APHC010129532025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

FRIDAY ,THE NINTH DAY OF MAY

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA

WRIT PETITION NO:

Between:

1. M/S SRI SAMBASIVA DAIRY PRODUCTS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED,

HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT 11

SIRIS KAMINENI ROAD, ROAD NO.4, LB NAGAR, HYDERABAD,

TELANGANA - 500074, REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED

SIGNATORY, MR. KANCHI PARAMESWARA REDDY

1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL

SECRETARY SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,

SECRETARIAT, VELAGAPUDI AMARAVATHI

2. THE DIRECTOR, MID DAY MEAL AND SCHOOL SANITATION,

ANDHRA PRADESH

NAGARJUNA NAGAR, NEAR PARINAYA KALYANA MANDAPAM,

VIJAYAWADA, NTR DISTRICT

3. M/S PURI JAGGANATH ENTERPRISES, HAVING ITS UNIT/OFFICE

AT 25-3-264, 4TH CROSS ROAD, GOWTHAM NAGAR, SPSR

NELLORE, ANDHRA PRADESH

Counsel for the Petitioner:

1.

CKR ASSOCIATES

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

FRIDAY ,THE NINTH DAY OF MAY

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA

PRASAD

WRIT PETITION NO: 6508 OF 2025

M/S SRI SAMBASIVA DAIRY PRODUCTS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED,

HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT 11 -14-394-12/1, PLOT NO.24,

SIRIS KAMINENI ROAD, ROAD NO.4, LB NAGAR, HYDERABAD,

500074, REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED

RY, MR. KANCHI PARAMESWARA REDDY

...PETITIONER

AND

THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL

SECRETARY SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,

SECRETARIAT, VELAGAPUDI AMARAVATHI

THE DIRECTOR, MID DAY MEAL AND SCHOOL SANITATION,

ANDHRA PRADESH (MDMSS, AP) PLOT NO. 129, ROAD NO.5,

NAGARJUNA NAGAR, NEAR PARINAYA KALYANA MANDAPAM,

VIJAYAWADA, NTR DISTRICT

M/S PURI JAGGANATH ENTERPRISES, HAVING ITS UNIT/OFFICE

264, 4TH CROSS ROAD, GOWTHAM NAGAR, SPSR

NELLORE, ANDHRA PRADESH -524004

...RESPONDENT(S):

Counsel for the Petitioner:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

[3328]

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA

M/S SRI SAMBASIVA DAIRY PRODUCTS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED,

12/1, PLOT NO.24,

SIRIS KAMINENI ROAD, ROAD NO.4, LB NAGAR, HYDERABAD,

500074, REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED

...PETITIONER

THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL

SECRETARY SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,

THE DIRECTOR, MID DAY MEAL AND SCHOOL SANITATION,

(MDMSS, AP) PLOT NO. 129, ROAD NO.5,

NAGARJUNA NAGAR, NEAR PARINAYA KALYANA MANDAPAM,

M/S PURI JAGGANATH ENTERPRISES, HAVING ITS UNIT/OFFICE

264, 4TH CROSS ROAD, GOWTHAM NAGAR, SPSR

...RESPONDENT(S):

2

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

1. GP FOR SCHOOL EDUCATION

2. CHILUKURI KARTHIK

The Court made the following ORDER:

Heard Sri S.V.S.S. Siva Ram, learned Counsel representing M/s CKR

Associates for the Writ Petitioner; Sri Gurram Rama Chandra Rao, learned

Government Pleader for Education appearing for Respondent Nos.1 and 2;

and, Sri R.N. Hemandranath Reddy, learned Senior Counsel (appearing

through online) assisted by Sri Ch. Karthik, learned Counsel for the

Respondent No.3.

2. The prayer made in the Writ Petition is as under:

“…….to issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature

of the Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the Respondent No.2

herein in declaring the Respondent No.3 herein as "L1" in respect of the E-

procurement Tender Notification after opening the financial bids for

Package 6 & NIT No: 36/2024, dated 27.12.2024 for Procurement and

Supply of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki to School Children under the Dokka

Seethamma Madhyana Badi Bhojanam (MDM Scheme) for the FY 2025-

26 contrary to the Eligibility Criteria stipulated in the Section II of the said

tender document as being arbitrary, illegal, unjust, and violative of the

fundamental rights of the Petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14 and

19(1)g of the Constitution of India and consequently disqualify the

Respondent No.3 from the E-procurement Tender Notification process

notified vide Package-6 & NIT No: 36/2024, dated 27.12.2024 by directing

the Respondent No.2 herein to consider the Petitioner herein as "L1" in

respect of the said tender in accordance with the law and/or pass any such

other order/order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the

facts and circumstances of the case.”

SUBMISSIONS OF THE WRIT PETITIONER:

3. Sri S.V.S.S. Siva Ram, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of M/s

CKR Associates would submit that the Writ Petitioner herein is a Private

Limited Company engaged in supply of trade of fresh milk, pouch milk, milk

and milk processed food products and allied products; that the Writ Petitioner

claims to be one of the largest suppliers of the listed products herein

mentioned and is known for maintaining and supplying quality products; that

3

the Government of Andhra Pradesh has initiated a policy of School Meal

Programme, wherein free lunch/mid-day meal is provided to the students

enrolled in the Government recognized schools to aid the disadvantaged

children in rural and urban areas with proper nutrition, food security, and

school access; that, it is submitted that mid-day meal scheme contemplated

by the Government of Andhra Pradesh is through the School Education

Department and was primarily to avoid classroom hunger for the children,

attend classes and increase the school enrollment and attendance and most

importantly malnutrition amongst the children; that, initially the mid-day meal

scheme was provided for children upto Class V from 2003 to 2007; that,

thereafter, the same scheme was extended to Classes VI to X as well and

also to the students in the special training centers (NCLP) and Model Schools.

3.1. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner

that the Government of Andhra Pradesh, in addition to the mid-day meals, has

decided to provide Peanut-Jaggery Chikki from the year 2020 as an additional

nutritious food; and that the said Peanut-Jaggery Chikki would be provided

three times a week from 21.01.2020.

