IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)

WPA 5407 of 2026

M/s. The Peerless Inn, Kolkata

Vs.

The State of West Bengal & Ors.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Jaydip Kar, sr. adv.

Mr. Ranjay De, sr. adv.

Mr. B. Banerjee,

Mr. A.A. Bose,

Mr. S.D. Roy.

For the Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Balaram Patra,

Mr. Suvadip Bhattacharjee.

Judgment reserved on : 21.04.2026

Judgment delivered on : 18.05.2026

SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. :

1. The writ application has been preferred challenging an

order dated 02.02.2026 passed by the learned First Industrial

Tribunal, Kolkata.

2. Vide the impugned order , the learned Tribunal

considering the issue raised by the petitioner herein, decided the

said issue as follows:-

“Now the moot question is “ as to whether the entire

proceeding to be gone away on subsequent

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deregistration of the Union No. 1 under Trade

Union Act or not.”………..

In this regard, I have carefully gone through all 3(three)

citations referred by OP/Company and my considered

and humble opinion is that the citation (2006) 11 SCC

P-731(II) is not applicable in the given case as because

in that citation from the day beginning or at the time

filing writ, the petitioner being an unregistered union as

registration already withdrawn, suppressed the fact of

withdrawal of registration before the court of justice,

which was misleading to the court. So, only on the

ground of misleading and suppressing the fact of

withdrawal of registration, the prayer was turned down.

But here in this case, the Union No. 1 was all through a

registered trade union in the proceeding and there was

no suppression of fact rather the fact of subsequent de-

registration, which is not similar with the fact of above

citation.

The citation No. 2, SCC Online Cal 640 is also not

relevant to this case as fact of the citation is altogether

different with the facts in hand because the trade union

registered under the West Bengal Co-operative Society

Act not under the Trade Union Act.

The citation No. 3, 2025 SCC Online Gauhati 2659 is

also not applicable in given fact of the case as because

on that citation the union representing the members is

totally unregistered union.

But in this case, the Union No. 1 was all through a

registered union under the Trade Union Act 1926 as per

requirement of Industrial Dispute Act and subsequently

at the stage of hearing of argument i.e. on 27.07.2023, it

became unregistered. So, the question is the subsequent

event like de-registered of the trade union subsequently,

will have any effect in this proceeding or not, that to be

taken for consideration.

At the threshold, it should be kept in mind that the

Industrial Dispute Act is a peace of social welfare

legislation, enacted with a view to protect the workers

from the exploitation and at the same time to ensure the

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all-round development of industry by maintaining

industrial peace.

In this regard, I would like to recapitulate the meaning

of industrial dispute - Industrial Dispute as a dispute,

which is likely to disrupt the industrial peace. Hon'ble

Supreme Court in citation in 1979(3) SCC 291, has

held that the industrial dispute can be raised by a

substantial numbers of workmen, even an un -

registered minority union can raise such a

dispute. There is nothing in the act to require that

dispute should be raised by all the workmen.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in citation, 1960 SCC Online

SC 324, held that a dispute becomes an industrial

dispute even where it is sponsored by a union, which is

not registered.

On relying upon ruling 2000 (4) L. L. N. 1086 Cal,

Hon'ble Calcutta High Court on its judgement dated

04.08.2000, has held that for the purpose of raising an

industrial dispute on behalf of the workmen, it is not

necessary that the trade union must be recognized

union. Even some of the other workmen are entitled to

raise an industrial dispute on behalf of the concerned

workmen as group of workmen.

In 1960 SCC Online Mad 233 , Hon'ble High Court of

Madras has held that all that is necessary that the

dispute in order to become an industrial dispute should

have the support of substantial Section of the workmen

concerned in the establishment. If such a collective

dispute exists in relation to the matters specified by the

definition of an industrial dispute, then the conditions

required on the appropriate government to make a

reference of the dispute for adjudication are satisfied.

In various judgments, the Hon'ble Apex Court has stated

that any worker represented by union either registered

or unregistered can proceed with the case unde r

Industrial Dispute Act as because the registration or

non-registration of any union does not cause to brush

aside or wipe out the existence of industrial dispute.

