HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
W.P.No.37753 of 2022
Between:
M/s. RNK Agro & Chemicals Pvt Ltd.,
Rep. by its Accounts Manager,
Sri M. Kalyan Chakravarthy,
Plot No.16/7/51, 1
st
lane, Rama Murthy Nagar,
Nellore – 524 002.
Registered Office at 3-6-665/3, Street No.10,
Himayatnagar, Hyderabad - 500029. .. Petitioner
And
The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer-II,
O/o the Commercial Tax Officer, Nellore-III Circle,
Nellore, Andhra Pradesh and eight others.
.. Respondents
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 11.08.2023
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No
marked to Law Reporters/Journals?
3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to Yes/No
see the fair copy of the Judgment?
_________________________
U. DURGA PRASAD RAO, J
__________________________
T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J
::2::
*HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U.DURGA PRASAD RAO
AND
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
+ W.P.No.37753 of 2022
%11.08.2023
# M/s. RNK Agro & Chemicals Pvt Ltd.,
Rep. by its Accounts Manager,
Sri M. Kalyan Chakravarthy,
Plot No.16/7/51, 1
st
lane, Rama Murthy Nagar,
Nellore – 524 002.
Registered Office at 3-6-665/3, Street No.10,
Himayatnagar, Hyderabad - 500029.
.. Petitioner
Vs.
$ The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer-II,
O/o the Commercial Tax Officer, Nellore-III Circle,
Nellore, Andhra Pradesh and eight others..
.. Respondents
<GIST:
>HEAD NOTE:
! Counsel for petitioner: Sri A. Sarveswar Row.
Counsel for respondents: Sri Y. Vivekananda, Learned Government Pleader for
Commercial Taxes-II
? CASES REFERRED:
1. 1998 68 STC 220 AP
2. 1999 SCC OnLine AP 558
::3::
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO
AND
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
W.P.No.37753 of 2022
ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice U. Durga Prasad Rao)
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner Sri A. Sarsweswar Row
and Sri Y. Vivekananda, learned Government Pleader for Commercial
Taxes-II representing the respondents.
2. In essence, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is
that aggrieved by the assessment order dated 14.03.2019 passed by the 2
nd
respondent, the petitioner filed appeal before the Appellate Deputy
Commissioner, Tirupathi/3
rd
respondent and the 3
rd
respondent vide his
order in ADC Order No.ZL370620OD34741, dated 11.06.2020 rejected
the appeal on the main ground that the petitioner filed appeal after 128
days from the date of receipt of original Assessment Order. Aggrieved,
the petitioner filed appeal TA No.1/2022 on the file of AP VAT
Appellate Tribunal, Visakhapatnam/5
th
respondent and the same is
pending for hearing. Along with appeal, the petitioner also filed a stay
application in TMP No.29/2022 in TA NO.1/2022 and the same is posted
for hearing on 17.11.2022. However, for non-appointment of chairperson
of the AP VAT Tribunal, the matter could not be taken up and in the
meanwhile respondent No.1 issued notice dated 03.11.2022 for recovery
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of disputed tax and also issued garnishee notices 05.11.2022 to the
respondents 6 to 8 banks with which the petitioner maintains his accounts
for recovery of the disputed tax which is illegal. Learned counsel for the
petitioner thus prays to declare the action of respondent No.1 as illegal
and direct the respondent No.2 not to take any steps for recovery of the
balance disputed tax till disposal of the appeal in TA No.1/2022 pending
before the respondent No.5.
3. Learned GP opposed the petition contending that in term of Section
31(3)(c) of AP VAT Act, 2005 r/w Rule 40 of AP VAT Rules, 2005, AP
VAT Appellate Tribunal, Visakhapatnam/5
th
respondent has no
jurisdiction to entertain the stay petition and therefore recovery of the tax
need not be stopped on the ground that the petitioner filed stay
application in the appeal filed before the 5
th
respondent. He prayed to
dismiss the writ petition.
