A M/S SA VITA CHEMICALS (PVT.) LTD.

v.

DYES AND CHEMICAL WORKERS UNION AND ANR.

DECEMBER 11, 1998

B [S.B. MAJMUDAR AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.]

Labour laws:

Trade unions-Maharashtra Recognition

of Trade

Union & Prevention

C of Unfair Labour Practices Act, I97 I, Sections 24(/)(a), 6I (!) and 44-

Settlement between the management and the Union-Notice of strike during

the period

of settlement-Format of notice-Held, format as prescribed under

Form I of Rule 22 of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade

Union & Prevention

of Unfair Labour Practices Rules-Four basic requirements of Form I has to

D be fa/filled for issuing strike notice-Typing of the notice in the same sequence

as prescribed

in Form I or referred to in Section 24(I) is not a basic

requirement-Mode

of service of notice is also not a basic requirement-On

facts, held all the basic requirements

of Form I were complied with in the

notice in question--Contrary finding arrived at by the labour Court was

patently illegal and

was rightly reversed by the High Court in exercise of its

E jurisdiction under Article 227-Maharashtra Recognition of Trade

Union &

Prevention of Unfair labour Practices Rules, I975, Rule 22 read with Form

I-Maharashtra labour Court (Practice and Procedure Rules I975, Rules

50 and 5I.

F Words and phrases-Phrase "covered by the settlement"-Meaning

of-In the context Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union & Prevention of

Unfair Labour Practices Act, I97I.

Constitution

of India-Article 227-Jnterference under-Scope of­

Where the findings were patently erroneous and dehors the factual and legal

G position on record-Held, interference was proper and justified.

Respondent Union had made a charter of demands

to the appellant and

a settlement was arrived

at before the Conciliation Officer between the

parties which was valid for a particular period. The settlement provided that

H the then existing practice of granting 12. days privilege leave for each

488

SAVITA CHEM. (PVT.)LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. 489

completed 240 days' work per year and one day more for additional 12 days A

of work beyond 240 days was to continue and in all other respects, the

provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the existing rules were to apply.

During the operation

of the settlement the respondent-Union gave a notice

of strike inter alia on the ground that there were illegal changes brought

about in the matter of computing privilege leave. The appellant filed an

application before the Labour Court seeking a declaration that the respondent-

B

Union had gone on an illegal strike under Section 24(1)(i)(a) to (i) of the

Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union & Prevention of Unfair Labour

Practices Act,

1971 (the "Act"). Labour Court came to the conclusion that

the strike notice issued by the respondent-Union was not required by law and

was

contrary to the provisions of Section 24(l)(i) of

th~ Act, and declared C

the strike as illegal. Respondent-Union challenged the order of the Labour

Court by filing a writ petition before the High Court, which set aside the

order of the Labour Court and held that the strike was not illegal. Hence

this appeal •.

It was contended by the appellant that the notice of st,rike was violative D

of Section 24(1)(a) of the Act as the same was not in proper form and was

contrary to Rules 50 and 51 of the Maharashtra Labour Courts (Practice

and Procedure,) Rules, 1975.

It was also contended by the appellant that the

said ground of strike was covered

by the settlement.

Allowing the appeal, this

Court

HELD: 1.1. The Labour Courts (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 1975

in Maharashtra are for guidance of the Labour Courts and for regulating

E

the practice and procedure of those courts. Thus, Rules 50 and 51 which are

part and parcel of these Rules, cannot have anything to do with format of the F

notice of strike which a

Union has to give to the management as per Section

24(1)(a)

of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade

Unions and Prevention of

Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. Prescribed format for the purpose of the

said provision will necessarily be as per Form I as was laid down by Rule

22

of the Rules framed by the

State Government. Format I shows that the

notice must contain, amongst others, the following basic requirements:

G

(506-D-Ef

(i) the name of the trade union giving notice, its address and the date

of the notice;

(ii) the name of the employer and full address of the undertaking for H

490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A which the notice is meant;

(iii) clear indication in the notice

about the call for strike of the

workmen employed

in the undertaking and the date from which the strike

is to be resorted to;

B (iii) and the reason for the proposed strike. (506-F-G]

1.2.

If all these four requirements are

fulfilled, in substance, the basic

requirements

of Form I will get satisfied . It is not as if the notice must be

typed

in the same sequence in which Form I is drafted or that it must mention

Section 24(1). The latter

are mere formal requirements.

Similarly, whether

C notice is given by registered post or by hand delivery is also not a basic

requirement.

It refers to the mode of service. In the present case, admittedly

the notice was duly served on the management. Sending

of copies of notice

to the mentioned persons

is also not a part of the basic requirement of the

notice. All the four basic requirements

of Form I have been complied with

D in the present case. The name and address of the trade union which served

the notice

are clearly mentioned, the date of the notice is

also indicated, the

name

of the addressee of the notice and his address are also mentioned,

namely, it has been addressed to the Factory Manager of the Company who

was in charge

of the Company at the relevant time and under whom the

workmen proposing to go on strike were actually working . It is also clearly

E mentioned as to from which date the strike is proposed to be resorted to, as

it

is mentioned that the strike would be resorted to on the expiry of 14 days

from the date

of receipt of letter-cum-notice. It is also clearly mentioned that

the letter will be treated as notice for going on the proposed strike. Then

follows the heart of the notice, namely, the reasons why the proposed strike

F has to be resorted to. As regards para 2 of Form I it did not

apply to the facts

of the present case and had to be treated to have been struck off for the

purpose

of issuing strike notice. Therefore, it has to be

held that the notice

was perfectly valid strike notice. (506-H; 507-A-E; 508-C]

1.3. The grievance made in the impugned strike notice did not pertain

G to any modification of the crystallised rights regarding privilege leave granted

to the workmen under the settlement but it pertained to an entirely different

grievance based on a situation which was posterior to the settlement

of

rights and obligations regarding privilege leave between the parties. Thus,

this grievance about non-implementation

of the crystallised terms of settlement

cannot be said to be a matter

"covered" by the settlement for purposes of the

H definition of"illegal strike". It can be said to be amounting to a grievance

SA VITA CllEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. 491

in connection with the non-implementation of the settlement in its true and A

correct perspective. That of course, would also amount to allegation of unfair

l:ibour practice on the part of the employer as reflected by a conjoint reading

of Section 26 and Schedule IV Item 9 of the Act. But such an allegation has

nothing to do with the question whether it also amounts to going behind the

settlement. The Labour

Court was patently in error when it took the view B

that because of the alternative remedy available to the workmen viz. filing

a complaint about alleged unfair labour practice

on the part of the management,

they

could not have resorted to a more drastic remedy of strike under the

provisions

of the Act. (510-G-H; 511-A-B]

1.4. One must see the express terms

of the settlement with a view to C

finding out as to which matters are covered by the settlement. This necessarily

would connote

that the settlement in express terms must refer to a matter

which is subsequently made a subject matter of notice of strike. In the

instant case, all that the settlement had guaranteed is the right of the

workmen

to earn 12 days' privilege

leave for 240 days worked in a year and

an additional one day for every 12 days beyond 240 days worked in a year. D

The question regarding the correct method of computation of the leave under

the settlement is not expressly covered by the terms of the said settlement.

