In the High Court at Calcutta

Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

And

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Uday Kumar

M.A.T. No.53 of 2025

+

IA No: CAN 1 of 2025

M/s Ram Kumar Sinhal

Vs.

State of West Bengal and Others

For the appellant : Mr. Dhiraj Lakhotia,

Ms. Radhika Agarwal,

Ms. Meghana Joshi,

Ms. Khushi Kundu,

Ms. Madhulika Sharma

For the respondents : Mr. Momenur Rahaman ,

Ms. Rima Sarkar

Heard and reserved on : 23.07.2025

Judgment on : 28.07.2025

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The present appeal arises out of an order passed by the learned Single

Judge dismissing the writ petition of the appellant/partnership firm,

which was preferred against an order of the Appellate Authority under

Section 107 of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

(hereinafter referred to as “the WBGST Act”), only on the ground of

limitation.

2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

2

3. An intimation in Form GST DRC-01A was issued by the Proper Officer

to the assessee/appellant detailing discrepancies for the tax period

April 1, 2019 to March 31, 2020. The same was followed by a Show

Cause Notice under Section 73(1) of the said Act dated May 10, 2024.

In the said Show Cause Notice, the date of personal hearing was

scheduled on June 3, 2024 whereas the date for filing reply to the Show

Cause Notice was mentioned as June 10, 2024.

4. The appellant filed a written representation/reply on June 10, 2024,

specifically seeking therein a personal hearing.

5. However, by an ex parte assessment order dated August 12, 2024, the

liability of the appellant was fixed at Rs.17,79,242/-. The Proper

Officer was of the opinion that an opportunity of hearing had already

been given to the appellant in the Show Cause Notice.

6. The order was uploaded on the self-same date, that is, on August 12,

2024 under the tab “View Additional Notices/Orders” (for short, “the

Additional Tab”) on the GST Portal and the not under the “View Notices

and Orders” tab (in brief, “the Normal Tab”).

7. The appellant filed an appeal under Section 107 of the WBGST Act on

April 2, 2025, beyond the limitation period as stipulated in Section

107(1) as well as the additional period of one month given under

Section 107(4) of the said Act. The reason for the delay, as pleaded by

appellant, was two-fold – medical grounds of the two active partners of

the appellant-Firm, and the difficulty in viewing the Additional Tab,

under which the order was uploaded, since the said tab was not the

Normal Tab under which such orders are supposed to be uploaded. 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

3

8. Upon hearing the appellant, the Appellate Authority dismissed the

appeal only on the ground of limitation by an order dated April 23,

2025, which was the subject-matter of challenge in the writ petition

bearing WPA No.1140 of 2025.

9. The learned Single Judge, by an order dated June 11, 2025, which is

impugned herein, dismissed the said writ petition on the grounds as set

forth in the said judgment, prompting the present appeal.

10. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends that the learned

Single Judge failed to take into consideration the judgment of S.K.

Chakraborty and Sons v. Union of India, reported at (2024) 123 GSTR

229, where a co-ordinate Bench of this Court held that the Appellate

Authority has the power to condon e delay even after the statutory

period stipulated in Section 107 of the WBGST Act. It is contended

that the learned Single Judge failed to take into consideration the

medical grounds cited by the appellant. Whereas both the active

partners were engaged due to medical emergencies, the learned Single

Judge took into consideration the disability of only one of the partners

and proceeded on the premise that the other partners c ould have

preferred the appeal in time. Secondly, it is argued, the learned Single

Judge failed to take into consideration the settled proposition of law

that in the event there is a violation of natural justice, the writ court

can interfere even where the statutory limitation period has been

transgressed.

11. In support of such contention, learned counsel cites Murtaza B.

Kaukawala v. State of West Bengal , reported at (2023) 156 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

4

taxmann.com 377 (Calcutta), Delta Goods (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India,

reported at (2024) 167 taxmann.com 641 (Calcutta), Chandni Crafts v.