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Resultantly industrial dispute always exists between

the employer and employer or employer and employees

with relating to condition of employment and terms of

employment. In this context registration or non -

registration is not so significant. Rather dispute is

required to be addressed.

Therefore, the ratio decendi of the judgments of the

Hon'ble Apex Courts and various High Courts, it is

settled that industrial dispute can be raised by any

group of workers, unions either registered or un -

registered those who espoused the common interests of

the workers.

If that be the view of the Hon'ble Apex Court, then the

industrial dispute espoused by any union either

registered or un-registered, if referred by the government

will be the subject for adjudication by the Tribunal.

Here in the case, the OP tried to point out that the

judgement passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court before the

amendment of Section 2qq of the Industrial Dispute Act

i.e. before 1984 and Section 2A before 1965 and these

are not applicable.

But, I am not agreed with the argument of the

OP/Company as because Section 2A has given a right to

any individual workman for coming to the Tribunal

straightway on compliance of prior formalities for

seeking relief as it was not ensured in 2K of the

definition of industrial dispute. It implies that union

either registered or un-registered always has the right to

raise the industrial dispute and espouse the same for

seeking relief.

It is also relevant to state that in the given case the

Union No. 1 was registered union under the Trade Union

Act from the very inception of the proceedings. And at

the time of hearing argument, the registration of Union

No. 1 has been withdrawn by the competent authority

on 27.07.2023. For such withdrawal of certificate for

registration will have no effect in the entire proceedings.

In addition to that, it can be said that there is no

retrospective effect in de-registered of trade union in on

going industrial dispute proceedings.

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In view of above, in the given fact of the case, the

subsequent cancellation of the certificate of registration

against the Union No. 1 does not have any effect on the

merit of the proceedings.

As such, the point raised by OP/Company is having no

merit and liable to be rejected.”

3. Hence, the writ application, being aggrieved by the

impugned order.

4. The petitioner’s case in short is that the State

Government being the appropriate Government, by an order of

reference dated 15/16.03.2005, referred an issue of charter of

demand to the Learned Fourth Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata for

adjudication.

5. On 19.05.2008, by a Government Order, the same was

transferred to the Learned First Industrial Tribunal, Government

of West Bengal.

6. In between 12.11.2008 to 09.02.2016, both the parties

that is Respondent No. 2 and the petitioner herein produced

their respective witnesses who were discharged after being fully

cross-examined.

7. On 20.07.2023, the registration of the union being

Respondent No. 2 has been cancelled by the Appropriate

Authority under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Thereafter, two

applications were filed on behalf of the petitioner on 27.07.2023

raising maintainability of the instant case based on the de -

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registration of the Respondent No. 2 as well as taking up such

point first by keeping in abeyance other issues. An objection was

filed on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 to the said application on

04.08.2023.

8. The aspect of de-registration was challenged at the

instance of the Respondent No. 2 in WPA No. 16813 of 2025. By

a judgment and order dated 14.08.2025 this Hon'ble Court was

pleased to direct the Respondent No. 2 to file a statutory appeal

in connection with the order of cancellation dated 20.07.2023

and the said order has not been upset by the Hon'ble Division

Bench till today.

9. The petitioner herein is aggrieved that by an order dated

02.02.2026, the Respondent Tribunal allowed the Respondent

No. 2 to take part in the pending case though it became a

deregistered entity thereby acting against the statutory

provisions as well as the law of the land decided by the Hon'ble

Apex Court.

10. In course of hearing, both parties have filed their

respective written notes along with judgments relied upon.

11. The petitioner on filing written notes has argued

whether the Respondent No.2 being an unregistered union can

represent an Industrial Dispute or take part in the judicial

proceedings pending before the Learned First Industrial Tribunal

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after amended definition of Trade Union under Section 2(qq) of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short "the said Act of

1947").

