant to

handover the train and cease operations along with catering services on the

subject train.

2.12 By order of even date, i.e., 12

th

December, 2025, in ARB.P.

1444/2025 filed by the appellant under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration Act,

this Court referred the disputes between the parties to a Sole Arbitrator.

2.13 Pursuant to the dismissal of the petition under Section 9 of the

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 5 of 18

Arbitration Act and completion of the seven day period granted by this

Court, the respondent issued a Termination Notice dated 19

th

December,

2025 to the appellant to cease the on-board catering services operations in

the subject train.

2.14 The appellant challenged the judgment dated 12

th

December, 2025

passed in OMP.(I)(COMM) 162/2025, by way of an appeal, i.e.,

FAO(OS)(COMM) 212/2025, under Section 37 (1)(b) of the Arbitration Act.

By order dated 22

nd

December, 2025, the said appeal was disposed of, by

directing the appellant to approach the Sole Arbitrator by filing an

appropriate application.

2.15 Thereafter, the appellant approached the learned Sole Arbitrator on

the same day, i.e., 22

nd

December, 2025, under Section 17 of the Arbitration

Act, wherein, order came to be passed in the following manner:

“xxx xxx xxx

7. In these circumstances and taking into account that an interim

order passed by the Hon'ble High Court was ensuing in favour of

the Claimant since 05.05.2025, it is deemed appropriate to grant

similar interim protection to the Claimant for a short period till the

present application can be decided. It is, therefore, directed that as

was the position when the Claimant's petition under Section 9 was

pending before the Hon'ble High Court, the Claimant will continue

to discharge its obligations under the MLA till the next date. It is,

however, made clear that this interim protection is being granted

only due to paucity of time and will not be taken as an expression of

opinion on the merits of the Claimant's plea for interim protection.

xxx xxx xxx”

(Emphasis Supplied)

2.16 After hearing the parties and considering their submissions, the

learned Sole Arbitrator vide the impugned order dated 12

th

January, 2026,

dismissed the application of the appellant, holding that the restoration of a

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 6 of 18

terminated contract at the interim stage, was neither warranted nor in public

interest.

2.17 Thus, the present appeal has come to be filed by the appellant.

3. On behalf of the appellant, the following submissions have been

advanced:

3.1 The respondent has terminated the contract in a most high-handed

manner, without adherence to the terms and conditions of the contract/tender

and the principles governing the procedure for termination of contract.

3.2 The decision-making process adopted by the respondent leading to the

issuance of the Termination Order, was arbitrary, unfair and in violation of

the Principles of Natural Justice. Further, the learned Arbitrator erred in not

appreciating the fact that the Termination Order is an unreasoned/non-

speaking order, which does not reveal cogent reasons nor refers to the

contentions made by the appellant.

3.3 Clause 6.10 as relied upon by the respondent has to be read in

conjunction with Clauses 6.10 (a) and 6.10 (b) of the contract agreement,

which refers to Annexure K. The said Annexure K provides for imposition of

penalty for established passenger complaints and prescribes a procedure

leading to termination, as per which, penalties are to be imposed based on

the recurrence of a particular type of complaint. As per Annexure K, it is

only after the fifth established case for „Type II‟ and „Type III‟ complaint

and after the second established case for a „Type IV‟ complaint, that the

contract of the appellant was liable to be terminated. Further, Annexure K of

the contract agreement also envisaged imposition of penalties of the

amounts as mentioned therein, before which action for termination could be

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 7 of 18

taken. However, penalty of the amount mentioned in Annexure K, as per the

Termination Order has cumulatively been imposed upon the appellant,

without disclosing whether the same were on account of Type I/Type

II/Type III/Type IV complaint.

3.4 The respondent has acted in complete disregard of the contractual

framework governing termination, rendering the Termination Order

arbitrary and contrary to the express terms of the contract.

3.5 The Termination Notice travels far beyond the scope and

consequences set out in the Show Cause Notices. The learned Arbitrator

erred in not appreciating the fact that the respondent has failed to state the

grounds for the proposed action against the appellant in the Show Cause

Notices. The grounds of termination as given in the Termination Notice are

different from the grounds given in the Show Cause Notices.

