land allotment, DDA, property law
0  01 Dec, 1994
Listen in mins | Read in 16:00 mins
EN
HI

M/S. Shori Lal and Sons and Anr Vs. Delhi Development Authority and Anr

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /632/1986
Link copied!

Case Background

The appellants filed an appeal in the Delhi High Court against the Delhi Development Authority’s order to retake their possession of land as government land.

Bench

Applied Acts & Sections

No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case

Hello! How can I help you? 😊
Disclaimer: We do not store your data.
Document Text Version

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6

PETITIONER:

M/S. SHORI LAL & SONS & ANT.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANT.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/12/1994

BENCH:

VENKATACHALA N. (J)

BENCH:

VENKATACHALA N. (J)

RAMASWAMY, K.

CITATION:

1995 AIR 1084 1995 SCC (3) 320

JT 1995 (1) 92 1994 SCALE (5)88

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:

VENKATACHALA, J.:

1. This appeal by special 'leave is directed against the

Order dated 1.2.1985 by which Writ Petition, C.W.P. No. 1264

of 1984 of the appellants was dismissed by the Delhi High

Court.

2. Briefly stated, the facts are :-

Shori Lal and his minor sons were among those who

migrated from Pakistan to India after its partition in 1947.

In the year 1949 Shori Lal occupied 177 square yards of

Government land out of Plot No. 10242, Motia Khan,

Paharganj, Delhi for setting up a business in iron and steel

under the name of his proprietary concern M/s. Shori Lal &

Sons. In the year 1956, Shori Lal's proprietory concern M/s.

Shori Lal & Sons became partnership firm since Shori Lal's

first son, Krishan Kumar (Appellant-2), who on attaining the

age of majority, was admitted as its partner. Shori Lal's

second son, Manmohan Lal was also admitted as the partner of

M/s. Shori Lal & Sons in the year 1962 when he attained the

age of majority. In the meantime 322 square yards of land

out of Plot No. 10242, Motia Khan, lying on the rear side of

the land of 177 square yards of land, where M/s. Shori Lal &

Sons carried on its iron & steel business came to be

occupied by it in the name of its partner Krishan Kumar for

its godown. However, M/s. Shori Lal & Sons carried on its

iron & steel business in the said two places under a single

Sales Tax number and by paying damages for occupation of

both the lands in its name. Delhi Development Authority

94

(DDA) for purposes of assessing damages recoverable for 322

square yards of land in Plot No. 10242, Motia Khan, treated

that land as Premises No. 117 and opened a file therefor as

No.D/JH/KM-117. Further DDA for purposes of assessing

damages recoverable for 177 square yards of land in Plot No.

10242, Motia Khan, treated that land as Premises No. 115 and

opened a file therefor as No. D/JH/KM-115.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6

3. However, in the year 1975, DDA in its endeavour to

clear up government land at Motia Khan, Delhi where iron &

steel businesses were carried on by various persons and

firms occupying it unauthorisedly, sought to allot to such

persons and firms alternate plots for their businesses in

the area covered by Naraina Warehousing Scheme. Sizes of

alternate plots which were to be allotted to persons and

firms, ready to shift from their plots in government land at

Motia Khan, by vacating them, had to be done according to

the following criteria:

--------------------------------------------------

Existing area under occupation Area to be allotted

--------------------------------------------------

Below 50 sq. yds. 91.86 sq. yds.

51 to 100 sq. yds. 125 sq. yds.

101 to 150 sq. yds. 172.22 sq. yds.

151 to 200 sq. yds. 200 sq. yds.

201 to 250 sq. yds. 250 sq. yds.

251 to 300 sq. yds. 300 sq. yds.

301 to 400 sq. yds. 400 sq. yds.

401 sq. yds. 450 sq. yds.

and above

4. On applications made to DDA for obtaining such

allotment, Plot No. X-70 of 200 sq. yds. in Naraina

Warehousing Scheme was allotted on 21.7.1975 in lieu of

Premises No. 115 measuring 177 sq. yds. in Motia Khan and

Plot No. Y-5 of 450 sq. yds. in Naraina Warehousing Scheme

was allotted on 25.7.1975 in lieu of both Premises' No. 117

measuring 322 sq. yds of land in Motia Khan and Premises No.

115 measuring 177 sq. yds. of land in Motia Khan.