12. It is further argued by the learned senior counsel Mr.

Kar, appearing for the petitioner that undisputedly, trade unions

can be classified into two (2) categories. One is registered and the

other one is unregistered. Now the question arises as to out of

these two categories, which category of union enjoys statutory

protection and / or statutory recognition. The right, title and

obligations of a trade union finds place in the Trade Unions Act,

1926 and the same is meant for the trade unions registered

there under and not otherwise.

13. The petitioner relies upon Section 15(c) of the Trade

Unions Act, 1926 which is as follows:-

“The prosecution or defence of any legal proceeding to which

the Trade Union or any member thereof is a party, when

such prosecution or defence is undertaken for the purpose of

securing or protecting any rights of the Trade Union as such

or any rights arising out of the relations of any member with

his employer or with a person whom the member

employees.”

14. It is further stated that a registered Union and its office

bearers and its members enjoys immunities under certain acts.

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15. It is further stated that Section 2(qq) provides, a trade

under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Section 36 provides that a

workman may be represented by a registered trade union.

16. The following judgments are relied upon in support of

their case by the petitioner:-

i. Ramchandra Keshav Adke (Dead) by LRs. and Ors. vs

Govind Joti Chavare and Ors.(1973) 1 SCC 559 , Para

25.

“25. A century ago, in Taylor v. Taylor, Jassel,

M. R. adopted the rule that where a power is

given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the

thing must be done in that way or not at all and

that other methods of performance are

necessarily forbidden. This rule has stood the

test of time. It was applied by the Privy Council,

in Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor and later by this

Court in several cases, to a magistrate making a

record under Sections 164 and 364 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1898. This rule squarely

applies "where, indeed, the whole aim and object

of the Legislature would be plainly defeated if

the command to do the thing in a particular

manner did not imply a prohibition to do it in any

other." The rule will be attracted with full force in

the present case, because non-verification of the

surrender in the requisite manner would

frustrate the very purpose of this provision.

Intention of the Legislature to prohibit the

verification of the surrender in a manner other

than the one prescribed, is implied in these

provisions. Failure to comply with these

mandatory provisions, therefore, had vitiated the

surrender and rendered it non est for the

purpose of Section 5(3) (b).”

ii. State of Odisha and Anr. vs Satish Kumar Ishwardas

Gajbhiye and Ors. (2021) 17 SCC 90, Para 12, 18.

Page 9

“12. To proceed with a structured preliminary

enquiry, it must have statutory sanction. A

statutory authority can do only such acts which

are permissible under the statute and the

authority cannot be permitted to do something

which is not provided in law. This principle was

formulated by the Calcutta High Court nine

decades ago in Maniruddin Bepari v. Chairman

of the Municipal Commissioners [Maniruddin

Bepari v. Chairman of the Municipal

Commissioners, 1935 SCC OnLine Cal 296] , in

which it was inter alia held : (SCC OnLine Cal)

“It is a fundamental principle of law that a

natural person has the capacity to do all lawful

things unless his capacity has been curtailed

by some rule of law. It is equally a fundamental

principle that in the case of a statutory

corporation it is just the other way. The

corporation has no power to do anything unless

those powers are conferred on it by the statute

which creates it.”

18. We have quoted the judgment

[Maniruddin Bepari v. Chairman of the

Municipal Commissioners, 1935 SCC OnLine

Cal 296] of the Calcutta High Court, with which

we concur. The principle of law that emerges

from that judgment is that though a private

citizen is permitted to do what is not prohibited

in law, a statutory authority can do only what

is permissible in law. As such in our

considered view, the order directing the

preliminary inquiry in the present case, in the

form it was undertaken, was not justified in

law. In situations where Rules do not provide

for holding preliminary enquiry before initiating

disciplinary action, the principle laid down

in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah [Champaklal

Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India, 1963 SCC

OnLine SC 42 : AIR 1964 SC 185 4] would

prevail. But the nature of enquiry in such a

situation would be in the nature of information

gathering exercise, on the basis of which the

authorities would decide whether to proceed in

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the matter or not. In this case, as we have

already observed, the preliminary enquiry

resulted in issue of article of charges, the

phrasing of which clearly revealed formation of

opinion of the authorities in finding of guilt of

Respondent 1.”

iii. B. Srinivasa Reddy vs Karnataka Urban Water Supply

& Drainage Board Employees Association and Ors.