3.6 The learned Arbitrator, while passing the impugned order, erred in not

appreciating the fact that the appellant did not have a reasonable opportunity

to defend itself. In this regard, it can be seen that the grounds on which the

Termination Order has been issued were never mentioned to the appellant in

the Show Cause Notices issued to it, thus, rendering the Show Cause

Notices issued by the respondent as invalid. Thus, the Termination Order

travels beyond the scope and allegations contained in the Show Cause

Notices and, therefore, cannot be sustained and should have been stayed by

the learned Arbitrator.

3.7 No notice for curing the defect has been issued to the appellant, which

was required to be given as per the contractual terms. The respondent has,

thus, violated Clause 8.2 of the subject tender/agreement, as the mandatory

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 8 of 18

period of fifteen days for remedying the breach before terminating the

contract and forfeiting the security deposit, was not granted. The

Termination Order clearly states that the termination and forfeiture is being

done as per Clause 7.1 of the contract, therefore, it was mandatory for the

respondent to observe compliance of Clause 8.2.

3.8 The learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate that the Termination Order

was issued under Clause 7.1 of the agreement, which required the

respondent to comply with the procedure under Clause 8.2 of the agreement,

which was a condition precedent to termination under Clause 7.1 of the

agreement. No such notice under the said clause was ever issued to the

appellant by the respondent. Hence, the subject contract is not determinable

in view of the law laid down in the case of Ascot Hotels and Resorts Pvt.

Ltd. & Anr. Versus Connaught Plaza Restaurants Pvt. Ltd., 2018 SCC

OnLine Del 7940; DLF Home Developers Limited Versus Shipra Estate

Limited and Others, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4902; Jumbo World Holdings

Limited and Another Versus Embassy Property Developments Private

Limited and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 61.

3.9 The balance of convenience is in favour of the appellant as the

termination would cause irreparable financial loss to the appellant.

Termination and consequential debarment would severely impede future

business prospects of the appellant as it enjoys substantial goodwill. The

livelihood of 115 individuals deployed on the train and at the base kitchens.

Further, the complaints received are miniscule compared to the number of

passengers, the appellant caters to during the on-board catering service.

4. On behalf of the respondent, the following submissions have been

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 9 of 18

made:

4.1 The contract has been validly terminated in terms of Clause 6.10 of

the Master License Agreement in view of the unsatisfactory service and

persistent passenger complaint against the appellant. The termination of the

license was based on persistent complaints and unsatisfactory service, issues

which are contractually reserved to the sole discretion of the respondent,

which is final and binding.

4.2 The Master License Agreement entered into between the parties is a

determinable contract, as is evident from Clause 6.10, which expressly

provides that the respondent reserves the right to terminate the license

without notice in the event of persistent complaints, unsatisfactory services,

or non-compliance with the terms of the Agreement. The Specific Relief

Act, 1963 prohibits the performance of such determinable contracts.

4.3 The reliefs sought by the appellant for reinstatement of its license and

injunction against the Termination Order, are in effect prayers for status quo

ante. Such reliefs would have the direct consequence of restoring the

appellant to contractual performance and is therefore prohibited by statute.

4.4 Clause 6.10 functions as an independent and standalone provision,

specifically addressing instances of persistent complaints. Clauses 6.10 and

6.10 (a) are disjunctive in nature, operating as alternative grounds for action.

In the present case, the respondent has invoked Clause 6.10, which

empowers it to terminate the Agreement forthwith and without prior notice.

4.5 Even assuming that Clause 6.10 (a) were to apply, the stipulated

criteria under that provision, as outlined in Annexure K, have been fully

satisfied. This is substantiated by multiple „Type-III‟ complaints, including,

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 10 of 18

those pertaining to over-charging and the presence of insects or cockroaches

in food. Further, Annexure K enables the respondent to impose penalty upon

default, and in the present case there have been 100 instances of levied

penalty upon the appellant, which was placed before the learned Arbitrator.

4.6 The fundamental requirement for a valid notice was satisfied by the

respondent. The Show Cause Notices dated 03

rd

April, 2025 and 08

th

April,

2025, issued by the respondent are complete in all respects and were further

supplemented by Letters dated 24

th

December, 2024, 27

th

January, 2025, 21

st

February, 2025, 24

th

March, 2025 and 09

th

April, 2025, whereby, the

appellant was communicated of its continued breach of contract.