Any grievance

in connection with the same, therefore, has to be treated to

be outside the compass

of the settlement. (512-D-F(

2. The phrase

"covered by the settlement" as found in Section 24 is

not defined by the Act nor is it defined by the Bombay Industrial Relations

Act, 1946

or by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, in view of

Section 3(18) of the Act one can turn to the general dictionary meaning of

E

the term

"covered". After taking the exercise, one would find that the term

"covered" is more restrictive in nature as compared to the terms "arising F

out or• or "referable to". Question of implementation of the terms of the

settlement may be said to be a matter "arising out or' the settlement or

"referable to" the settlement but it is certainly not "covered" by the

settlement. Therefore, matters which were not expressly covered by the

settlement can be made the subject-matter

of grievance by the parties G

concerned

while arriving at a settlement and if a strike is resorted to by the

union

of workmen on that ground, it cannot be said that the said strike would

be hit by the provisions

of Section 24(l)(i) of the Act. Hence, it must be held

that the impugned strike notice was not violative of Section 24(l)(i) of the

Act

in so far as the grievance regarding computation of privilege leave was

concerned. The Labour

Court had patently erred in its decision. This patent H

492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A error was rightly set aside by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction

under Article 227. (512-G; 513-C-D; 514-B-CI

Newman v. Bennett, 212 Kan 562, referred to.

Concise Oxford Dictionary,

7th Edition Black's law Dictionary, 5th

B Edition, referred to.

3.

Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court could

not have set aside the findings reached by the lower authorities where two

views were possible and unless those findings were found to be patently bad

and suffering from clear error of law. But as the findings reached by the

C Labour Court on relevant terms were patently erroneous and dehors the

factual and legal position on record, the said patently illegal findings could

not have been countenanced

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India

by the High

Court. In fact the High Court

could have failed to exercise its

jurisdiction if it had not set aside such patently illegal findings of the Labour

D Court. [515-F-Hl

E

F

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed /shaque, (1955( I SCR 1104; Nagendra

Nath Bora

v. Commissioner of

Hills Division & Appeals, Assam, (1958( SCR

1240 and Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation, AIR (1984)SC 146,

referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10611 of

1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.11.92 of the Bombay High Court

in W.P. No. 2171of1983.

M.C. Bhandare, and N.B. Shettye, Sushi! Kumar Jain, A.P. Dhamija,

Pradeep Aggarwal, Umesh Bohare and A. Mishra for the Appellant.

Ms. Anitha Shenoy and Sanjay Parikh for the Respondents.

G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. The appellant company, on grant of leave to

appeal under Article

136 of the Constitution of India, has brought in challenge

the judgment and order

of the learned Single Judge of the High

Court who

allowed the Writ Petition tiled by Respondent Nq. I Union under Article 227

H of the Constitution of India and quashed the decision of the Presiding Officer,

SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD.''· DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 493

First Labour Court, Thane. By the said decision, the First Labour Court, A

Thane, took the view on an application moved by the appellant company that

Respondent No. I union had gone on an illegal strike from 30th March, 1983

pursuant to the strike notice dated 14th March, 1983. In the impugned

judgment, learned Single Judge

of the High Court took the contrary view and

held that the appellant had failed to establish that the strike in question was B

illegal.

In order to appreciate the grievances of the appellant against the decision

I

of the High Court, it will be necessary to have a glance at the background

facts.

Introductory Facts:

The appellant is a company registered under the Comµanies Act, 1956

c

and is carrying on the business of chemicals at Thane in the State of

Maharashtra since more than 38 years. Respondent No.I is a workers' union

registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Respondent No.

I union had D

submitted a charter of demands to the appellant on I st April, 1981. During

negotiations a settlement

was arrived at before the Conciliation

Officer between

the parties on 8th March, 1982. The said settlement was valid up to December

1984 .. The settlement, inter a/ia, amongst others, covered the following two

demands; i) Demand No.14 -Privilege Leave; ii) Demand No.26 Medical

Check-up; It is the case of the appellant company that during the subsistence E

of the aforesaid settlement, Respondent No. I union sent a letter of demand

to the Factory Manager of the appellant company on 14th March, 1983. As

per the said letter, various demands were raised and it was submitted by

Respondent No. I union that it would go on strike on the expiry of 14 days

from the date of service of the notice. According to Respondent No. I, the F

said notice was to be considered as notice for going on strike. The Factory

Manager of

the appellant company sent a reply to the notice of Respondent

No.

I on 23rd March, 1983. Respondent No. I union, having gone on strike

from 30th March, 1983, sent a replication on 2nd April, 1983.

The appellant company which is governed by the Maharashtra G

Recognition of Trade Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act,

1971 (hereinafter ref..:rred to as the 'Maharashtra Act') filed an application

under Section

25 of the Maharashtra Act before the Labour Court. Thane,

seeking a declaration that Respondent No.

I, union had gone on an illegal

strike. In the said application. the appellant's case was that the said strike was

illegal under Section 24( 1 )(i)(a) and (i) of the Maharashtra Act. The said H ·

494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A application was moved as per the provisions of Section 24(1) read with

Section 25( I) of the Maharashtra Act.

The Labour Court, after hearing the parties, by its order dated 20th May,

1983 came to the conclusion that the letter dated 14th March, 1983 was not

a strike notice

as required

by1law and was also contrary to the provisions of

B Section 24( I )(i) of the Maharashtra Act. It, therefore, declared that the strike

resorted

to by the workmen and the staff members with effect from

30th

March, 1983 was illegal.

Respondent

No.

I challenged the said order of the Labour Court in the

aforesaid writ petition

which was registered as Writ Petition No.2171 of 1983

C in the High Court. As noted earlier, learned single Judge of the High Court, .

by his order allowed the said writ petition and set aside the order of the

Labour

Court and held that the strike was not illegal. The said decision was

rendered on 27th November, 1992. It is this decision, which is brought on the

anvil of scrutiny

of this Court in this appeal.

D

RIVAL CONTENTIONS:

Shri M.C. Bhandare, learned senior counsel for the appellant contended

that

the Labour

Court was perfectly justified in taking the view that the

impugned notice dated 14th March, 1983 was not legal and valid as it violated

E provisions of Section 24( I )(a) of the Maharashtra Act as the said notice of

strike was not in the prescribed form. He also submitted that the said notice

was contrary to Rules 50 and 51 of the Labour Courts (Practice & Procedure)

Rules, 1975. That the notice did not recite that Respondent No. I union, being

a recognised union, obtained

vote of majority of the members in favour of the

strike before serving

the notice as required under

Clause (b) of sub-section

F (1) of Section 24 of the Maharashtra Act. Consequently, according to the

learned senior counsel

for the appellant, strike would become illegal also as

per

Section 24( 1 )(b) of the Maharashtra Act. He next contended that the

impugned strike

was also hit by

Section 24( 1 )(i) of the Maharashtra Act as

it was resorted to pursuant to the said notice, during the period in which

(j settlement of 8th March, 1982 was in operation and the notice amongst others

was based also in respect of two matters covered by the settlement, namely,

Demand No.14 -Privilege Leave and Demand No. 26 -Medical Check-up, both

of which were settled pursuant to the aforesaid settlement. It was also

contended that once

the Labour

Court had come to the conclusion on facts

on the relevant issue in the light of the evidence laid before it and appreciated

H by it, it was not open to the High Court under Article 227 to set aside the

SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJl\:UDAR, J.] 495

findings of fact when there was no patent error reflected in the judgment of A

the Labour Court. He also tried to submit that the High Court should not have

entertained the writ petition as Respondent No. I had a remedy

of going in

revision in the Industrial

Court under Section 44 of Maharashtra Act though

ultimately the said contention was

not seriously pressed. Learned senior

counsel for the appellant contended that in any case the impugned strike was

B

clearly violative of the requisite provisions of Section 24 of the Maharashtra

Act and

it was wrongly held by the High

Court as not to have resulted in

an illegal strike. It was, therefore, contended that the decision of the learned

Single Judge is required to be set aside and the decision rendered by the

Labour Court deserves to be upheld.