Union of India, reported at (2023) 148 taxmann.com 164 (Rajasthan) and

Shreeji Developers v. State of Gujarat , reported at (2025) 172

taxmann.com 359 (Gurajat).

12. Learned counsel for the appellant further argues that by the Show

Cause Notice dated May 10, 2024, the respondent-Authorities fixed the

date of personal hearing on June 3, 2024 whereas the date for

submission of reply to the show cause was fixed on June 10, 2024, on

which date the same was actually filed. It is contended the in order to

afford a proper opportunity of personal hearing, the date of filing the

reply to the show cause, on the basis of which such personal hearing is

to be given, has to precede the date of hearing. In the present case,

however, the cart was put before the horse by fixing the date of hearing

on June 3, 2024, that is, seven days prior to the date of filing the reply,

that is, June 10, 2024. The said irregularity vitiates the entire

assessment as a whole.

13. In support of such contention, learned counsel cites M/s. Ans Trading

Company v. Deputy Commissioner State Tax and another , reported at

2024:AHC:182815-DB, in the Hon’ble High Court at Allahabad ,

Mahaveer Trading Company v. Deputy Commissioner, State Tax ,

reported at (2024) 163 taxmann.com 515 (Allahabad), Mahindra &

Mahindra ltd. v. Union of India, reported at [2024] 162 taxmann.com 53

(Chhattisgarh), S.P. Singla Constructions (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India,

reported at [2025] 173 taxmann.com 241 (Patna) , Modine Therman 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

5

System (P.) Ltd. v. State of Uttarakhand, reported at [2025] 174

taxmann.com 1252 (Uttarakhand) and Adama India (P.) Ltd. v. Union of

India, reported at [2024] 165 taxmann.com 95.

14. Learned counsel for the appellant next argues that the Show Cause

Notice was uploaded on the Additional Tab instead of the Normal Tab

on the GST portal. Learned counsel cites a series of judgments, as

mentioned in paragraph no. 17 below, where various High Courts have

held that the Additional Tab is not easily accessible and as such,

affords sufficient ground to hold that there was no proper service of the

Show Cause Notice as contemplated in Section 73 of the WBGST Act

and the connected Rules.

15. As per the Rules, proper uploading in the GST Portal or direct service

via SMS/e-mail can be effected. In the present case, no direct service

by the second method was effected b y the respondent-Authorities.

Since the uploading was also faulty and it was difficult to access the

concerned tab in the Portal, which is a pan-India problem according to

the appellant, the service of notice was itself vitiated.

16. Thus, it is argued that there was no deliberate delay on the part of the

appellant in preferring the appeal late, which was not considered by the

Appellate Authority or the learned Single Judge at all.

17. In support of such contentions, learned counsel for the appellant cites

Lord Vishnu Construction (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India, reported at [2025]

172 taxmann.com 794 (Patna), Neelgiri Machinery v. Commissioner Delhi

Goods and Service Tax, reported at [2025] 172 taxmann.com 847 (Delhi),

Ola Fleet Technologies (P.) Ltd. v. State of UP, reported at [2025] 170 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

6

taxmann.com 66 (Allahabad), Light Group v. State of Madhya Pradesh,

reported at [2025] 174 taxmann.com 663 (Madhya Pradesh), Ishan Snax

Private Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Revenue, Siliguri Charge &

Ors. in WPA 1517 of 2024 (Circuit Bench at Jalipaiguri, in the High Court

at Calcutta), Viswaat Chemicals Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, reported at

[2025] 173 taxmann.com 419 (Gujarat), Surya Resmi Traders v. State

Tax Officer, reported at [2025] 173 taxmann.com 644 (Kerla), Tvl. Sri

Renkanna Steels v. Assistant Commissioner (ST), Chennai, reported at

[2024] 165 taxmann.com 727 (Madras) , St. Xaviers College Calcutta

Alumni Association v. Dy Commissioner of Revenue Cgst and Ors. in

WPO 559 of 2024 (High Court at Calcutta) and Sukumar Kundu v. Union

of India & Ors. in WPA 12124 of 2024 (High Court at Calcutta).