3.2. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner

that vide Proceeding dated 31.01.2024, the Director, Mid Day Meal & School

Sanitation (Respondent No.2) has issued Supply Order in favour of the Writ

Petitioner, which is valid upto 31.03.2025 and in the execution of Supply

Order, the Writ Petitioner has been supplying the Peanut-Jaggery Chikki.

3.3. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner

that on 27.12.2024 the State Government of A.P has issued e-procurement

tender notification for procurement and supply of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki to

school children under “Dokka Seethamma Madhyhna Badi Bhojanam” (“MDM

Scheme”) for the financial year 2025-2026; that the e-procurement tender

notification is divided into six packages; and that each package is meant for a

group of districts for supply of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki in the said area.

4

3.4. A table providing six Packages, the value of Tender (in crores) in

respect of each Package, the group of districts ear-marked under each

Package and the Bidders’ ranking is provided as under:

Package

No.

Value of

the

Tender (in

Crs)

Extent of Supply

Bid Ranking of

Writ Petitioner

and Respondent

No.3

Package 1 26.37 Srikakulam,Manyam,

Vizianagaram, ASR

& Anakapalli

--

Package 2 24.38 Kakinada, East

Godavari,

Konaseema, Eluru,

WG District.

Writ Petitioner– L.3

Respondent No.3 –

L.2

Package 3 22.31 Krishna, NTR,

Guntur, Palnadu &

Baptla.

Respondent No.3 –

L.1

Package 4 21.21 Prakasam, Nellore,

Tirupathi

Writ Petitioner– L.5

Respondent No.3 –

L.1

Package 5 23.36 Chittoor,

Annamayya, YSR

Kadapa, Sri Sathya

Sai

--

Package 6 26.56 Ananthapuram,

Kurnool, Nandyal.

Writ Petitioner– L.2

Respondent No.3 –

L.1

3.5. It is submitted by the Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner that the

bidders are required to adopt a three cover system (Pre-qualification,

Technical and Financial Bids) from the eligible bidders. Learned Counsel

would further submit that the highest annual turnover of any one financial-

year in the last three financial years of bidders will be considered as the

turnover of the respective bidder. That, every bidder is permitted to bid for any

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number of Packages but the individual annual turnover shown for one bid

(package) will not be considered another bid (package).

3.6. It is further submitted that the Writ Petitioner’s turnover for the

financial year 2022-2023 is Rs.90.20 crores, which is the highest in the last

three financial years. The Writ Petitioner has bidded for Package Nos.2, 4 & 6.

It is further submitted that the Unofficial Respondent No.3 has turnover of

₹.56.66 crores and it has bidded for Package Nos.2,3,4 and 6. It is submitted

that the Unofficial Respondent No.3 is declared as L.1 in respect of Package

Nos.3, 4 & 6, whereas the Writ Petitioner was declared as L.3 in Package

No.2, L.5 in Package No.4 and L.2 in Package No.6.

3.7. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner has drawn the attention of

this Court to various clauses of tender conditions. Insofar as the Package

No.6 is concerned, it is meant for supply of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki for the

Districts of Ananthapuramu, Kurnool and Nandyal. The number of schools

under the said Package No.6 are 4,487 in number and the total number of

children are about 6,03,612 in number. Therefore, the quantity of Peanut-

Jaggery Chikki which is required to be supplied is 16,59,936 kgs. The other

clauses are common for all the Packages.

3.8. Section-II of the tender document deals with eligibility criteria. The

relevant clauses of the tender notification that fall for consideration before this

Court are usefully extracted hereunder:

SECTION-II

INSTRUCTIONS TO BIDDERS

1. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

(a) xxxxx.

(b)xxxxx.

(c) The Annual Turnover in Peanut Jaggery Chikki/Food products /

Confectioneries of the Bidder in any one year of last 03 years shall

be equal to or more than the tender value of the bid. A certificate

6

(with UDIN number) from Chartered Accountant shall be submitted

for confirmation.

i. The turnover shown for one bid (Package) will not be

considered for another bid (Package)

ii. However, the Tender Committee/ Tender Inviting

Authority reserves the right in this regard.

(d) The Bidder should have satisfactorily executed supply of Peanut

Jaggery Chikki equal to or more than 50% of the bid value of the

tender value in any one year of the preceding three financial years.

The experience of Peanut Jaggery Chikki works and satisfactorily

executed orders towards any State or Central Government

Departments/Organizations/PSU/Local Body/ Public Sector

Undertakings/ in any reputed private company will only be counted

as experience. A copy of supply order, proof of supply order along

with turnover tax receipt should be enclosed.” (emphasis supplied)

3.9. The particulars of Technical Bid are provided under clause 5.1 of

the tender document. Subclauses (iv) & (v) of Clause 5.1 of the technical-bid

reads as under:

iv. The Bidder shall have a minimum Turn Over of Rs.26.56

crores, in any one of the Financial Year of the last three (3)

financial years.

v. A certificate (With UDIN number) of Chartered Accountant for

the Annual Turnover in Food products and/or Confectioneries

of the Bidders in any one year of last 03 years shall be equal

to or more than the tender value of the bid”

3.10. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner that,

after the Technical Bid evaluation was done, the Writ Petitioner has addressed

a letter to the Respondent No.2 on 10.03.2025 (Ex.P.2) raising certain

technical objections with regard to the tender submitted by the Unofficial

Respondent No.3.

3.11. It is the submission of the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner

that since Unofficial Respondent No.3 has bidded for Package Nos.2,3,4 & 6,

when it comes to Package No.6, the Financial Bid of Unofficial Respondent

7

No.3 ought not have been opened because the turnover capacity which is

reckoned for one package cannot be utilized for any other package. In other

words, if the value of tender Package No.2 is 24.38 crores and Package-3 is

Rs.22.31 crores, the total value of tender for Package Nos.2 & 3 would be

Rs.46.69 crores. Therefore, since the total turnover is only Rs.56.66 crores for

the financial year 2021-2022 for the Unofficial Respondent No.3, the Financial

Bid of Unofficial Respondent No.3 in respect of Package Nos.4 & 6 ought not

to have been opened at all.