(2006) 11 SCC 731 (II), Para 36, 38, wherein the Court

held:-

“36. In Parents Teachers Assn. v. Chairman,

Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan [AIR 2001 Raj 35 :

(2000) 6 SLR 68] speaking for the Bench, Dr. Ar.

Lakshmanan, C.J., in paras 12 and 13 observed as

under: (AIR pp. 38-39)

“12. The appellant-petitioners have not placed

before this Court any document to show that the

Parents-Teachers Association is a registered and

recognised association. The writ petition has been

allegedly filed in public interest and the alleged

large interest of the students. It is evident that the

so-called Parents-Teachers Association is an

unregistered and unrecognised association and,

therefore, in our view, has no fundamental right to

approach this Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution. This point has been concluded by the

decision of the Apex Court in Mahinder Kumar

Gupta [(1995) 1 SCC 85 : JT (1995) 1 SC 11] and

by the decision of Full Bench of this Court in RSEB

Accountants' Assn. [RSEB Accountants' Assn. v.

Rajasthan SEB, (1996) 1 SLR 467 (FB)] A reply to

the preliminary objection raised by the respondents

was also made by the appellants. It is stated that

the Parents-Teachers Association has been

recognised by the KVS and that the Principal is the

Vice-Chairman of the said Association and hence,

the Association is competent to file the writ petition

on behalf of the students. In our view, the above

reason cannot be considered as a valid reason for

Page 11

maintaining the writ petition. It is not in dispute

that the Association is not a registered body and

recognised association. Thus, after examining this

point of law in detail and placing reliance on

various judgments delivered by the Apex Court

from time to time, the Full Bench of this Court in

RSEB Accountants' Assn. [RSEB Accountants'

Assn. v. Rajasthan SEB, (1996) 1 SLR 467 (FB)]

held as under:

„It may also be observed that an unregistered

association has no fundamental right to approach

this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and

this point is concluded by the decision in Mahinder

Kumar Gupta v. Union of India [(1995) 1 SCC 85 :

JT (1995) 1 SC 11] . A decision in Akhil Bharatiya

Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Rly.) v. Union of India

[(1981) 1 SCC 246 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 50 : AIR 1981

SC 298] was relied upon where the non-registered

association was held to apply under Article 32 of

the Constitution. We may observe that there had

been a number of instances of pub lic interest

litigation where large body of persons is having

grievance against inaction of the State. Even letters

have been considered to be a writ petition but all

these are the matters where large section of public

is affected and the personal interest of any person

or a smaller section as in the present case, is not

involved. Even in People's Union for Democratic

Rights v. Union of India [(1982) 3 SCC 235 : 1982

SCC (L&S) 275 : AIR 1982 SC 1473] when the

question of locus standi was considered, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court had taken into

consideration the poverty, illiteracy and the

ignorance obstructing and impeding accessibility of

the judicial process and on that ground it was

considered that the writ petition can be filed. In

D.S. Nakara v. Union of India [(1983) 1 SCC 305 :

1983 SCC (L&S) 145 : AIR 1983 SC 130] the old

pensioners individually were unable to undertake

journey through labyrinths of costly and protracted

legal judicial process for allowing to espouse their

cause. In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1981 Supp

SCC 87 : AIR 1982 SC 149] poverty, helplessness

and disability or social or economic disadvantaged

position was considered a sufficient ground for

Page 12

maintaining the writ petition. There had been other

decisions of the Apex Court as well and principles

which emerge from all of them are as under:

(a) That the members of the said association should

have sufficient strength so as to come in the

category of a large section of public.

(b) That the members should be identifiable.

(c) That the members must be of the category of

poor/illiterate/helpless or disabled.

(d) That the individual members must not be

capable of filing a writ petition.