18. Learned counsel also cites State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh, reported at

AIR 1958 SC 86, where it was held that if an inferior court or Tribunal

acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction, the

superior court may exercise its power to issue a writ of certiorari even

when an appeal to another Tribunal was available and recourse was

not had to it, or if such Tribunal merely confirmed what ex facie was a

nullity.

19. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent -Authorities contends

that the learned Single Judge was perfectly justified in passing the

impugned order by adverting to all relevant aspects.

20. It is argued that nothing prevented the appellant from appearing on

June 3, 2024 before the Proper Officer for the purpose of personal

hearing. Sufficient time was given to the appellant to do so, since the 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

7

notice was issued on May 10, 2024. Since the appellant deliberately

chose to skip such hearing, it cannot now turn around and contend

that there was a procedural irregularity. In the event the appellant had

any objection regarding the timelines, the appellant could very well

have pointed it out on the date fixed for personal hearing itself.

21. In any event, the appellant in the present case has filed a detailed

reply/representation to the show-cause which was considered while

making the impugned assessment. Thus , the assessment order was

not vitiated on such count.

22. It is argued that there is no difficulty for an assessee to access the

Additional Tab which is clearly available on the concerned official GST

Portal. Thus, the argument of the appellant that there was some

technical difficulty in accessing the tab is without any basis

whatsoever. It is argued that the appellant deliberately cites the

existence of the Additional Tab to get around limitation.

23. In any event, it is contended that an appeal has been preferred against

the judgment in S.K. Chakraborty (supra)

1

before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, in connection with the said SLP, has granted a

stay of operation of the judgment of this Court in the said case.

24. Learned counsel points out that Section 107, sub-sections (1) and (4),

read together, provide an outer limit of 3+1= 4 months for preferring an

appeal. Beyond such period, the Appellate Authority does not have the

power to condone the delay in preferring the appeal. In the present

1.

S.K. Chakraborty and Sons v. Union of India, reported at (2024) 123 GSTR 229. 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

8

case, as rightly held by the learned Single Judge, the appellant was

delayed by about three months and twenty days even beyond the expiry

of the said four months’ outer limit.

25. Hence, the delay was rightly not condoned.

26. Even otherwise, it is argued that the appell ant was negligent in

preferring the appeal since the medical ground taken in the application

was frivolous and baseless.

27. Learned counsel for the respondents reiterates that there was no

violation natural justice and as such, the powers under Article 226

ought not to be invoked.

28. Learned counsel for the respondents seeks to distinguish the

judgments cited by the appellant on facts. It is submitted that it might

very well have been that in certain cases, there were some technical

glitches regarding accessing the Additional Tab, but there was no such

technical issue in accessing the tab at the relevant juncture when the

notice under Section 73 (1) was issued in the present case. Thus, the

judgments cited on such count by the appellant are not germane for the

present consideration.

29. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, it transpires that several

issues have been raised in the matter, which are dealt with below:

Delay

30. There are two sub-issues involved under the question as to whether the

delay occasioned in preferring the appeal before the Appellate Authority

could be condoned. The first component is whether the Appellate 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

9

Authority and/or the writ court had power to so condone and secondly,

whether, on facts of the case, the same ought to have been condoned.

31. In S.K. Chakraborty (supra)

2

, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court

categorically observed that the timelines stipulated in Section 107(4) of

the WBGST Act are not mandatory and the provisions of the Limitation

Act are applicable.

32. The mere fact that an order of stay has been passed in respect of the

said judgment does not take away the value of the same as a precedent.

The operation of the order between the parties therein has been stayed,

but the ratio therein is binding on co-ordinate Benches as per the Law

of Precedents.