3.12. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner places reliance on

Subclause - c (i) of Clause-1 of Section-II of the tender document pertaining to

Package No.6 dealing with eligibility criteria. It is stated in the said clause that

the turnover shown for one bid (Package) will not be considered for another

bid (Package). At this stage, it is necessary to point out that Subclause - c (ii)

of Clause (1) of Section-II provides as “However, the Tender Committee/

Tender inviting Authority reserves the right in this regard”.

SUBMISSIONS OF OFFICIAL RESPONDENTS:

4. The Counter Affidavit has been filed by the Director, Mid-Day Meal &

School Sanitation (Respondent No.2). Sri Gurram Rama Chandra Rao,

learned Government Pleader for Education appearing for Respondent Nos.1

and 2 has taken through the relevant portions of the Counter Affidavit and also

relevant documents filed along with the Counter Affidavit. He would submit

that the Writ Petitioner herein, though had bidded for Package Nos.2,4 & 6,

had been declared as L.2 only in Package No.6. The Writ Petitioner is

declared as L.3 in Package No.2 and as L.5 in Package No.4. This indicates

that the Writ Petitioner is no way close to L.1 in Package Nos.2 & 4. He would

submit that the Writ Petitioner became L.2 only in Package No.6, and

therefore, the Writ Petitioner is trying to ensure that the bids of the Unofficial

Respondent No.3 shall be considered only for Package Nos.3 & 4 and it shall

not be considered for Package No.6. Learned Government Pleader would

submit that the tender condition in Subclause - c (i) of Clause (1) of Section-II

8

cannot be read in isolation, inasmuch as Subclause - c (ii) of Clause (1) of

Section-II has clearly provided that it is the Tender Committee which has a

right to decide as to the applicability of turnover vis-à-vis the value of tender in

terms of each package. Learned Government Pleader would submit that the

Writ Petitioner has approached this Court prematurely even before the

authority has exercised its discretion under Subclause - c (ii) of clause-1 of

Section-II by insisting on the authority that Subclause - c (i) of Clause (1) of

Section-II shall alone be applied, thereby subjecting the Unofficial Respondent

No.3 to be eliminated from being considered for Package No.6 despite the fact

that the Unofficial Respondent No.3 has been declared as L.1 for Package

No.6.

4.1. Learned Government Pleader would submit that a bidder cannot

dictate terms to the Employer (the State) as to who should be considered for

which Package, since the said procedure is exclusively reserved for the

Employer.

Submissions of the Unofficial Respondent No.3

5. Sri R.N. Hemandranath Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel (appearing

online) would submit that the Writ Petitioner has neither pleaded arbitrariness

nor malafides nor has been able to prove the same. Learned Senior Counsel

would submit that, if at all malafides are pleaded, standard of proof that

required to prove the same is very high. He would also submit that a Writ

Court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the

employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a Tenderer. Referring to a

decision in M/s. N.G Projects Vs. Vinod Kumar Jain (MANU/SC/0341/2022).,

he would submit that the Court does not have the expertise to examine the

terms and conditions of the present day economic activities of the State and

this limitation should be kept in mind by the Writ Courts.

5.1. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the Unofficial

Respondent No.3 has submitted the Certificate issued by the Chartered

9

Accountant dated 08.01.2025 for the financial years 2021-2022, 2022-2023 &

2023-2024. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the highest annual

turnover for supply of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki, as per the Turnover Certificate

issued by the Chartered Accountant, is Rs.59.66 crores. Whereas, the annual

turnover Certificate issued by the Assistant Commissioner (Sales Tax) dated

08.01.2025 would indicate that the Unofficial Respondent No.3 has turnover of

Rs.56.66 crores for the financial year 2021-2022. During the course of

arguments, he would submit that, in view of the difference of annual turnover

for the financial year 2021-2022 between the Certificate issued by the

Chartered Accountant and the Assistant Commissioner (Sales Tax), the

Unofficial Respondent No.3 has shown the lower annual turnover only which

is as Rs.56.66 crores instead of 59.66 crores for the financial year 2021-2022.

5.2. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Unofficial Respondent

No.3 has placed on record the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court

in Suraz Earth Movers and Engineering Works Vs. The State of Andhra

Pradesh and Ors : MANU/AP/0743/2022. He had relied on Para Nos.10 to

13 of the said Judgment.

5.3. Learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on Para Nos.23

to 26 of the Judgment in Agmatel India Private Limited Vs. Resoursys

Telecom and Others : (2022) 5 SCC 362.

Rejoinder by the Writ Petitioner:

6. The Writ Petitioner has filed Rejoinder along with the letter addressed

by the Writ Petitioner to Respondent No.2 dated 03.03.2025 stating that

although the Writ Petitioner is ranked as L.2 for Package-6 in the bidding

process, the Writ Petitioner is willing to supply Peanut-Jaggery Chikki at L.1

rates.

7. A Memo has also been filed by the Writ Petitioner on 20.03.2025,

which shows that the highest annual turnover of the Writ Petitioner for the

10

financial year 2021-2022 is for Rs.51.45 crores with regard to the supply of

Peanut-Jaggery Chikki.

8. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner has placed reliance on the

Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour Vs.

Chief Executive Officer and Others : 2024 SCC OnLine 1682. He has

relied on Para No.69 of the said Judgment. This Court has gone through the

content of Para No.69 of the Judgment relied on by the learned Counsel for

the Writ Petitioner. This Court is of the opinion that this would not help the Writ

Petitioner in any manner and rather it reiterates the principle that where there

is no arbitrariness or caprice in the decision making process, in the ordinary

course, the Courts should not interfere.

ANALYSIS:

9. During the first hearing on 13.03.2025, learned Counsel for the Writ

Petitioner had submitted that the Writ Petitioner has submitted a

Representation to the Respondent No.2 on 10.03.2025 and the same is under

consideration. During the course of hearing, the learned Assistant

Government Pleader for School Education had conceded to consider and

dispose of the Representation made by the Writ Petitioner in accordance with

law. Keeping in mind the submission of the learned Assistant Government

Pleader that the Representation of the Writ Petitioner would be disposed of,

this Court has given a direction to the Official Respondents to pass a

reasoned Order on the Representation of the Writ Petitioner within one week.