5. But, on complaints received at a latter stage when it

was discovered by DDA that Plots Nos. X-70 and Y-5 in the

Naraina Warehousing Scheme allotted in lieu of extents of

lands in Premises Nos. 117 and 115 in Motia Khan, had an

extent of land far. in excess of the extent of the land to

the allotment of which appellants were entitled under the

settled criteria and such allotment of excessive land had

been obtained by Appellant-2 by practicing fraud on it, the

DDA sought to withdraw the allotment of Plot No. X-70 of 200

sq. yds. in the Naraina Warehousing Scheme made in favour of

the appellants and retake possession of the same from the

appellants. When the DDA sent the communication dated

5.5.1984 to the appellants about the withdrawal of such

allotment and the retaking of possession of Plot No. X-70,

the appellants challenged the validity of that

communication, by filing writ petition, C.W.P. No. 1264 of

1984 in Delhi High Court. But the High Court dismissed that

Writ Petition by its order

95

dated 1.2.1985. It is the question of sustainability of

that order of the High Court which arises for consideration

in the present appeal by special leave filed by the

appellants adverted to at the outset.

6. Since the arguments advanced before us in the present

appeal were rounded on certain orders made by this Court

earlier, reference to them has become necessary. First

order made by this Court on 17.9.1985 relates to issue of

Notice on S.L.P. confining it for consideration of the

question of cancellation of allotment of Plot No. X-70.

Another order made by this Court.on the S.L.P. on

18.12.1985 reads:

"The matter is adjourned for one month to

enable Delhi Development Authority to take

appropriate action on a uniform basis against

all the persons mentioned in paragraph 24 of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6

the Special Leave Petition and the additional

affidavit dated 6.9.85. The Delhi Development

Authority cannot discriminate between persons

belonging to the same class and equally

situated. The report shall be submitted by

DDA within a month in this respect. The matter

shall be listed on 27th January, 1986."

7. By subsequent order dated 17.2.1986 made by this

Court on the S.L.P., Special Leave is granted and a

direction is given thus:

"We direct the Delhi Development Authority to

constitute a Committee of Inquiry to look into

the several allegations made by the

petitioners as regards the irregularities

committed in the matter of allotment of plots

in the Naraina Warehousing Scheme, Phase 1."

8. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants by

their learned Senior Counsel, Shri Soli Sorabjee was that

this appeal of the appellants was required to be allowed,

the order of the High Court under appeal set aside and the

order of the DDA cancelling the allotment of Plot No. X-70

made in favour of appellant-l quashed since the DDA had

failed to carry out the directions of this Court contained

in the Order dated 18.12.1985 and the Order dated 12.7.1986

as regards constitution of Enquiry Committee to look into

irregularities in allotment of plots and submit a report to

this Court in the matter even if it had a justifiable ground

to cancel the order of allotment of Plot No. X'70 made by it

in favour of appellant-l.

9. From the order made by this Court on 18.12.1985 at the

SLP stage, which we have excerpted already, DDA was directed

specifically to examine the cases of double allotments of

plots mentioned in Paragraph 24 of the Special Leave

Petition, and submit a report thereon to this Court. But, as

seen from the original files of the DDA, a Committee has

been, no doubt constituted by it to examine the cases of

double allotment of plots mentioned in Paragraph 24 of the

Special Leave Petition requiring it to make a report in the

matter for placing the same before this Court. Then, when

another order dated 17.2.1986 of this Court, already

adverted to by us, has come to be passed granting Special

Leave in the SLP and directing the DDA to constitute 'an

Enquiry Committee to look into the serious irregularities

alleged to have been committed in the matter of allotment of

plots by the DDA in Naraina Warehousing Scheme, Phase-l,

matter of enquiry does not appear to have been pursued by

the DDA. As seen from the files of the DDA the Enquiry

Committee said to have

96

been constituted to look into the irregularities committed

in the matter of allotment of plots in Naraina Warehousing

Scheme, does not appear to have even met after 23.1.1990.

The question is, whether this inaction of the DDA should

become the ground for us to uphold the allotment of plots of

land made in favour of the appellants, even though the

second allotment of plot had been obtained by appellant-2

far in excess of the area to which the appellants were

entitled and the cancellation of allotment of Plot No. X-70

made in favour of appellant-l, was rightly not interfered

with by the High Court ? We do not think that the facts of

the present case warrant upholding both the allotments of

plots made in favour of the appellants by the DDA and

interfering with the cancellation by the DDA of allotment of

Plot No. X-70 made in favour of appellant-l by it for the

reasons which we shall, presently set out.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6

