REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6143 OF 2008

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 10230 of 2006)

M/S SETHI AUTO SERVICE STATION &

ANR.

—APPELLANTS

VERSUS

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY &

ORS.

—RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

D.K. JAIN, J.:

Leave granted.

2.This appeal is directed against a common judgment and

order rendered by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi on

6

th

February, 2006 in Letters Patent Appeals No.2715 and

1

2722 of 2005. By the impugned order, the appeals

preferred by the two appellants herein, under Clause X of

the Letters Patent have been dismissed.

3. The appellant firms-M/s Sethi Auto Service Station and

M/s Anand Service Station own two petrol outlets adjacent

to each other, located at NH-8, Mahipalpur, New Delhi

since 1994. The land for the purpose was allotted by the

Airport Authority of India (for short ‘AAI’) whereas the petrol

pumps were allotted by the Indian Oil Corporation (for

short ‘IOC’) and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited

(for short ‘HPCL’) to Sethi and Anand respectively.

According to the appellants, in the year 1999, a proposal

was formulated for construction of an eight-lane express

highway between Delhi and Gurgaon, including

construction of a flyover/grid separator at Mahipalpur

crossing, where the two petrol pumps in question are

located. Claiming unviability in the operation of the two

petrol pumps on account of construction of the flyover and

relying on the policy framed by the Delhi Development

Authority (for short ‘the DDA’) on 14

th

October, 1999, the

2

two oil companies approached the DDA, respondent No.1 in

this appeal, for “re-sitement” of both the petrol pumps. It

was claimed that, in the first instance, IOC and HPCL had

corresponded with the original allotment agency, viz. AAI,

for re-sitement but some time in the year 2000, AAI

informed the Oil Companies that it did not have any

alternative site for allotment due to non-availability of land.

The appellants also relied on the letter issued by the

National Highway Authority of India (for short ‘NHAI’)

confirming that the proposed dual highway would be

developed along with the existing alignment of NH-8 and

that no access would be provided to any retail outlet or

private property along the highway. Supporting the claim of

the appellants, the State Level Coordinator (Oil Industry)

also wrote a letter to the DDA on 10

th

May, 2002, inter alia,

pointing out that the construction work on the grid

separator had commenced; after its completion, all vehicles

would cross over the separator and would not have any

access to the two petrol pumps in question for refueling

thereby rendering them economically unviable.

3

4. The stand of the appellants was that request for re-

sitement made by the two Oil Companies with the

recommendation of the State Level Coordinator had been

considered by the DDA; the DDA conducted its own field

survey; the Technical Committee of the DDA on 28

th

April,

2002 also recommended relocation/re-sitement and on 17

th

May, 2002, a proposal for allotment of alternative

sites/plots was referred to and considered by the Screening

Committee of the DDA at its meeting held on 21

st

November, 2003, when the proposal for allotment of two

alternative sites was approved. However, when the matter

was finally taken up by the Screening Committee of DDA on

28

th

November, 2003, the proposal for relocation was

disapproved and instead the Commissioner (Planning) was

directed to enquire and submit a report as to why two

petrol pump sites, earmarked for the appellants, were not

auctioned. The recommendation of the Screening

Committee was considered by the Vice Chairman of DDA,

who rejected the proposal for relocation of the two petrol

pumps in question.

4

5. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed writ petitions in

the Delhi High Court. It was pleaded that the State Level

Coordinator as well as the DDA having recognised that the

two petrol pumps were rendered commercially unviable due

to construction of the grid separator, they had a legitimate

right to the allotment/relocation of petrol pumps at

alternative sites, in terms of the policy of the Ministry of

Petroleum and Natural Gas formulated in the year 1998 as

well as the policy of the DDA of 1999. It was urged that all

the requisite conditions for such re-allotment/re-sitement

were fulfilled by them and the DDA had also recommended

the allotment in May, 2002; which proposal had also been

cleared by the Technical Committee and, therefore, the

DDA was bound by the said decisions. Moreover, having

acted upon its decisions by earmarking the two sites, the

decision to withhold allotment and include the two

earmarked plots in the proposed auction was unreasonable,

irrational and arbitrary and the mere fact that the DDA

chose to sit over the recommendations and did not issue

formal orders of allotment could not rob the appellants of

5

their valuable right to such allotment. In a nutshell, the

case of the appellants was that the decision taken by the

DDA in the year 2002, in favour of the appellants, upon

consideration of all the relevant materials and factors, gave

rise to substantive legitimate expectations in their minds

that the allotment for alternative sites would be made in

favour of the appellants. Allegations of discrimination were

also levelled against the DDA, inter alia, stating that six-

seven named petrol outlets were given alternative lands

even though they were not operating on the lands allotted

by the DDA.