(e) That the entire body of the members must

authorise the association to protect their legal

rights.

(f) That such an association must have its own

constitution, and

(g) That there must be authority to file a writ

petition on behalf of all the members.‟

13. In the instant case, none of the grounds

mentioned above in (a) to (g) have been satisfied by

the present appellants to maintain the writ petition.

Since the above conditions are not fulfilled such an

unregistered association cannot file writ petition in

respect of the legal rights of the said association for

the alleged breach of fundamental right as the

association itself has no fundamental right of its

own.”

38. In the writ petition filed by Respondents 1 and

2 their locus standi to challenge the appointment of

the appellant was asserted in the following words:

“The petitioner Association is a trade unio n

registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The

petitioner is the only registered trade union existing

in the 2nd respondent Board. The Board has held

several negotiations with the petitioner Union with

regard to the service conditions of the employees of

Page 13

the 2nd respondent Board since its formation in the

year 1986. The Board has entered into several

settlements with the petitioner Union with regard to

their service conditions. The petitioner which is a

recognised trade union is entitled to agitate the

matter with regard to the appointment of the 3rd

respondent to the Board. The petitioner is

concerned about the functioning of the 2nd

respondent Board, and as such is entitled to

question the appointment of the 3rd respondent as

Managing Director on contract basis. Hence, the

petitioner has locus standi to file this writ petition.”

(emphasis supplied)

These averments were established to be false. The

registration of the first respondent under the Trade

Unions Act had been cancelled as early as on 2-11-

1992. It is not a registered and recognised union. In

fact, it was pointed out that the one recognised

association is the Karnataka Urban Water Supply

and Drainage Board Officers' and Employees'

Association and the first respondent does not have

even a handful of members. The fact of cancellation

of registration of the first respondent came to the

knowledge of the appellant long after the disposal

of the earlier Writ Petition No. 44001 of 1995

wherein the Court had given a finding that the first

respondent has locus standi to challenge the

appointment of the appellant to the post of

Managing Director of the Board solely on the

ground that it is a registered trade union. In our

opinion, the High Court gravely erred in refusing to

examine the question of locus standi on the ground

that it is decided in the earlier writ petition which

operates as res judicata and that the petitioners

even otherwise have locus standi. Chapter III of the

Trade Unions Act, 1926 sets out rights and

liabilities of the registered trade unions. Under the

said enactment, an unregistered trade union or a

trade union whose registration has been cancelled

has no manner of right whatsoever, even the rights

available under the ID Act have been limited only to

those trade unions which are registered under the

Trade Unions Act, 1926 by insertion of clause 2(qq)

in the ID Act w.e.f. 21-8-1984 defining a trade

union to mean a trade union registered under the

Trade Unions Act, 1926.”

Page 14

iv. Calcutta Port Trust Union vs Haldia Shore Ship

& Transport H andling Workers Co -operative

Construction Society Ltd. & Anr. , 2013 SCC

OnLine Cal 6440.

“Reference to the tribunal was made by the

Central Government in terms of the order

passed by the Division Bench of this Court in

FMAT No. 3452 of 1993 and FMAT 3291 o f

1993. Section 14 of the Trade Union Act in

explicit and unequivocal words says that the

registration of any Trade Union under the

Society Registration Act, 1960, the Co -

operative Society Act, 1912, and the

Companies Act, 1956, shall be void. The

reference was made under the Industrial

Dispute Act, 1947 wherein the Trade Union is

defined as Trade Union Registered under the

Trade Union Act, 1926. Therefore, any Trade

Union, who is not registered under the Trade

Union Act, cannot be treated as the Trade

Union under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.

Section 36 which deals with the

representation of a parties in clear terms

stipulates that a workman is entitled to be

represented in any proceeding under the

Industrial Dispute Act by any member of the

executive or other office bearer of a Registered

Trade Union.

