2026 INSC 566

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 1 of 39

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(@ SLP (C) NO.27534 OF 2025)

M/S TARINI PRASAD MOHANTY APPELLANT

VERSUS

M/S SUNFLAG IRON AND STEEL RESPONDENT

COMPANY LIMITED

J U D G M E N T

ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J

1. An objection raised under Section 16 of the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996

1 that various agreements executed

between the parties were insufficiently stamped was turned

down by the learned Arbitrator. A challenge was raised to the

said order by the objector through a writ petition preferred

under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India

2. A

learned Single Judge of the High Court entertained the writ

1

For short, ‘the A and C Act’

2

For short, ‘the Constitution’

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 2 of 39

petition and upheld the objection raised under Section 16 of

the A and C Act. Impounding of the said agreements was

directed. The other party challenged this decision in a writ

appeal that was allowed by the Division Bench of the High

Court. The objector, being aggrieved, has approached this

Court.

2. Leave granted.

3. Two issues arise for consideration in the present appeal,

namely (a) whether in the exercise of jurisdiction under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, a challenge to an

order passed under Section 16 of the A and C Act ought to

have been entertained, especially when the Arbitrator was

seized of the arbitration proceedings? and (b) the learned

Single Judge having upheld the challenge to an order passed

under Section 16 of the A and C Act, whether the Division

Bench was right in interfering with such exercise of

jurisdiction and setting aside that order?

4. It is not necessary to refer to the facts in great detail.

Suffice it to observe that an agreement for sale of iron ore

came to be executed on 12.02.2004 between the appellant-

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 3 of 39

M/s Tarini Prasad Mohanty

3 and the respondent-M/s Sunflag

Iron and Steel Company Limited

4. Supplementary agreements

were also entered into between the parties thereafter. During

the course of their contractual engagement, disputes arose

between the parties. In accordance with the arbitration clause

contained in the agreement for sale, these disputes were

referred to a Sole Arbitrator. SISCO as claimant made various

claims against the mine owner, who in turn filed a counter

claim against SISCO. On 05.02.2024 during the course of the

arbitration proceedings, the mine owner filed an application

under Section 16 of the A and C Act. It was stated therein that

the agreement for sale dated 12.02.2004 alongwith various

supplementary agreements had been insufficiently stamped.

According to the mine owner, the contract between the parties

was in the nature of ‘conveyance’ and, hence, it was necessary

that the agreements had to be stamped in accordance with

Article 23 of Schedule I to the Indian Stamp Act, 1899

5. It was,

thus, stated that unless the agreements were impounded and

3

For short, ‘the mine owner’

4

For short, ‘SISCO’

5

For short, ‘the Stamp Act’

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 4 of 39

properly stamped, the arbitration proceedings could not

continue.

5. The claimant filed its reply to the aforesaid objection and

took the stand that the agreements between the parties had

been duly stamped and there was no need to impound the

same. It was further stated that such objection had not been

raised when the counter claim was filed and it was not liable

to be entertained as having been raised belatedly.

The learned Arbitrator after hearing both sides by his

order dated 30.05.2024 turned down the said objection and

held that the agreement between the parties was “ an

agreement to sell” and not “conveyance” or sale. Since the

agreement had been properly stamped in accordance with

Article 5(c) of Schedule I to the Stamp Act, the objection was

rejected.

6. The mine owner being aggrieved by the aforesaid order

challenged the same by filing a writ petition under Articles

226 and 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 5 of 39

of Orissa

6. The prayers made in the writ petition read as

under:

“A) Why the Impugned Order dated 30.05.2024 vide Annexure 1,

passed by the Ld. Arbitral Tribunal shall not be quashed, being

illegal, arbitrary and contrary to settled principles of law;

B) Why directions shall not be issued to the Ld. Sole Arbitrator

directing the Respondent to produce the original Sale Agreement

before the concerned Collector for impounding the same for the

determination of the deficit stamp duty and payment of the same

by the Respondent;

C) Why the arbitral proceedings in the matter of arbitration

between “Sunflag Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. Tarini Prasad

Mohanty” shall not be kept in abeyance until the Respondent

rectifies the defect as per the law prescribed procedure in law;

D) Why such other appropriate order/orders as this Hon’ble Court

may deem fit and proper shall not be passed;”

7. SISCO opposed the writ petition by urging that the order

passed by the learned Arbitrator under Section 16 of the A

and C Act during pendency of the arbitration proceedings

could not be challenged in writ jurisdiction. It stated that at

the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, the remedy

provided under Section 34 of the A and C Act could be availed.

It was further stated that the conclusion arrived at by the

learned Arbitrator that the agreements had been properly

stamped was correct and this did not call for any interference.

6

For short, ‘the High Court’

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 6 of 39

8. A learned Single Judge of the High Court by the

judgment dated 25.02.2025 considered the question as to the

maintainability of a writ petition wherein a challenge was

raised to an interlocutory order passed by the Arbitral

Tribunal. He, thereafter, examined the situations in which an

order passed under Section 16 of the A and C Act could be

interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction. After finding

that an ‘exceptional’ case for interference had been made out,

the learned Single Judge proceeded to hold that unless proper

stamp duty was paid on the sale agreement, the learned

Arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to arbitrate the disputes.

On that basis, the order passed under Section 16 of the A and

C Act came to be set aside and the Arbitral Tribunal was

directed to impound the agreements to enable them to be duly

stamped in accordance with Article 23, Schedule I(b) to the

Stamp Act. Various directions indicating the manner in which

such impounding was to be undertaken were also given. The

writ petition preferred by the mine owner, thus, came to be

allowed.