Ms. Anita Shenoy, learned counsel for the Respondent, on the other

hand, submitted that the appellant company had filed the application under

Section 24 iead with Section 25 of the Maharashtra Act only on the ground

c

that the strike in question was allegedly illegal as per the provisions of

Section 24(l)(a) meaning thereby it was alleged that the notice was not in the

prescribed form and also on the ground

of violative of Section 24(

I )(i); that D

no case was even alleged for voiding the notice and the ultimate strike on

the ground that provisions

of Section 24(

I Xb) were violated. It was also

submitted by her that the main requirements

of the prescribed notice as per

Form-I read with Rule 22

of the Rules under the Act were complied with by

the said notice. That the notice was addressed to the authority

of the company E

in charge of the management of the factory at the relevant time; that it was

clearly mentioned that there were grounds indicated therein which were

compelling Respondent No.

I union to go on strike. Even the time for going

on strike was also mentioned

as 14 days' after the service of the notice; that

clause-2

of the prescribed Fonn-l could not have applied as it was not the

case

of the appellant company itself before the Labour

Court that Respondent F

No. I was a recognised union as per the Maharashtra Act. Therefore, the

asterisk placed against clause 2

of Fonn-1 which permitted the striking off of

clause 2 when not applicable gets squarely applied to the facts of the present

case.

She submitted that jn order to be a recognised union, certificate was to

be issued

in favour of Respcndent No.

I union, as seen from the definition G

of Section 3(13) of the Maharashtra Act. That it was not the case of the

appellant that provisions

of

Chapter III, especially, Sections I 0 to 12 were ever

complied with by Respondent No. I union so as to be treated as a recognised

union under the Maharashtra Act. Consequently, paragraph 2 of the prescribed

Form-I

of the notice did not apply to

Respondent No. I union. Therefore, there

was no occasion for Respondent No. I union to even whisper about obtaining H

496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A vote of majority of the members in the said notice as tried to be submitted

by learned senior counsel for the appellant. It was contended that the notice

in question substantially complied with the requirements of the said prescribed

form of the notice. Consequently, the Labour Court was in patent error when

it took the view that Respondent No. I had not given strike notice in the

B prescribed form and on that score Section 24(1 )(a) got attracted on the facts

of the present case. Such a patent error was rightly set aside by the High

Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. She next contended that

as the appellant company did not invoke alleged violation of Section 24( I )(b)

before the Labour Court, there was no question of examining the said ground

either by the Labour Court or by the High Court. She submitted that the very

C fact that the said sub-clause (b) was not pressed in service by the appellant

company shows that it never treated Respondent No. I as a recognised union.

So far as the applicability of Section 24(l)(i) is concerned, she submitted that

the strike notice was not given during the currency of the settlement with

respect to any of the matters covered by the settlement. It was submitted that

Demand No.14 regarding the privilege leave as found in the settlement only

D granted crystalisation of the right of the workmen represented by Respondent

No. I union for getting privilege leave of 12 days for each completed 240 days

of work per year and further privilege leave of one day for every additional

12 days of work as provided therein. That the dispute raised in the strike

notice did not seek, in any way, to change the basis of the said grant of

E privilege leave but the grievance was entirely different as it pertained to the

proper computation of the privilege leave as per the terms of the settlement.

Jn a way it amounted to calling for correct and proper implementation of the

settlement for which Respondent No. I union could have filed a complaint

under Section

28 of the Act pertaining to unfair labour practice on the part

of

the employer as found in Schedule

IV Item 9 of the Maharashtra Act. But

F that did not take away the additional right of strike available to Respondent

No. I union on behalf of its workmen. It was also submitted that the very fact

that failure to implement the award was made by the legislature a subject

matter of

the complaint, showed that such implementation

would not be

covered by the settlement. It is for the simple reason that if it had already

G been covered by the settlement, even the more drastic remedy of strike for

getting the settlement implemented would have stood barred under Section

24(1)(i). In other words, it was contended that matters covered by the settlement

as per Section 24(1 )(i) would be only those matters which were expressly

referred

to in the settlement. Computation of the benefit as per the agreed

tem1s in the settlement was not a matter which was covered by the settlement

H but was a matter even if arising out of the settlement was one which was

SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 497

consequent upon the settlement. It was an independent matter for which there

A

was no express provision in the settlement. It was posterior to the settlement

and not embedded therein. Consequently, Section

24(l)(i) also was not

applicable to the facts

of the present .case and as the Labour Court had

committed a patent error

in this connection it was rightly co!Tected by the

High Court. Similar was her contention regarding Demand No.26 about Medical

B

Check-up. It was submitted that the said settlement had nothing to do with

the prevention

of disease as Demand No.26 referred to medical treatment for

the disease which was already suffered by the workmen due to occupational

hazards. Prevention

of

s~ch disease which was the subject matter of impugned

notice was anterior to the question

of medical check-up and was not covered

by the terms

of the settlement. Even on that ground Section 24(J)(i) did not C

get attracted. That the High Court rightly corrected the patent error of the

Labour Court

in this connection. It was, therefore, contended that the High

Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 227, was justified in interfering

with the order

of the Labour Court and in setting aside the patently erroneous

order

of the said court. It was, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves D

to be dismissed. She contended that

40 workmen who were out of job since

more than

15 years have suffered immensely and that their services have been

illegally terminated by the appellant company. This part

of the grievance, in

our view, cannot form subject matter of the present proceedings and, therefore,

whatever remedies may be available to the concerned workmen,

in this

connection, may be open

to them in accordance with law. It will be equally E

open to the appellant company to resist the said future proceedings in

accordance with law

if at all that occasion arises. We do not express any

opinion about the same.

In this case, we are concerned with the short question

whether the High Court was justified

in setting aside the Labour Court's order

declaring the strike

of the workmen from

30th March, i 983 illegal as per

provisions

of Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(l)(i) of the Maharashtra Act. F

Aforesaid rival contentions give rise to the following points for our

consideration:

(i) Whether the impugned strike notice of 14th March, 1983 given G

by Respondent No.

I union on behalf of its members was violative

of Section 24(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Act;

(ii) Whether the impugned strike notice is liolative of provision of

Section 24(1 )(b) of the Maharashtra Act;

(iii) Whether the impugned strike notice was hit by Section 24(1)(i) H

498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A of the Maharashtra Act;

B

c

(iv) Whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under

Article 227 of the Constitution of India, was justified in interfering

with the findings reached by the Labour Court; and

(v) What final order?