4. Per contra, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is
that when an appellate tribunal is vested with power and jurisdiction to
hear the appeal, it goes without saying that it has been vested with the
ancillary power of passing interlocutory orders including stay order in the
interest of justice and such a power is inherent in the appellate tribunal.
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5. The point for consideration is whether the AP VAT Appellate
Tribunal/5
th
respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain the stay
application pending appeal before it in the circumstances of the present
case?
6. We gave our anxious consideration to the above respective
arguments. In order to decide whether in terms of Section 31(3)(c) of AP
VAT Act r/w Rule 40 of AP VAT Rules, 2005 stay petition is
maintainable before the AP VAT Appellate Tribunal, Visakhapatnam/5
th
respondent or not, the relevant provisions have to be perused. They read
thus:
Appeals and Revisions
(a) 31. Appeal to Appellate Authority:- (1) Any VAT dealer or TOT
dealer or any other dealer objecting to any order passed or proceeding
recorded by any authority under the provisions of the Act other than an
order passed or proceeding recorded by an Additional Commissioner
or Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, may within thirty
days from the date on which the order or proceeding was served on
him, appeal to such authority as may be prescribed:
Provided that the appellate authority may within a further period
of thirty days admit the appeal preferred after a period of thirty days if
he is satisfied that the VAT dealer or TOT dealer or any other dealer
had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period:
“Provided further that the Commissioner may, in general but not
in specific cases and in such circumstances, in which the appellate
authorities are not able to discharge their normal functions due to
natural calamities, public agitations or other similar reasons, notify the
period of time to be excluded for the purpose of computation of the
time limit for filing of appeals prescribed under the sub-section.”
(Inserted by Act No.4 of 2016, dated 12.01.2016)
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Provided further that an appeal so preferred shall not be admitted
by the appellate authority concerned unless the dealer produces proof
of payment of tax, penalty, interest or any other amount admitted to be
due, or of such installments as have been granted, and the proof of
payment of twelve and half percent of the difference of the tax,
penalty, interest or any other amount, assessed by the authority
prescribed and the tax, penalty, interest or any other amount admitted
by the appellant, for the relevant tax period, in respect of which the
appeal is preferred.
(2)The appeal shall be in such form, and verified in such manner, as
may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by a fee which shall not
be less than Rs.50/- (Rupees fifty only) but shall not exceed Rs.1000/-
(Rupees one thousand only) as may be prescribed.
(3) (a) Where an appeal is admitted under sub-section(1), the
appellate authority may, on an application filed by the appellant and
subject to furnishing of such security or on payment of such part
of the disputed tax within such time as may be specified, order stay
of collection of balance of the tax under dispute pending disposal
of the appeal;
(b) Against an order passed by the appellate authority refusing to
order stay under clause(a), the appellant may prefer a revision
petition within thirty days from the date of the order of such
refusal to the Additional Commissioner or the Joint Commissioner
who may subject to such terms and conditions as he may think fit,
order stay of collection of balance of the tax under dispute pending
disposal of the appeal by the appellate authority;
(c) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (a) or (b), where a VAT
dealer or TOT dealer or any other dealer has preferred an appeal
to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 33, the stay, if any,
ordered under clause (b) shall be operative till the disposal of the
appeal by such Tribunal, and, the stay, if any ordered under clause
(a) shall be operative till the disposal of the appeal by such
Tribunal, only in case where the Additional Commissioner or the
Joint Commissioner on an application made to him by the dealer
in the prescribed manner, makes specific order to that effect.
xxxx
(b) Rule 40(1) : Application for Stay when appeal is filed before the
Appellate Tribunal:- (1) In a case where stay of collection of the tax
or penalty under dispute is granted by the Appellate Deputy
Commissioner under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 31 and on
disposal of the appeal by such Appellate Deputy Commissioner under
sub-section (4) of Section 31, the appellant files an appeal to the
Appellate Tribunal, he may apply to the Additional Commissioner
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(Commercial Taxes)(Legal) or Joint Commissioner (Commercial
Taxes)(Legal) for the continuance of the stay granted under clause (a)
of sub-section (3) of Section 31 by the Appellant Deputy
Commissioner until the appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal is
disposed of.