9. The claimant being aggrieved by the exercise of

jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge preferred writ appeal

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 7 of 39

under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Act, 1992. The Division

Bench of the High Court after referring to various decisions of

this Court was of the view that the power of judicial review

under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the power

superintendence over courts and tribunals under Article 227

of the Constitution were integral parts of the basic structure

which could not be curtailed and/or abridged under any

legislative fiat. It further held that an order upholding the

jurisdiction of the Arbitrator was capable of being challenged

under Section 34 of the A and C Act at the conclusion of the

arbitration proceedings. It found that the exercise of

determining whether the agreements were properly stamped

required an interpretation of the contract between the parties.

This was required to be done on the basis of evidence to be

adduced by the parties. It was therefore desirable that the writ

court ought not to go into the question involving

interpretation of the contract. On that basis, it held that the

view taken by the learned Arbitrator could not be said to be

perverse or that the Arbitral Tribunal lacked inherent

jurisdiction to entertain the arbitration proceedings. The

Division Bench, thus, set aside the judgment of the learned

Single Judge holding the same to be in excess of jurisdiction.

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 8 of 39

The mine owner being aggrieved by this adjudication has

preferred the present appeal.

10. Mr. Shashank Garg, learned Senior Advocate for the

appellant in support of the appeal made the following

submissions:

a) The writ appeal preferred by SISCO was not

maintainable:

It was urged that though the mine owner referred to

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in the writ petition

preferred by him, the said writ petition was in fact one under

Article 227 of the Constitution alone. This was clear from the

tenor of the writ petition and the grounds raised therein. The

mine owner had invoked supervisory jurisdiction of the High

Court under Article 227 of Constitution and therefore, the writ

appeal preferred by SISCO was not maintainable. The

directions issued in the order passed by the learned Single

Judge as regards impounding of the documents in question

would not result in converting the proceedings into one under

Article 226 of the Constitution. In this regard, the learned

Senior Advocate placed reliance on the decisions in Umaji

Keshao Meshram and others Vs. Radhikabai w/o Anandrao

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 9 of 39

Banapurkar and another

7, Life Insurance Corporation of

India Vs. Nandini J. Shah and others

8 and Ram Kishan

Fauji Vs. State of Haryana and others

9.

b) The writ petition preferred by the mine owner for

challenging the order passed under Section 16 of the A and C

Act was maintainable:

It was submitted that in exceptional cases and on

grounds of perversity, an order passed by the Arbitral

Tribunal under Section 16 of the A and C Act would be

maintainable. The fact that the learned Single Judge set aside

the order passed under Section 16 of the A and C Act on the

ground that the same was ‘grossly erroneous and perverse’

justified the invocation of such jurisdiction by the mine

owner. Since an exceptional case had been made out by the

mine owner, jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution

was rightly exercised by the learned Single Judge.

c) The agreement dated 12.02.2004 and the

supplementary agreements constituted ‘conveyance’:

It was submitted by referring to the provisions of Section

2(10) of the Stamp Act and Section 4(4) of the Sale of Goods

Act, 1930

10 that on a reading of the agreements in their

7

1986 INSC 41

8

2018 INSC 178

9

2017 INSC 238

10

For short, ‘SoG Act’

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 10 of 39

entirety, it was clear that the transaction envisaged therein

was one of sale. Reference was made to various clauses of the

agreement dated 12.02.2004 to substantiate this contention.

The nomenclature of the said document was not relevant but

its substance was required to be seen. The learned Arbitrator

having failed to determine the exact nature of the agreement

dated 12.02.2004 and the supplementary agreements , the

learned Single Judge was justified in concluding that the

transactions entered into amounted to ‘conveyance’. Reliance

was placed on the decision in State of Uttaranchal and

others Vs. M/s Khurana Brothers

11 in that regard.

d) Failure of the Arbitral Tribunal to impound the various

agreements resulted in a jurisdictional error:

It was submitted that unless the agreement for sale

between the parties was properly stamped, the learned

Arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to arbitrate the disputes.

For determining the true nature of the transaction, t he

agreement for sale dated 12.02.2004, various supplementary

agreements and the eighty-nine purchase orders ought to

have been taken into consideration. They all were relevant for

determining the issue of proper stamp duty being paid on the

11

2010 INSC 746

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 11 of 39

agreements. The Arbitral Tribunal erred in failing to take the

entire material into consideration before arriving at its

conclusion. The learned Single Judge rightly considered all

the relevant material in this regard and found that the

agreements were insufficiently stamped. Unless proper stamp

duty was duly paid, the learned Arbitrator could not have

proceeded with the arbitration proceedings. The Division

Bench, thus, erred in interfering with the well reasoned order

passed by the learned Single Judge.

e) The interest of revenue ought to be borne in mind while

adjudicating the present dispute:

It was submitted that non-payment of stamp duty or

insufficiency of stamp duty results in a loss to the public

exchequer. For an instrument to be admitted in evidence

and/or acted upon in law, the document ought to have been

correctly stamped. Reference was made to the judgment of the

Constitution Bench in Re: Interplay Between Arbitration

Agreements Under The Arbitration And Conciliation Act,

1996 and The Indian Stamp Act, 1899

12. Moreover, the

scope for interference under Section 34 of the A and C Act was

12

2023 INSC 1066

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 12 of 39

limited as reiterated in Gayatri Balasamy Vs. M/s ISG

Novasoft Technologies Limited

13.

It was, thus, submitted on the aforesaid grounds that

the judgment of the Division Bench impugned herein was

liable to be set aside and order passed by the learned Single

Judge impounding the agreement dated 12.02.2004 deserved

to be upheld.