33. Even otherwise, on an independent consideration of the issue, we are of

the opinion that the proposition laid down in S.K. Chakraborty (supra)

2

,

with utmost respect, is correct.

34. While considering the said issue, we are to ascertain whether the

timeline stipulateds in sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 107 of the

WBGST Act are mandatory.

35. Sub-section (1) provides that the appeal has to be preferred within

three months from the date on which the decision and order is

communicated to the assessee, whereas sub-section (4) provides that

the Appellate Authority may, if satisfied that the appellant was

prevented by sufficient cause, allow the appeal to be presented within a

further period of one month. It is to be noted that sub-section (4) of

2.

S.K. Chakraborty and Sons v. Union of India, reported at (2024) 123 GSTR 229. 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

10

Section 107 is not couched either in negative language, debarring an

appeal from being filed after the outer limit of one month, nor is the

mandatory expression “shall” used in any manner.

36. By resorting to internal aids of interpretation available in the self-same

Section, we find that sub-section (6) of Section 107 uses such negative

and mandatory language, debarring any appeal from being filed at all

unless the payments as stipulated in Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section

(6) are made.

37. The language of sub-section (6) is couched in the following manner:

“No appeal shall be filed under sub-section (1), unless the appellant has

paid …”.

As opposed thereto, sub -section (4) provides that the Appellate

Authority may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by

sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period

of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be

presented within a further period of one month.

38. Thus, the intention of the Legislature to keep the said timeline under

sub-section (4) of Section 107 directory is evident from the contrary

expression used in sub-section (6) in the self-same Section. If the

Legislature intended sub-section (4) to be couched in a similar negative

and mandatory language, absolutely debarring appeals from being filed

after expiry of four months, the Legislature would have used such

language in sub-section (4) as well.

39. Applying external aids for the interpretation of Section 107 of the

WBGST Act, we can look at a somewhat similar timeline stipulated in 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

11

the proviso to Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act,

1997 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1997 Act”) , another State

legislation of the State of West Bengal.

40. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 7 of the 1997 Act stipulate a timeline

for making the deposits as contemplated therein. As per the proviso to

sub-section (2) of Section 7, extension in respect of such deposit can be

granted only once and the period of extension shall not exceed two

months. Sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the said Act provides that if the

defendant in an eviction suit under the said Act fails to deposit within

the time or the extended time as stipulated thereinabove, the Controller

under the said Act shall order the defence of the defendant to be struck

out.

41. Thus, in a similar scenario, where a particular outer limit of extension

of time has been provided, the 1997 Act makes such outer time-limit

mandatory by using the expressions “only once” and “shall not exceed

two months”. Coupled with the following sub-section (3), the effect of

the timeline is that in case of violation of the same, no such deposit can

be permitted at all.

42. In this regard we should look at Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,

1963, which provides that Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act shall apply

to special or local laws only insofar as, and to the extent of which, they

are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Hence, the

purport of Section 29(2) is that the bar has to be express and explicit.

By default, if there is no express bar in the special law itself, the

provisions of the Limitation Act shall apply. 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

12

43. Since, in view of our comparison above, there is no express bar found

in Section 107(4) of the WBGST Act, the obvious conclusion is that the

provisions of Section 5 (which comes with Sections 4 to 24) of the

Limitation Act, 1963 should apply.

44. It is interesting to note, by drawing inspiration from our previous

analogy with the 1997 Act, that Section 40 of the said Act stipulates

that subject to the provision of the said Act relating to the limitation,

the provisions of the Limitation Act shall apply to all proceeding and

appeals under the 1997 Act. Hence, despite the Limitation Act having

been applied in respect of the said Act, the proviso to Section 7(2) of the

1997 Act provides a specific and express exclusion of the operation of

the Limitation Act, unlike Section 107(4) of the WBGST Act.

45. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that the timeline stipulated in Section

107(4) of the WBGST Act is not mandatory but directory.

46. Another aspect which crops up for consideration on the question of

delay is, what would be the starting point of limitation for preferring the

appeal in the present case.

