IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

****

WRIT PETITION No.22568 of 2020

And

CONTEMPT CASE No.1580 of 2021

Between:

M/s. Sunshine Electricals,

Rep. by its Proprietor, Mr. K.V.R. Babu,

S/o. Venku Naidu, Aged about 51 years,

Office at :D.No.12-1-25, GNT Road,

Nehru Chowk,

Anakapalli, Visakhapatnam-531001,

R/o. H.No.12-4-36/8, Lokesh Vari Veedhi,

Near RTC Complex, Anakapalle,

Visakhapatnam District

--- Petitioner

And

The State of A.P.,

Rep. by its Principal Secretary,

Panchayat Raj and Rural Development,

(RWS & S) Department,

Secretariat Buildings,

Velagapudi, Amaravathi,

Guntur District

and others

--- Respondents

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 06.09.2022

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL :

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HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers

may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes/No

2. Whether the copy of judgment may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No

3. Whether His Lordship wish to

see the fair copy of the judgment? Yes/No

_________________________________________

VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA, J

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* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA

+ WRIT PETITION No.22568 of 2020

And

CONTEMPT CASE No.1580 of 2021

% 06.09.2022

# Between:

M/s. Sunshine Electricals,

Rep. by its Proprietor, Mr. K.V.R. Babu,

S/o. Venku Naidu, Aged about 51 years,

Office at :D.No.12-1-25, GNT Road,

Nehru Chowk,

Anakapalli, Visakhapatnam-531001,

R/o. H.No.12-4-36/8, Lokesh Vari Veedhi,

Near RTC Complex, Anakapalle,

Visakhapatnam District

--- Petitioner

And

The State of A.P.,

Rep. by its Principal Secretary,

Panchayat Raj and Rural Development,

(RWS & S) Department,

Secretariat Buildings,

Velagapudi, Amaravathi,

Guntur District

and others

--- Respondents

! Counsel for the petitioner : Sri Subba Rao Korrapati

^Counsel for Respondent Nos.: Learned Government Pleader

1 and 2 for Panchayat Raj

^ Counsel for Respondent No.3: Sri Alapati Vivekananda,

Learned Standing Counsel

for NREDCAP

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wp_22568_2020 & cc_1580_2021

< Gist:

> Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1. 2011 (5) SCC 697

2. 2015 (14) SCC 685

3. (2004) 3 SCC 553

4. (1981) 3 SCC 238

5. (1989) 2 SCC 116

6. (1996) 6 SCC 22

7. (2000) 6 SCC 293

8. (2015) 7 SCC 728

9. 2019 SCC Online All 2244

10. (2019) 16 SCC 794

This Court made the following :

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA

WRIT PETITION No.22568 of 2020

And

CONTEMPT CASE No.1580 of 2021

COMMON ORDER :

Learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned

counsel for the respondents agreed to pass a common order in

both the writ petition as well as in contempt case. Accordingly,

this Court is inclined to pass a common order in both the writ

petition as well as in contempt case.

2. The present writ petition is filed declaring the inaction of

the respondents in releasing the payments due to the petitioner

concern, as per the directions of the 2

nd

respondent herein, vide

Memo No.24/CPR & RD/LED/2018, dated 19.05.2020 and

subsequent letter of the 1

st

respondent vide Letter No.PRR01-

PROPPAN(STLT)/5/Pts.III/A2/2020, dated 19.08.2020 in

respect of the work executed by the petitioner for conversion of

existing conventional streetlights into energy efficient LED street

lighting system for conservation of energy in Gram Panchayats

in Visakhapatnam District, as per agreement dated 30.10.2017

with the 3

rd respondent-Corporation herein, as illegal and

arbitrary.

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3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned

Government Pleader for Panchayat Raj and learned Standing

Counsel for 3

rd respondent-Corporation.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the 1

st

respondent took a policy decision and decided to convert the

existing conventional streetlights into energy efficient LED street

lighting system for conservation of energy and for minimizing

the maintenance expenditure incurring under street lighting

head in various Gram Panchayats in Andhra Pradesh.