11. Per contra, Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Mr. N.K.Mody and

Ms. Malvika Trivedi, learned Senior Advocates for the

respondent supported the judgment of the Division Bench and

urged as under:

a) The writ appeal filed by SISCO was maintainable:

It was submitted that the writ petition filed by the mine

owner was under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Substantive reliefs in the nature of writs had been prayed for

and no supervisory direction had been sought. The learned

Single Judge after setting aside the order passed under

Section 16 of the A and C Act issued a direction to the

Collector to determine the deficient stamp duty. Even

otherwise, the writ petition having been filed invoking Articles

13

2025 INSC 605

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 13 of 39

226 and 227 of the Constitution, the writ appeal would be

maintainable by treating the writ petition as filed under Article

226 of the Constitution. Reliance was placed on the decision

in Umaji Keshao Meshram (supra) to support this submission.

b) The order passed by the learned Arbitrator under

Section 16 of the A and C Act was not liable to be interfered

with:

The learned Single Judge erred in interfering with the

order passed by the learned Arbitrator under Section 16 of the

A and C Act. It was not a case of complete lack of inherent

jurisdiction on the part of the learned Arbitrator so as to

enable writ jurisdiction being invoked. The Constitution

Bench in Re: Interplay (supra) having held that the issue as to

stamping of a document was one that fell within the ambit of

the Arbitral Tribunal, the decision taken by the learned

Arbitrator under Section 16 of the A and C Act was thus

within its jurisdiction. Merely by stating that the

circumstances were ‘exceptional’, writ jurisdiction could not

have been exercised. Assuming that the order passed by the

learned Arbitrator under Section 16 of the A and C Act was

erroneous in law, the same could have been challenged under

Section 34 of the A and C Act at the conclusion of the

proceedings as provided under Section 16(6).

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 14 of 39

c) The agreement dated 12.0 2.2004 and the

supplementary agreements did not amount to ‘conveyance’

under Section 2(10) of the Stamp Act:

It was submitted that on a complete reading of the entire

agreement dated 12.0 2.2004 and the supplementary

agreements, it was clear that it envisaged a future sale of iron

ore by the mine owner to SISCO. Under the said agreements,

the goods were neither ascertained nor were they in a

deliverable state. Reference was made to various clauses in

the agreements to substantiate this contention. It was further

urged that the aspect of interpretation of a document touched

the merits of the dispute, consideration of which was yet to be

undertaken by the learned Arbitrator. This Court, therefore,

would not undertake that exercise at this stage. The decision

in M/s Khurana Brothers (supra) relied upon before the

learned Single Judge was sought to be distinguished. It was

also submitted that various purchase orders were sought to

be relied upon by the mine owner for the first time in the writ

petition before the learned Single Judge. In any event, the

transaction in question could not be treated to be

‘conveyance’.

It was, thus, submitted that the Division Bench of the

High Court having rightly set aside the order passed by the

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 15 of 39

learned Single Judge, no interference was called for and the

appeal was liable to be dismissed.

12. We have heard the learned Senior Advocates for the

parties at length and with their assistance, we have also

perused the relevant documentary material placed on record.

At the outset, it would be necessary to consider the objection

raised on behalf of the mine owner that the writ appeal

preferred by SISCO was not maintainable as the learned

Single Judge had merely exercised jurisdiction under Article

227 of the Constitution while setting aside the order passed

under Section 16 of the A and C Act. According to the mine

owner, since a challenge was raised to an order passed by the

learned Arbitrator under Section 16 of the A and C Act,

notwithstanding the invocation of Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution in the writ petition, the jurisdiction exercised by

the learned Single Judge was only under Article 227 of the

Constitution.

We are not in a position to accept this submission for

more than one reason. Perusal of the writ petition as preferred

by the mine owner including the prayers made therein makes

it clear that the writ petition was preferred under Articles 226

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 16 of 39

and 227 of the Constitution. Besides the cause title of the said

writ petition, the pleadings therein, especially paragraph 27

indicates that the mine owner sought to invoke the

extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226

of the Constitution. Further, the learned Single Judge after

referring to various decisions cited before him by the parties

observed in paragraph 60 as under:

“60. A perusal of the above-mentioned decisions, shows that

the following principles are well settled, in respect of the scope

of interference under Article 226/227 in challenges to orders by

an arbitral tribunal including orders passed under Section 16

of the Act:

(i). An arbitral tribunal is a 'tribunal’ against which a petition

under Article 226/227 would be maintainable;

(ii). The non-obstante clause in section 5 of the Act does not

apply in respect of exercise of powers under Article 227 which

is a Constitutional provision;

(iii). For interference under Article 226/227, there have to be

'exceptional circumstances';

(iv). Though interference is permissible, unless and until the

order is so perverse that it is patently lacking in inherent

jurisdiction, the writ court would not interfere;

(v). Interference is permissible only if the order is completely

perverse i.e., that the perversity must stare in the face;

(vi). High Courts ought to discourage litigation which

necessarily interfere with the arbitral process;

(vii). Excessive judicial interference in the arbitral process is not

encouraged;

(viii). It is prudent not to exercise jurisdiction under Article

226/227;

(ix). The power should be exercised in 'exceptional rarity' or if

there is 'bad faith' which is shown;

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 17 of 39

(x). Efficiency of the arbitral process ought not to be allowed to

diminish and hence interdicting the arbitral process should be

completely avoided.”