The said Representation is to the effect that the Writ Petitioner, though has

been declared as L.2, is willing to match the price of Unofficial Respondent

No.3 who stood as L.1 insofar as Package No.6 is concerned. In this view of

the matter, this Court had directed the Respondent No.2 not to finalise the

tender insofar as the Package No.6 is concerned.

10. Since the pleadings are about to be completed, this Court had

continued with the Interim Order on 20.03.2025. However, this Court, vide

11

Order dated 21.03.2025, had modified the earlier Order to the effect that the

process of tender will be subject to the final outcome in this Writ Petition.

11. The Order dated 21.03.2025 would clearly indicate that this Court

has not laid any fretters on the Official Respondents in proceeding with the

tender process.

12. Subclause - c (i) & (ii) of Clause-1 of Section-II are the only clauses

that fall for consideration before this Court. It is an admitted fact that after

Financial Bids were opened and after declaring the Unofficial Respondent

No.3 as L.1 and the Writ Petitioner as L.2 insofar as Package No.6 is

concerned, before the Employer took a decision on all the packages, the Writ

Petitioner has approached this Court. At this stage, the Employer has not

rendered its decision. The Writ Petitioner is seeking a direction from this

Court against the Official Respondents declaring Unofficial Respondent No.3

(who stood as L.1 for Package No.6) as disqualified on the ground that the

turnover of Unofficial Respondent No.3 got exhausted in respect of Package

Nos.2 & 3, and therefore, the Financial Bid of Unofficial Respondent No.3 for

Package No.4 & 6 ought not to have been opened. The Writ Petitioner has

projected the present case in a myopic manner insisting this Court to read and

follow only Subclause - c (i) of Clause-1 of Section-II of the tender document

and by completely ignoring the content in Subclause - c (ii) of Section-II of the

tender document.

13. The Writ Petitioner is attempting to elbow-out the Unofficial

Respondent No.3 for Package No.6 for the reasons stated above. Admittedly,

the turnover of Unofficial Respondent No.3 is Rs.56.66 crores for the financial

year 2021-2022 in respect of supply of Peanut-Jaggary Chikki. The Unofficial

Respondent No.3 has stood successful as L.1 insofar as Package Nos.3, 4 &

6 are concerned. Whereas the Writ Petitioner has stood as L.3 in Package

No.2 and as L.5 in Package No.4. It is Package No.6 in which the Writ

Petitioner has stood as L.2. It is for this reason that the Writ Petitioner is

contending that the turnover of Rs.56.66 crores for the financial year 2021-

12

2022 of Unofficial Respondent No.3 shall be set off insofar as Package Nos.3

& 4 are concerned, and consequently, for Package No.6, Financial Bid of the

Unofficial Respondent No.3 ought not to have been opened at all.

14. This Court is unable to accept the contention of the Writ Petitioner in

view of the settled position of law with regard to flexibility and discretion that is

available to an Employer. The law is well settled in this regard to the effect

that the Writ Courts shall not interfere into the decision making process of the

Employer.

15. In the present case, the Employer has not even rendered its

decision. Whereas, prematurely, the Writ Petitioner has approached this

Court. The terms of the Tender are very clear. The Tendering Authority had

reserved its rights to apply the turnover according to its discretion. This

condition has been expressly stated in Subclause - c (ii) of Clause-1 of

Section-II to the effect that the Tender Committee/Tender inviting Authority

reserves the right with regard to the application of the turnover as against the

Packages. In this view of the matter, the plea of the Writ Petitioner to read

Subclause - c (i) of Clause (1) of Section-II in isolation cannot be accepted by

this Court.

16. Even in the absence of Subclause - c (ii) of Clause (1) of Section-II,

the law is to the effect that the flexibility and discretion are vested with the

employer. In other words, ‘play in the joints’ is very much available to an

Employer (Sterling Computers Limited Vs. M/s M & N Publications

Limited and Others : (1993) 1 SCC 445 – Para No.12); and Directorate of

Education and Others Vs. Educomp Datamatics Ltd., and Others : (2004)

4 SCC 19 – Para No.12).

17. In State of Madhya Pradesh and Another Vs. Uttar Pradesh

State Bridge Corporation Limited and Another : (2022) 16 SCC 633. The

Hon’ble Apex Court, in Para Nos.21 to 26, held as under:

13

“21. We have heard all the learned counsel for the parties.

The parameters of judicial review in matters such as the

present have been well stated in many decisions of this

Court, beginning with the celebrated Tata Cellular v. Union of

India [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651] , in

which a three-Judge Bench of this Court laid down the

following principles : (SCC pp. 687-88, para 94)

“94. The principles deducible from the

above are:

(1) The modern trend points to judicial

restraint in administrative action.

(2) The court does not sit as a court of

appeal but merely reviews the manner in

which the decision was made.

(3) The court does not have the expertise

to correct the administrative decision. If a

review of the administrative decision is

permitted it will be substituting its own

decision, without the necessary expertise

which itself may be fallible.

(4) The terms of the invitation to

tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny

because the invitation to tender is in the

realm of contract. Normally speaking, the

decision to accept the tender or award the

contract is reached by process of

negotiations through several tiers. More

often than not, such decisions are made

qualitatively by experts.

(5) The Government must have freedom of

contract. In other words, a fair play in the

joints is a necessary concomitant for an

administrative body functioning in an

administrative sphere or quasi-

administrative sphere. However, the

decision must not only be tested by the

application of Wednesbury principle of

reasonableness (including its other facts

pointed out above) but must be free from

arbitrariness not affected by bias or

actuated by mala fides.

(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy

administrative burden on the

administration and lead to increased and

unbudgeted expenditure.”

