RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page1 of 23

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Reserved on: 10

th

February, 2026

Pronounced on: 27

th

February, 2026

+ RFA(COMM) 665/2025, CAV 461/2025, CM APPL. 74948/2025,

CM APPL. 74949/2025 & CM APPL. 74950/2025

1. TANISHQ AGENCIES ,

No. 3 GRD FLR. KAVERI ROYAL APT.

SWARN JAYANTI NAGAR, RAMQHAT ROAD,

ALIGARH- 202001, UTTAR PRADESH.

THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR/AR -

SMT. NEHA GUPTA,

ALSO AT: 2/614, RMBAGH COLONY,

GALI NO. 3, RAMGHAT ROAD, ALIGARH,

UTTAR PRADESH.

2. TANISHQ AGENCIES,

No. 3 GRD FLR. KAVERI ROYAL APT.

SWARN JAYANTI NAGAR, RAMGHAT ROAD,

ALIGARH- 202001, UTTAR PRADESH .

THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR/AR

MR. RAJNEESH VARSHNEY (RAJA). .....APPELLANTS

Through: Mr. Amish Tiwari, Adv.

versus

M/S VENTURA INTERN ATIONAL PVT LTD

AT.1/120, FIRST FLOOR, WHS, KIRTI NAGAR,

NEW DELHI-110015.

THROUGH ITS FINANCE CONTROLLER

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page2 of 23

SH. SANJAY AGARWAL. .....RESPONDENT

Through: Mr. Karan Sinha, Adv.

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL

JUDGMENT

AJAY DIGPAUL, J.

CM APPL 74949/2025 & CM APPL 74950/2025 (Condonation of

delay of 1,000 days in filing and 14 days in re-filing the appeal)

1. These applications by the appellants/defendants

1

seek condonation

of delay in filing and re-filing the present appeal. The time limit for

challenging a money decree as laid down under Section 13 of the

Commercial Court Act, 2015, is 60 days, with the present appeal being

filed after a delay of 1,000 days.

2. Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, allows a court to condone delay

where sufficient cause is shown. The application for condonation assigns

the reason for this delay as an inability to contact their counsel due to

COVID-19 and update themselves regarding the dates of hearing, and

that their counsel was negligent in not appearing at the stage of plaintiff

evidence. The application states that the existence of the ex-parte decree

against the appellants only first came to the appellants‘ knowledge on

1

Appellants hereinafter

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page3 of 23

receipt of notice in execution proceedings against them in February 2025

from a commercial court in Aligarh, U.P.

3. Seeing as to how all allegations against the appellants‘ previous

counsel are unsubstantiated by any earlier formal action against him, we

are not inclined to condone the present delay of 1,000 days. We

emphasise that sufficient cause to condone delay cannot exist in the

absence of diligence shown on the part of a litigant.

4. This is especially so due to the object of the Commercial Courts

Act in ensuring strict adherence of timelines by parties to facilitate the

speedy disposal of suits, coupled with the law laid down by the Hon‘ble

Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources

Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. M/s Borse Brothers

Engineers & Contractors P Ltd.

5. The applications stand disposed of for the aforesaid reasons.

RFA (COMM) 665/2025

6. Despite our refusal to condone the delay of 1,000 days in filing the

present appeal, we deem it appropriate to apply our minds to its

substance, owing to a litigant‘s substantive right to a first appeal.

7. This regular first appeal

2

filed under Section 13 of the Commercial

Court Act, 2015, assails ex-parte judgment and decree dated 21.12.2022

passed by the learned District Judge (Commercial Court) – 01, West

2

RFA

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page4 of 23

District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in CS (COMM) 185/2019, whereby

the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff

3

has been partially decreed in its

favour to the extent of ₹8,34,336/- along with interest at 10% per annum

accruing from 09.01.2019, along with costs of ₹15,707/-.

8. The appellants later moved an application under Order IX Rule 13

of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, praying that the ex-parte judgment

and decree dated 21.12.2022 be set aside. This application came to be

dismissed vide order dated 05.07.2025, which has not been impugned in

the present appeal.

9. Upon consent of counsel for both sides, we have decided to hear

this appeal finally.

The Impugned Judgment & Decree dated 21.12.2022

10. The case of the respondent is that the appellants are a

proprietorship concern carrying out trading related business and that the

respondent is a company engaged in the business of architectural interior

products, including laminates and allied materials. The respondent

supplied goods to the appellants against multiple invoices, of which six

invoices raised during the period of February to May 2016 comprised the

decretal amount sought. A running account was said to have been

maintained between the parties, against which, only part payments were

received against the invoices in question.