Presently, the street lighting system prevailing in the Gram

Panchayats of State of Andhra Pradesh is conventional lighting

systems based on High Pressure Sodium Vapor lamps, Metal

Halide lamps, Florescent Tube Lights and CFL etc. In fact, the

LED based street lighting systems offers higher efficiency, better

illumination and life expectancy, apart from being

environmentally benign. While so, to achieve this object, the 1

st

respondent has entered into MOU with the 3

rd

respondent on

26.03.2016 for survey, supply and installation of LED Fixtures

and CCMS through SMART Centre Connectivity including their

post installation maintenance over the project for a period of 10

years at specified Gram Panchayats in Andhra Pradesh. The 3

rd

respondent-Corporation is created by the 1

st respondent.

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Hence, it is classified as Government Company and owned by

the 1

st respondent.

5. Pursuant to achieving the proposed object of the 1

st

respondent, the 3

rd

respondent-Corporation was permitted to

act as Nodal Agency on behalf of the 2

nd

respondent herein for

conversion of conventional street lighting. Similarly, the 2

nd

respondent also indentified another agency i.e., EESL and

entered into an agreement dated 17.07.2017, which is

subsequent to the agreement entered by the 3

rd respondent

herein. It is a fact that the agreement between the 1

st

respondent and EESL is allowing payments for installation

charges apart from other charges, which are common in respect

of the 3

rd respondent and EESL. Then, the vendors, who were

entered into agreements with the 3

rd respondent to achieve the

above said object, have requested vide affidavits dated

03.10.2017 to enlarge the benefit of payment of installation

charges in accordance with the terms of agreement entered into

between the 1

st

respondent and EESL. The said request was

forwarded and to see that it is acceptable to the 1

st

respondent

by the 3

rd

respondent herein. Accordingly, the 1

st

respondent

issued a Memo dated 18.10.2017 permitting the 2

nd respondent

to enter into a separate agreement with the 3

rd respondent with

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conditions same as that of conditions of agreement with EESL

dated 17.07.2017. In view of the same, the agreements with

the 3

rd respondent as well as EESL entered into by the 2

nd

respondent are one and the same.

6. In pursuance of the object, the 1

st

respondent identified

the Gram Panchayats in Visakhapatnam and West Godavari

Districts in Phase-I and entrusted the same for such conversion

to the 3

rd

respondent herein. The 3

rd

respondent issued tender

notice dated 01.06.2017 and after completion of entire tender

procedure, the 3

rd respondent-Corporation and petitioner

entered into an agreement dated 30.10.2017. As per the

agreement, the total value of the work is about Rs.75 Crores in

respect of 925 villages. He further submits that as per the

terms and conditions of the agreement and with the help of the

agencies, the petitioner completed the execution of work in

respect of Visakhapatnam District. Then the 5

th

respondent

also issued satisfaction letter about the work of the petitioner to

the 3

rd

respondent-Corporation and specified Rs.7,56,04, 379/-

to be payable out of that only Rs.1,92,01,513/- paid so far.

Then the petitioner submitted a representation dated

30.06.2020 to the 2

nd respondent and another representation

dated 30.09.2019 to the 3

rd respondent seeking payment of due

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amount of Rs.9,33,90,066/- but there is no response. Learned

counsel for the petitioner also submitted the documents issued

by the respondent authorities under which the respondents

admitted the amounts and agreement on par of EESL. The 3

rd

respondent addressed a letter to the 2

nd

respondent for entering

into an agreement as per the directions of the 1

st

respondent

regarding infrastructure development authorities with the 2

nd

respondent dated 23.10.2017. On 19.05.2020 the 2

nd

respondent issued a memo directing respondent Nos.5 to 7 to

release of the funds for payment of the dues to the petitioner.

Even after specific memo no payments were released, the

petitioner having waited for considerable time, then made

representations to the concerned authorities and also National

Commission for Backward Classes. Pursuant to the letter

addressed by the National Commission for Backward Classes,

respondent Nos.1 and 2 replied that the 3

rd

respondent

submitted bills for an amount of Rs.14.19 Crores towards

installation of LED Lights in respect of Visakhapatnam, West

Godavari and Krishna Districts. Out of an amount of Rs.14.19

Crores, an amount of Rs.3.60 Crores was already paid to the 3

rd

respondent. So, the total remaining bill to be payable is

approximately Rs.11.00 Crores. While so, the 2

nd respondent

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vide Memo dated 19.05.2020 admitted the amount payable to

the petitioner in respect of Visakhapatnam District is

Rs.6,84,69,937/- as on that date and the same was also

confirmed by the 1

st

respondent vide letter dated 19.08.2020.