Before taking up the consideration of these aforesaid points, it will be

necessary to have a look at the relevant statutory scheme in the light

of which the controversies between the parties will have to be resolved.

STATUTORY SCHEME:

The Maharashtra Act is enacted, amongst others, for the recognition of

trade unions for facilitating collective bargaining for certain undertakings, to

state their rights and obligations; to confer certain powers on unrecognised

unions

and to provide for declaring certain strikes and lock-outs as illegal

strikes

and lock-outs, to define and provide for the prevention of certain

D unfair labour practices and to constitute courts (as independent machinery)

for carrying

out the purposes of according recognition to trade unions.

Section 3, sub-section (13) defines a recognised union.

Chapter III deals

with recognition

of unions and lays down that the provisions of this chapter

E will apply to every undertaking, wherein fifty or more employees are employed,

or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months; Section 12 lays

down the procedure to be followed by the Industrial

Court while granting

certificate of recognition

to the applicant union.

Chapter V deals with illegal

strikes

and lock-outs. Section 24 covers these topics. The relevant provisions

of Section 24 read as under:

F

G

"24. Illegal strike and lock-out:- In this Act, unless the context

requires otherwise:-

(I) "illegal strike" means a strike which is commenced or continued-

(a) without givin5 to the employer notice of strike in the prescribed

form, or within fourteen days of the giving of such notice;

(b) where there is a recognised union, without obtaining the vote

of the majority

of the members of the union, in favour of the

strike before the notice

of the strike is given:

H ( c) xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx

SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD., .. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 499

(d) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx A

( e) xxxxxx xxxxx xxxx

(f) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

(g) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

(h) xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx

(i) during any period in which any settlement or award is in operation,

in respect

of any of the mailers covered by the settlement or award." (Emphasis supplied).

B

Section 25 deals with procedure to be followed for getting the declaration C

whether strike or lock-out is illegal. Sub-section ( 1) thereof which is relevant

for our purpose provides that:

"Where the employees in any undertaking have proposed to go on

strike or have commenced a strike, the State Government or the

employer

of the undertaking may make a reference to the Labour Court D

for a declaration that such strike is

illegal."

Sub-section (5) of Section 25 lays down that:

"Where any strike or lock-out declared to be illegal under this section

is withdrawn within forty-eight hours of such declaration, such strike E

or lock-out shall not, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be

illegal under this Act."

Chapter VI deals with Unfair Labour Practices. Section 26 thereof which is

the first section in that Chapter lays down that:

"unless the context requires otherwise, 'unfair labour practices' mean

any

of the practices listed in Schedules II, III and

IV."

Section 28 prescribes the procedure for dealing with complaints relating to

unfair labour practices. Sub-section

(I) thereof provides :

"Where any person has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair

labour practice, then any union or any employee or any employer or

any Investigating Officer may, within ninety days

of the occurrence

of such unfair labour practice, file a complaint before the Court

competent to deal with such complaint either under section

5, or as

F

G

the case may be, under section 7, of this

Act:" H

500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Schedule IV, which is relevant for our purpose, deals with General Unfair

Labour Practices on the part of employers. Item 9 thereof deals with failure

to implement award, settlement or agreement on the part of the employer

which would be treated as general unfair labour practice on the part of the

employers. It is in the background of the aforesaid statutory scheme that we

have to consider the points which arise ror our determination.

B.

Point No.I:

The factual matrix relevant for consideration of this point indicates, as

noted earlier, that there was a settlement arrived at between the appellant

company

and Respondent No.I union on 8th March, 1982 which, amongst

C others, settled demand nos. 14 and 26 regarding privilege leave and medical

check-up. We will have occasion to deal with the terms of settlement regarding

these demands a little later when we will deal with point no.3. It is snfficient

for the present to mention that the aforesaid settlement was for three years

valid up to December, I 984. It is during the subsistence of the aforesaid I D settlement that Respondent No. I union sent a letter of demand to the Factory

Manager of the appellant company on 14th March, 1983, as noted earlier. It

will be relevant at this stage to refer to the exact wording of the said letter.

It read as under:

E

"Ref. No. DCWU/146/1983

Hand Delivery

The Factory Manager,

Savita Chemicals P. Ltd.,

Plot No.17 A, Belapur Road,

Dated 14-3-1983.

F Thane.

Sir,

We find that one Shri U.V. Sinkar and Shri Durga Prasad P.S.R.K.,

working as chemists in your company have been under the pretext of

G retrenchment and/or slackness of work, removed by you. The ground

advanced is a cloak though factually the work under no circumstances

was reduced and there were junior most persons continued in the

employment in the similar category.

We may also bring to your notice that ever since the staff members

H have enrolled themselves as members of our union, your management

SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND CW.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 501

has started harassing them and you have been demanding their A

resignations from the primary membership of the union. Threats were

openly held that the union will be liquidated by the m!nagement.

We also find that the workmen are subjected to harassment and

the workmen who have been appointed as probationers are continued B

as probationers despite the fact that the law of the land namely

Employment Standing Orders Act 1946 which becomes applicable to

your establishment does not permit continuance of such ~mployees

as probationers for an indifinite period. "Similarly there have been

illegal changes brought about in the matter of computing the privilege

leave." There have been instances where the workmen under fabulous C

allegations are charge-sheeted and removed, and many more are

awaiting the charge-sheets. This has become the order of the day, and

the lives of the workmen in the company also have become intolerable.

(Emphasis supplied)

There are also difficulties and hazards emanating from the operations D

and no effective steps have been taken by your management to

prevent such hazards. It is very difficult to understand how the

management has been continuing its operations in a crude fashion

and exposing the workmen to serious types of hazards. The process

of sulphonation is positively causing dangerous effects on the lives E

of the workmen and no steps of any manner have been taken either

to modify and/or cure the processes whereby the ingredients or hazards

are reduced and the lives become tolerable. Similarly operation

containing Polyneuclear Aromatics and Alkylate is capable of causing

cancer

to the work.men. It is rather tragic that no steps have been

taken to prevent

such processes where large majority of the workmen F

not only in your company but those working surround your company

who are susceptible to such after effects are given any assurance by

way of rectifying the method and taking away the dangerous hazards

involved. Lives of the workmen are often becoming dangerous and

under no circumstances, it is possible for the workmen, considering G

the total indifference on the part of the management to continue

operation

in the circumstances in which the management wants to

continue it. The workmen, therefore, have resolved that the total

attitude of the management towards resolution of the industrial dispute

and other relevant circumstances as stated hereinabove, which are

making the lives of the workmen very dangerous and are exposing H

A

B

c

D

502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

them to the dangers and therefore, the workmen in order to prevent

the after effects and such dangers and also shabby treatment meted

•

out to the workmen and also the physical attacks lodged against the

workmen through anti-social elements employment (sic) by the

company, to protect themselves and their rights and on that account,

the workmen have decided to proceed on strike and that being so, this

notice

is given to you. The workmen therefore, want you to treat this

letter

to be treated as notice of strike and it may be noted

that after

the expiry of 14 days from the date of receipt of this letter hereof, the

workmen will proceed

on strike and the consequence in such

circumstances

flowing there-from shall be your responsibility which

please

note.