(emphasis supplied)

22. Likewise, in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa [Jagdish

Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517] , this Court

held : (SCC pp. 531-32, para 22)

“22. Judicial review of administrative

action is intended to prevent arbitrariness,

irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and

mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether

14

choice or decision is made “lawfully” and

not to check whether choice or decision is

“sound”. When the power of judicial review is

invoked in matters relating to tenders or award

of contracts, certain special features should

be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial

transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding

contracts are essentially commercial

functions. Principles of equity and natural

justice stay at a distance. If the decision

relating to award of contract is bona fide and

is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise

of power of judicial review, interfere even if a

procedural aberration or error in assessment

or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The

power of judicial review will not be

permitted to be invoked to protect private

interest at the cost of public interest, or to

decide contractual disputes. The tenderer

or contractor with a grievance can always

seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by

unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary

grievances, wounded pride and business

rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills

of some technical/procedural violation or

some prejudice to self, and persuade

courts to interfere by exercising power of

judicial review, should be resisted. Such

interferences, either interim or final, may

hold up public works for years, or delay

relief and succour to thousands and

millions and may increase the project cost

manifold. Therefore, a court before

interfering in tender or contractual matters

in exercise of power of judicial review,

should pose to itself the following

questions:

(i) Whether the process adopted or

decision made by the authority is mala fide

or intended to favour someone;

OR

Whether the process adopted or

decision made is so arbitrary and irrational

that the court can say:‘the decision is such

that no responsible authority acting

reasonably and in accordance with

relevant law could have reached’;

(ii) Whether public interest is affected.

If the answers are in the negative, there

should be no interference under Article

226. Cases involving blacklisting or

imposition of penal consequences on a

tenderer/contractor or distribution of State

largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of

15

licences, dealerships and franchises)

stand on a different footing as they may

require a higher degree of fairness in

action.”

(emphasis supplied)

23. In Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture

Consortium) [Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint

Venture Consortium), (2016) 8 SCC 622 : (2016) 4 SCC

(Civ) 106] , this Court held as follows : (SCC p. 638, paras

47-48)

“47. The result of this discussion is that the

issue of the acceptance or rejection of a bid or

a bidder should be looked at not only from the

point of view of the unsuccessful party but

also from the point of view of the employer. As

held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana

Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport

Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] the

terms of NIT cannot be ignored as being

redundant or superfluous. They must be given

a meaning and necessary significance. As

pointed out in Tata Cellular [Tata

Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651]

there must be judicial restraint in interfering

with administrative action. Ordinarily, the

soundness of the decision taken by the

employer ought not to be questioned but

the decision-making process can certainly

be subject to judicial review. The

soundness of the decision may be

questioned if it is irrational or mala fide or

intended to favour someone or a decision

‘that no responsible authority acting

reasonably and in accordance with

relevant law could have reached’ as held

in Jagdish Mandal [Jagdish Mandal v. State

of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517] followed

in Michigan Rubbe [Michigan Rubber

(India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8

SCC 216].

(emphasis supplied)

48. Therefore, whether a term of NIT is

essential or not is a decision taken by the

employer which should be respected. Even if

the term is essential, the employer has the

inherent authority to deviate from it provided

the deviation is made applicable to all bidders

and potential bidders as held in Ramana

Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram

Shetty v. International Airport Authority of

16

India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] . However, if the

term is held by the employer to be ancillary or

subsidiary, even that decision should be

respected. The lawfulness of that decision can

be questioned on very limited grounds, as

mentioned in the various decisions discussed

above, but the soundness of the decision

cannot be questioned, otherwise this Court

would be taking over the function of the tender

issuing authority, which it cannot.”

24.Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn.

Ltd. [Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn.

Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818] puts the proposition extremely well

when it states : (SCC p. 825, paras 14-15)

“14. We must reiterate the words of caution

that this Court has stated right from the time

when Ramana Dayaram

Shetty v. International Airport Authority of

India [Ramana Dayaram

Shetty v. International Airport Authority of

India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] was decided almost

40 years ago, namely, that the words used in

the tender documents cannot be ignored or

treated as redundant or superfluous — they

must be given meaning and their necessary

significance. In this context, the use of the

word “metro” in Clause 4.2(a) of Section III of

the bid documents and its connotation in

ordinary parlance cannot be overlooked.

15. We may add that the owner or the

employer of a project, having authored the

tender documents, is the best person to

understand and appreciate its

requirements and interpret its documents.

The constitutional courts must defer to this

understanding and appreciation of the

tender documents, unless there is mala

fide or perversity in the understanding or

appreciation or in the application of the

terms of the tender conditions. It is

possible that the owner or employer of a

project may give an interpretation to the

tender documents that is not acceptable to

the constitutional courts but that by itself

is not a reason for interfering with the

interpretation given.”

(emphasis supplied)

25. This view of the law has been subsequently reiterated

and followed in Montecarlo Ltd. v. NTPC [Montecarlo

17

Ltd. v. NTPC, (2016) 15 SCC 272] (see para 25 at p. 287)

and Caretel Infotech [Caretel Infotech Ltd. v. Hindustan

Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., (2019) 14 SCC 81] (see paras 38-39

at pp. 92-93).

26. Judged by these parameters, it is clear that this

Court must defer to the understanding of clauses in

tender documents by the author thereof unless, pithily

put, there is perversity in the author's construction of

the documents or mala fides…...”

18. In N.G. Projects Limited Vs. Vinod Kumar Jain and Others :

(2022) 6 SCC 127. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Para No.13, held as under:

“13. This Court sounded a word of caution in another

judgment reported as Silppi Constructions

Contractors v. Union of India [Silppi Constructions

Contractors v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489] ,

wherein it was held that the courts must realise their

limitations and the havoc which needless interference in

commercial matters could cause. In contracts involving

technical issues, the courts should be even more

reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes do not

have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon

technical issues beyond our domain. As laid down in the

judgments cited above, the courts should not use a

magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make

every small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact,

the courts must give “fair play in the joints” to the

government and public sector undertakings in matters

of contract. The courts must also not interfere where

such interference would cause unnecessary loss to the

public exchequer. It was held as under : (SCC p. 501,

paras 19-20)