6. The stand of the DDA before the High Court was that its

policy and guidelines of 1999 for re-sitement of petrol

outlets and gas godowns had been revised in June, 2003,

superceding all its earlier policies on the subject. As per

the new policy, re-sitement was permissible only when the

land of an existing outlet was utilized for a planned

proposal/scheme directly necessitating its closure; as per

its policy the DDA has to dispose of land for petrol outlets

through competitive mode of tender or auction and, in any

6

case, the new policy does not contain any provision for

allotment of an alternative site for an existing petrol pump

located on private land or land allotted by other agency

such as the AAI; that the internal notings or

communications with the DDA are of no relevance and

consequence till a final decision was taken and

communicated to the concerned parties. In the present

case though the proposals of other Government Agencies

were considered, no final decision was taken and

communicated by the DDA to the appellants. As regards

the approval by the Technical Committee or other officials,

the stand of the DDA was that till a final decision was taken

by the competent authority i.e. the Vice Chairman and

communicated to the appellants, there was no question of

any vested right accruing in favour of the appellants, merely

on the basis of recommendations of the officials of the DDA.

7. None of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants

found favour with the learned Single Judge of the High

Court. The learned Judge, by a well reasoned order, came

to the conclusion that the appellants could not claim an

7

enforceable right merely on the basis of the proposal

leading to the recommendation by the Technical Committee

as it did not amount to an order or decision of the DDA,

particularly when its competent authority had rejected the

request of the appellants. The learned Judge also observed

that at best the appellants had a mere expectation of being

considered for re-sitement. The stand of the DDA that in

view of the fact that a new policy had been formulated in

June, 2003, it was within its right to apply the same was

also found to be in order. Thus, the learned Judge found

that the DDA had acted fairly and reasonably in rejecting

appellants’ prayer for re-sitement. Accordingly, both the

writ petitions were dismissed.

8. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants preferred

Letters Patent Appeals under Clause X of the Letters Patent

as applicable to the High Court of Delhi. Both the appeals

having been dismissed, the appellants have preferred this

appeal.

8

9. Mr. Arun Jaitley, learned senior counsel, appearing for the

appellants, strenuously urged that the representations of

the appellants were considered by the DDA in terms of its

policy dated 14

th

October, 1999 and its Technical

Committee, headed by the Vice Chairman himself, had

found the appellants to be eligible and on 28

th

November,

2002 recommended re-sitement of the two outlets and,

therefore, it was not open to the DDA to do a volte-face and

reject the representation of the appellants. It was

contended that once appellants’ cases were considered by

the DDA under the guidelines in vogue at the relevant time

and they were found to be covered thereunder, the

appellants had substantive legitimate expectation that

allotments would be made to them. It was argued that

mere delay on the part of the DDA in communicating formal

orders of allotment to the appellants could not defeat their

valuable right on the ground of subsequent change in the

policy in June, 2003, which could only be applied

prospectively.

9

10.Per contra, Mr. A. Sharan, learned Additional Solicitor

General, appearing for the DDA, submitted that mere

notings and proposals in the files of the DDA did not result

in creation of any right in favour of the appellants till a final

decision was taken by the Vice Chairman as the

administrative head of the DDA and the same was

communicated to the appellants. It was also urged that in

the absence of a final decision duly communicated to the

appellants, their claims had to be considered on the basis

of the policies framed by the DDA from time to time and the

relevant date for the said purpose would be the date when

the Vice Chairman took the final decision under the policy

in vogue at that point of time. In support of the

proposition, reliance was placed on a decision of this Court

in P.T. R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of

India & Ors.

1

A reference was also made to Howrah

Municipal Corporation & Ors. Vs. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd.

& Ors.

2

to contend that in view of the amendment of the

guidelines, which had the statutory flavor, in June, 2003,

1

(1996) 5 SCC 268

2

(2004) 1 SCC 663

10

the so called vested right to be considered under the 1999

guidelines, if any, also got nullified on account of the

amended guidelines.

11.Thus, the first question arising for consideration is whether

the recommendation of the Technical Committee vide

minutes dated 17

th

May, 2002 for re-sitement of appellants

petrol pumps constitutes an order/decision binding on the

DDA?