Thereafter, on examining the agreement for sale dated

12.02.2004 as well as the second agreement dated

09.01.2011, the learned Single Judge was of the view that the

challenge raised by the mine owner could be treated to be

‘exceptional’ and writ jurisdiction ought to be exercised in the

matter.

13. In this regard, we may refer to the decision of this Court

in Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd . Vs. Shankar Prasad

14

wherein after referring to the decision in Umaji Keshao

Meshram and others (supra), it was observed as under:-

“It is, therefore, obvious that the Writ Petition invoking

jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles

226 and 227 of the Constitution had tried to make out a case

for High Court's interference seeking issuance of an appropriate

Writ of Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Basic averments for invoking such jurisdiction were already

pleaded in the Writ Petition for High Court's consideration. It is

true, as submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, that the

order of the learned Single Judge nowhere stated that the Court

was considering the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. It is equally true that the learned Single

Judge dismissed the Writ Petition by observing that the Courts

below had appreciated the contentions and rejected the

complaint. But the said observation of the learned Single Judge

did not necessarily mean that the learned Judge did not inclined

to interfere under article 227 of the Constitution of India only.

The said observation equally supports the conclusion that the

14

1999 INSC 279

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 18 of 39

learned Judge was not inclined to interfere under Articles

226 and 227. As seen earlier, that he was considering the

aforesaid Writ Petition moved under Articles 226 as well as 227

of the Constitution of India. Under these circumstances, it is not

possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the

appellant that the learned Single Judge had refused to interfere

only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India when he

dismissed the Writ Petition of the respondent. In this

connection, it is profitable to have a look at the decision of this

Court in the case of Umaji Keshao Meshram and Others vs.

Radhikabai, widow of Anandrao Banapurkar and Anr., [(1986)

Supp SCC 401]. In that case O.Chinnappa Reddy and

D.P.Madon, JJ., considered the very same question in the light

of clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the Bombay High

Court. Madon J., speaking for the Court in para 107 of the

Report at page 473, made the following pertinent observations :

“Petitions are at times filed both under Articles

226 and 227 of the Constitution. The case of Hari Vishnu

Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque before this Court was of

such a type. Rule 18 provides that where such petitions

are filed against orders of the tribunals or authorities

specified in Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side

Rules or against decrees or orders of courts specified in

that rule, they shall be heard and finally disposed of by a

Single Judge. The question is whether an appeal would lie

from the decision of the Single Judge in such a case. In

our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an

application either under Article 226 or 227 of the

Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application

under both these articles, in fairness and justice to such

party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right

of appeal the court ought to treat the application as being

made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in

the final order the court gives ancillary directions which

may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to

deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of

the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order

sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Such

was the view taken by the Allahabad High court in Aidal

Singh v. Karan Singh and by the Punjab High Court in Raj

Kishan Jain v. Tulsi Dass and Barham Dutt v. Peoples' Co-

operative Transport Society Ltd., New Delhi and we are in

agreement with it.”

The aforesaid decision squarely gets attracted on the facts of

the present case. It was open to the respondent to invoke

jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 19 of 39

226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Once such

jurisdiction was invoked and when his Writ Petition was

dismissed on merits, it cannot be said that the learned Single

Judge had exercised his jurisdiction only under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India. This conclusion directly flows from the

relevant averments made in the Writ Petition and the nature of

jurisdiction invoked by the respondent as noted by the learned

Single Judge in his judgment, as seen earlier. Consequently, it

could not be said that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was not

attracted for preferring appeal against the judgment of learned

Single Judge…..”

[emphasis supplied by us]

14. In our view, the observations referred to above are

clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. The mine

owner having invoked jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227

of the Constitution and the learned Single Judge having

exercised jurisdiction without clearly specifying any

particular Article, it cannot be said that what was exercised

by the learned Single Judge was jurisdiction only under

Article 227 of the Constitution and not under Article 226 of

the Constitution. Moreover, the mine owner himself having

invoked both Articles and having succeeded before the

learned Single Judge, in fairness, he ought not now contend

that the writ petition preferred by him was only under Article

227 of the Constitution so as to question the maintainability

of the writ appeal.

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 20 of 39

We would reiterate what was held by this Court in Sh

Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji Vs. State of Gujarat and

others

15 in paragraph 25:

“25. From the aforesaid pronouncements, it is graphically clear

that maintainability of a letters patent appeal would depend upon

the pleadings in the writ petition, the nature and character of the

order passed by the learned Single Judge, the type of directions

issued regard being had to the jurisdictional perspectives in the

constitutional context. Barring the civil court, from which order

as held by the three-Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam (supra) that

a writ petition can lie only under Article 227 of the Constitution,

orders from tribunals cannot always be regarded for all purposes

to be under Article 227 of the Constitution. Whether the learned

Single Judge has exercised the jurisdiction under Article 226 or

under Article 227 or both, needless to emphasise, would depend

upon various aspects that have been emphasised in the

aforestated authorities of this Court. There can be orders passed

by the learned Single Judge which can be construed as an order

under both the articles in a composite manner, for they can co-

exist, coincide and imbricate. We reiterate it would depend upon

the nature, contour and character of the order and it will be the

obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent appeal

to discern and decide whether the order has been passed by the

learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction under Article

226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. The Division Bench would

also be required to scrutinize whether the facts of the case justify

the assertions made in the petition to invoke the jurisdiction

under both the articles and the relief prayed on that

foundation….”

We are, therefore, of the view that the learned Single

Judge having entertained the writ petition that was preferred

under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and having

granted relief to the mine owner, the writ appeal preferred by

15

2015 INSC 485

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 21 of 39

SISCO was maintainable. SISCO, therefore, cannot be non-

suited on this count.