The word „Registered Trade Union‟ is of great

significance and can imbibe within it's contour

the Trade Union Register under the Trade

Union Act and not otherwise. The said section

further takes care of the interest of the

workman who is not a member of a Trade

Union to be represented by any member of the

executive or other office bearer of any Trade

Union connected with or by other workmen

employed in the industry in which the worker

is employed. In any of such eventualities, the

representation is to be made through a Trade

Union Registered under the Trade Union Act

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and not through any Association or Union

which is not recognized under the said Act.

Section 14 of the Trade Union Act declares the

registration of a Trade Union under the Co-

operative Society Act to be void. It does not get

valid recognition in a proceeding initiated

under the Industrial Dispute Act. The Union

seeking addition in a proceeding under the

Industrial Dispute Act must have a legal

recognition in relation to the said proceeding

and capable of enforcing such right for which

it is formed and/or constituted. The said

Union cannot be termed to be necessary

and/or proper party as it cannot validly

espouse the cause of its member in a reference

proceeding before the Tribunal which is a

creature of the Industrial Dispute Act. The

statutory tribunal cannot travel beyond its

authority limited under the Act which

constituted it. The Industrial Dispute Act does

not recognize the Trade Union other than those

who are registered under the Trade Union Act

and, therefore, the tribunal should not have

allowed the application for addition of party.”

17. It appears that the written notes also includes

submission on merit which this Court is not inclined to go into

at this stage considering the issue involved in the impugned

order.

18. The petitioner argues that so far as the judgment of 2000

(4) LLN 1086 Secretary (Policy) Regional Director (Food)

Employees Association vs FCI and Ors. is concerned, it deals

with the power of an "unrecognized union" to raise an industrial

dispute. Admittedly, the concept of registration is a statutory

provision under the said Act of 1926 read with the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947. In fact, a registered union may be an

Page 16

unrecognized one by the employer but that does not prevent it

from raising an industrial dispute whereas an unregistered

entity cannot get such privilege under the said Act of 1947. The

entire statutory scheme makes a clear distinction between a

body of workmen acting informally and a "trade union"

recognized by law. Once the legislature has defined "trade union"

in Section 2(qq) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to mean a

trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926, the

consequence is clear: rights, privileges and representational

capacity under the Act, wherever conferred on a trade union, are

available only to such registered union. The definition is

exhaustive and not illustrative. Accordingly, after cancellation

of registration, Respondent No. 2 cannot continue to assert

statutory rights as a "trade union" under the Industrial

Disputes Act.

19. It is further stated by the petitioner that the Learned

Tribunal misdirected itself in law while holding that withdrawal

of the registration of the Respondent No. 2 cannot have a

retrospective operation being totally oblivious of the fact that

Section 36 of the said Act of 1947 has already created a

legal impediment for the said Union to take part in the

proceedings as of now. It is fundamental that no civil

proceedings can sustain on the eventuality of the death of the

Page 17

Petitioner / Plaintiff unless proper steps are taken by the legal

heirs, if any. The de registration of the Respondent No. 2 is really

a civil death of the said Union in the eye of law and as a

consequence thereof, it is stripped off from all statutory

protection and rights from the date it has got the Order of

Cancellation. In such view of the matter, the conclusion of the

Learned Tribunal pertaining to retrospective operation is totally a

misconceived one.

20. The respondent no. 2 has countered the case of the

petitioner herein and argues that for an industrial dispute to be

maintainable before a tribunal, the trade union espousing the

dispute must be registered and/or recognized under the

applicable trade union laws; if the union loses registration but

was validly registered at the time the dispute was raised, its

locus to maintain the dispu te may still be subject to

adjudication.

21. The respondent no. 2 further argues that Section 10 of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, specifically states that no

disputes shall exceed three months . A dispute becomes an

industrial dispute even where it is sponsored by a union which is

not registered. In the instant case there are 40/50 permanent

staff (including Officer/Managerial Staffs approximately 5 to 10

in numbers) out of 40/30 workmen our union has 12 to 15

Page 18

members which constitutes a substantial number for continuing

with the dispute and it is a settled law that a substantial

numbers is required to maintain the dispute in respect of the

said dispute, the petitioner relies upon the judgment of the

Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 304 Para 5 , State of Bihar vs

Kripa Shankar Jaiswal.