12.It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do not

have the sanction of law to be an effective order. A noting

by an officer is an expression of his viewpoint on the

subject. It is no more than an opinion by an officer for

internal use and consideration of the other officials of the

department and for the benefit of the final decision-making

authority. Needless to add that internal notings are not

meant for outside exposure. Notings in the file culminate

into an executable order, affecting the rights of the parties,

only when it reaches the final decision-making authority in

11

the department; gets his approval and the final order is

communicated to the person concerned.

13.In Bachhittar Singh Vs. The State of Punjab

3

, a

Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to

consider the effect of an order passed by a Minister on a

file, which order was not communicated to the person

concerned. Referring to the Article 166(1) of the

Constitution, the Court held that order of the Minister

could not amount to an order by the State Government

unless it was expressed in the name of the Rajpramukh, as

required by the said Article and was then communicated

to the party concerned. The court observed that business

of State is a complicated one and has necessarily to be

conducted through the agency of a large number of officials

and authorities. Before an action is taken by the authority

concerned in the name of the Rajpramukh, which formality

is a constitutional necessity, nothing done would amount to

an order creating rights or casting liabilities to third parties.

It is possible, observed the Court, that after expressing one

3

[1962] Supp 3 SCR 713

12

opinion about a particular matter at a particular stage a

Minister or the Council of Ministers may express quite a

different opinion which may be opposed to the earlier

opinion. In such cases, which of the two opinions can be

regarded as the “order” of the State Government? It was

held that opinion becomes a decision of the Government

only when it is communicated to the person concerned.

14.To the like effect are the observations of this Court in

Laxminarayan R. Bhattad & Ors. Vs. State of

Maharashtra & Anr.

4

, wherein it was said that a right

created under an order of a statutory authority must be

communicated to the person concerned so as to confer an

enforceable right.

15.In view of the above legal position and in the light of the

factual scenario as highlighted in the order of the learned

Single Judge, we find it difficult to hold that the

recommendation of the Technical Committee of the DDA

fructified into an order conferring legal right upon the

appellants. We may note that during the course of hearing

4

(2003) 5 SCC 413

13

of the writ petitions, the learned Single Judge had

summoned the original records wherein the representations

of the appellants were dealt with. On a perusal thereof, the

learned Judge observed that the proposal for re-sitement

was apparently approved up to the level of the

Commissioner and the matter was placed before the

Technical Committee, which approved it on 28

th

November,

2002. Thereafter, the DDA took further steps on the basis

of field inspection to earmark the two sites; the entire

matter was placed before the Screening Committee and the

Screening Committee in its decision some time in 2003

noted that the matter had to be placed for disposal in

accordance with the policy. Some time in July, 2004 after

the conclusion of certain inquiries into the complaints

regarding re-sitement, the issue of relocation was again

taken up and a detailed note was made on 12

th

August,

2004, recounting the steps taken including the discussion

of the Screening Committee in its meeting on 21

st

November, 2003. It is pointed out that the note records

that the proposals for re-sitement were not finally approved.

14

The learned Judge has also observed that the note dated

21

st

November, 2003 along with the inspection report and

the proposal for re-sitement was put up before the

Commissioner (LB) who, on 9

th

September, 2004 recorded

the following comments:

“However, the basic fact to be noted is that

these petrol pumps were allotted on the land

of Airport Authority of India and there is no

responsibility on the part of the DDA to bear

any cost or to carry out resitement for such

sites given by any other land owning agency

and which are being effected by a project

which is being done by a third agency vis

National Highway Authority of India with

which DDA has no links. This was discussed

with VC and PC last week in the context of

certain other resitement proposal pending for

different areas in Dwarka and it was agreed

that the onus of such petrol pump sites on

DDA land, does not lie upon DDA particularly

in a situation when DDA now has a policy for

auction of petrol pump sites. It was, therefore,

decided that irrespective of the impact of the

proposed Express Way on these petrol pump

sites, there is no reason for DDA to take the

responsibility of resitement of these petrol

pump sites and the oil companies concerned

may either participate in the auction process

or obtain private plots for the purpose of

carrying out their business.”

15

16.Finally, the Vice Chairman concurred with the view of the

Commissioner; proposals for re-sitement were rejected and

consequently decision was taken to put the two plots, on

which the appellants had staked their claims for auction.