47. Section 107(1) of the WBGST Act specifically provides that the starting

point will be the date on which the decision or order is communicated

to the assessee/aggrieved person.

48. In the present case, it is an admitted position that no individual

communication was made directly either by SMS o r e-mail to the

appellant/assessee in respect of the assessment order. Although

uploading on the GST Portal is an accepted mode under the statute and

the Rules framed thereunder, a glaring question arises here, as to 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

13

whether the uploading of the notice only on the Additional Tab would

suffice as communication.

49. A printout of the relevant portal has been annexed to the

supplementary affidavit filed by the appellant in connection with the

CAN 1 of 2025 in the present appeal. We find therefrom that the

Normal Tab in respect of viewing notices and orders appears second

from the top in the list of tabs appearing on the said portal whereas the

Additional Tab is placed seventh from the top. Thus, there is every

chance that an assessee would miss out the seventh tab and would

only click the Normal Tab, since the latter is captioned comprehensively

as “View Notices and/or Orders”, after viewing which no necessity

might be felt at all to look for any other tab.

50. On a more fundamental premise, there is no explanation furnished in

the GST Portal itself as to which notices and orders would come under

the Normal Tab and which would come under the Additional Tab.

51. In the present case, the notice under Section 73(1) was, for all practical

purposes, the first notice issued in connection with the assessment to

the appellant/assessee. Thus, the term “additional” did not apply at

all. If there was a question of multiple notices being issued at that

point of time, or of previous notices having been issued, there still

could have been a justification for uploading the notice under Section

73(1) under the Additional Tab. In the present case, however, since the

said notice was the first of its kind in respect of the present

assessment, there was no reason or occasion at all for the appellant to

click the Additional Tab. Hence, the accessibility of the notice only 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

14

under the Additional Tab, as opposed to the Normal Tab, could not

constitute a proper communication or uploading as contemplated in

Section 73(1) of the WBGST Act, read with the concerned Rules.

52. In this regard, we are constrained to observe that the GST Authorities

must take note of the issue being faced with regard to accessibility of

notices from the Normal Tab from the end of the assessee, which has

already been taken note of and red-flagged in several judgments and

orders passed by different High Courts.

53. Thus, the GST Authorities should indicate clearly on the relevant

webpage/portal as to what category of notices or orders would come

under the Additional Tab and which types of notices or orders would be

accessible under the Normal Tab. In the alternative, the GST

authorities should ensure that there is no Additional Tab at all and all

notices and orders are uploaded under a single tab under the caption

“View Notices and/or Orders”.

54. In view of the above observations, there was no proper communication

of notice at all to the appellant in the present case at any point of time,

since the purported uploading thereof was vitiated on the grounds as

indicated above.

55. Even if it is taken that there was proper uploading of the notice, the

appellant has clearly made out a convincing case for condonation of

delay. It was specifically pleaded by the appellant before the Appellate

Authority that out of the two active partners of the appellant-Firm,

which is a family firm, one underwent surgery and the other was

engaged in looking after his seriously ailing mother at the relevant point 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

15

of time. The learned Single judge, while deciding such issue, observed

that the absence of only one of the partners was explained , by

overlooking the other aspects of the matter.

56. The learned Single Judge, with utmost respect, applied double

standards while applying rigidly the strict rule of interpretation in

respect of the timelines provided in the WBGST Act, but took a softer

approach in applying the strict rule with regard to the rigorous

compliance of the provisions of the statute in respect of proper service

of notice under Section 73(1) of the WBGST Act.

57. Thus, in the present case, sufficient grounds have been made out by

the appellant for condonation of the delay in preferring the appeal

before the Appellate Authority after about three months and twenty

days from the expiry of the four months’ outer limit as provided in the

statute.