“19. This Court being the guardian of

fundamental rights is duty-bound to

interfere when there is arbitrariness,

irrationality, mala fides and bias. However,

this Court in all the aforesaid decisions

has cautioned time and again that courts

should exercise a lot of restraint while

exercising their powers of judicial review

in contractual or commercial matters. This

Court is normally loathe to interfere in

contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of

arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or

irrationality is made out. One must remember

that today many public sector undertakings

compete with the private industry. The

contracts entered into between private parties

are not subject to scrutiny under writ

18

jurisdiction. No doubt, the bodies which are

State within the meaning of Article 12 of the

Constitution are bound to act fairly and are

amenable to the writ jurisdiction of superior

courts, but this discretionary power must be

exercised with a great deal of restraint and

caution. The courts must realise their

limitations and the havoc which needless

interference in commercial matters can

cause. In contracts involving technical

issues the courts should be even more

reluctant because most of us in Judges'

robes do not have the necessary expertise

to adjudicate upon technical issues

beyond our domain. As laid down in the

judgments cited above the courts should

not use a magnifying glass while scanning

the tenders and make every small mistake

appear like a big blunder. In fact, the

courts must give “fair play in the joints” to

the government and public sector

undertakings in matters of contract. Courts

must also not interfere where such

interference will cause unnecessary loss

to the public exchequer.

20. The essence of the law laid down in the

judgments referred to above is the exercise of

restraint and caution; the need for

overwhelming public interest to justify judicial

intervention in matters of contract involving

the State instrumentalities; the courts should

give way to the opinion of the experts unless

the decision is totally arbitrary or

unreasonable; the court does not sit like a

court of appeal over the appropriate authority;

the court must realise that the authority

floating the tender is the best judge of its

requirements and, therefore, the court's

interference should be minimal. The authority

which floats the contract or tender, and

has authored the tender documents is the

best judge as to how the documents have

to be interpreted. If two interpretations are

possible then the interpretation of the

author must be accepted. The courts will

only interfere to prevent arbitrariness,

irrationality, bias, mala fides or perversity.

With this approach in mind, we shall deal

with the present case.”

(emphasis supplied)

19

19. In Tata Motors Limited Vs. Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply &

Transport Undertaking (Best) and Others : (2023) SCC OnLine SC 671.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in Para No.52 held as under:

“52. Ordinarily, a writ court should refrain itself from imposing

its decision over the decision of the employer as to whether

or not to accept the bid of a tenderer unless something very

gross or palpable is pointed out. The court ordinarily should

not interfere in matters relating to tender or contract. To set

at naught the entire tender process at the stage when the

contract is well underway, would not be in public interest.

Initiating a fresh tender process at this stage may consume

lot of time and also loss to the public exchequer to the tune

of crores of rupees. The financial burden/implications on the

public exchequer that the State may have to meet with if the

Court directs issue of a fresh tender notice, should be one of

the guiding factors that the Court should keep in mind. This

is evident from a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court

in Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India,

reported in (2005) 1 SCC 679.”

20. In Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited (BESCOM)

Vs. E.S. Solar Power Private Limited and Others : (2021) 6 SCC 718. The

Hon’ble Apex Court, in Para Nos.16 & 17, held as under:

“16. Before embarking on the exercise of interpretation of the

agreement it is necessary to take stock of the well-settled

canons of construction of contracts. Lord Hoffmann

in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich

Building Society [Investors Compensation Scheme

Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building Society, (1998) 1 WLR 896 :

(1998) 1 All ER 98 (HL)] summarised the broad principles of

interpretation of contract as follows : (WLR pp. 912-13)

“(1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the

meaning which the document would convey to

a reasonable person having all the

background knowledge which would

reasonably have been available to the parties

in the situation in which they were at the time

of the contract.

(2) The background was famously referred to

by Lord Wilberforce as the “matrix of fact”, but

this phrase is, if anything, an understated

description of what the background may

include. Subject to the requirement that it

should have been reasonably available to the

parties and to the exception to be mentioned

next, it includes absolutely anything which

20

would have affected the way in which the

language of the document would have been

understood by a reasonable man.

(3) The law excludes from the admissible

background the previous negotiations of the

parties and their declarations of subjective

intent. They are admissible only in an action

for rectification. The law makes this distinction

for reasons of practical policy and, in this

respect only, legal interpretation differs from

the way we would interpret utterances in

ordinary life. The boundaries of this exception

are in some respects unclear. But this is not

the occasion on which to explore them.

(4) The meaning which a document (or any

other utterance) would convey to a reasonable

man is not the same thing as the meaning of

its words. The meaning of words is a matter of

dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of

the document is what the parties using those

words against the relevant background would

reasonably have been understood to mean.

The background may not merely enable the

reasonable man to choose between the

possible meanings of words which are

ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens

in ordinary life) to conclude that the parties

must, for whatever reason, have used the

wrong words or syntax : see Mannai

Investment Co. Ltd. v. Eagle Star Life

Assurance Co. Ltd. [Mannai Investment Co.

Ltd. v. Eagle Star Life Assurance Co. Ltd.,

1997 AC 749 : (1997) 2 WLR 945 (HL)]

(5) The “rule” that words should be given their

“natural and ordinary meaning” reflects the

common sense proposition that we do not

easily accept that people have made linguistic

mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On

the other hand, if one would nevertheless

conclude from the background that something

must have gone wrong with the language, the

law does not require Judges to attribute to the

parties an intention which they plainly could

not have had. Lord Diplock made this point

more vigorously when he said in Antaios

Compania Naviera S.A. v. Salen Rederierna

A.B. [Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v. Salen

Rederierna A.B., 1985 AC 191 : (1984) 3 WLR

592 (HL)] , AC at p. 201 : (AC p. 201)

‘… if detailed semantic and syntactical

analysis of words in a commercial contract is

going to lead to a conclusion that flouts

business commonsense, it must be made to

yield to business commonsense.’”