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully

Sd/ -

General

Secretary"

The said letter was addressed by Respondent No. I union to the Factory

Manager

of the appellant company. As seen from this letter, the following

averments I

to 8 contained therein had nothing to do with

Section 24(1 )(i) of

the Act. (I) Firstly it was mentioned that one Shri U.V.S.inkar and Shri Durga

E Prasad P.S.R.K., working as chemists were wrongly retrenched. (2) Secondly

the grievance of Respondent No. I union was that the management had

started harassing the staff members who were enrolled as members of the

union and their resignations were being demanded from the primary membership

of the union. (3) The first part of the third grievance of the union was that ,

workmen were subjected to harassment and the workmen who had been

F appointed as probationers were continued as probationers despite the fact

that the law of the land, namely, Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946 did

not permit such continuance. Then followed the recitals which have been

strongly pressed in service by the learned senior counsel for the appellant,

in support of his submission, which in his view made the proposed strike

G

illegal under the relevant provisions of Section 24. lt will, therefore, be profitable

to extract the recitals in extenso. It has been mentioned in second part of

paragraph

three of the notice as under:

"Similarly there have been illegal changes brought about in the matter

of computing the privilege leave."

H (4) The rest of the paragraph dealt with different grievances, namely, that

SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 503

workmen under frivolous allegations were charge-sheeted and removed and A

many more were awaiting charge-sheets. (5) Then followed the fourth grievance

regarding the difficulties and hazards emanating from the operation

of the

factory and that

no effective steps had been taken by the management to

prevent such hazards.

It was recited that the management had been continuing

its operations

in a crude fashion and exposing the workmen to serious types B

of hazards. (6) It was then mentioned that the process of sulphonation was

positively causing dangerous effects on the lives

of the workmen and no

steps

of any manner had been taken either to modify and/or cure the processes

whereby the ingredients or hazards were reduced and the lives became

tolerable. (7) Similarly, operation containing Polynuclear Aromatics and Alkylate

was capable

Qf causing cancer to the workmen. (8) Then the grievance was C

made that no steps had been taken to prevent such processes where large

majority

of the workmen not only in the company but those working in the

surroundings

of the company who were susceptible to such after effects were

not given any assurance by way

of rectifying the method and taking away

the dangerous hazards involved.

It was then recited that the lives of the

workmen were often becoming dangerous and under

no circumstances, it was

possible for the workmen, considering the total indifference on the part

of the

D

management to continue operation in the circumstances in which the

management wanted to continue the work.

It was then recited that the workmen,

therefore, had resolved that considering the total attitude

of the management

regarding resolution

of the industrial dispute and other relevant circumstances E

as stated herein, they had decided to proceed on strike and that being so this

notice was given to the addressee.

It was then mentioned in the notice that

the workmen wanted the addressee

to treat this letter as notice of strike and

it was to be noted that after the expiry of 14 days from the date of receipt

of the letter, the workmen would proceed on strike. The said letter was replied

to on behalf

of the company by its Factory Manager on 23rd March, 1983 F

refuting the allegations made in the strike notice and calling the representatives

of the union for discussion and settlement of the matter amicably. It is

thereafter that the members of Respondent No. 1 union went on strike from

30th March,. 1983 and then sent the replication through the union on 2nd

April, 1983 refuting the contents

of the reply of the management dated 23rd G

March, 1983.

In the light of the aforesaid factual matrix, first question arises whether

the impugned notice

of 14th March, 1983 fell foul on the touch-stone of

Section 24(1 )(a) of the Maharashtra Act. Learned senior counsel for the

appellant submitted that the said notice was not

in the prescribed form. For H

504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A supporting this contention, he relied upon Rule 22 framed by the State

Govemm.ent under Section 61 (I) of the Act which lays down that:

B

"the State Government may, by notification, in the Official Gazette,

and subject to the condition of previous publication, make rules for

carrying out the purposes of this Act".

The relevant rule is found in the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions

& Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Rules, 1975. Rule 22 is found in

Chapter V of the said rules. It lays down as follows:

"22. Notice of strike :-The notice of strike under clause (a) of sub-

C section (I) of section 24 shall be in the Form I and shall be sent by

registered post."

D

When we tum to Form No.I, we find the prescribed form as under:

FORM-I

(See Rule 22)

Name of the Trade Union:

Name of 5 elected representatives of the workmen, where no Trade

E Union exists :

F

Address ...

Dated the ... day of .... ..... I 9 ,

To,

(Here mention name of the employer and full address of the

undertaking)

Dear

Sir (s)/Madam,

G In accordance with the provisions contained in sub-section (I) of

section

24 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade

Unions and

Prevention of unfair Labour Practices Act, 197 I, I/We,

(Here insert name of the person(s)) hereby give you Notice that I/we

propose to call a strike of the workmen employed in your undertaking

H propose to go on strike along with the other workmen employed in

SAVITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.8. MAJMUDAR, J.) SOS

your undertaking from the ..... day of ..... 19 ..... for the reason(s) A

explained in the Annexure attached hereto.

2.

* This

Union being a recognised Union in your undertaking has

obtained the vote

of majority of the members in your undertaking in

favour of the strike, before serving this notice on you, under clause

(b) of sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act. B

Place .............. .

Yours faithfully,

Signature

General Secretary/Secretary,

(Here insert name

of the

Union) C

*Strike off whichever is not applicable

Copy to:

Annexure

Statement of Reasons

( 1) The Investigating Officer ..... .

(Here enter office address

of the Investigating Officer,

for the area concerned)

(2) The Registrar, Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay.

(3) The Judge, Labour Court ......... .

(Here enter address

of the Labour Court,

of the area concerned).

(4) The Commissioner

of Labour, Bombay.

D

E

F

The learned senior counsel for the appellant relied upon Rules

50 & 51 of the

Labour Courts (Practice & Procedure) Rules, 1975. So far as these rules are

concerned, they are framed by the Industrial Court

of Maharashtra in exercise G

of its powers conferred under

Section 44 of the Maharashtra Act. When we

tum to Section 44, we find that it deals with powers of Industrial Court in

connection with exercise of superintendence over all Labour Courts. It lays

down as follows:

"The Industrial Court shall have superintendence over all Labour H

506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Courts and may,­

(a) call for returns;

B

(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating

the practice and procedure

of such Courts in matters not

expressly provided for by this

Act, and in particular, for securing

the expeditious disposal

of the cases;

(c) prescribe form

in which books, entries and accounts shall be

£-,

kept by officers of any Courts; and

(d) settle a table

of fees payable for process issued by a Labour

C Court or the Industrial

Court."

It, therefore, becomes obvious that the Labour Courts (Practice & Procedure)

Rules,

1975 are for guidance of the Labour Courts and for regulating the

practice and procedure

of these courts. Thus, Rules

50 and 51 which are part

and parcel

of these rules, cannot have anything to do with the format of the

D notice of strike which a union has to give to the management as per Section

24(1 X a). Prescribed format for the purpose of the said provision will necessarily

be

as per Form-I as was laid down by Rule 22 of the Rules framed by the

State

Govt. Rules 50 and 51 of the Labour Courts (Practice & Procedure) Rules, 1975

are, therefore, totally redundant and irrelevant for resolving this controversy.