In view of the said admission on the part of the respondents,

they are bound to release the payments to the petitioner. As

such, the petitioner can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court

since it is well settled that the alternative remedy is not effective

and efficacious except to invoke a writ jurisdiction when an

injustice is caused and rule of law is violated. He further

submits that it is also well settled that the writ petition is

maintainable in the matter of contracts, when the action of the

respondent statutory authorities is in violation of principles of

natural justice and is not in accordance with the procedure as

contemplated and in the public interest as held by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in Union of India and others v. Tantia

Constructions Private Limited

1

and similarly the Hon’ble

Apex Court also in Naseem Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh

2

held that “in view of the fact that the amount had been admitted

by the respondent Government, we feel that said amount should

1

2011 (5) SCC 697

2

2015 (14) SCC 685

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wp_22568_2020 & cc_1580_2021

be paid without entering into any arbitration, etc. and therefore

the amount shall be paid to the appellant within four months

from today after deducting taxes etc.” In support of his case, he

also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in ABL

International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation

of India Ltd.

3

. He also submits that apart from the judgments

of the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court also granted reliefs

together with interest in W.P.No.2369 of 2018 dated 23.09.2019

and another W.P.No.496 of 2020 dated 13.08.2020. Therefore,

the respondents are liable to pay the amounts as admitted by

them as stated above.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that as

per the counter affidavit of the 3

rd respondent, the 3

rd

respondent specifically and categorically admitted that the

amount payable to the petitioner upto 30.06.2020 is

Rs.8,42,61,256.56 out of which, an amount of Rs.3,03,79,110/-

was paid and balance quarterly bill amount of Rs.5,38,82,146/-

is to be received from respondent Nos.1 and 2. But the 2

nd

respondent in his counter affidavit admitted total amount

payable in respect of Visakhapatnam District upto December,

3

(2004) 3 SCC 553

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wp_22568_2020 & cc_1580_2021

2019 is Rs.6,62,00,643/- to the 3

rd respondent herein and out

of the said amount upto December, 2019, Rs.3,04,13,963/- was

paid and remaining Rs.3,57,88,868/- was paid after the orders

of this Court and pleaded the entire amount due to the

petitioner as per Memo dated 19.05.2020 has been paid. He

also submits that the difference of amount between the 3

rd

respondent as well as the 2

nd

respondent is Rs.2,83,02,463.41

ps. towards infrastructural developmental costs/installation of

lights, which was admitted by the 1

st respondent vide Memo

dated 18.10.2017. Pursuant to said memo, respondent Nos.2

and 3 are entered into an agreement for such payment on

23.10.2017. Therefore, the respondents are liable to pay an

amount of Rs.4,83,86,491/- upto June, 2020. In view of the

categorical admission on the part of the 3

rd respondent in its

counter affidavit, the contention of the respondents that the writ

petition is not maintainable since alternative remedy is available

as per clauses of the agreement entered into between the 3

rd

respondent and the petitioner dated 30.10.2017 are cannot be

sustained as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this

Court that wherever there is an admission of amounts or

admission of facts on the part of official respondents the writ

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jurisdiction is always available to the aggrieved party. In view of

the settled law, this writ petition is liable to be allowed.

8. Learned Government Pleader for Panchayat Raj appearing

for respondent Nos.1 and 2 submits that the present writ

petition is not maintainable since the petitioner is available

effective alternative remedy by way of initiation of arbitration

proceedings as per Clauses 19(1), 19(2) and 19(3) of the

agreement dated 30.10.2017 entered into between the petitioner

as well as the 3

rd respondent herein. Moreover, there is no

privity of contract between the petitioner and respondent Nos.1

and 2. Even though there is no privity of contract between the

petitioner and respondent Nos.1 and 2, but wantonly

respondent Nos.1 and 2 arrayed as party respondents in the

writ petition. The other contention of learned Government

Pleader is that the prayer of the petitioner in the writ petition is

only declaring the inaction of the respondents in releasing the

payments due to the petitioner as per the directions of the 2

nd

respondent vide memo dated 19.05.2020 and subsequent letter

of the 1

st

respondent dated 19.08.2020, as illegal and arbitrary.