17.From the afore-extracted notings of the Commissioner and

the order of the Vice Chairman, it is manifest that although

there were several notings which recommended

consideration of the appellants’ case for relocation but

finally no official communication was addressed to or

received by the appellants accepting their claim. After the

recommendation of the Technical Committee, the entire

matter was kept pending; in the meanwhile a new policy

was formulated and the matter was considered afresh later

in the year 2004, when the proposal was rejected by the

Vice Chairman, the final decision making authority in the

hierarchy. It is, thus, plain that though the proposals had

the recommendations of State Level Co-ordinator

(oil industry) and the Technical Committee but these did

not ultimately fructify into an order or decision of the DDA,

16

conferring any legal rights upon the appellants. Mere

favourable recommendations at some level of the decision

making process, in our view, are of no consequence and

shall not bind the DDA. We are, therefore, in complete

agreement with the High Court that the notings in the file

did not confer any right upon the appellants, as long as

they remained as such. We do not find any infirmity in the

approach adopted by the learned Single Judge and affirmed

by the Division Bench, warranting interference.

18.We may, now, consider the plea relating to the legitimate

expectation of the appellants in terms of DDA’s policy dated

14

th

October, 1999 and the impact of change of the policy,

in June, 2003, thereon.

19.The protection of legitimate expectations, as pointed out

in De Smith’s Judicial Review (Sixth Edition), (para

12-001), is at the root of the constitutional principle of the

rule of law, which requires regularity, predictability, and

certainty in government’s dealings with the public. The

doctrine of legitimate expectation and its impact in the

17

administrative law has been considered by this Court in a

catena of decisions but for the sake of brevity we do not

propose to refer to all these cases. Nevertheless, in order to

appreciate the concept, we shall refer to a few decisions. At

this juncture, we deem it necessary to refer to a decision by

the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions &

Ors. Vs. Minister for the Civil Service

5

, a locus classicus

on the subject, wherein for the first time an attempt was

made to give a comprehensive definition to the principle of

legitimate expectation. Enunciating the basic principles

relating to legitimate expectation, Lord Diplock observed

that for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decision of the

administrative authority must affect such person either (a)

by altering rights or obligations of that person which are

enforceable by or against him in private law or (b) by

depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either: (i)

he has in the past been permitted by the decision maker to

enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted

to continue to do until some rational ground for

5

[1984] 3 All ER 935

18

withdrawing it has been communicated to him and he has

been given an opportunity to comment thereon or (ii) he has

received assurance from the decision-maker that they will

not be withdrawn without first giving him an opportunity of

advancing reasons for contending that they should be

withdrawn.

20.In Attorney General of Hong Kong Vs. Ng Yuen Shiu

6

, a

leading case on the subject, Lord Fraser said: “when a

public authority has promised to follow a certain procedure,

it is in the interest of good administration that it should act

fairly and should implement its promise, so long as the

implementation does not interfere with its statutory duty”.

21.Explaining the nature and scope of the doctrine of

legitimate expectation, in Food Corporation of India Vs.

M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries

7

, a three-Judge

Bench of this Court had observed thus:

“The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation

of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by

itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure

to consider and give due weight to it may

render the decision arbitrary, and this is how

6

(1983) 2 All.ER 346

7

(1993) 1 SCC 71

19

the requirement of due consideration of a

legitimate expectation forms part of the

principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary

concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate

expectation is a relevant factor requiring due

consideration in a fair decision-making

process. Whether the expectation of the

claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the

context is a question of fact in each case.

Whenever the question arises, it is to be

determined not according to the claimant’s

perception but in larger public interest

wherein other more important considerations

may outweigh what would otherwise have been

the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A

bona fide decision of the public authority

reached in this manner would satisfy the

requirement of non-arbitrariness and

withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of

legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the

rule of law and operates in our legal system in

this manner and to this extent.”

22.The concept of legitimate expectation again came up for

consideration in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Hindustan

Development Corporation & Ors.