3

Respondent hereinafter

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page5 of 23

11. A legal notice dated 09.01.2019 was issued by the respondent

demanding payment of the outstanding amount, to which no response

was received from the appellants.

12. Application for mandatory pre-institution mediation was made by

the respondent on 21.02.2019. Subsequently, noting that there was no

appearance on behalf of the appellants on both dates (16.03.2019 and

08.04.2019) despite service of notices upon the appellant, a non-starter

report came to be issued on 08.04.2019, i.e., about 46 days later, by the

Delhi Mediation Centre, Tis Hazari Courts.

13. The respondent instituted a suit for recovery of money on

23.05.2019 seeking recovery of ₹13,68,311/- inclusive of interest of 24%

on the ground of unpaid dues against goods supplied to the appellants, as

well as non-supply of requisite C forms, attracting a payment of ₹

1,11,257/- and ₹7,122/- as penalty and interest thereon, respectively.

However, it is only the latter amount of ₹7,122/- on Bill no. 1766 dated

29.02.2016 which had been claimed as recoverable on account of non-

supply of C forms.

14. The appellants filed their written statement dated 17.12.2019,

wherein it was pleaded that the suit lacks requisite cause of action, and

that the suit is barred by limitation, since parties did not have a running

account, leading to the correct computation of limitation periods to run

from the date of each individual invoice. The appellants also pleaded that

the respondent had suppressed material facts, and that transactions on the

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page6 of 23

basis of which the suit was instituted involved the supply of defective

goods.

15. In response to the written statement, the respondent filed its

replication denying the averments contained within the written statement.

The respondent‘s replication, along with other documents and the

statement of truth were taken on record thereafter vide order dated

20.01.2022.

16. The parties were referred to mediation pursuant to joint request

vide order dated 12.04.2022, and were directed to appear in person

before the Mediation Centre on 05.05.2022 at 2.00 pm. Yet again, a non-

starter report dated 14.07.2022 was issued due to non-participation of

parties.

17. Issues were framed vide order dated 07.07.2022, noting that oral

submissions were made regarding failure of mediation. Issues framed

stand reproduced thus:

―1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of Rs. 13,68,311/-

alongwith interest from the defendant as alleged? (OPP)

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of Rs. 7,122/- on

account of non submission of Form-C as alleged.? (OPP)

3. Whether there is no cause of action in favour of plaintiff?

(OPD)

4. Whether the suit is time barred by limitation? (OPD)

5. Relief.‖

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page7 of 23

18. The respondent led evidence by way of affidavit dated 22.08.2022

of PW-1/ Sanjay Kumar Agarwal, authorised signatory, whereby

purchase history of goods by the appellant from the respondent during

the year 2016 for the months of February to May were tabulated. The

same stands reproduced below for ready reference:

Sr. No. Invoice No. Date of

Purchase

Quantity Amount

1 83 16.04.2016 74.06 sqmt. 73,749.00/-

2 163 29.04.2016 73.72 sqmt. 74,168.00/-

3 180 03.05.2016 103.49 sqmt. 1,28,077.00/-

4 257 18.05.2016 54.12 sqmt. 67,112.00/-

5 258 18.05.2016 297.58 sqmt. 4,91,230.00/-

6 1766 29.02.2016 35.72 sqmt. 48,171.00/-

19. The respondent contended that no grievance of defective goods

was raised by the appellants in connection with these supplies. It was

further pleaded that the appellants assured to send the relevant C Forms

concerning the bills raised, and that upon their failure to do so, the

respondent made multiple requests for their supply along with payment

of the outstanding amount of ₹ 13,68,311/- with interest at 24% per

annum.

20. On 09.11.2022, PW-1‘s examination in chief stood completed, but

despite multiple calls, the appellants did not enter appearance. Owing to

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page8 of 23

this, cross examination of PW-1 stood closed, along with defence

evidence, and the appellants were proceeded against ex-parte.

21. The learned Trial Court, based on its findings qua the four issues

delineated, decreed the suit partially in favour of the respondent to the

tune of ₹ 8,34,336/- with interest at 10% per annum from 09.01.2019

until realisation, along with costs.

Proceedings under Order IX Rule 13

22. Against impugned ex-parte judgment and decree dated

21.12.2022, the appellants preferred an application under Order IX Rule

13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, whereby it was argued that

summons were received in February 2025 from the Commercial Court,

Aligarh, U.P, concerning execution proceedings, and that subsequently

on 18.02.2025, when the appellants appeared before the said court, it was

only then that it became aware that it was proceeded against ex-parte vis-

à-vis the impugned judgment and decree. Thereafter, it is the appellant‘s

case that the previous counsel was unreachable between 18.02.2025 to

23.03.2025, after which a new counsel was engaged.