7. Thus, section 31(3)(c) says that pending the appeal before the AP
VAT Appellate Tribunal U/s 33, the stay earlier granted under section
31(3)(b) shall be operative till disposal of the appeal by the AP VAT
Appellate Tribunal. However, in the present case the facts would show
the petitioner has not applied for stay before the 4
th
respondent as his
appeal was rejected at the threshold as it was filed beyond condonable
period of delay. Therefore, the question of 4
th
respondent refusing to
grant stay and thereupon the petitioner obtaining stay by preferring a
revision before Additional Joint Commissioner or the Joint Commissioner
in terms of Section 31(3)(b) does not arise. Consequently, the question of
continuation of said stay pending the appeal before AP VAT Appellate
Tribunal in terms of Section 31(3)(c) also does not arise.
8. Be that it may, in terms of Rule 40 AP VAT Rules, 2005, the
petitioner, pending his appeal before AP VAT Appellate Tribunal, has to
apply for stay before the Additional Commissioner (Commercial Taxes)
(legal) or Joint Commissioner (Commercial Taxes) (legal) for the
continuation of the stay granted under section 31(3)(a) by the Appellate
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Deputy Commissioner until the appeal filed before AP VAT Appellate
Tribunal is disposed of. This situation also does not arise because the
petitioner did not move any stay application before Appellate Deputy
Commissioner/4
th
respondent inasmuch as, as stated supra, his appeal was
dismissed at the inception and therefore there was no occasion for him to
file any stay application before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner.
Therefore, the question of said authority granting stay and the petitioner
in terms of Rule-40 praying the Additional Commissioner or Joint
Commissioner to continue his stay granted by Appellate Deputy
Commissioner till disposal of his appeal before the AP VAT Appellate
Tribunal also does not arise.
9. Thus briefly stating, the present case projects a situation where the
petitioner had no occasion to file a stay application before Appellate
Deputy Commissioner/4
th
respondent and consequently the question of
the said authority either allowing or dismissing the said stay application
did not occur. In essence, the petitioner for the first time files the stay
application straight away before the AP VAT Appellate Tribunal. Hence
the situations covered by Section 31(3)(c) and Rule 40 have not arisen in
the instant case. In that view, the crucial question is whether AP VAT
::9::
Appellate Tribunal can entertain the stay application and dispose it on
merits.
10. The contention of learned Government Pleader is that whether in a
situation of Appellate Deputy Commissioner himself granting stay while
appeal was pending before him or upon his refusal, stay being granted by
the Joint Commissioner or Additional Commissioner, in both these
occasions, when main appeal is pending before the AP VAT Appellate
Tribunal, the said Tribunal has not been vested with power to grant stay
because the AP VAT Act and its Rules have not conferred stay granting
power on AP VAT Appellate Tribunal. On the other hand, such power is
taken away from AP VAT Appellate Tribunal by virtue of Section
33(6)(b) of the AP VAT Act.
11. We examined the said contention. It is true, as rightly submitted
by learned counsel for the petitioner, when a substantive power of
deciding an appeal is vested with an Appellate Court or Tribunal, the
incidental/ancillary power of passing interlocutory orders including stay
order shall also be deemed to be vested with the aforesaid Appellate
Authority for rendering complete justice as otherwise the appeal will
become otiose and the said Appellate Institution will be redundant. This
will be against the public interest. In State of Andhra Pradesh v.