15. We further find from the proceedings in the writ appeal

before the Division Bench that the parties did not join issue

on the maintainability of the writ appeal. Rather the contest

was on the scope of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227

of the Constitution and the legal propriety of the learned

Single Judge exercising such jurisdiction. In paragraphs 1, 4

and 5 of the ‘Note for Writ Appeal’ submitted by the mine

owner, it has been stated as under:

“I. Whether a writ court can interfere with the order passed

by the arbitral tribunal in exercise of its powers under Section

16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act

1. The test propounded by the court for a challenge of an

order of the arbitral tribunal (section 16 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act 1996) by way of a writ petition under Article

226/227 is perverse/exceptional circumstance namely: patent

lack of inherent jurisdiction.”

4. In relation to jurisdiction of a writ court challenging a

Section 16 order of an arbitral tribunal, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has upheld the position in Deep Industries, in the case of

Punjab State Power Corporation Limited V. EMTA Coal Limited

and anr. (2020) 17 SCC 93, in paragraph 4 as follows:

“4. We are of the view that a foray to the writ court from

a Section 16 application being dismissed by the

arbitrator can only be if the order passed is so

perverse that the only possible conclusion is that

there is a patent lack in inherent jurisdiction. A patent

lack of inherent jurisdiction requires no argument

whatsoever – it must be the perversity of the order that

must stare one in the face.”

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 22 of 39

5. The order passed by the single judge squarely falls within

the parameters.”

16

The Division Bench, therefore, observed in paragraph 8

of the impugned judgment as under:

“8. Learned Counsels appearing for the respective parties

made extensive arguments not only on the nature of an

agreement for the purpose of stamp duty leviable thereupon but

also on the scope and jurisdiction of the High Court conferred

under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.”

It, thus, becomes clear that maintainability of the writ

appeal was not specifically questioned by the mine owner

before the Division Bench.

16. Having found that the writ appeal preferred by SISCO

was maintainable, it would now be necessary to consider

whether the Division Bench was justified in entertaining the

same and setting aside the order passed by the learned Single

Judge. For doing so, a brief reference to the adjudication by

the learned Arbitrator under Section 16 of the A and C Act

would be necessary. During the course of arbitration

proceedings, an objection was raised by the mine owner on

05.02.2024 that the agreement for sale dated 12.02.2004 as

16

(See pages 299 and 300, Annexure R-7 of counter affidavit by SISCO)

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 23 of 39

well as the supplementary agreements executed between the

parties were insufficiently stamped. Unless the said

instruments were impounded and adequate stamp duty was

paid, the arbitration proceedings could not proceed. The

learned Arbitrator considered the said objection. After

referring to the agreements in question including its relevant

clauses, he came to the conclusion that the agreements could

not be treated to be ‘conveyance’ or sale of movable property.

The application under Section 16 of the A and C Act was,

thus, dismissed on 30.05.2024.

17. A perusal of the aforesaid adjudication would prima facie

indicate that on consideration of various agreements between

the parties and the relevant clauses therein, the learned

Arbitrator concluded that the same were merely in the nature

of an agreement to sell and not ‘conveyance’. This decision

was arrived at after examining and prima facie interpreting

the agreements in question. The learned Single Judge while

considering the challenge to the said order re-examined the

said agreements and clauses therein. He undertook the

exercise of determining the true intention of the parties

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 24 of 39

behind executing the said agreements. In fact, in paragraph

70 of his judgment, it has been observed as under:

“70. Now, this court shall embark on a perusal of the true

intention of the Parties by examining the Agreement itself as it

is settled in law, that the mere title of the document would not

be indicative of the true nature of the document itself…..”

Thereafter, he concluded in paragraph in 75 of his

judgment that the intention of the parties made it clear that

the minerals excavated from the mines of SISCO would stand

vested in the mine owner for a period of ten years for which

the consideration had already been fixed and paid. He,

therefore, concluded that there was indeed conveyance of the

goods in question. The conclusion of the learned Arbitrator as

recorded in paragraphs 38 to 40 of his order was held to be

grossly erroneous and perverse.

It is, thus, evident that while considering the challenge

raised by the mine owner to the order passed by the learned

Arbitrator under Section 16 of the A and C Act, the learned

Single Judge entered into the merits of the dispute and

thereafter concluded that the transactions were in the nature

of ‘conveyance’.

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 25 of 39

18. At this stage, it would be necessary to refer to the

decision of the Constitution Bench in M/s S.B.P. and

Company Vs. M/s Patel Engineering Ltd. and another

17

. In

paragraphs 6, 44 and 45 of the majority judgment, it has been

held as under:

“6. …….Chapter IV deals with the jurisdiction of Arbitral

Tribunals. Section 16 deals with the competence of an Arbitral

Tribunal, to rule on its jurisdiction. The Arbitral Tribunal may rule

on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objection with

respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. A

person aggrieved by the rejection of his objection by the Tribunal

on its jurisdiction or the other matters referred to in that Section,

has to wait until the award is made to challenge that decision in

an appeal against the arbitral award itself in accordance with

Section 34 of the Act. But an acceptance of the objection to

jurisdiction or authority, could be challenged then and there,

under Section 37 of the Act.”

xxxxxxxx

“44. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the

basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during

arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226

or 227 of the Constitution of India. We see no warrant for such an

approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal

appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue

for ventilating his grievances against the award including any in-

between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral

tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by

any order of the arbitral tribunal, unless has a right of appeal

under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed

by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The

arbitral tribunal is after all, the creature of a contract between the

parties, the arbitration agreement, even though if the occasion

arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract

between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the

arbitral tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by

agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some

of the High Courts that any order passed by the arbitral tribunal

is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226

17

2005 INSC 526

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 26 of 39

or 227 of the Constitution of India. Such an intervention by the

High Courts is not permissible.