As per the said memo, the 2

nd

respondent instructed the 5

th

respondent to take steps for payment of bills due in favour of

the petitioner as well as others. As per the said memo, the

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amount due as on December, 2019 is Rs.6,84,69,937/- out of

the said admitted amount, an amount of Rs.3,04,13,963/- was

paid prior to the writ petition and an amount of

Rs.3,57,88,868/- was paid to the 3

rd

respondent after filing of

the present writ petition. Therefore, the entire amount as

admitted vide Memo dated 19.05.2020 as prayed by the

petitioner and the same was complied with and for further dues,

which may arise after filing of the writ petition, are not admitted

by the 2

nd respondent and regarding infrastructural

developmental charges, which are claiming by the petitioner, is

never admitted by respondent Nos.1 and 2 and there is no

privity of contract even between the petitioner and 3

rd

respondent. Therefore, the extraordinary jurisdiction of this

Court is not amenable regarding disputed facts between the

parties. In support of his case, he relied upon the judgments

rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which are as under:

1. In Divl. Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd.

4

,

the Hon’ble Apex Court held at para No.9 as under:

“9. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained

of, a party complaining of such breach may sue for specific

performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being

4

(1981) 3 SCC 238

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specifically performed, or the party may sue for damages.

Such a suit would ordinarily be cognizable by the civil court.

The High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would not

entertain a petition either for specific performance of

contract or for recovering damages. A right to relief flowing

from a contract has to be claimed in a civil court where a

suit for specific performance of contract or for damages

could be filed. This is so well-settled that no authority is

needed. However, we may refer to a recent decision bearing

on the subject. In Har Shankar v. Deputy Excise & Taxation

Commissioner [(1975) 1 SCC 737] the petitioners offered

their bids in the auctions held for granting licences for the

sale of liquor. Subsequently, the petitioners moved to

invalidate the auctions challenging the power of the

Financial Commissioner to grant liquor licences. Rejecting

this contention, Chandrachud, J. (as he then was), speaking

for the Constitution Bench at p. 263 observed as under:

(SCC p. 746, para 16)

“Those who contract with open eyes must accept

the burdens of the contract along with its benefits.

The powers of the Financial Commissioner to grant

liquor licences by auction and to collect licence fees

through the medium of auctions cannot by writ

petitions be questioned by those who, had their

venture succeeded, would have relied upon those very

powers to found a legal claim. Reciprocal rights and

obligations arising out of contract do not depend for

their enforceability upon whether a contracting party

finds it prudent to abide by the terms of the contract.

By such a test no contract could ever have a binding

force.”

16

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Again at p. 265 there is a pertinent observation which may

be extracted: (SCC p.747, para 21)

“Analysing the situation here, a concluded contract

must be held to have come into existence between the

parties. The appellants have displayed ingenuity in

their search for invalidating circumstances but a writ

petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching

contractual obligations.”

This apart, it also appears that in a later decision, the

Assam High Court itself took an exactly opposite view in

almost identical circumstances. In Woodcrafts

Assam v. Chief Conservator of Forests [AIR 1971 Ass 92] a

writ petition was filed challenging the revision of rates of

royalty for two different periods. Rejecting this petition as

not maintainable, a Division Bench of the High Court held

that the complaint of the petitioner is that there is violation

of his rights under the contract and that such violation of

contractual obligation cannot be remedied by a writ petition.

That exactly is the position in the case before us. Therefore,

the High Court was in error in entertaining the writ petition

and it should have been dismissed at the threshold.”

2. In Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh

5

,

the Hon’ble Apex Court held at para No.22 as under:

“22. There is a line of decisions where the contract

entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is

non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are

governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order

can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

5

(1989) 2 SCC 116

17

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wp_22568_2020 & cc_1580_2021

so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of

contract pure and simple — Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State

of Bihar [(1977) 3 SCC 457], Premji Bhai Parmar v. Delhi

Development Authority [(1980) 2 SCC 129]

and DFO v. Biswanath Tea Company Ltd. [(1981) 3 SCC

238]”

3. In State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd.

6, the

Hon’ble Apex Court held at para Nos.15, 16, 18 and 21 as

under:

“15. In our opinion, the very remedy adopted by the

respondent is misconceived. It is not entitled to any relief in

these proceedings, i.e., in the writ petition filed by it. The

High Court appears to be right in not pronouncing upon any

of the several contentions raised in the writ petition by both

the parties and in merely reiterating the effect of the order of

the Deputy Commissioner made under the proviso to

Section 8-D(1).