::10::
Hindustan Shipyard Limited
1
the division bench of Common High
Court of Andhra Pradesh was dealing with the question whether the
Tribunal has the power to grant stay in appeals pertaining to the
Assessment Years fallen prior to 01.07.1985 because w.e.f the said date,
Section 21 of APGST Act, 1956 was amended and sub section 6 and 6(a)
were introduced. Section 6(a) created an express embargo of granting
stay pending disposal of the appeal filed against the order of first
appellate authority or deputy commissioner suo moto or in revision. The
division bench was considering the issue whether the said deprivation of
the power to grant stay has retrospective effect or not. In that context, the
division bench has held
“On a consideration of the rival submissions, we are inclined to
agree with the respondents’ counsel. The approach adopted by the
learned Government Pleader to call the said power a procedural one
and on that basis to say that it is not saved, is, in our opinion, not the
right approach to adopt. The Tribunal was granting stay hitherto in
exercise of its incidental/ancillary power which is an adjunct of, and
flows from the substantive power to entertain and hear the appeal,
conferred upon the Tribunal. We do not find it possible to separate this
incidental/ancillary power from the substantive power. The
substantive power to entertain and hear the appeal remains
undisturbed. May be so, submits the learned Government Pleader, the
said incidental power is clearly taken away with retrospective effect.
We find it difficult to agree. The retrospective affect must be given
either by express language, or must arise by necessary
implications. We are not satisfied that any such intention is
evidenced by the Amendment Act. (emphasis supplied)”
1
1988 68 STC 220 AP
::11::
12. In Penguin Textiles Ltd., Hyderabad v. State of Andhra
Pradesh
2
also, similar view was expressed by full bench of A.P. High
Court. It is stated thus:
“11. As a prelude to the discussion of the core question, we
may recapitulate certain well-settled principles relevant to the remedy
of appeal/revision and the passing of interim orders pending such
appeal/revision. As long back as in the year 1968, the Supreme Court
ruled in ITO v. Mohammed Kunhi, 71 ITR 815, that even though no
express provision exists, the appellate Tribunal must be held to have
power to grant stay as an incident of its appellate jurisdiction. It was
observed:
"It could well be said that when Section 254 confers appellate
jurisdiction, it impliedly grants the power of doing all such acts, or
employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution
and that the statutory power carries with it the duty in proper cases to
make such orders for staying proceeding as will prevent the appeal if
successful from being rendered nugatory."
12. Be it noted that the above proposition enunciated by the
Supreme Court will hold good only when there is no express provision
one way or the other. There is no room to apply the doctrine of
incidental or implied powers when the Legislature makes a specific
provision debarring the grant of stay or otherwise placing fetters on the
appellate or revisional authority to grant stay.”
13. Applying the above jurisprudence, it can be said that the incidental
or ancillary power to pass interlocutory orders in the main appeal is
inherent or intrinsic in its substantive power of the Appellate Court or
Tribunal to decide the appeal pending before it unless such ancillary or
incidental power is taken away by an express provision or by necessary
implication. We now therefore have to examine whether such stay
granting power is expressly or impliedly taken away from the AP VAT
2
1999 SCC OnLine AP 558
::12::
Appellate Tribunal. In this regard, it is apposite to peruse Section 33 of
the AP VAT Act.
14. Section 33 reads thus:
33. Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. – [(1) Any dealer
objecting to an order passed or proceeding recorded:-
(a) by any authority, on appeal under Section 31; or
(b) by the Additional Commissioner or Joint Commissioner or
Deputy Commissioner under sections 21 or 32 or 38; or
(c) By any authority following the ruling or order passed under
Section 67;
may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within sixty days from
the date of service of the order or proceeding on him.]
xxxxx
(6)(a) Where a VAT dealer or TOT dealer or any other dealer,
objecting to an order passed or proceeding recorded by a Deputy
Commissioner under Section 21 or 32 has preferred an appeal to the
Appellate Tribunal, the Additional Commissioner, or the Joint
Commissioner may, on an application filed by the dealer, subject to
such terms and conditions, as he may think fit, order stay of collection
of the tax under dispute pending disposal of the appeal by the
Appellate Tribunal;
(b) The payment of tax and penalty, if any, due in accordance
with the order of the first appellate authority or of the Deputy
Commissioner under Section 21 or in revision under Section 32, in
respect of which an appeal has been preferred under sub-section (1),
shall not be stayed pending disposal of the appeal.