45. The object of minimising judicial intervention while the

matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be

defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227

or under Article 226 of the Constitution against every order made

by the Arbitral Tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that

once the arbitration has commenced in the Arbitral Tribunal,

parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of

course, a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of

the Act even at an earlier stage.”

[emphasis supplied by us]

The object of minimal judicial intervention and

availability of a remedy under Section 34 of the A and C Act

has been highlighted.

19. As regards challenge to the rejection of an objection

raised under Section 16 of the A and C Act is concerned, this

Court in M/s Deep Industries Ltd. Vs. Oil and Natural Gas

Corporation Limited and another

18 held in paragraph 16 as

under:

“16. …….The drill of Section 16 of the Act is that where a

Section 16 application is dismissed, no appeal is provided and the

challenge to the Section 16 application being dismissed must await

the passing of a final award at which stage it may be raised under

Section 34. What the High Court has done in the present case is

to invert this statutory scheme by going into exactly the same

matter as was gone into by the arbitrator in the Section 16

application, and then decided that the two-year ban/blacklisting

was no part of the notice for arbitration issued on 2-11-2017, a

finding which is directly contrary to the finding of the learned

18

2019 INSC 1299

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 27 of 39

arbitrator dismissing the Section 16 application. For this reason

alone, the judgment under appeal needs to be set aside.”

Yet again in Bhaven Construction through Authorised

Signatory Premjibhai K. Shah Vs. Executive Engineer,

Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited and another

19, it

was held in paragraphs 11, 15, 16 and 25 as under:-

“11. We need to note that the Arbitration Act is a code in itself.

This phrase is not merely perfunctory, but has definite legal

consequences. One such consequence is spelled out under

Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, which reads as under

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the

time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial

authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.”

The non-obstante clause is provided to uphold the intention of

the legislature as provided in the Preamble to adopt UNCITRAL

Model Law and Rules, to reduce excessive judicial interference

which is not contemplated under the Arbitration Act.”

xxxxxxxx

“15. In this context, we may state that the appellant acted in

accordance with the procedure laid down under the agreement

to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator, without Respondent 1

mounting a judicial challenge at that stage. Respondent 1 then

appeared before the sole arbitrator and challenged the

jurisdiction of the sole arbitrator, in terms of Section 16(2) of

the Arbitration Act.

16. Thereafter, Respondent 1 chose to impugn the order

passed by the arbitrator under Section 16(2) of the Arbitration

Act through a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Indian

Constitution. In the usual course, the Arbitration Act provides

for a mechanism of challenge under Section 34. The opening

phase of Section 34 reads as ‘Recourse to a Court against an

arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting

aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-

section (3)’. The use of term ‘only’ as occurring under the

provision serves two purposes of making the enactment a

complete code and lay down the procedure.”

19

2021 INSC 9

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 28 of 39

xxxxxxxxxx

“25. It must be noted that Section 16 of the Arbitration Act,

necessarily mandates that the issue of jurisdiction must be

dealt first by the tribunal, before the court examines the same

under Section 34. Respondent 1 is therefore not left remediless,

and has statutorily been provided a chance of appeal. In Deep

Industries case (supra) this Court observed as follows:

“22. One other feature of this case is of some importance.

As stated hereinabove, on 9 -5-2018, a Section 16

application had been dismissed by the learned arbitrator

in which substantially the same contention which found

favour with the High Court was taken up. The drill of

Section 16 of the Act is that where a Section 16 application

is dismissed, no appeal is provided and the challenge to the

Section 16 application being dismissed must await the

passing of a final award at which stage it may be raised

under Section 34.”

(emphasis supplied)

20. Recently, the Constitution Bench in Re: Interplay (supra)

considered the scheme of the A and C Act including Section

16 thereof as well as the question whether the rejection of an

objection raised under Section 16 could be subjected to

challenge in the midst of the arbitral proceedings. In

paragraphs 120 and 122, it was held as under:

“120. …..Section 16 empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on

its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with

respect to the existence or validity of arbitration agreement.

Importantly, the parties have a right under Sections 16(2) and

16(3) to challenge the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal on

grounds such as the non-existence or invalidity of the arbitration

agreement. The Arbitral Tribunal is obligated to decide on the

challenge to its jurisdiction, and where it rejects the challenge, it

can proceed with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral

award. It is the principle of procedural competence-competence

which recognises the power of an Arbitral Tribunal to hear and

decide challenges to its jurisdiction. Once the Arbitral Tribunal

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 29 of 39

makes an arbitral award, Section 16(6) allows the aggrieved party

to make an application for setting aside the award under Section

34. Sections 16(5) and 16(6) further show that Parliament has

completely ousted the jurisdiction of Courts to interfere during the

arbitral proceedings - courts can intervene only after the tribunal

has made an award. Thus, Section 16 is intended to give full effect

to the procedural and substantive aspects of the doctrine of

competence-competence.”

xxxxxxxxx

“122. Under Section 34, the grounds for setting aside an arbitral

award are specific. The provision requires a party challenging an

award to plead and prove the existence of one or more such

grounds.