4.7 The appellant cannot seek enforcement of the contract by way of

injunction, and once it is settled that a contract is determinable in nature and

is terminated, remedies are confined to damages.

4.8 The pre-requisites for granting interim relief have not been satisfied

by the appellant. There is no prima facie case in favour of the appellant, as

the Master License Agreement is determinable in nature. Further, balance of

convenience is against the appellant as interim protection to the appellant

could expose passengers to continued sub-standard services and the

appellant in its own letters has stated the grievance only to the effect that

they have suffered or will suffer monetary loss, therefore, the appellant can

be compensated through damages. Moreover, irreparable harm will be

caused to the respondent, which is evidenced by the 700 fresh complaints

against the appellant that have been received since the filing of the Section 9

petition, which causes irreversible prejudice to the public welfare and the

respondent‟s obligations, especially, when the appellant‟s claims are

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 11 of 18

compensable by damages.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the

records.

6. At the outset, this Court notes the settled position of law that in case

the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal is plausible and free from perversity,

interference under Section 37 (2)(b) of the Arbitration Act, is not warranted.

The scheme of the Arbitration Act emphasizes minimal judicial intervention

and Courts do not substitute their opinions for that of the Arbitral Tribunal,

limiting the interference of the Court only in cases where the impugned

order is perverse, patently illegal or suffers from jurisdictional infirmity.

Thus, this Court in the case of Databit Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Versus Red Fort Finance Company Pvt. Ltd., MANU/DE/0179/2026, held

as follows:

“xxx xxx xxx

7. It is well settled that the scope of interference under Section 37 is

limited. The appellate court does not act as a court of first instance and

cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own discretion over that

of the arbitral tribunal. Interference is warranted only where the

impugned order is perverse, patently illegal, or suffers from a

jurisdictional infirmity. Mere disagreement with the view taken by the

tribunal or the possibility of an alternative view is not a ground for

interference. The power exercised by the arbitral tribunal under

Section 17 is discretionary and is guided by settled principles governing

grant of interim measures, namely, the existence of a prima facie case,

balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable prejudice.

8. It is equally well settled that interlocutory orders are, by their very

nature, discretionary and the scope of interference, in judicial review,

with discretionary orders is limited. Where the discretion exercised is

towards direction for a deposit, the court has to be additionally

circumspect, as the issue of whether a deposit ought, or ought not, to be

directed, so as to secure the sanctity of the arbitral proceedings and

ensure that they proceed to fruition, is essentially a matter to be assessed

by the learned Arbitral Tribunal. Unless such assessment is perverse or

suffers from manifest illegality, the approach of the court, ordinarily,

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 12 of 18

should be one of restraint [refer: Dinesh Gupta v. Bechu Singh,

MANU/DE/3757/2021: 2021:DHC:4400].

xxx xxx xxx”

(Emphasis Supplied)

7. Likewise, holding that scope of interference in appeal against orders

passed by Arbitrators on applications under Section 17 of the Arbitration

Act, is limited and the restraints which apply on the Court while examining

the challenge to a final award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act,

equally apply to a challenge under Section 37 (2)(b) of the Arbitration Act,

this Court in the case of World Window Infrastructure Private Limited

Versus Central Warehousing Corporation, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5099,

held as follows:

“xxx xxx xxx

66. The scope of interference, in appeal, against orders passed by

arbitrators on applications under Section 17 of the 1996 Act is limited.

This Court has already opined in Dinesh Gupta v. Anand Gupta [Dinesh

Gupta v. Anand Gupta, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2099] , Augmont Gold (P)

Ltd. v. One97 Communication Ltd. [Augmont Gold (P) Ltd. v. One97

Communication Ltd., (2021) 4 HCC (Del) 642] and Sanjay

Arora v. Rajan Chadha [Sanjay Arora v. Rajan Chadha, (2021) 3 HCC

(Del) 654] that the restraints which apply on the court while examining

a challenge to a final award under Section 34 equally apply to a

challenge to an interlocutory order under Section 37(ii)(b). In either

case, the court has to be alive to the fact that, by its very nature, the

1996 Act frowns upon interference, by courts, with the arbitral process

or decisions taken by the arbitrator. This restraint, if anything, operates

more strictly at an interlocutory stage than at the final stage, as

interference with interlocutory orders could interference with the

arbitral process while it is ongoing, which may frustrate, or impede, the

arbitral proceedings.