E

We, therefore, do not dilate on the same. However, Shri Bhandare, learned

senior counsel for the appellant, contends that at least prescribed Form-I as

per Rule 22

of the Rules framed by the

State of Maharashtra is relevant for

deciding this controversy. To that extent he is right. Now, a mere look at the

said Form-I shows that the notice must contain, amongst others, the following

basic requirements:

F (i) The name of the Trade

Union giving notice, its address and the

G

H

date of the notice;

(ii) The name of the employer and full address of the undertaking

for which the notice is meant;

(iii) Clear indication in the notice about the call for strike of the

workmen employed

in the undertaking and the date from which

the strike

is to be resorted to;

(iv) and the reasons for the proposed strike.

It

is easy to visualise that if all the aforesaid four requirements are fulfilled,

in substance, the basic requirements of Form-I would get satisfied. It is not

-

SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 507

as if that the notice must be typed in the same sequence .in which Form-I is A

drafted or that it must mention Section 24(1). The latter are mere formal

requirements. In substance, the notice must fulfil the aforesaid basic

requirements

of the prescribed form. If they are fulfilled, which section of the

Act applies to such notice can be easily found out by reference to the Act.

Similarly, whether notice

is given by registered post or by hand delivery is B

also not a basic requirement. It refers to mode of service. In the present case,

it

is not in dispute that notice was duly served on the management.

Sending

of copies of notice to mentioned persons is also not a part of the basic

requirement

of the notice. When we examine the impugned strike notice, we

find that all these four basic requirements

of Form-I have been complied with

in the present case. The name and address of the Trade

Union which served C

the notice are clearly mentioned, the date of the notice is also indicated, the

name

of the addressee of the notice and his address are also mentioned,

namely, it has been addressed to the Factory Manager

of the company who

was in-charge

of the company at the relevant time and under whom the

workmen proposing to go on strike were actually working. It

is also clearly

mentioned as to from which date the strike

is proposed to be resorted to, as D

it is mentioned that the strike would be resorted to on the expiry of 14 days

from the date

of the receipt of the letter cum notice. It is also clearly mentioned

that the letter will be treated as notice for going on proposed strike. Then

follows the heart

of the notice, namely, reasons why the proposed strike has

to

be resorted. Thus, all the basic requirements of Form-I have been satisfied. E

Even the Labour Court took the view that the substance of the notice had

to be seen and not its form.

Still, however, it persuaded itself to hold that the

notice was not in the prescribed Form. The said finding

of the Labour Court

was patently illegal and was rightly reversed by the High Court

in the impugned

judgment. Learned senior counsel for the appellant,

Shri Bhandare, however,

submitted that requirement

of paragraph 2 of the said Form-I was not complied F

with in the present case. It is not mentioned in the notice that the

Union being

a recognised union has obtained the vote

of majority of the members to go

on strike. It must be kept in view that this

clause 2 of Form-I bears an asterisk

which says that any portion which

is not applicable has to be struck off when

not applicable.

It was not the case of the appellant at any time that Respondent G

no. I

Union was recognised union under the Act having followed the

requirements and had obtained the certificate

of a recognised union under Section 12 of the Act. On the contrary, when we tum to the application filed

by the appellant before the Labour Court, we find that it was the case of the

appellant itself before the Labour Court that the Union was a registered Union

and claimed to represent the employees employed by the applicant in the said H

508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A factory. It was not the case of the appellant before the Labour Court in the

application Under Section 25 that Respondent No. I Union was a recognised

union under the Act. Not only that, the application sought to invoke only

Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Act and did not

invoke Section 24(1 )(b) of the Act which deals with a recognised union. It is

also the case of Respondent no. I that it is not a recognised union under the

B Act. Thus, it was almost an admitted position on the record before the Labour

Court that Respondent no. I Union was not a recognised union under the Act.

Once that conclusion

is reached, it becomes obvious that paragraph 2 of the

Form-I did not apply to the facts

of the present case and had to be treated

to have been struck-off for the purpose

of issuing strike notice by Respondent

C

no.I Union to the appellant company. Consequently, the finding of the Labour

Court that the impugned notice was not

in a prescribed form and therefore,

would result in the strike

of 30th March, 1983 onwards becoming an illegal

strike being contrary to

Section 24(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Act must be held

to be patently erroneous and was rightly set aside by the High Court

in writ

jurisdiction. In fact, on this aspect, two views are not possible at all and only

D one view which appealed to the High Court is the only possible and

permi~sible

view. The view taken_ by the Labour Court was clearly contrary to evidence

on record and had to be treated as perverse and patently illegal.

It must,

therefore,

be held that the impugned notice of strike was not violative of the

provisions

of

Section 24(1 )(a) of the Maharashtra Act. It must be held that

E the said notice was a perfectly valid strike notice as required by the said

provision read with Rule 22 and Form-I

of the

relevant M.R.T. and P.U.L.P.,

Rules, 1975. The first point is, therefore, answered in negative, in favour of

Respondent no. I Union and against the appellant company.

F

Point No.2:

This takes us to the consideration of Point No.2. It is obvious that it

was not the case of the appellant company before the Labour Court that the

impugned strike was contrary

to the provisions of

Section 24(l)(b) of the Act.

In fact, as seen earlier, it was not the case of the appellant company that

G Respondent no. I Union, was a recognised union under the Act at the relevant

time when

it gave the impugned notice.

Consequently, the appellant's case

before the Labour Court for getting the strike declared illegal was based only

on the violation

of

Section 24(1)(a) and (i) of the Act. The Labour Court has

also treated the proceedings accordingly and the ultimate decision rendered

by the Labour Court is also to the effect that the strike notice of 14th March,

H 1983 was no notice in law and violative of provisions of Section 24(1 )(i). In

; .

SAVITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J] 509

substance, the Labour Court had no occasion to consider the question whether A

it was violative also of Section 24(l)(b) of the Act. It is also, in this connection,

pertinent to note the prayer in the application moved by the appellant before

the Labour Court under Section 25

of the Act. The said prayer reads as under:

"The Applicant prays that the Hon 'ble Court may be pleased to

declare:

B

(i) That the strike resorted to

t y the workmen as well as by the staff

members employed

in the Applicant's factory commencing from 30-3-83 at their respective shift schedule timings and continued

thereafter every day

in all the shifts and which is still continuing

in an illegal strike under Sec.24(1Xa) & (i) of the MRTU &

PULP C

Act, 1971."

It, therefore, becomes obvious that it is not open to learned senior counsel

for the appellant -Shri Bhandare to submit that the impugned strike notice

was violative

of the provision of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act. Consequently,

this point does not arise for our consideration and must be held to be

D

redundant and is not applicable to the facts of the present case. It must,

therefore, be held while answering this point that the impugned strike notice

cannot be said to be violative

of the provision of Section 24(l)(b) of the Act

for the aforesaid reasons.

Point No. 3:

So far as this point is concerned, it requires a more closer scrutiny. As

we have seen earlier, there was also a binding settlement between the parties

in connection \!th demand nos. 14 and 26. We shall first deal with settlement

on demand no.14 regarding Privilege Leave.

So far as this demand is concerned, the settlement reads as under:

"DemandNo.14: PRIVILEGE LEAVE:

The existing practice of 12 days leave for the first 240 days worked

E

F

and 1 day for every 12 days worked beyond 240 days shall continue G

and in all other respect the provisions of Factory Act and existing

rules shall apply."