20 The scheme of the Arbitration Act shows that although

an Arbitral Tribunal is given priority to determine all issues

pertaining to its jurisdiction based on the principle of competence-

competence, the tribunal's decision is subject to judicial review at

the stage when an award is challenged. Moreover, one of the

grounds on which an arbitral award can be set aside is that the

arbitration agreement is not valid under law. This indicates that

the Arbitration Act does not contemplate the Court determining

the validity of an arbitration agreement at a pre-arbitral stage.”

Thereafter, the Constitution Bench recorded its

conclusions in paragraph 224 as under:

“224. The conclusions reached in this judgment are summarised

below:

a. Agreements which are not stamped or are inadequately stamped

are inadmissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act.

Such agreements are not rendered void or void ab initio or

unenforceable;

b. Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect;

c. An objection as to stamping does not fall for determination

under Sections 8 or 11 of the Arbitration Act. The Court concerned

must examine whether the arbitration agreement prima facie

exists;

d. Any objections in relation to the stamping of the agreement fall

within the ambit of the Arbitral Tribunal; and

20

Fiza Developers & Inter-Trade (P) Ltd. v. Amci (I) (P) Ltd., (2009) 17 SCC 796 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ)

637

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 30 of 39

e. The decision in N.N. Global (2)

21 and SMS Tea Estates

22 are

overruled. Paras 22 and 29 of Garware Wall Ropes

23 are overruled

to that extent.”

21. The learned Senior Advocate for the mine owner also

urged that relegating the stamping objection to the post-

award stage under Section 34 of the A and C Act would

compel the mine owner to endure prolonged and expensive

arbitral proceedings merely to vindicate what he characterises

as a mandatory fiscal objection going to the root of the

agreement, while the remedy available under Section 34 is too

circumscribed to adequately address such a fundamental

defect. This Court is unable to accept this submission, as it

derives its force only if non-stamping or inadequate stamping

of an agreement is treated as a fatal, jurisdictional infirmity

that vitiates the agreement at its inception. That premise,

however, no longer holds good in law. The Constitution Bench

in Re: Interplay (supra), has unequivocally held that non-

stamping or inadequate stamping of an arbitration agreement

is merely a curable defect. In paragraph 48, it was held as

under:

21

N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd., (2023) 7 SCC 1 : (2023) 3 SCC (Civ)

564

22

SMS Tea Estates (P) Ltd. v. Chandmari Tea Co. (P) Ltd., (2011) 14 SCC 66 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 777

23

Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine constructions & Engg. Ltd., (2019) 9 SCC 209 :

(2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 324

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 31 of 39

“48. Section 35 of the Stamp Act is unambiguous. It stipulates,

“No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in

evidence…” The term “admitted in evidence” refers to the

admissibility of the instrument. Sub- section (2) of Section 42, too,

states that an instrument in respect of which stamp-duty is paid

and which is endorsed as such will be “admissible in evidence.”

The effect of not paying duty or paying an inadequate amount

renders an instrument inadmissible and not void. Non-stamping

or improper stamping does not result in the instrument becoming

invalid. The Stamp Act does not render such an instrument void.

The non-payment of stamp duty is accurately characterised as a

curable defect. The Stamp Act itself provides for the manner in

which the defect may be cured and sets out a detailed procedure

for it. It bears mentioning that there is no procedure by which a

void agreement can be ‘cured’.”

Hence, this Court drew a careful and fundamental

distinction between the admissibility of an instrument in

evidence and its validity and enforceability in law, holding

that the scheme of the Stamp Act is concerned only with

admissibility and mere non-stamping or inadequate stamping

does not render an agreement void. The agreement survives

non-stamping or insufficient stamping, and the defect can be

cured by getting the agreement sufficiently stamped at any

stage, whereupon it becomes admissible in the eyes of law. It

is the arbitral tribunal that is empowered to deal with this

issue in the first instance. The remedy of having the Tribunal

satisfy itself on the question of stamping under Section 16,

with the award remaining open to challenge under Section 34

at a later stage, is not inadequate. The apprehension of the

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 32 of 39

mine owner, therefore, rests on a legal position that stands

overruled.

22. Besides the well settled parameters to be borne in mind

while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution, it is also necessary to be mindful of the

statutory scheme of the concerned enactment from which the

impugned order arises. If the enactment besides providing for

a statutory remedy [herein, Section 34] also expects minimal

judicial interference prior to the culmination of the arbitral

proceedings [herein, Section 5], the said factor would be of

relevance while considering the exercise of jurisdiction. In

other words, the threshold to be satisfied before exercising

discretion under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in

the light of such legislative intent would be higher. As held in

Re: Interplay (supra), the non-obstante clause in Section 5 of

the A and C Act must take precedence over any other law for

the time being in force. It would have to be demonstrated that

notwithstanding the availability of an alternate remedy at the

conclusion of the proceedings, such challenge cannot await

the final adjudication of the proceedings and despite the

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 33 of 39

statutory expectation of minimal interference, intervention in

exercise of writ jurisdiction at an interim stage is imperative.

We may clarify that our observations are as regards the

‘entertainability’ of a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227

of the Constitution and not with regard to its ‘maintainability’.

This Court in M/s Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. The Excise and

Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and others

24

has succinctly explained these concepts as under :-

“4 …In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it

clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not

operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ

petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue

the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of

policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of

law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that

“entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition

are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between

the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to

“maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such

objection were found to be of substance, the courts would

be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for

adjudication. On the other hand, the question of

“entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion

of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ

petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained

by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even

be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound

legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further

public interest….”