67. Views expressed by arbitrators while deciding applications under

Section 17 are interlocutory views. They are not final expressions of

opinion on the merits of the case between the parties. They are always

subject to modification or review at the stage of final award. They do

not, therefore, in most cases, irreparably prejudice either party to the

arbitration. Section 17 like Section 9 is intended to be a protective

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 13 of 18

measure, to preserve the sanctity of the arbitral process. The pre-

eminent consideration, which should weigh with the arbitrator while

examining a Section 17 application, is the necessity to preserve the

arbitral process and ensure that the parties before it are placed on an

equitable scale. The interlocutory nature of the order passed under

Section 17, therefore, must necessarily inform the court seized with an

appeal against such a decision, under Section 37. Additionally, the

considerations which apply to Section 34 would also apply to Section

37(ii)(b).

xxx xxx xxx

82. That the province of Section 9 jurisdiction of the court, and of Section

17 jurisdiction of the arbitrator, are co-equal, stands settled by the recent

decision of the Supreme Court in Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India

Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd. [Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India

Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 712 : AIR 2021 SC 4350]

xxx xxx xxx”

(Emphasis Supplied)

8. Similar view has been taken by this Court in the cases of GLS Foils

Products Pvt. Ltd. Versus FWS Turnit Logistic Park LLP and Others,

2023 SCC OnLine Del 3904 and Dinesh Gupta and Others Versus Anand

Gupta and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2099.

9. Thus, the position of law is clear that the Court is possessed with the

power of only limited interference under Section 37 (2)(b) of the Arbitration

Act, only in cases where the impugned order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal

suffers from patent illegality or perversity.

10. Keeping in mind the aforesaid perspective, the facts of the case reveal

that the appellant was granted a license for on-board catering services under

the Master License Agreement. The license of the appellant was terminated

by the respondent vide order dated 02

nd

May, 2025, on account of persistent

passenger complaints against the appellant and unsatisfactory services by the

appellant. The said action of termination was preceded by multiple

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 14 of 18

complaints by aggrieved passengers, issuance of penalties and various

communications by the respondent regarding dissatisfaction with the

services rendered by the appellant.

11. The respondent has placed on record various documents, including,

Show Cause Notices, passenger complaints, penalty letters and

correspondence, whereby, the appellant was warned about the deteriorating

standards of service. Various letters and show cause notices were issued by

the respondent to the appellant viz. Show Cause Notices dated 03

rd

April,

2025 and 08

th

April, 2025; Letters dated 24

th

December, 2024, 27

th

January,

2025, 21

st

February, 2025, 24

th

March, 2025 and 09

th

April, 2025, whereby,

the appellant was communicated of its continued breach of contract.

12. Reading of the various communications sent by the respondent to the

appellant, brings forth that maximum number of complaints regarding on-

board catering services, were registered against the appellant with respect to

the subject train, and the subject train was considered to be one of the worst

performing Mail Express Trains, a fact which was intimated to the appellant

vide letter dated 21

st

February, 2025. The appellant was communicated

regarding the various complaints relating to service quality, hygiene, food

quality, over-charging, etc. The appellant was directed in categorical terms

to take all round measures to improve the catering services. It was further

indicated that in case of failure by the appellant to take steps to improve the

level of catering services offered, the respondent would initiate process for

imposition of penal action as per Terms and Conditions of the Contract.

13. Attention of this Court has also been drawn to the tabulated statement

from the Catering Service Information Management (“CSIM”) Portal, where

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 15 of 18

complaints are lodged by the passengers against the on-board catering

services. The brief summary of the complaints received against the appellant

for the subject train from the passengers, on the CSIM Portal, as on record

before this Court, is reproduced as under:

14. Perusal of the aforesaid table and the description of

complaints/remarks annexed with the present appeal, make it evident that

there are multiple complaints of over-charging, service quality, hygiene,

food quality, etc. against the appellant, which presents a troubling state of

affairs as regards the on-board catering services being offered by the

appellant on the subject train. On account of the said complaints, penalties

have been imposed upon the appellant, which have been duly paid by the

appellant.