16. Firstly, the contract between the parties is a contract

in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. It is

governed by the provisions of the Contract Act or, maybe,

also by certain provisions of the Sale of Goods Act. Any

dispute relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions

of such a contract cannot be agitated, and could not have

been agitated, in a writ petition. That is a matter either for

arbitration as provided by the contract or for the civil court,

as the case may be. Whether any amount is due to the

respondent from the appellant-Government under the

contract and, if so, how much and the further question

6

(1996) 6 SCC 22

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whether retention or refusal to pay any amount by the

Government is justified, or not, are all matters which cannot

be agitated in or adjudicated upon in a writ petition. The

prayer in the writ petition, viz., to restrain the Government

from deducting a particular amount from the writ

petitioner's bill(s) was not a prayer which could be granted

by the High Court under Article 226. Indeed, the High Court

has not granted the said prayer.

18. Accordingly, it must be held that the writ petition

filed by the respondent for the issuance of a writ of

mandamus restraining the Government from deducting or

withholding a particular sum, which according to the

respondent is payable to it under the contract, was wholly

misconceived and was not maintainable in law. (See the

decision of this Court in Asstt. Excise Commr. v. Issac

Peter [(1994) 4 SCC 104] where the law on the subject has

been discussed fully.) The writ petition ought to have been

dismissed on this ground alone.

21. There is yet another substantial reason for not

entertaining the writ petition. The contract in question

contains a clause providing inter alia for settlement of

disputes by reference to arbitration (clause 67 of the

contract). The arbitrators can decide both questions of fact

as well as questions of law. When the contract itself provides

for a mode of settlement of disputes arising from the

contract, there is no reason why the parties should not

follow and adopt that remedy and invoke the extraordinary

jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The

existence of an effective alternative remedy — in this case,

provided in the contract itself — is a good ground for the

court to decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction

under Article 226. The said article was not meant to

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supplant the existing remedies at law but only to

supplement them in certain well-recognised situations. As

pointed out above, the prayer for issuance of a writ of

mandamus was wholly misconceived in this case since the

respondent was not seeking to enforce any statutory right of

theirs nor was it seeking to enforce any statutory obligation

cast upon the appellants. Indeed, the very resort to Article

226 — whether for issuance of mandamus or any other writ,

order or direction — was misconceived for the reasons

mentioned supra.”

4. In Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E.

Kalathil

7, the Hon’ble Apex Court held at para No.11 as under:

“11. A statute may expressly or impliedly confer power

on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable

it to discharge its functions. Dispute arising out of the terms

of such contracts or alleged breaches have to be settled by

the ordinary principles of law of contract. The fact that one

of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body

will not by itself affect the principles to be applied. The

disputes about the meaning of a covenant in a contract or

its enforceability have to be determined according to the

usual principles of the Contract Act. Every act of a statutory

body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory

power. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to

contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise

any issue of public law. In the present case, it has not been

shown how the contract is statutory. The contract between

the parties is in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory

7

(2000) 6 SCC 293

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contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms

and conditions of such a contract could not have been

agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India. That is a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in

arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any

amount is due and if so, how much and refusal of the

appellant to pay it is justified or not, are not the matters

which could have been agitated and decided in a writ

petition. The contractor should have relegated to other

remedies.”

5. In Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of

India

8, the Hon’ble Apex Court held at para Nos.69.4. 70.4,

70.6, 70.8 and 71 held as under:

“69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of

contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained

except in exceptional circumstances.

70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article

226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate

avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred.

70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is

complained of, the party complaining of such breach may

sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is

capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party

may sue for damages.

70.8. If the contract between private party and the

State/instrumentality and/or agency of the State is under

the realm of a private law and there is no element of public

law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke

21

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the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than

approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India and invoking its extraordinary

jurisdiction.

71. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles and after

considering the arguments of the respective parties, we are

of the view that on the facts of the present case, it is not a fit

case where the High Court should have exercised

discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution. First, the matter is in the realm of pure

contract. It is not a case where any statutory contract is

awarded.”

6. In Ipjacket Technology India Private Limited v. M. D.

Uttar Pradesh Rajakiya Nirman Nigam Ltd .

9

, the Hon’ble Apex

Court held at para No.24 as under:

“24. We may gainfully refer to the judgment in the case

of Joshi Technologies International Inc. (supra) wherein the

entire legal position in this regard has been taken note of

and summarized in the following terms:—

“69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid

principles has to be understood in the context of discussion

that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per

this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the

maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual

matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or

even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time,

discretion lies with the High Court which under certain

circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that

8

(2015) 7 SCC 728

9

2019 SCC OnLine All 2244

22

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under the following circumstances, “normally”, the Court

would not exercise such a discretion:

69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the

action has some public law character attached to it.

69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of

dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would

refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the

Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of

settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be

resorted to through the means of arbitration.

69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact

which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for

their determination.

69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of

contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained

except in exceptional circumstances.””

9. Learned Standing Counsel for respondent No.3 submits

that he adopted the arguments of learned Government Pleader

for Panchayat Raj and contended that the amount, which was

claimed by the petitioner as per Memo dated 19.05.2020, is paid

and the claim of the petitioner regarding infrastructural

developmental charges so far not finalized and it is only a

disputed fact between the parties. He further submits that the

contention of the petitioner that the 6

th respondent is admitted

the amount payable to the petitioner is Rs.8,42,61,256.56 ps.,

which includes Rs.2,83,02,463/-, is towards infrastructural

developmental charges/for installation of lights is not received

23

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by this respondent. Even though it was admitted in counter

affidavit but this respondent clarified in its additional counter

affidavit that the petitioner is due to the Corporation an amount

of Rs.1,56,68,405/- towards CCMS Boxes out of that they have

not deducted an amount of Rs.29,33,296/- deposited by

respondent Nos.1 and 2 and therefore, the amount admitted by

the 2

nd

respondent in its Memo dated 19.05.2020 i.e.,

Rs.6,64,46,338/- was paid to the petitioner after deduction of

service charges to this Corporation in 14 installments. As such,

the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

10. Having regard to the contentions made by learned counsel

for the petitioner as well as learned counsel for the respondents

and the material placed before this Court, this Court is of the

considered view that the contention of the petitioner that once

the 3

rd

respondent-Corporation admitted by sworn affidavit

before the Court regarding payments to be payable to the

petitioner is amounts to admission on the part of the 3

rd

respondent and the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court can

be exercised in view of such admission made by the 3

rd

respondent is sustainable. The another contention of the

petitioner that for payment of infrastructural developmental

charges is accepted by respondent Nos.1 and 2 and issued a

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wp_22568_2020 & cc_1580_2021

memo directing the 2

nd respondent to enter into an agreement to

that effect with the 3

rd respondent is complied with and

accordingly, an agreement was entered on 23.10.2017. In view

of the agreement entered into between respondent Nos.2 and 3,

the 3

rd

respondent admitted such amount in its counter

affidavit regarding infrastructural developmental charges to be

payable to the petitioner. Therefore, such contention of the

petitioner is sustainable. The other contention of the petitioner

that when there is an admission on the part of the respondents

regarding any contract and its payment, the extraordinary

jurisdiction of this Court is very much available is also

sustainable as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the following

judgments:

1. In Naseem Ahmad ’s case (2 supra), the Hon’ble Apex

Court held at para Nos.3 and 4 as under:

“3. It is an admitted fact that Rs 8,81,085 (Rupees eight-

lakhs eighty-one thousand and eighty-five only) were

payable to the appellant by the respondent Government and

the said fact is very clearly admitted in the Letter dated 14-

7-2010, written by the Executive Engineer, Lower Division,

East Yamuna Canal, Muzaffarnagar. From the said amount

certain deductions are to be made, which are in the nature

of certain taxes including business tax, etc.