22. It is further argued that Section 10(8) of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 specifically says that " No proceeding

pending before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal in

relation to an industrial dispute shall not lapse merely by reason

of the death of any of the parties to the disputes being a

workman, and such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal

shall complete such proceeding and submit its award to the

appropriate Government".

23. The respondent relies upon the following judgments:-

i. Newspapers Ltd. vs U.P. State Industrial Tribunal &

Ors. AIR 1960 SC 1328 Para -4,

ii. Workmen of India Express (P) Ltd. vs Management

1969(1) SCC 228 Para 07.

iii. Management of Gammon (India) Ltd. vs State of Orissa

and Ors. 1973 SCC Online Ori 267 Para-8.

24. It is further stated that a proceeding starts upon a

reference, continues and shall be deemed to have concluded only

Page 19

when the award becomes enforceable under Section 17A of th e

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and that for the purpose of raising

an industrial dispute on behalf of the workmen it is not

necessary that the trade union must be a recognized union.

25. As such it is stated that the order No. 223 dated

02.02.2026 passed by the Learned Tribunal does not suffer from

any error apparent on the face of the record and hence the same

should not be interfered with.

26. In respect of the judgments relied upon by the petitioner,

it appears that the judgments in Ramchandra Keshav (Supra),

Laxmichand (Supra) and Satish Kumar Ishwardas (Supra),

the same apply, to the acts of the statutory authorities.

27. The judgment in B. Srinivas Reddy (Supra) states

about the statutory rights of rights and liabilities of a registered

trade union under the trade unions act, 1926 and denial of the

same to an unregistered one or whose registration has been

withdrawn.

28. The observations in Haldia Shore ship (Supra) is in

respect of an union seeking to be added as a party, wherein the

union was not a valid union registered under the Trade Unions

Act, 1929 and was an union barred under Section 14 of the Act.

29. Admittedly in the present case, on 15.03.2005, the

reference in the present case was made in respect of a dispute

Page 20

raised by two registered Trade Unions representing their

members.

30. The registration of one of the Unions “Peerless Hotels and

Trade” workers union (respondent no. 2 herein) was withdrawn/

cancelled on 20.07.2023.

31. Only the respondent no. 2 union was taking part in the

proceedings when its registration was withdrawn.

32. The other registered union who jointly raised the dispute

was not participating in the proceeding.

33. The sole contention of the petitioner herein is that as the

trade union which is participating in the proceeding has lost its

registration, it can no more continue to participate in the

proceedings as it has losts it’s rights under Section 14 of the act.

34. The petitioner prays for deteting the respondent no. 2

from the order of reference in the present case.

35. The dispute in this case was regarding “charter of

demands” of the respondent no. 2 representing its members.

36. In WPA 20373 of 2 008 Steel Authority of India

Limited, IISCO Steel Plant vs The State of West Bengal &

Ors., order dated 18.08.2025, this Court held:-

“27. Once a valid reference is made, the referring

government becomes functus officio, it cannot

cancel or withdraw the reference.

28. In State of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguly, AIR

1958 SC 1018, the Supreme Court was of the

view that:-

Page 21

“Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947, does not confer on the appropriate

Government the power to cancel or supersede a

reference made thereunder in respect of an

industrial dispute pending adjudication by the

tribunal constituted for that purpose. Nor can s.

21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, vest such a

power by necessary implication.”

37. A reference to a tribunal survives even after the

registration of a trade union has been cancelled. Under Indian

labor law, an industrial dispute properly referred to an Industrial

Tribunal or Labour Court remains valid and active regardless of

whether the initiating union's registration is subsequently

withdrawn.

38. The reference to a tribunal concerns the su bstantive

rights of the workmen, not merely the legal standing of the union

itself. Cancellation of a union's registration under the Trade

Unions Act, 1926 does not extinguish the underlying industrial

dispute.