21

17. The duty of the court is not to delve deep into the

intricacies of human mind to explore the undisclosed

intention, but only to take the meaning of words used i.e. to

say expressed intentions (Kamla Devi v. Takhatmal

Land [Kamla Devi v. Takhatmal Land, (1964) 2 SCR 152 :

AIR 1964 SC 859] ). In seeking to construe a clause in a

contract, there is no scope for adopting either a liberal or a

narrow approach, whatever that may mean. The exercise

which has to be undertaken is to determine what the words

used mean. It can happen that in doing so one is driven to

the conclusion that clause is ambiguous, and that it has two

possible meanings. In those circumstances, the court has to

prefer one above the other in accordance with the settled

principles. If one meaning is more in accord with what the

court considers to be the underlined purpose and intent of

the contract, or part of it, than the other, then the court will

choose the former or rather than the latter. Ashville

Investments Ltd. v. Elmer Contractors Ltd. [Ashville

Investments Ltd. v. Elmer Contractors Ltd., 1989 QB 488 :

(1988) 3 WLR 867 : (1988) 2 All ER 577 (CA)] The intention

of the parties must be understood from the language they

have used, considered in the light of the surrounding

circumstances and object of the contract. Bank of India v. K.

Mohandas [Bank of India v. K. Mohandas, (2009) 5 SCC 313

: (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 524 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 32] . Every

contract is to be considered with reference to its object and

the whole of its terms and accordingly the whole context

must be considered in endeavouring to collect the intention

of the parties, even though the immediate object of inquiry is

the meaning of an isolated clause. Bihar SEB v. Green

Rubber Industries [Bihar SEB v. Green Rubber Industries,

(1990) 1 SCC 731] .”

21. In Meerut Development Authority Vs. Association of

Management Studies and Another : (2009) 6 SCC 171. The Hon’ble Apex

Court, in Para Nos.26, 27 & 29, held as under:

“26. A tender is an offer. It is something which invites and is

communicated to notify acceptance. Broadly stated it must

be unconditional; must be in the proper form, the person by

whom tender is made must be able to and willing to perform

his obligations. The terms of the invitation to tender cannot

be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is

in the realm of contract. However, a limited judicial review

may be available in cases where it is established that the

terms of the invitation to tender were so tailor-made to suit

the convenience of any particular person with a view to

eliminate all others from participating in the bidding process.

22

27. The bidders participating in the tender process have no

other right except the right to equality and fair treatment in

the matter of evaluation of competitive bids offered by

interested persons in response to notice inviting tenders in a

transparent manner and free from hidden agenda. One

cannot challenge the terms and conditions of the tender

except on the abovestated ground, the reason being the

terms of the invitation to tender are in the realm of the

contract. No bidder is entitled as a matter of right to insist the

authority inviting tenders to enter into further negotiations

unless the terms and conditions of notice so provided for

such negotiations.

28. xxx

29. The Authority has the right not to accept the highest bid

and even to prefer a tender other than the highest bidder, if

there exist good and sufficient reasons, such as, the highest

bid not representing the market price but there cannot be

any doubt that the Authority's action in accepting or refusing

the bid must be free from arbitrariness or favouritism.”

22. In the light of the above discussion and the law laid down by the

Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court does not find any arbitrariness or malafide

insofar as the conduct of the Official Respondents are concerned. The

Employer has a ‘play in the joints’ and has an absolute discretion in choosing

its supplier. Writ Courts would not go into the nitty-gritties of a contract,

inasmuch as a Writ Court would not substitute its wisdom with the wisdom of

the Executive in selecting its Contractors/Suppliers. An African proverb states

that - “a monkey cannot decide the affairs of the forest”; somuchso, a bidder

cannot seek a Mandamus to compel the Employer to reject the bid of another

bidder. In this case, the admitted fact is that the Subclause - c (ii) of Clause

(1) of Section-II clearly provides for application of discretion by an Employer in

applying the turnovers vis-à-vis the Packages. It is an admitted fact that the

Unofficial Respondent No.3 stood as L.1 insofar as the Package Nos.3,4 & 6

are concerned and only in respect of Package No.6, that the Writ Petitioner

has come anywhere close by being declared as L.2. The endeavour of the

Writ Petitioner to elbow-out, the Unofficial Respondent No.3 from Package

No.6 by reading Subclause - c (i) of Clause-1 of Section-II in isolation and by

23

completely ignoring the effect of Subclause - c (ii) of clause-1 of Section-II is

not only unacceptable but it is also impermissible.

23. The attempt made by the Writ Petitioner by submitting the

Representation on 10.03.2025 (Ex.P.2) making an offer to match the prices of

L.1 had been rightly rejected by the Official Respondents. This apart, this

Court is also of the opinion that the Writ Petitioner approached this Court

prematurely inasmuch as the Employer has not even finalised the tenders by

applying Subclause - c (ii) of Clause (1) of Section-II of the Tender Document.

24. Abuse of process

The Writ Petitioner had made pleadings which are contrary to the tender

conditions with a view to mislead this Court. The Writ Petitioner has stated in

Para-16 of the Affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition that the Writ

Petitioner’s turnover for the supply of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki for the financial

year 2022-2023 is Rs.90.20 crores, and therefore, the said turnover of

Rs.90.20 crores being the highest among the last three years, it has quoted

the said turnover and as such the Writ Petitioner herein has participated in the

tender process in respect of Package Nos.2, 4 & 6. The said Para – 16 of the

Affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition is usefully extracted hereunder:

“It is respectfully submitted that the turnover of

the Petitioner herein in supply of the Peanut Jaggery

Chikki during the last three financial years is Rs.

8476.21 Lakhs, Rs. 9020.25 Lakhs and Rs. 2858.00

Lakhs. As per the eligibility requirements, as the

petitioner's turnover for the financial year 2022-23 is

Rs.90.20 crores and it being the highest amongst the last

three years, it has quoted the said turnover and as such

the Petitioner herein has participated in the tender

process in respect of the Package No. 2, 4 and 6 as

stated supra in as much as the cumulative value of these

three packages (70.98 crores) is within the threshold of

Rs.90.20 crores. It has qualified in the pre-qualification

stages of the respective packages. However, the

Petitioner herein is declared as L-3 in respect of the

Package - 2, L-5 in respect of the Package 4 and L2 in

respect of the Package 6 in the financial bids opened on

10.01.2025.”