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wp_22568_2020 & cc_1580_2021

4. In view of the fact that the amount had been admitted

by the respondent Government, we feel that the said amount

should be paid without entering into any arbitration, etc.

and therefore, the said amount shall be paid to the appellant

within four months from today after deducting taxes, etc.

and along with the payment, details with regard to the

deductions made shall also be given to the appellant by the

respondent.”

2. In ABL International Ltd.’s case (3 supra), the Hon’ble Apex

Court held at para Nos.16, 17, 19, 27 and 55 as under:

“16. A perusal of this judgment though shows that a writ

petition involving serious disputed questions of facts which

requires consideration of evidence which is not on record,

will not normally be entertained by a court in the exercise of

its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

This decision again, in our opinion, does not lay down an

absolute rule that in all cases involving disputed questions

of fact the parties should be relegated to a civil suit. In this

view of ours, we are supported by a judgment of this Court

in the case of Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee,

Bhatinda [(1969) 3 SCC 769] where dealing with such a

situation of disputed questions of fact in a writ petition this

Court held: (SCC p. 774, paras 14-16)

“14. The High Court observed that they will not

determine disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But

what facts were in dispute and what were admitted could

only be determined after an affidavit-in-reply was filed by

the State. The High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss

the petition in limine. The High Court is not deprived of its

jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely

because in considering the petitioner's right to relief

26

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wp_22568_2020 & cc_1580_2021

questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition

under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try

issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it

is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised

on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises

questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their

determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on

that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute

may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High

Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in

limine will normally be justified, where the High Court is of

the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the

nature of the claim made dispute sought to be agitated, or

that the petition against the party against whom relief is

claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised

thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try it in

the writ jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons.

15. From the averments made in the petition filed by

the appellants it is clear that in proof of a large number of

allegations the appellants relied upon documentary

evidence and the only matter in respect of which conflict of

facts may possibly arise related to the due publication of

the notification under Section 4 by the Collector.

16. In the present case, in our judgment, the High

Court was not justified in dismissing the petition on the

ground that it will not determine disputed question of fact.

The High Court has jurisdiction to determine questions of

fact, even if they are in dispute and the present, in our

judgment, is a case in which in the interests of both the

parties the High Court should have entertained the petition

and called for an affidavit-in-reply from the respondents,

and should have proceeded to try the petition instead of

relegating the appellants to a separate suit.”

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wp_22568_2020 & cc_1580_2021

17. The above judgment of Gunwant Kaur [(1969) 3 SCC

769] finds support from another judgment of this Court in

the case of Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar

Municipal Council [(1970) 1 SCC 582] wherein this Court

held: (SCC p. 587, para 13)

“Merely because a question of fact is raised, the High

Court will not be justified in requiring the party to seek

relief by the somewhat lengthy, dilatory and expensive

process by a civil suit against a public body. The questions

of fact raised by the petition in this case are elementary.”

19. Therefore, it is clear from the above enunciation of

law that merely because one of the parties to the litigation

raises a dispute in regard to the facts of the case, the court

entertaining such petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution is not always bound to relegate the parties to a

suit. In the above case of Gunwant Kaur [(1969) 3 SCC 769]

this Court even went to the extent of holding that in a writ

petition, if the facts require, even oral evidence can be taken.

This clearly shows that in an appropriate case, the writ

court has the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition

involving disputed questions of fact and there is no absolute

bar for entertaining a writ petition even if the same arises

out of a contractual obligation and/or involves some

disputed questions of fact.

27. From the above discussion of ours, the following legal

principles emerge as to the maintainability of a writ petition:

(a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a

State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a

contractual obligation is maintainable.

(b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise

for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to

entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule.

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(c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of

monetary claim is also maintainable.

55. In Bal Krishna Agarwal (Dr) v. State of U.P. [(1995) 1

SCC 614 this Court held: (SCC p. 618, para 10)

“10. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and

circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court was

not right in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant on

the ground of availability of an alternate remedy under

Section 68 of the Act especially when the writ petition that

was filed in 1988 had already been admitted and was

pending in the High Court for the past more than 5 years.