10. Appellant-l is a partnership firm with partners, the

2nd appellant - Krishan Kumar, his brother - Manmohan Lal

and his father - Shori Lal, is an admitted fact. While the

business of iron and steel was carried on by that firm in

Premises No. 115, Premises No. 117 in the name of its

partner, Krishan Kumar appears to have been used as its

godown. If there were to be more premises than one occupied

by a partnership firm and its partners to carry on iron and

steel business in Motia Khan area, such persons were

entitled to obtain alternate plot/plots limited to the area

specified in the aforementioned criteria, the same being the

policy of the DDA to provide alternative plots for the

persons who had to vacate the plots in Motia Khan area and

get plots in the area covered by the Naraina Warehousing

Scheme or other schemes. But, what has been done by Krishan

Kumar, as disclosed from the original DDA records, in

getting allotments of Plot No. X-70 measuring 200 sq. yds.

and Plot No. Y-5 measuring 450 sq. yds. in Naraina

Warehousing Scheme is nothing short of fraud played by him

on the DDA, even though connivance of officers of DDA in the

matter cannot be ruled out. The contents of application for

allotment made by Shori Lal, his statement relating to

Premises No. 115, Motia Khan and the contents of allotment

order allotting Plot No. X-70 in lieu of Premises No.115,

Motia Khan, as disclosed from the excerpt of the original

application for allotment are these:

"I Shori Lal son of Shri Ram Singh for and on

behalf of M/s. Shod Lal & Sons have today 21st

July, 1975 voluntarily handed over peaceful

possession of Premises No. D/TH/KM/115, Motia

Khan, to DDA and shifted to Naraina

Warehousing Scheme. I have not been allotted

any plot by the DDA.

Area = 117 sq. yds.

Pre-1960

Sd/- in Urdu

Signature of the Applicant

He may be allotted Plot No. X-70

Measuring 200 square yards

Countersigned

Sd/

(Executive Officer)"

11. Then, when it comes to Krishan Kumar's original

application for allotment, his statement relating to

surrender of possession of Premises No. 117 and Premises No.

115, Motia Khan, and the allotment order made on the basis

of such statement allotting Plot No. Y-5 in lieu of Premises

97

No. 117 and Premises No. 115, Motia Khan. reads thus:

"I. Krishan Kumar s/o Shri Shori Lal. Krishan

Kumar and Manmohan Lal for and on behalf of

M/s. Shori Lal have today 27th July. 1975

voluntarily handed over peaceful possession of

Premises No. D/TH/KM/117 & 115 Motia Khan to

the Delhi Development Authority and shifted to

Naraina Warehousing Scheme. I have not been

allotted any plot by the DDA.

Area = 499

Pre - 1960

K.K.Moga

Sd/-

Signature of the Applicant

Sd/-

Krishan Kumar

He may be allotted Plot No. Y-5

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6

Measuring 450 sq. yards.

Countersigned

Sd/

(Executive Officer)"

12. As becomes clear from the contents of the above

application and the above allotment order. an application is

made by Krishan Kumar to get allotment of a plot of land for

M/s. Shori Lal, Krishan Kumar and Manmohan Lal. the partners

of M/s. Shori Lal & Sons in lieu of both Premises No. 117

and also Premises No. 115 in Motia Khan because of handing

over possession of them to the DDA. The statement made

therein in the handwriting of Krishan Kumar himself that "I

have not been allotted any plot by DDA" in unequivocal

language indicates that he had not been allotted any plot in

lieu of both Premises No. 117 and Premises No. 115. Motia

Khan. is a falsehood. in that. for Premises No. 115. handed

over by Shori Lal he had already obtained 200 sq. yds. of

Plot No. X-70 of Naraina Warehousing Scheme.

13. As has been pointed out by us earlier. there were two

files, one relating to Premises No. 117 which was No.D/JH/

KM/117 covering an area of 322 sq. yds. and another relating

to Premises No. 115 was No.D/JH/KM/115 relating to 177 sq.

yds. When the allotment of alternate plot was made in favour

of M/s. Shori Lal. Krishan Kumar and Manmohan Lal. both the

files being the areas of two premiseses are taken together

as 322 sq. yds. + 177 sq. yds., their entitlement for

allotment is considered to be 499 sq. yds. of one plot. But.

under the criteria of allotment of alternate plots to which

we have referred to. the area of such plot could not have

exceeded 450 sq. yds. That is how for both the premiseses.

i.e., Premises No. 117 and Premises No. 115. appellant-l and

its partners including appellant-2 are given Plot No. Y-5 of

450 sq. yds. in Naraina Warehousing Scheme. This also

becomes clear from allotment letter issued to all the three

partners by the DDA. If Krishan Kumar had not stated in his

application that he was not given an alternate plot for both

the premiseses. i.e., Premises No. 117 and Premises No. 115.