39. Once an industrial dispute is validly referred to a tribunal

by the appropriate government, the cancellation or dissolution of

the union does not render the reference infructuous or void. The

dispute survives as it is fundamentally a matter between the

affected workmen and the employer.

40. Even if a union loses its registration, individual workmen

or groups of workmen can continue to pursue the dispute and

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can often be represented by authorized office-bearers or other

advocates before the tribunal, as long as the representation is

permissible under Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947.

41. Under industrial law, an unregistered trade union

generally lacks the statutory standing to initiate or formally

represent workers in proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal

or Labour Court. Once a union loses its registration, its capacity

to act as a legal entity in formal disputes is impacted.

42. According to Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947, a workman who is a party to a dispute is entitled to be

represented by an officer of a registered trade union. An

unregistered union cannot officially espouse the cause of its

members as a recognized corporate body.

43. Although the union itself may lose its locus standi upon

cancellation of its registration, the workers who are parties to the

dispute are not left entirely without a voice. The affected

workmen can usually continue to participate in the proceedings

through alternative avenues.

44. The workers can choose to represent themselves

directly or be represented by other authorized fellow

workmen.

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45. Admittedly as stated by the petitioner on 14.08.2025, the

High Court by an Order in WPA 16813 of 2025 while dealing

with the aspect of de registration of Respondent No. 2 was

pleased to direct the said Union to approach the Appellate

Authority under Section 11 of Trade Unions Act, 1926 within 30

days from the said Order but the Union did not avail of such

opportunity, instead preferred an appeal which is pending at the

instance of the said Union, before a division bench of this Court.

46. In Polypharma Pvt. Ltd. vs Kamgar Sabha, 22

August, 2005, (2006) ILLJ620BOM, the Bombay High Court

held:-

“12. Espousal of a dispute cannot have a restricted

meaning. It cannot be confined to mere initiation of a

dispute. The dictionary meaning of the word

"espousal" is -"the act of espousing or betrothing; the

taking upon oneself of eg. a cause)". Espousal,

therefore, would include not only the initiation but

also taking up the cause till its logical conclusion.

Therefore, this submission of Mr. Mokashi is also

without any merit. It is a well settled position of law

that subsequent withdrawl of support by a Trade

Union will not affect the character of the dispute nor

will it take away the jurisdiction of an Industrial

Tribunal. What is required to be noticed is

whether on the date the reference was made , a

trade union had espoused the cause. Admittedly,

in the present case, the MGKU had sponsored the

dispute and continued to do so till the reference was

made.”

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47. It appears that the respondent no. 2 had preferred a writ

application (WPA 16830 of 2025) challenging the cancellation of

the registration of the respondent no. 2 Union by the registrar of

trade union who had passed an order on merit. In the said writ

application vide an order dated 14.08.2025 the Court granted

liberty to the respondent no. 2 to prefer an appeal under Section

11 of the Trade Unions Act before the appellate authority. It is

submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 that

an appeal has been preferred against the said order dated

14.08.2025 which is pending.

48. Considering the said conduct of the said petitioner and

the relevant provision of the trade Unions Act as referred to by

this Court in this judgment, this Court is of the view that the

respondent no. 2 being admittedly an unregistered trade union

at present, cannot participate any further in the proceedings

before the tribunal. But the materials and evidence already on

record is to be considered by the tribunal. It appears that the

reference before the learned tribunal is in respect of a charter of

demand regarding revision of various issues, espousing the

cause of a substantial number of workmen , who are the

members of the said union.

49. As the reference remains a valid reference, the workmen,

being a substantial number of members of the union, which has

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lost it’s registration are at liberty to appear/participate in the

reference case to continue/pursue the dispute as the dispute

and the reference survives fundamentally, being a matter

between the workmen and the employer, until the unions gets it

registration or the reference is disposed of, whichever is earlier.

50. WPA 5407 of 2026 is disposed of.

51. Connected application, if any, stands disposed of.

52. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

53. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied

for, be supplied to the parties expeditiously after due compliance.

[Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.]