Natural Justice

58. It is well-settled that the strict rule of interpretation is applied in

respect of taxing and penal statutes. Since the relevant provisions of

the WBGST Act are penal in nature and the WBGST Act itself is a

taxing statute, the strict rule of interpretation has to be applied in

construing its provisions. Going by the said rule, where some action is

provided for in the statute to be done in a particular mode and manner,

it either has to be done exactly in accordance therewith or not at all.

59. The scheme of the WBGST Act is required to be looked into in this

context. 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

16

60. Section 74 of the said Act applies in cases where tax is not paid or

short paid or erroneously refunded or input tax credit wrongly availed

or utilised by reason of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of

facts. On the other hand, Section 73 contains similar provisions in

respect of cases where such fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression

of fact is absent. As the notice to the present appellant was issued

under Section 73(1), it is a foregone conclusion that there was no

allegation of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

61. Section 73(1) provides for service of a notice on the person chargeable

with tax where it appears to the Proper Officer that any tax is not paid

or short paid or erroneously refunded or where input tax credit wrongly

availed or utilised.

62. Sub-section (9) of Section 73, on the other hand, stipulates that the

Proper Officer shall, after considering the representation, if any, made

by person chargeable with tax, determine the amount of tax, interest

and penalty equivalent to 10 per cent of tax or Rs.10,000/-, whichever

is higher, due from such person and issue an order.

63. Section 75 of the Act contains the general provisions relating to

determination of tax, as evident from its caption. The said Section is an

umbrella provision which circumscribes and takes under its sweep

scenarios both under Section 73 and Section 74 and imposes additional

obligations on the GST Authorities over and above those stipulated in

Sections 73 and 74 respectively.

64. Section 73(1), read with Section 73 (9), require a notice to be served

and representation by way of reply to the said Show Cause Notice, if 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

17

given by the assessee, to be considered before passing an order. Sub-

section (4) of Section 75 imposes an additional obligation on the Proper

Officer to grant an opportunity of hearing to the assessee under two

circumstances – first, where a request is received in writing from the

assessee and second, where any adverse decision is contemplated

against such person.

65. Thus, on a composite reading of Section 73, sub-sections (1) and (9)

and Section 75(4) of the GST Act, it is seen that not only is a notice to

be served before passing an assessment order, the Proper Officer is to

comply with both the requirements – consider the representation/reply

to the Show Cause Notice and also to give an opportunity of hearing to

the assessee in the event a written request in that regard is received

from the assessee or an adverse decision is contemplated against such

person.

66. In the present case, both the occasions contemplated in Section 75 (4)

arose, since, in its reply dated June 10, 2024, filed on the scheduled

date, the appellant/assessee categorically sought an opportunity of

personal hearing and an adverse decision was contemplated against the

appellant. The Proper Officer turned down such request of the appellant

on the premise that an opportunity of hearing had already been given.

However, the date of such hearing was fixed on June 3, 2024, that is,

prior to the date of filing the representation which, as rightly argued by

the appellant, is a typical case of the proverbial “putting the cart before

the horse”. If a statute provides both a right of representation and a

personal hearing, it is self-evident that such hearing has to be given on 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

18

the basis of the said written representation. A hearing prior to the

representation is an absurd proposition, since such a hearing would be

illusory. It is all the more absurd if taken to its logical conclusion. In a

case where a hearing is given prior to the representation, t wo

opportunities of hearing have to be given, one without a representation

and another on the representation.

67. In the present case, even if we ignore the written request in writing for a

personal hearing made in the representation of the appellant itself,

since the Proper Officer contemplated an adverse decision against the

assessee, which is clear from the Show Cause Notice itself, it was

mandatory for a hearing to be given.

68. As discussed above, apart from the illusory prior date of hearing, no

further opportunity was given to the appellant at all on the

representation.

69. Thus, the principle of natural justice, Audi Alteram Partem, as

embodied in Section 73(9) and Section 75(4) of the WBGST Act, were

categorically denied to the appellant.