(emphasis supplied)

24

25. The attempt made by the Writ Petitioner to aver that its highest

annual turnover among the three financial years is Rs.90.20 crores for the

supply of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki for the financial year 2022-2023 is to project

that the Writ Petitioner is eligible to bid for all the three packages (Package

Nos.2, 4 & 6). This averment made by the Writ Petitioner is completely

contrary to the record. As indicated above the annual turnover of a bidder

shall be in respect of supply of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki/Food

products/Confectioneries of the bidder in any one year of last three years.

Whereas the Writ Petitioner has submitted the two certificates issued by its

Chartered Accountant dated 02.01.2025. One certificate issued by the

Chartered Accountant pertains to the annual turnover of three financial years

in respect of supply of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki only i.e., for financial years

2021-2022, 2022-2023 and 2023-2024. Among the three financial years, the

Writ Petitioner has the highest turnover of Rs.51.45 crores in the financial year

2021-2022 in respect of supply of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki. This certificate of

the Chartered Accountant dated 02.01.2025 is filed as Page No.2 along with

the Memo dated 20.03.2025. The Writ Petitioner has filed an another

certificate dated 02.01.2025 issued by the same Chartered Accountant, which

shows the annual turnover of the Writ Petitioner’s company, without indicating

the nature of the business done for the above mentioned financial years. The

said certificate dated 02.01.2025 would indicate that the annual turnover for

the financial year 2022-2023 as the highest among the three financial years

indicating a turnover of Rs.90.20 crores. This certificate of the Chartered

Accountant dated 02.01.2025 at Page No.3 of the Memo filed by the Writ

Petitioner dated 20.03.2025, does not indicate the nature of the businesses

undertaken by the Writ Petitioner, which shows the volume of turnover for the

financial year as Rs.90.20 crores.

26. For this purpose, this Court is required to once again examine the

Subclause - c of Clause – (1) of Section-II of tender conditions. Subclause - c

of Section-II in its entirety has already been re-produced (Para – 3.8 supra).

25

Subclause - c (i) of Clause – (1) of Section-II has specifically stipulated that

the annual turnover shall be in respect of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki/Food

products/Confectioneries only. This apart, Subclause (v) of Clause 5.1 also

stipulates the same requirement (mentioned in Para - 3.9 supra). Whereas the

Chartered Accountant’s certificate produced by the Writ Petitioner dated

02.01.2025 (Page No.3 of the Memo dated 20.03.2025) does not at all

disclose the nature of the products that are supplied by the Writ Petitioner

which aggregated to the highest annual turnover of Rs.90.20 crores for the

financial year 2022-2023. Therefore, this non-descriptive certificate issued by

the Charted Accountant dated 02.01.2025 cannot be considered at all.

27. In this view of the matter, the Writ Petitioner ought not to have

placed reliance on the annual financial turnover of Rs.90.20 crores because

the said certificate is neither in compliance with Subclause – c of Clause-1 of

Section-II nor in compliance with Subclause (v) of Clause 5.1 of Section-II of

the tender conditions. In fact, the Writ Petitioner is also conscious of the fact

that the certificate of the Chartered Accountant dated 02.01.2025 indicating

the annual financial turnover of Rs.90.20 crores for the financial year 2022-

2023, cannot pass the muster and rigor of the tender condition mentioned in

Subclause – c of Clause-1 of Section-II of tender condition. Being conscious

of this fact, the Writ Petitioner has also submitted an another certificate issued

by the same Chartered Accountant i.e., 02.01.2025 indicating the annual

turnover for three years for supply of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki only. In the said

certificate, the Peanut-Jaggery Chikki supplied by the Writ Petitioner for the

financial year 2021-2022 is the highest which is for a sum of Rs.51.45 crores

only.

28. If the highest annual turnover among the three financial years for

the supply of Peanut-Jaggery Chikki is Rs.51.45 crores for the financial year

2021-2022, the submission made by the Writ Petitioner against the Unofficial

Respondent No.3, if accepted, would directly hit the Writ Petitioner as well

inasmuch as the bids in respect of Package Nos.2 & 4 bidded by the Writ

26

Petitioner would itself aggregate to Rs.45.49 crores. In such an event, if the

submission of the Writ Petitioner is logically applied to the Financial Bid of the

Writ Petitioner, such a bid ought not to be opened for the Package No.6.

29. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the

Writ Petitioner has made averments in Paras-16 of the Affidavit filed in support

of the Writ Petition which are completely contrary to the tender conditions and

the contentions of the Writ Petitioner against the Unofficial Respondent No.3

would directly hit the Writ Petitioner as well. Therefore, this Court is also of

the opinion that the Writ Petition, apart from being premature is also an abuse

of process, inasmuch as the case made out by the Writ Petitioner against the

Unofficial Respondent No.3 would also militate against the Writ Petitioner

itself.

30. In this view of the matter, the instant Writ Petition is a gross abuse

of process apart from being premature and being devoid of any merit.

31. In the above premise, this Court is of the opinion that the present

Writ Petition is not only devoid of merit but is also an abuse of process.

Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed with Costs of Rs.1,00,000/-

(Rupees One Lakh only) to be paid by the Writ Petitioner within eight weeks

from the date of uploading of this Order in the web-site of this Court. Out of

the Costs of Rs.1,00,000/-, an amount of Rs.50,000/- shall be paid in favour of

the Andhra Pradesh High Court Legal Services Committee. The balance of

Rs.50,000/- shall be paid in favour of the Andhra Pradesh High Court

Advocates’ Association for the purpose of purchasing Law Books and add

them to the Association’s Library. Registry is directed to supply copies of this

Order to the Secretary, Andhra Pradesh High Court Legal Services Committee

and the President, Andhra Pradesh High Court Advocates’ Association for

effective compliance.

27

32. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed in terms of this order.

______________________________________

GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD, J

Dt: 09.05.2025

Note: LR copy to be marked.

B/o. JKS/MNR

28

313

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD

WRIT PETITION No. 6508 OF 2025

Dt: 09.05.2025

Note: LR copy to be marked.

B/o. JKS/MNR