A mere look at the settlement on this Item shows that it was agreed between

the parties that the then existing practice

of granting 12 days privilege leave

for each completed

240 days work per year and one day more for every H

510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A additional 12 days of work beyond 240 days was to continue and in all other

respects the provisions

of Factory Act and existing rules were to apply. Now,

the question

is whether any part of this settlement on privilege leave was

sought to

be by-passed or challenged in the impugned notice so as to get

voided on the touchstone

of Section 24(1 )(i) of the Act. The said provision

B lays down that

"Illegal strike" means a strike which is commenced or continued

during any period in which any settlement or award

is in operation, in respect

of any of the matters covered by the settlement or award. The question is

whether the proposed strike, amongst others, was concerning the grievances

in connection with any matter

"covered" by the settlement. A conjoint reading

of relevant clauses of settlement on demand No.14 regarding Privilege Leave

C shows that it was settled between the parties that during the continuation of

the settlement, a workman would be entitled to claim only 12 days for 240

days of work and I day for every additional 12 days of work beyond 240 days

thereafter

in a given year. It was not the case of Respondent No. I Union in

the impugned notice

of strike that they wanted any more days of privilege

D leave after

240 days of work in a year by way of grant of privilege leave vis­

a-vis the nt!mber of days worked during the year. The impugned strike notice,

as noted earlier, recited an entirely different grievance, namely, that there were

illegal changes brought about in the matter

of computing privilege leave.

Actual and correct computation

of privilege leave on the basis of actual days

worked

in a year for concerned workers was not covered by the terms

of the

E settlement. This grievance pertained to non-implementation of the agreed

settlement regarding privilege leave and had nothing to do with the claim for

any extra privilege leave

in addition to that which was agreed to between the

parties. To take an analogy, the rights crystalised

in the decree stand on an

entirely different footing

as compared to the grievance in execution proceedings

F regarding non-implementation of the settled rights under the decree. The

grievance made

in the impugned strike notice did not pertain to any modification

of the crystalised rights regarding privilege leave granted to the workmen

under the settlement but it pertained

to an entirely different grievance based

on a situation which was posterior to settlement of rights and obligations

G regarding privilege leave between the parties. Thus, as seen earlier, this

grievance about non-implementation

of the crystallised terms of settlement

cannot be said to

be a matter

"covered' by the settlement for purposes of

the definition of "Illegal strike" referred to above. It can be said to be

amounting to a grievance

in connection with non-implementation of the

settlement

in its true and correct perspective. That, of course, would also

H amount to allegation of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer as

SAVITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.i.J. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 51 J

reflected by a conjoint reading of section 26 and Schedule IV Item 9 of the A

Act, as noted earlier. But the allegation of unfair labour practice on the part

of the management has nothing to do with the question whether it also

amounts to going behind the settlement. Thus, the strike notice referred to

a claim which arose subsequent to the settlement

in connection with

non­

implementation of the main terms of the settlement. The Labour Court was

patently

in error when it took the view that because of the alternative remedy B

available to

the workmen of filing a complaint about alleged unfair labour

practice on the part

of the management, they could not have resorted to a

more drastic remedy

of strike under the provisions of the Maharashtra Act.

Nothing in this Act could

be relied upon to show that if any grievance of the

workmen

is covered by unfair labour practice alleged against the employer, C

they cannot resort to strike. However learned senior counsel for the appellant

Shri Bhandare, rightly submitted that such a more drastic remedy was of the

tast resort. He was also right when he submitted that when a less drastic

remedy was available, the workmen should have resorted to the same for

maintaining industrial peace and production. However, that would be in the

realm

of trade union policy. It may be more

prudent for a union of workmen, D

with a view to having industrial peace and continued production as well as

for not disrupting continuity of employment of workmen, to resort to

negotiations, and that if needed, to go

in the Labour Court with complaint

under

Section 28 on the ground of unfair labour practice by the employer for

the alleged non-implementation

of the settlement. It may also be an ideal E

solution of the problems. But what is ideal may not necessarily be followed

by a more militant body

of workmen. It may, in the long run, prove to be a

more drastic remedy for the workmen as they would suffer pangs

of

unemployment and starvation not only for themselves but also for the members

of their families. But only because such better and more prudent remedy was

available, it cannot

be said that the extreme step of strike resorted to by the F

Union by not following such remedy was per se illegal unless it fell within

the fore-comers

of

Section 24( I )(i) of the Maharashtra Act. It is also easy to

visualise that the same Maharashtra legislature which enacted Section 24( I )(i)

also enacted Schedule

IV Item 9 by treating it to be an unfair labour practice

on the part

of

tht: employer. The Maharashtra Act laid down two separate G

provisions in connection with illegal strike as well as unfair labour practice

by the employer. What

is unfair labour practice on the part of the employer

cannot be pressed

in service by the management to show that workers making

grievances regarding the same could not have resorted

to the strike in

connection with the same unfair labour practice and if they did so the strike

only on that score became an illegal strike, especially when it was not

H

512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A contrary to any of the provisions of Section 24(1 ). In any case, the grievance

regarding non-implementation

of the settlement is not treated by the legislature

to be a matter

"covered' by the settlement as both these topics are separately

dealt with it by enacting Section 24(1 )(i) on the one hand and Schedule IV

Item 9 of the Act on the other.

B But leaving aside these aspects of the matter, it becomes clear that the

intention

of the legislature by enacting 24(1 )(i) is that during any period in

which any settlement is in operation if strike is restorted to by the union or

the workmen

in connection with any matter

"covered' by the settlement the

strike would be illegal. Therefore,

it must be shown that the strike has been

C resorted to in connection with any matter covered by the settlement. It

therefore necessarily means that the terms of the settlement, when read, must

indicate that they encompassed any matter which

is made the subject matter

of the strike notice. We must see the express terms of settlement with a view

to finding out as to which matters are covered by the settlement. This

necessarily would connote that the settlement

in express terms must refer to

D a matter which is subsequently made a subject matter of notice of strike.

When we tum to the settlement

of demand no. 14 regarding privilege leave,

we find that how 12 days leave for the first

240 days of work in a year and

I day for every additional

12 days worked beyond

240 days worked are

computed

in a given year, is not a matter which is at all indicated or mentioned

E in the settlement. All that the settlement has guaranteed is the right of the

workmen to earn

12 days privilege leave for

240 days worked in a year and

additional one day for every

12 days beyond

240 days worked ir. a year. The

question regarding the correct method

of computation of the leave under the

settlement

is not expressly covered by the terms of the said settlement. Any

grievance

in connection with the same therefore, has to be treated to be

F outside the compass of the settlement. In this connection, it is profitable to

note that the phrase

"covered by the settlement" as found in the said clause

of Section 24 is not defined by the Act nor it is defined by the Bombay

Industrial Relations Act,

1946 or by the Central Act, namely, the Industrial

Disputes Act, 194

7. Definition section 3 sub-section (18) lays down as under:

G

"words and expressions used in this Act and not defined therein, but

defined

in the Bombay Act shall, in relation to an industry to which

the provisions

of the Bombay Act apply, have the meanings assigned

to them by the Bombay Act; and in any other case, shall have the

meanings assigned to them

by the Central

Act."