24

2023 INSC 92

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 34 of 39

23. Yet another aspect that is required to be referred to is

that the learned Single Judge while referring to the scope of

interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution

was cognizant of the fact that such power needs to be

exercised in exceptional rarity wherein the illegality or

perversity in the order of the learned Arbitrator stares one in

the face. These observations can be found in paragraph 61 of

the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Despite noticing

the contours and the scope of jurisdiction under Articles 226

and 227 of the Constitution, the learned Single Judge

proceeded to go into the intention of the parties and thereafter

determine the true nature of the agreements between them. It

may be noted that the Constitution Bench in Re: Interplay

(supra) has held in clear terms that any objection in relation

to stamping of an agreement falls within the ambit of the

Arbitral Tribunal. It would, thus, be clear that the learned

Arbitrator was duly empowered to decide the objection raised

by the mine owner as regards insufficient stamping of the

agreement. The jurisdiction to decide cannot mean to decide

in a particular manner. While exercising such power, one may

err on merits. Such error may not be one beyond jurisdiction.

The learned Arbitrator was, thus, within his jurisdiction in

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 35 of 39

not upholding the objection raised by the mine owner. It

therefore cannot be said that there was any inherent lack of

jurisdiction with the learned Arbitrator. Once it is found that

the learned Arbitrator had the jurisdiction to decide the

objection in relation to stamping of the agreements, in our

view, it was impermissible for the learned Single Judge to

undertake the exercise of entertaining a challenge to the said

adjudication by proceeding to interpret the agreements.

Assuming that the learned Arbitrator erred in his conclusion

that the agreement between the parties was ‘an agreement to

sell’, that would not make the case ‘exceptional’ for being set

aside in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Even on this count, the

approach of the learned Single Judge is found to be incorrect.

24. In our view, there is another material aspect that

requires mention. It was not open for the learned Single Judge

in exercise of writ jurisdiction to enter into the merits of the

dispute while adjudicating the challenge to an order passed

under Section 16 of the A and C Act. It has to be noted that

learned Arbitrator is still seized of the arbitration proceedings

and the parties are yet to lead evidence therein. Determining

the nature of the agreements at such stage would definitely

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 36 of 39

result in prejudice to the parties. We may in this regard refer

to the decision in Bhaven Construction through Authorised

Signatory Premjibhai K. Shah (supra)

25 wherein a three Judge

Bench of this Court observed that it was settled law that

interpretation of contracts should not generally be

undertaken while exercising writ jurisdiction. Therein, the

question arose as to whether the contract between the parties

was a contract for manufacture simpliciter or whether it was

a contract that was composite in nature and thus a works

contract. It was held that the said question required

contractual interpretation and was a matter of evidence,

especially when both parties had taken contradictory stands

in that regard.

We, therefore, find that that the learned Single Judge

was not justified in going into the merits of dispute between

the parties as regards the nature of the agreements while

exercising writ jurisdiction. An exercise requiring

interpretation of the various agreements ought not to have

been undertaken in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction.

25

2021 INSC 9

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 37 of 39

25. We may state that Mr. Shashank Garg, learned Senior

Advocate for the mine owner sought to justify the finding

recorded by the learned Single Judge as regards the true

nature of the agreements and the conclusion that it was in

the nature of ‘conveyance’. Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned

Senior Advocate for SISCO in his usual fairness sought to

dissuade the appellant from seeking an adjudication as

regards the true nature of the agreements at this stage.

According to him, undertaking such exercise now would be

premature as the arbitration proceedings were pending before

the learned Arbitrator and adjudication of the said issue

required interpretation of various terms of the agreements.

He, therefore, submitted that such adjudication could be

undertaken during the course of arbitration proceedings

before the learned Arbitrator after the evidence was led and

that the aggrieved party could thereafter avail the statutory

remedy, if aggrieved.

Since we have found that for the purposes of

determining the true nature of the agreement for sale dated

12.02.2004, it would be necessary to meaningfully interpret

the said agreement alongwith other supplementary

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 38 of 39

agreements, we are not inclined to undertake such exercise

as the same touches the merits of the dispute. Suffice it to

observe that the remedy available under Section 34 of the A

and C Act could be invoked by the party aggrieved and all

contentions could be raised at that stage. Section 16(6) read

with Section 34 of the A and C Act takes care of such

contingency. We, therefore, leave open the consideration of

the question as to whether the agreement for sale dated

12.02.2004 and the subsequent agreements between the

parties were in fact ‘conveyance’ as contended by the mine

owner or were merely agreements for sale as contended by

SISCO. We have, therefore, not dealt with the decisions cited

by learned counsel in this regard.

26. We would, thus, restrict ourselves to recording a

conclusion that the learned Single Judge was not justified in

exercising writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution for examining and thereafter setting aside the

order passed by the learned Arbitrator under Section 16 of

the A and C Act. Consequently, the Division Bench was

justified in entertaining the writ appeal and setting aside the

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.27534 of 2025 Page 39 of 39

order passed by the learned Single Judge after finding the

same to be in excess of jurisdiction.

27. To conclude, we do not find any reason whatsoever to

interfere with the order passed by the Division Bench of the

High Court. It is clarified that the issue with regard to

stamping of the agreement for sale dated 12.02.2004 and the

subsequent agreements is kept open for being raised by the

aggrieved party under Section 34 of the A and C Act, if the

need for the same arises. We place on record our deep

appreciation for the meaningful assistance rendered by all the

learned Senior Advocates as well as the learned counsel

assisting them in presenting before us the issues as raised in

a concise and clear manner.

The Civil Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with no order

as to costs. Pending applications also stand disposed of.

…………………………..J.

[ J. K. MAHESHWARI ]

….…..………………………..J.

[ ATUL S. CHANDURKAR ]

NEW DELHI,

MAY 27, 2026.