Motia Khan. New Delhi. and if he had not stated that he had

surrendered both of them. there would not have been any

scope for the DDA to allot to him a huge Plot No. Y-5.

measuring 450 sq. yds. which was the only full entitlement

in lieu of two premises. It is these glaring facts which

have led us to the conclusion that Krishan Kumar. appellant-

2. has played fraud on the DDA in making a wilful

misrepresentation about the handing over of possession of

premiseses as also the non-obtaining of alternate plots in

his application for

98

allotment. When such fraud is the cause for obtaining the

allotment of Plot No. Y5 measuring 450 sq. yds. in Naraina

Warehousing Scheme, there could be no justification for

retention by the firm and its partners earlier allotment

made of Plot No. X70 measuring 200 sq. yds., which would be

beyond their entitlement. Since this Court, while issuing

notice on S.L.P., has limited the consideration of this

appeal to the question of cancellation of allotment of Plot

No. X-70 in Naraina Warehousing Scheme, we find that the

cancellation of that plot by the DDA was rightly upheld by

the High Court by dismissing the Writ Petition of the

appellants. That order of the High Court does not call for

our interference.

14. The next question is, whether DDA, which has failed to

carry out the specific orders of this Court in holding the

enquiry in respect of double allotments and irregularities

alleged to have been committed in making allotment of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6

alternate plots, and making a report thereon, should be

proceeded against by taking contempt action against it.

Public bodies like, DDA, which are trustees of public

properties, and are to carry out public functions, in our

view, cannot escape their accountability for their failure

to carry out the orders of this Court made in public

interest. The officers of the DDA, who are guilty of

inaction, in our view, should be proceeded against in

contempt action. Adoption of such course, in our view, is

necessary for the reason that if the officers of the DDA or

similar public bodies are directed by this Court to confer

benefits on certain ineligible persons either because of

such officers' inaction or because of conferment by such

officers of similar benefits on others who were ineligible

for them, the same could result not only in public loss but

also in providing unwarranted protection to officers from

their liability for punitive action on account of wrongs

committed by them. However, in the facts of the present

case, DDA and its concerned officers, we feel, should be

given a further opportunity to carry out the orders of this

Court in the matter of constituting an Enquiry Committee and

enquiring into the irregularities or illegalities adverted

to in the orders and making a report therefor, before making

them liable for inaction, if any. We, therefore, propose to

grant as a last chance to DDA and its concerned officers

three months' time to comply with the orders of this Court

made on 18.12.1985 and on 17.2.1986, and make a report of

remedial action taken in the matter, before proceeding to

take contempt action against them for non-compliance with

the orders of this Court. The Registry of this Court shall

put up this case for orders in the matter immediately on the

expiry of three months from today.

15. Subject to the above directions given to DDA and the

Registry of this Court, we dismiss this Civil Appeal, but

without costs. C.M.P. No. 38020 of 1980 of petitioners

therein for impleadment as supplemental respondents in this

Civil Appeal is rejected as not surviving for consideration.

However, a copy of this order be sent forthwith by the

Registry of this Court to the Chairman, Delhi Development

Authority, Vikas Bhawan, Indraprasta Estate, New Delhi, with

a view to enable the D.D.A. to comply with the directions

given . to it therein.

99

Reference cases

Description

Fraud Vitiates Allotment: Supreme Court's Landmark Ruling in M/S. Shori Lal & Sons vs. DDA

The Supreme Court of India's judgment in M/S. Shori Lal & Sons & Anr. vs. Delhi Development Authority & Anr. stands as a critical authority on the intersection of administrative action and the Doctrine of Fraud. This case, prominently featured on CaseOn, delves into whether a public body's administrative lapses can excuse a beneficiary's fraudulent actions in securing land under a DDA Allotment Scheme. The ruling meticulously unpacks the principle that fraudulent misrepresentation unravels all subsequent benefits, regardless of the authority's own procedural shortcomings.

Issue: Can a Fraudulently Obtained Land Allotment Be Retained Due to the DDA's Own Failures?

The central legal question before the Supreme Court was twofold:

  1. Does a deliberate false statement made in an application to a public authority like the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) to secure a second, additional plot of land constitute fraud?
  2. Can the DDA's subsequent failure to comply with a court order to investigate widespread irregularities in an allotment scheme prevent it from cancelling an allotment proven to be obtained by such specific, individual fraud?