8

. Referring to a large

number of foreign and Indian decisions, including in

Council of Civil Service Unions and Kamdhenu Cattle

Feed Industries (supra) and elaborately explaining the

concept of legitimate expectation, it was observed as under:

“If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given

case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or

is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased,

8

(1993) 3 SCC 499

20

gross abuse of power or violation of principles

of natural justice, the same can be questioned

on the well-known grounds attracting Article

14 but a claim based on mere legitimate

expectation without anything more cannot

ipso facto give a right to invoke these

principles. It can be one of the grounds to

consider but the court must lift the veil and

see whether the decision is violative of these

principles warranting interference. It depends

very much on the facts and the recognised

general principles of administrative law

applicable to such facts and the concept of

legitimate expectation which is the latest

recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by

the courts for the review of administrative

action, must be restricted to the general legal

limitations applicable and binding the manner

of the future exercise of administrative power

in a particular case. It follows that the concept

of legitimate expectation is “not the key which

unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it

ought not unlock the gate which shuts the

court out of review on the merits”, particularly

when the element of speculation and

uncertainty is inherent in that very concept.”

23.Taking note of the observations of the Australian High

Court in Attorney General for New South Wales Vs.

Quinn

9

that “to strike down the exercise of administrative

power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment

of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to

set the Courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism”,

speaking for the Bench, K. Jayachandra Reddy, J. said that

9

(1990) 64 Aust LJR 327

21

there are stronger reasons as to why the legitimate

expectation should not be substantively protected than the

reasons as to why it should be protected. The caution

sounded in the said Australian case that the Courts should

restrain themselves and restrict such claims duly to the

legal limitations was also endorsed.

24.Then again in National Buildings Construction

Corporation Vs. S. Raghunathan & Ors.

10

, a three-Judge

Bench of this Court observed as under:

“The doctrine of “legitimate expectation” has

its genesis in the field of administrative law.

The Government and its departments, in

administering the affairs of the country, are

expected to honour their statements of policy

or intention and treat the citizens with full

personal consideration without any iota of

abuse of discretion. The policy statements

cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied

selectively. Unfairness in the form of

unreasonableness is akin to violation of

natural justice. It was in this context that the

doctrine of “legitimate expectation” was

evolved which has today become a source of

substantive as well as procedural rights. But

claims based on “legitimate expectation” have

been held to require reliance on

representations and resulting detriment to the

claimant in the same way as claims based on

promissory estoppel.”

10

(1998) 7 SCC 66

22

25.This Court in Punjab Communications Ltd. Vs. Union of

India & Ors.

11

, referring to a large number of authorities

on the question, observed that a change in policy can defeat

a substantive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on

“Wednesbury” reasonableness. The decision maker has the

choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant to the

change in policy. Therefore, the choice of the policy is for

the decision maker and not for the Court. The legitimate

substantive expectation merely permits the Court to find

out if the change in policy which is the cause for defeating

the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one

which no reasonable person could have made. (Also see:

Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. Vs. Commercial Tax

Officer & Ors.

12

)

26.Very recently in Jitendra Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of

Haryana & Anr.

13

, it has been reiterated that a legitimate

expectation is not the same thing as an anticipation. It is

distinct and different from a desire and hope. It is based on

11

(1999) 4 SCC 727

12

(2005) 1 SCC 625

13

(2008) 2 SCC 161

23

a right. It is grounded in the rule of law as requiring

regularity, predictability and certainty in the Government’s

dealings with the public and the doctrine of legitimate

expectation operates both in procedural and substantive

matters.

27.An examination of the afore-noted few decisions shows that

the golden thread running through all these decisions is

that a case for applicability of the doctrine of legitimate

expectation, now accepted in the subjective sense as part of

our legal jurisprudence, arises when an administrative body

by reason of a representation or by past practice or conduct

aroused an expectation which it would be within its powers

to fulfill unless some overriding public interest comes in the

way. However, a person who bases his claim on the

doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, has

to satisfy that he has relied on the said representation and

the denial of that expectation has worked to his detriment.

The Court could interfere only if the decision taken by the

authority was found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in

gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural

24

justice and not taken in public interest. But a claim based

on mere legitimate expectation without anything more

cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It

is well settled that the concept of legitimate expectation has

no role to play where the State action is as a public policy

or in the public interest unless the action taken amounts to

an abuse of power. The court must not usurp the

discretion of the public authority which is empowered to

take the decisions under law and the court is expected to

apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding

authority the full range of choice which the legislature is

presumed to have intended. Even in a case where the

decision is left entirely to the discretion of the deciding

authority without any such legal bounds and if the decision

is taken fairly and objectively, the court will not interfere on

the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose

interest based on legitimate expectation might be affected.