Since the question that is raised involves a pure question of

law and even if the matter is referred to the Chancellor

under Section 68 of the Act it is bound to be agitated in the

court by the party aggrieved by the order of the Chancellor,

we are of the view that this was not a case where the High

Court should have non-suited the appellant on the ground

of availability of an alternative remedy. We, therefore,

propose to go into the merits of the question regarding inter

se seniority of the appellant and Respondents 4 and 5. We

may, in this context, mention that Respondent 4 has

already retired in January 1994.””

3. In Surya Constructions v. State of Uttar Pradesh

10

,

the Hon’ble Apex Court held at para Nos.3 and 4 as under:

“3. It is clear, therefore, from the aforesaid order dated

22-3-2014 that there is no dispute as to the amount that

has to be paid to the appellant. Despite this, when the

appellant knocked at the doors of the High Court in a writ

petition being Writ Civil No. 25216 of 2014, the impugned

judgment dated 2-5-2014 [ Surya Construction v. State of

10

(2019) 16 SCC 794

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wp_22568_2020 & cc_1580_2021

U.P., (2014 SCC OnLine All 6071)] dismissed the writ

petition stating that disputed questions of fact arise and that

the amount due arises out of a contract. We are afraid the

High Court was wholly incorrect inasmuch as there was no

disputed question of fact. On the contrary, the amount

payable to the appellant is wholly undisputed. Equally, it is

well settled that where the State behaves arbitrarily, even in

the realm of contract, the High Court could interfere under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India (ABL International

Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd. [(2004) 3

SCC 553])

4. This being the case and the work having been

completed long back in 2009, we direct Uttar Pradesh Jal

Nigam to make the necessary payment within a period of

four weeks from today. Given the long period of delay,

interest @ 6% p.a. may also be awarded.”

11. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Writ Petition is

disposed of with a direction to the respondents to pay the

remaining balance amount as per the counter affidavit of the 3

rd

respondent herein within a period of six (6) weeks from the date

of receipt of a copy of this order.

12. C.C.No.1580 of 2021 is filed by the petitioner complaining

that the order of this Court dated 16.08.2021 is not complied

with by the respondents. Hence, the respondents are liable for

punishment under Sections 10 and 12 of the Contempt of

Courts Act, whereas the respondents filed detailed counters,

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wherein they specifically and categorically stated that the

interim order of this Court dated 16.08.2021 has been complied

with and therefore, the contempt case may be closed.

13. For better appreciation, it is appropriate to extract the

order of this Court dated 16.08.2021 hereunder:

“On instructions, the learned Government Pleader for

Panchayat Raj appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2

submits that up to 04.08.2021, Rs.1,15,09,168/- was paid

to respondent No.3, which is payable to the petitioner in

turn by respondent No.3. Payment of remaining amount is

under process.

Sri Alapati Vivekananda, learned counsel for respondent

No.3, submits that no instructions with regard to the

payment received by respondent No.3 and sought time.

In view of the above, respondent No.3 is directed to

release the amounts in favour of the petitioner which they

have received from respondent Nos.1 and 2 forthwith.

Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are directed to take steps to

release the balance amount payable to the petitioner within

a reasonable period but not beyond two weeks from today.”

14. The counters filed by the 2

nd

respondent as well as the 3

rd

respondent which contended that as per the directions of this

Court that is to release the balance amount pursuant to the

Memo dated 19.05.2020 issued by the 2

nd respondent, under

which the 2

nd respondent directed the other respondents to take

steps for payment of Rs.6,64,46,338/-, the said amount has

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been paid in two occasions before filing of the writ petition and

after filing of the writ petition.

15. In view of the payment of amount by the respondents as

prayed by the petitioner in his prayer, and the petitioner is not

quantified the amount payable other than the amount

mentioned by the 2

nd

respondent in its Memo dated 19.05.2020,

therefore, it cannot be said that the respondents did not comply

with the orders of this Court in the absence of quantifying of

amount to be received by the petitioner. Therefore, the interim

order of this Court dated 06.08.2021 has been complied with.

16. Accordingly, the Contempt Case is closed. There shall be

no order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any,

shall stand closed.

______________________________________

VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA, J

Date: 06.09.2022

Ivd

Note: L.R. copy to be marked

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wp_22568_2020 & cc_1580_2021

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA

WRIT PETITION No.22568 of 2020

And

CONTEMPT CASE No.1580 of 2021

Date: 06.09.2022

Ivd