Rule of Law: The Unshakable Principle of 'Fraus Omnia Vitiat'

The legal framework for this case is anchored in the well-established maxim, 'Fraus omnia vitiat' — fraud vitiates everything. This principle dictates that any transaction, contract, or advantage gained through deceit, misrepresentation, or deliberate concealment of facts is voidable at the discretion of the party that was deceived. In the context of public law, this means a benefit granted by a government body based on fraudulent information can be revoked. The DDA operated under a specific policy to allot alternate plots to displaced businesses, with the size of the new plot linked directly to the area of the vacated land. Any attempt to secure more than this entitlement through dishonest means would fall afoul of this fundamental legal and equitable principle.

Analysis: The Court’s Dissection of Deceit and Duty

The Supreme Court conducted a meticulous examination of the facts and the conduct of both the appellants and the DDA.

Unmasking the Calculated Misrepresentation

The Court found the appellants' actions to be a clear case of calculated fraud. The sequence of events was damning:

  • First Allotment: The firm, through its senior partner Shori Lal, surrendered Premises No. 115 (177 sq. yds.) and was rightfully allotted Plot No. X-70 (200 sq. yds.). This was a complete transaction.
  • Second Application: Subsequently, another partner, Krishan Kumar, submitted a new application to surrender both Premises No. 115 and 117 (totaling 499 sq. yds.). In this application, he made a patently false statement in his own handwriting: "I have not been allotted any plot by the DDA."
  • Unjust Enrichment: Based on this falsehood, the DDA, treating it as a fresh claim for the entire combined area, allotted a large Plot No. Y-5 (450 sq. yds.).

The Court concluded that this was not a simple error but a willful misrepresentation designed to secure a double benefit—retaining the first plot while acquiring a second, much larger one. The second plot (Y-5) was, in fact, the firm's maximum entitlement for the total area. Therefore, the first allotment (X-70) was an excess benefit procured directly through deceit.

Navigating the nuances of judicial reasoning, especially where the conduct of both parties is in question, requires sharp focus. For legal professionals pressed for time, CaseOn.in offers concise 2-minute audio briefs that distill the core analysis of complex rulings like this one, clarifying how the court balanced the appellant's fraud against the DDA's administrative negligence.

Administrative Lapses Cannot Sanitize Fraud

The appellants' primary defense was that the DDA should be barred from cancelling their allotment because it had failed to follow the Supreme Court's earlier directive to form an Enquiry Committee to investigate all scheme irregularities. The Court firmly rejected this argument, establishing a crucial distinction between general administrative failure and specific, proven fraud.

The judgment clarified that the DDA’s duty to conduct a broad inquiry and its right to act against an individual case of fraud were two separate issues. The DDA's inaction, while regrettable and worthy of censure, could not be used as a shield to protect those who had defrauded the public exchequer. To allow this would, as the Court noted, provide "unwarranted protection to officers from their liability" and reward fraudulent conduct.

Conclusion: Appeal Dismissed, but Authority Admonished

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision and the DDA's cancellation of the first allotment, Plot No. X-70. It affirmed that the allotment of Plot Y-5 was the full and final settlement of the appellants' claim, and the fraudulently obtained Plot X-70 could not be retained.

However, the Court did not let the DDA escape accountability. It strongly admonished the authority for its lethargy and failure to comply with judicial orders. In a significant move, the Court granted the DDA a final chance of three months to constitute the Enquiry Committee and submit a report, failing which contempt of court proceedings would be initiated against its officials. This balanced approach ensured that while the fraudulent party was penalized, the public body was also held to a high standard of accountability.


Why This Judgment is an Important Read

For Practicing Lawyers: This case is a vital precedent in administrative and property law. It provides a clear roadmap for arguing cases where a government body's actions are challenged. It demonstrates that while administrative lapses can be grounds for legal action, they do not create a 'free pass' for citizens to engage in fraudulent activities. It reinforces that the clean hands doctrine remains paramount when seeking equitable relief.

For Law Students: This judgment is a perfect illustration of the IRAC method and the real-world application of the doctrine of fraud. It highlights how courts weigh competing arguments and separate distinct legal issues—the fraud of the individual versus the duty of the state. It underscores the judiciary's dual role in punishing wrongdoing and ensuring the accountability of public institutions.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The information provided is a summary and analysis of a judicial pronouncement and should not be used as a substitute for consultation with a qualified legal professional.

Legal Notes

Add a Note....