Therefore, a legitimate expectation can at the most be one

of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but

25

the granting of relief is very much limited. [Vide Hindustan

Development Corporation (supra)]

28.Bearing in mind the aforestated legal position, we may now

advert to the facts at hand. In the light of the factual

scenario noted above, the short question arising for

determination is whether rejection of appellants claim for

resitement on the basis of the revised policy of the year

2003, their substantive legitimate expectation of being

considered under the old policy of 1999 has been defeated?

29.In order to adjudicate upon the controversy, it would be

necessary to briefly refer to the two policies being pressed

into service by the rival parties. In the guidelines issued in

1999, the relevant eligibility criteria was in the following

terms:

“iv) The resitement sought due to reduction in

sale on account of any planned

scheme/project may be entertained by DDA,

provided it is referred by an Oil

Company/Ministry mentioning that the sale

level is below the prescribed limit and petrol

pump is not feasible in its existing location.”

26

30.According to the said guidelines, a request for resitement

on the ground of reduction in sales level below the

prescribed limit could be entertained by the DDA provided

the proposal was referred by the oil company or the

Ministry. The parties are ad-idem that the cases of both the

appellants for relocation were recommended by the two Oil

Companies, viz., IOC and HPCL, on account of expected fall

in sales because of the construction of the flyover and grid

separator. However, before a final decision on the

representation of the appellants could be taken, the policy

of the DDA underwent revision in the year 2003. The

criterion for allotment of land by the DDA for resitement of

existing petrol pumps was changed. Under the revised

policy, dated 20

th

June, 2003, a case for resitement could

be considered by the DDA only under the following

circumstances:

“A. Resitement:

1) Resitement will be made only when the

existing petrol pump/gas godown site is

utilized for a planned project/scheme which

directly necessitates the closing down of the

petrol pump/gas godown site. No resitement

will be made on any other grounds. As the

27

petrol pumps will be disposed on annual

Licence fee basis rather than on upfront

payment, if an allottee does not find the

business lucrative due to certain other

reasons, he can always chose to surrender the

site.

2)In all cases of resitement, the existing

rates for the new site will be charged and the

possession of the old site will be handed over

to DDA.

3)The alternative site will be allotted

through computerized draw from the available

sites. For holding the draw at least 3 sites

must be available on the date of holding the

draw.”

31.It is plain that under the new policy resitement of a petrol

pump etc. is possible only when the existing petrol pump is

utilized for a planned project/scheme, which directly

necessitates the closing down of the petrol pump. Under

the new policy, resitement on account of fall in sales etc. is

not contemplated. In fact, resitement on any other ground

is specifically ruled out. It is also evident from the new

policy that in the event of DDA permitting resitement, the

possession of the old site has to be delivered to the DDA,

which presupposes that the old site was also allotted by the

28

DDA. As noted above, the existing sites on which the two

petrol pumps in question are operating were allotted by the

Airport Authority of India and not by the DDA.

32.Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the facts in

hand, in our judgment, the doctrine of legitimate

expectation, as explained above, is not attracted in the

instant case. It is manifest that even under the 1999

policy, on which the entire edifice of appellants substantive

expectation of getting alternative land for resitement is built

does not cast any obligation upon the DDA to relocate the

petrol pumps. The said policy merely laid down a criterion

for relocation and not a mandate that under the given

circumstances the DDA was obliged to provide land for the

said purpose. Therefore, at best the appellants had an

expectation of being considered for resitement. Their cases

were duly considered, favourable recommendations were

also made but by the time the final decision-making

authority considered the matter, the policy underwent a

change and the cases of the appellants did not meet the

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new criteria for allotment laid down in the new policy. We

are convinced that apart from the fact that there is no

challenge to the new policy, which seems to have been

conceived in public interest in the light of the changed

economic scenario and liberalized regime of permitting

private companies to set up petrol outlets, the decision of

the DDA in declining to allot land for resitement of petrol

pumps, a matter of largesse, cannot be held to be arbitrary

or unreasonable warranting interference. Moreover, with

the change in policy, any direction in favour of the

appellants in this regard would militate against the new

policy of 2003. In our opinion, therefore, the principle of

legitimate expectation has no application to the facts at

hand.

33.In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is devoid of

any merit and deserves to be dismissed. It is dismissed

accordingly. However, in the circumstances of the case, the

parties are left to bear their own costs.

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………………………………………….J.

( C.K. THAKKER)

..….…………………………………….J.

( D.K. JAIN)

NEW DELHI,

OCTOBER 17, 2008.

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