70. A catena of judgments, as noted above, have been cited by the

appellant to underscore the proposition of law that where an appeal is

dismissed despite the violation of natural justice at the stage of

adjudication and/or the Appellate Authority fails to set right such

violation on the technical pretext of the appeal being time-barred, it is

wide open for the writ court to set aside such illegality by quashing the

action/order taken in violation of the principles of natural justice. 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

19

71. In the present case, as discussed above, there was palpable violation,

not only of the principles of natural justice but also the specific

provisions of Section 73(9), read with Section 75(4), of the WBGST Act,

which palpably vitiated the assessment order of the Proper Officer.

72. Thus, even on the said ground, the impugned orders of the Appellate

Authority as well as the Proper Officer ought to be set aside without

going into the technicality of delay, more so since the delay was not

inordinate and sufficient explanation for the delay was furnished.

73. In the backdrop of the above findings, the question which needs to be

considered now is whether the restrictive scope of an intra-court appeal

ought to be invoked in the present case.

74. We find from the impugned order of the learned Single Judge that the

above relevant facets of the matter have been overlooked in the

impugned order.

75. With due respect, the learned Single judge turned the strict rule of

interpretation in respect of taxing statutes, applicable to the WBGST

Act, on its head by sticking to the said principle for the purpose of

considering the timelines provided, while giving a go-bye to such

principle in interpreting the specific provisions of opportunity of

hearing and consideration of representation embodied in Sections 73(9)

and 75(4) of the WBGST Act. It is trite law that if the statute provides a

particular mode in which an order has to be passed or an action has to

be taken by an authority, it is either to be done in that manner or not

at all. In the present case, as discussed above, the timelines, even on a

strict interpretation, are not mandatory whereas the provision for giving 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

20

an opportunity of hearing on the representation of the assessee is so.

Such vital aspect was totally overlooked in the impugned order.

76. Secondly, while considering the starting point of limitation, the learned

Single Judge proceeded on the premise that due communication of the

notice was effected on the appellant, without taking into account the

glitches as pointed out above in uploading the notice on the Additional

Tab instead of the Normal Tab.

77. That apart, while observing that proper explanation of the delay was

not given, the learned Single Judge took into account the explanation

only for one of the partners who had suffered surgery while overlooking

the ground taken in respect of the other active partner of the appellant-

Firm who was extremely busy for justified reasons, looking after his

seriously ailing mother at the relevant point of time.

78. The other aspect which was overlooked in the impugned order is the

settled proposition of law that the writ court can interfere, either by

issuing a writ of certiorari or mandamus , where there is patent

miscarriage of justice or violation of the principles of natural justice as

well as violation of the modalities provided in the statute itself, as in the

present case.

79. In such view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the judgment of

the learned Single Judge is vitiated by patent error of law and, as such,

ought to be set aside.

80. Accordingly, M.A.T. No.53 of 2025 is allowed on contest, thereby setting

aside the impugned order dated June 11, 2025 passed in W.P.A.

No.1140 of 2025 as well as reversing the orders of the Appellate 2025:CHC-JP:133-DB

21

Authority dated April 23, 2025 and the order passed by the Proper

Officer in respect of the assessment with regard to the appellant-Firm.

It is made clear that nothing in this order shall preclude the

respondent-Authorities from issuing a fresh notice under Section 73(1)

of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and from

proceeding afresh on the basis of the same, upon due compliance of the

relevant provisions of the said Act and in accordance with law, in the

light of the observations made above.

81. Consequentially, IA No: CAN 1 of 2025 is disposed of as well.

82. There will be no order as to costs.

83. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.

84. The respondent-authorities shall specifically take note of the

observations made in paragraph nos. 52 and 53 of this judgmen t and

take curative steps accordingly at the earliest in order to obviate any

future doubt being created as to whether the uploading on the GST

Portal would constitute a proper communication of the notice under

Section 73(1) of the WBGST Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

I agree.

(Uday Kumar, J.)

2025:CHC-JP:133-DB