23. The court observed that at the time of framing of issues, the

appellants‘ previous counsel was duly present, and that their allegations

regarding previous counsel‘s lack of diligence was not substantiated by

any complaints to the concerned Bar Council. Holding that it was the

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page9 of 23

duty of the appellants to pursue their case diligently, and that the plea

against their previous counsel‘s conduct appears to be an afterthought to

evade liability, the application under Order IX Rule 13 stood dismissed.

Submissions before this Court

24. Mr. Amish Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellants, advances his

submissions on the following fronts:

a. The plaint of the respondent was not accompanied by a

statement of truth, rendering it non est and unreliable, and

that the plaint has not been appended with signatures of the

respondent on every page.

b. There has been non-compliance with Section 12 A of the

CC Act due to non-service of notice for pre-litigation

mediation on appellant (by post and electronic means) in

terms of Rule 3(2) of the CC Rules, 2018, and that the non-

starter report was obtained by fraud, vitiating the impugned

judgment and decree.

c. Complaints regarding defective goods raised by the

appellants‘ customers were duly communicated to the

respondents, who, in turn assured resolution.

d. The suit was decreed on the basis of false invoices and no

dues are outstanding on the side of the appellants with

respect to the respondent.

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page10 of 23

e. Non-compliance with order dated 23.12.2021 in terms of

payment of costs of ₹ 2,000/- to the appellants along with

one last opportunity to comply with order dated 28.10.2020,

and non-supply of copy of replication to the appellants

resulted in the respondent failing to prove contents of their

replication during examination-in-chief, amounting to

admission of all contents of the appellant‘s written

statement.

f. The suit was time barred as there was no running account

between the parties.

Analysis

25. Dealing with preliminary objections at the outset, we deem it

appropriate to examine whether the suit of the respondent was barred by

limitation.

26. The learned Trial Court has returned its finding on this issue, being

issue no. 4, at paragraph 16 of the impugned judgment. The same stands

reproduced below for ready reference:

“16. Issue no.4:- Whether the suit is barred by limitation:-

Defendants stated that suit was barred by limitation as the goods were

stated to be supplied in 2016 and there was no running account.

Plaintiff disputed this fact and stated that they were maintaining a

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page11 of 23

running account and the limitation would start from the date of last

invoice. Defendants have not led any corroborative evidence nor have

cross examined PW-1 on this issue. The plaintiff on the contrary has

placed on record the ledger account for the period 01.04.2016 to

31.03.2017. As per the same, there were entries being maintained both

for sales as well as part payments received from time to time. This

document supports plaintiff‘s contention that there was a running

account between the parties. In regard to limitation, the last entry is

shown to be of 18.05.2016 and the closing of the financial year would

be of 31.03.2017. The suit is shown to be filed in May 2019 and

plaintiff had also approached pre-litigation mediation on 21.02.2019

and the report was issued on 08.04.2019, as such, the suit is within the

limitation, period of 3 years from date of cause of action. Hence, this

issue is decided against the defendants and in favour of plaintiff.‖

27. In its finding, the learned Trial Court has held Article 1 of the

limitation Act to be applicable to the facts of the case. Article 1 of the

Limitation Act stands reproduced thus:

THE SCHEDULE

(PERIODS OF LIMITATION)

[See sections 2(j) and 3]

FIRST DIVISION — SUITS

Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which

period begins to run

PART I — SUITS RELATING TO ACCOUNTS

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page12 of 23

1. For the balance due on

a mutual, open and current

account, where there have

been reciprocal demands

between the parties.

Three years. The close of the year in

which the last item

admitted or proved is

entered in the account;

such year to be computed

as in the account.

28. A perusal of Article 1 reveals that the pre-requisites of its

application are found in four factors –

1) mutual,

2) open,

3) current account,

4) where there have been reciprocal demands between the parties.

All four of these factors must stand to have been satisfied to compute

limitation in accordance with the Article 1 of the Limitation Act.

29. On the point of factors 2) and 3), we observe that they stand

satisfied by virtue of the ledger account maintained by the respondent

concerning transactions with the appellant. The ledger account has been

led into evidence and the same stands reproduced below:

Date Particulars Vch

Type

Vch

No

Debit Credit

1-4-2016 To Opening

Balance

2,40,894.00

6-4-2016 To @ 2% CST

Sales

Retail

Invoice

83

73,749.00

29-4-2016 To @ 2% CST Retail 163 74,168.00 73,414.00

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page13 of 23

Sales Invoice

By HDFC Bank

Ltd.