15. This Court notes that the numerous complaints against the appellant

which were reflected on the CSIM Portal, as aforesaid, and which were also

brought to the notice of the appellant additionally by way of various letters,

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 16 of 18

have not been challenged by the appellant.

16. Therefore, prima facie at the interim stage, it cannot be said that the

appellant was not put to notice before taking any action against it, or that the

appellant was not aware of the various complaints regarding instances of

unsatisfactory service by it.

17. Furthermore, this Court takes note of the provisions of Clause 6.10 of

the Master License Agreement which makes provisions for termination of

the license without any previous notice to the licensee in the event of

unsatisfactory service, poor quality of articles, persistent complaints from

passengers and services below the standard. Clause 6.10 reads as under:

18. The Termination Notice dated 02

nd

May, 2025, by which the contract

awarded to the appellant for the subject train has been terminated, makes

reference to Clause 6.10, with regard to the action taken by the respondent.

Therefore, prima facie, the action taken by the respondent cannot be faulted

with.

19. As regards the submission raised by the appellant pertaining to the

mandate of Clause 8.2 regarding issuance of a specific 15 days‟ cure period

notice, in view of reference to Clause 7.1 in the Termination Notice, the

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 17 of 18

learned Arbitrator by the impugned order has held, as follows:

“xxx xxx xxx

27. During the course of arguments, the Claimant has not denied the

factum of these complaints against the food and services provided by

them being regularly brought to their notice by being placed on the

online portal which was accessible to them. There is, therefore, merit in

the Respondent's plea that it is not as if the Claimant has been taken by

surprise about the Respondent's decision regarding the deficiencies in its

service. No doubt, the provisions of Clause 8.2 which require a specific

15 day cure period notice, appears to have prima facie not been

followed but, at this interim stage, the Respondent's plea that the intent

of the said clause which mandates 15 days' notice duly stands fulfilled

cannot be simply brushed aside.

xxx xxx xxx”

(Emphasis Supplied)

20. This Court finds no perversity or illegality in the aforesaid finding of

the learned Arbitrator, and the same is a plausible view in the facts and

circumstances of the present case.

21. This Court also finds merit in the contention of the respondent that the

Court would not direct continuation of an arrangement under an agreement

which stands terminated. The legality of the termination of the contract by

the respondent would be a matter to be determined and adjudicated in the

arbitration proceedings. At the interim stage, while considering the

application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, the learned Arbitrator is

only required to consider whether the non-claimant/respondent is prima

facie entitled to take action for terminating the agreement. At the interim

stage, the validity of the Termination Order is considered only to the extent

of ascertaining as to whether there is a prima facie case in favour of the

claimant.

22. It is a settled proposition of law that matters of interpretation of

ARB. A. (COMM.) 11/2026 Page 18 of 18

contract lie primarily within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal, and would

not warrant interference by this Court in an appeal under Section 37 (2)(b)

of the Arbitration Act (See: Ambrish H. Soni Versus Chetan Narendra

Dhakan and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2280, Para 17).

23. The learned Arbitrator has categorically held that, taking into account

the factum of registration of various deficiencies in service quality, and

persistent passenger complaints on the online system, it would be against the

public interest to grant any interim stay to the appellant herein. Thus, the

learned Arbitrator did not find the present case to be a fit case where a status

quo ante deserved to be granted. The aforesaid view by the learned

Arbitrator does not suffer from any infirmity considering the submissions

and documents on record. The learned Arbitrator has taken into account the

material before the Arbitral Tribunal and has given a prima facie finding on

the issues before it. The view taken by the learned Arbitrator cannot be said

to be perverse and does not warrant any interference by this Court.

24. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the present appeal.

25. It is made clear that the observations made in the present order shall

not in any way influence the outcome of the arbitral proceedings.

26. The present appeal is consequently dismissed, along with the pending

applications.

MINI PUSHKARNA

(JUDGE)

JANUARY 19, 2026

KR/AK/SK