H Bombay Act is defined as Bombay Industrial Relations Act by section 3, sub-

SAVITACHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 513

section (I) and the Central Act means Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 as A

defined by Section 3, sub-section (2). In any of these Acts, the terms "covered"

has not been defined. We can, therefore, turn to the general dictionary

meaning

of the term

"covered". When we undertake this exercise, we find the

term "cover" defined by Concise Oxford Dictionary, Seventh Edition at page

219 to mean, amongst others "include, comprise, deal with". It is pertinent to B

note that the legislature in its wisdom has not construed a strike to be illegal

if the same is resorted to during any period of settlement which is in operation,

in respect of any of the matters "arising out of such settlement". The term

"covered" is more restrictive in nature as compared to the term "arising out

of' or "referable to". If the phraseology employed in the said provision was

to the effect any

of the matters

"arising out of or "referable to any settlement", C

learned senior counsel for the appellant would have been right in his contention

that implementation

of the settlement also would be a matter

"arising out of'

the settlement or may be "referable" to the settlement. But these words are

conspicuously absent and only the phrase "matters covered by the settlement"

has been employed by the legislature to treat any strike regarding such

covered matters

in a

settlel}lent to amount to an illegal strike. The term D

"arising from" has also a precise meaning as found at page 46 of the aforesaid

Concise Oxford Dictionary which states that the word "arise" means "originate;

be born; come into notice or result (from out of)". Question of implementation

of the terms of settlement may be said to be a matter "arising out of' the

settlement or "referable to" the settlement but it is certainly not "covered" by E

the settlement. Therefore, it is far from being "covered" by the settlement. In

Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at page 99 the term "arising out of' has

been indicated to have a special meaning relating to a decision

in the case

of Newman v. Bennett, (Kansas Reports). It has been mentioned in the said

dictionary that the

"words "arising out of employment" refer to the origin of

the cause of the injury". Thus the term "arising out of employment" in this F

case was held to refer to a grievance whose origin was found in the employment

concerned as noted

in this dictionary. Similarly, if the words

"arising out of

settlement" were employed by the legislature in the aforesaid clause, then it

could have been said that any grievance regarding non-implementation

of the

terms

of the settlement would have its origin in the settlement. However, as G

such a pharaseology is conspicuously absent in the said clause, it must be

held that the legislature

in its wisdom wanted to indicate a situation where

parties to the binding settlement cannot resort to a strike or lock out as the

case may be, in connection with these matters which were not expressly so

covered and referred to

in the settlement and thus matters which were expressly

not so covered could

be made the subject matter of grievance by the parties H

514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A concerned during the currency of such settlement and if a strike is resorted

to by the union

of workmen on that ground, it could not be said that the said

strike would

be hit by the provisions of Section 24(l)(i) of the Act. As a result

of the aforesaid conclusion, it must be held that the impugned strike notice

was not violative

of Section 24(1 )(i) of the Act so far as the grievance

regarding computation

of privilege leave was concerned. The Labour Court

B had patently erred in mis-reading the relevant provisions of the Act and the

express terms

of the settlement while reaching the conclusion that the impugned

notice refers to the grievance regarding non-implementation

of the settlement

terms in connection with privilege leave and had, therefore, violated the

aforesaid provisions

of the Act. This patent error was rightly set aside by the

C High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227.

It was further contended by learned senior counsel for the appellant

that, in any case, the impugned strike notice was also violative

of the aforesaid

provisions, in connection with the settlement regarding demand no. 26

providing for medical check-up.

It, therefore, becomes necessary to look at

D the terms of the settlement on the said demand. It reads as under :

E

"Demand No. 26 : MEDICAL CHECK UP

The Company shall get at its expense all the confirmed workmen

medically examined

i.e. X-ray, blood and

Urine examination and medical

check up

at the beginning of the year and the reports obtained. If

during this check up any workman is found suffering from any ailments

arising out

of the chemicals of gas emanating from the process in the

factory the management will bear the medical expenses for

his immediate

and initial treatment".

So far as this contention

is concerned, Shri Bhandare, learned senior counsel

F for the appellant is on a still weaker footing. The settlement regarding medical

check up deals with the rights

of the workmen to get medical re-imbursement

and the procedure for the medical examination

of the workmen suffering from

any ailment or disease. This right would arise under the settlement in

connection with those workmen who have already got afflicted

by occupational

G ailments. This has nothing to do with the grievance found in the impugned

strike notice regarding the health hazards suffered by the workmen and

preventive measures required to be taken by the company in this connection.

This grievance found

in the notice is based on the dictum

"prevention is

better than cure". The settlement regarding demand no. 26 pertaining to

medical check up deals with the procedure to be followed and the rights

H available to the workman after he has suffered from occupational diseases.

SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] SIS

The strike notice referred to an independent grievance in connection with the A

situation wherein a disease on proper preventive measures could be avoided.

It also referred to various health hazards due to the working conditions

of the

workmen. These grievances are entirely foreign to the terms

of the settlement

regarding medical check up. We fail to appreciate as to how the Labour Court

could persuade itself to ho

Id that the terms of settlement regarding demand B

no. 26 were also sought to be contravened by the impugned demands in the

notice. The said finding

of the Labour Court, to say least, was totally contrary

to the express terms

of the settlement of demand no. 26. Such a patently

erroneous finding had to be set aside by the High Court in writ proceedings

and no fault can be found with the High Court in undertaking such an

exercise. The valiant attempt

of Shri Bhandare, learned senior counsel for the C

appellant, for getting the impugned strike declared as illegal on this ground

is found to be wholly without any substance. It must, therefore, be held that

the impugned strike notice was not violative

of provisions of Section 24(1 )(i)

of the Act and had nothing to do with settlement on demand nos. 14 and 26.

The third point for determination is to

be answered in negative against the

·

appellant and in favour of Respondent no. I. D

Point No. 4.

So far as this point is concerned, placing reliance on various decisions

of this Court namely, Harish Vishnu Karnath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., E

[1955] 1 SCR 1104; Nagendra Nath Bora & Anr. v. The Commissioner of Hills

Division & Appeals, Assam and Ors., [1958] SCR 1240 and Sadhu Ram v.

Delhi Transport Corporation, AIR ( 1984) SC 1467, learned senior counsel for

the appellant submitted that unless there was a patent error committed by the

Labour Court, the High Court under Article 227 could not have interfered with

the findings

of the Labour Court as if it was bearing an appeal. There cannot F

be any dispute on the said settled legal position. Under Article 227 of the

Constitution

of India, the High Court could not have set aside any finding

reached by the lower authorities where two views were possible and unless

those findings were found to be patently bad and suffering from clear errors

of law. As we have already discussed earlier while considering point nos. 1 G

and 3, the findings reached by the Labour Court on the relevant terms were

patently erroneous and dehors the factual and legal position on record. The

said patently illegal findings could not have been countenanced under Article

227

of the Constitution of India by the High Court and the High Court would

have failed to exercise its jurisdiction

if it had not set aside such patently

illegal findings

of the Labour Court. Consequently, on this point the appellant H

516 SUPREME COURT REPO!lTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A has no case. Point No. 4 is, therefore, answered in negative against the

appellant

and in favour of the respondent.

Point No. 5:

In view of our conclusions on the aforesaid points, the inevitable result

B is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of

the case, there will be no orders as to costs.

RK.S. Appeal dismissed.