Thus, as can be seen, while under Section 33(1), a VAT Appellate
Tribunal has been conferred jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the
orders specified in that sub-section, including against order passed on
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appeal under Section 31 as in the present case, Section 31 (6)(b) creates
an express embargo on the stay granting power of VAT Appellate
Tribunal pending disposal of appeal passed against different orders
including the order of the first appellate authority. Therefore, in view
of the clear manifestation made by the express provision, we agree with
the contention of learned GP that AP VAT Appellate Tribunal is not
vested with the power or jurisdiction to entertain the stay application and
pass orders in the present situation.
15. To sum up our discussion on the aspect of stay granting powers,
(i) As per Section 31(3)(a), pending disposal of the appeal, an appellate
authority may on the application of the appellant and subject to
conditions mentioned therein may order stay of collection of
balance of the tax under dispute. After disposal of the appeal, if the
appellant is aggrieved by the order of appellate authority and files
an appeal under section 33(1) before VAT Appellate Tribunal, he
can file a stay application in terms of Rule 40 of the AP VAT Rules
before the Additional Commissioner (CT)(Legal) or Joint
Commissioner (CT)(Legal) for continuance of the stay earlier
granted under Section 31(3)(a) by the Appellate Deputy
Commissioner until the disposal of appeal before the VAT
Appellate Tribunal and the said authority may pass suitable order
thereon.
(ii) Pending appeal before the appellate authority under Section 31 and
if the said authority refused to grant stay, then in terms of Section
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31(3)(b), the appellant may prefer a revision petition before
Additional Commissioner or the Joint Commissioner and the said
authority subject to such terms and conditions may grant stay of
collection of balance of the tax pending disposal of the appeal
before the appellate authority. Then as per Section 31(3)(c), such
stay granted by Additional Commissioner or Joint Commissioner
shall be operative till disposal of the appeal preferred by the
appellant under Section 33 before the VAT Appellate Tribunal.
(iii) Under Section 33(6)(b), the Appellate Tribunal which entertains an
appeal against an order under Section 31 shall not stay the payment
of tax and penalty pending disposal of appeal, inasmuch as, in the
said provision it is expressly mentioned that the payment of tax
and penalty shall not be stayed pending disposal of the appeal.
16. Thus, the relevant provisions of the AP VAT Act and its Rules
pellucidly state that in none of the above contingencies, the VAT
Appellate Tribunal is vested with the power to grant stay pending the
appeal before it. The present petitioner’s case fall within the category
(iii) above, as he for the first time prays for stay before the AP VAT
Appellate Tribunal, but the said Authority for the above reasons cannot
entertain the stay application. This point is answered accordingly.
17. In the light of the above legal position obtained, the petitioner’s
prayer to declare the action of respondent No.1 in issuing the notice and
Garnishee notice pending the stay petition in TMP No.29/2022 in TA
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No.1/2022 before the AP VAT Appellate Tribunal as illegal, cannot be
considered on that ground. However, in our considered view, this Court
by exercising its plenary power under Article 226 of the Constitution,
pass appropriate order to meet the ends of justice.
18. Accordingly, there shall be stay of collection of the demanded tax
amount as per the Assessment Order dated 14.03.2009 pending disposal
of appeal TA No.1/2022 filed by the petitioner before the AP VAT
Appellate Tribunal, Visakhapatnam, on the condition of the petitioner
depositing 75% of the demanded tax (inclusive of the tax if any deposited
by him pending the successive appeals and otherwise) within four weeks
from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.
The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs. As a
sequel, interlocutory applications, pending if any shall stand closed.
_________________________
U. DURGA PRASAD RAO, J
__________________________
T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J
11.08.2023
Krk / mva
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