Receipt 130

3-5-2016 To @ 2% CST

Sales

Retail

Invoice

180 1,28,077.00

17-5-2016 By HDFC Bank

Ltd CC A/C

(CC HDFC)

Receipt 233 1,67,480.00

18-5-2016 To @ 2% CST

Sales

Retail

Invoice

257 67,112.00

To @ 2% CST

Sales

Retail

Invoice

258 4,91,230.00

By Closing

Balance

10,75,230.00 2,40,894.00

8,34,336.00

10,75,230.00 10,75,230.00

30. Against this ledger account relied upon by the respondent, the

appellants in their written statement denied any outstanding liability

towards the respondent. However, not a shred of evidence was led by the

appellants to dispute this ledger of accounts, indicating that the

transactions did take place between the parties. In fact, not a whisper is

found in the written statement as to the appellants‘ version of

transactions, or the quantum of money paid against these invoices raised

by the respondent.

31. Owing to the same and agreeing with the observations of the

learned Trial Court to the extent of lack of evidence led by the appellants

as to the nature of account maintained with the respondent, we hold that

the ledger account of the respondent stands unrebutted, and that the

account was of a current and open nature.

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page14 of 23

32. As to factors 1) and 4), both premised on the existence of mutual

obligations between the parties, we are of the view that goods appear to

have been supplied by the respondent to the appellants, creating

obligations of repayment upon the appellants, and that no cross

obligation as created against the respondent. Reliance to this extent is

placed upon paragraphs 13 to 15 of this Court‘s decision in Bharath

Skins Corporation v Taneja Skins Company Pvt. Ltd.

4

:

―13. From the aforesaid observations, it can be deduced that for the

creation of an open, current and mutual account, there must be an

intention between the parties, either express or implied, which may be

deducible from the course of dealings to have mutual dealings,

creating reciprocal obligations, independent of each other. A ‗demand‘

in relation to a matter of account means a ‗claim for money‘ arising

out of a ‗contractual business relationship‘ between the parties. Where

the dealings between the parties disclose a ‗single‘ contractual

relationship, there will be demands only in favor of one party. For

instance, where the relationship between ‗A‘ and ‗B‘ is that of lender

and borrower respectively, ‗A‘ will have a ‗demand‘ against ‗B‘ in

respect of every item of loan advanced. But ‗B‘ can have no demand

against ‗A‘. Where the dealings between the parties disclose ‗two‘

contractual relationships, there will arise demands in favor of each

side against the other. For instance, where ‗A‘ advances money to ‗B‘

from time to time as loan, and ‗B‘ engages ‗A‘ as his agent for the sale

of goods sent by ‗B‘, there are two contractual relationships between

the parties: one of lender and borrower and the other, that of principal

and agent. ‗A‘ as creditor may have several demands against ‗B‘ who

as principal may have, independently, several demands against ‗A‘.

The real test, therefore, to see whether there have been reciprocal

demands in any particular case is to see: Whether there is a ‗dual

contractual relationship‘ between the parties.

14. Where ‗A‘ sells goods to ‗B‘ from time to time and ‗B‘ makes

payments towards the price from time to time there is only a ‗single‘

4

2011 SCC OnLine Del 5523

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page15 of 23

contractual relationship, namely that of buyer and seller, between the

parties. ‗A‘ has demands against ‗B‘ for items sold, but ‗B‘ can have

no ‗demands‘ against ‗A‘. Such case is not one of reciprocal demands

and thus Article 85 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908

corresponding to Article 1 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963

will not apply to suits on such accounts…

15. In view of the above discussion, since the dealings between the

parties disclose a single contractual relationship i.e. of buyer and seller

between them, the account between them cannot be termed as a

‗mutual‘ account. As a necessary corollary, Article 1 of the Schedule

to the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application in the present case.‖

33. Therefore, we arrive at the conclusion that Article 1 of the

limitation act would not apply to the present set of facts. Though the

ledger account is undoubtedly of open and current nature, there is no

indication of mutual obligations upon parties.

34. This conceives the question of how limitation may be computed in

the present case, which also stands answered in Bharath Skins (supra),

wherein, it was observed that there being no Article in the Schedule to

the Limitation Act dealing with suits for recovery of money due on

running and current but non-mutual accounts, the residual article, Article

113, would stand attracted. Paragraphs 24 and 25 of the decision stand

reproduced thus:

“24. There being no Article in the Schedule to the Limitation Act,

1963 dealing with suits for recovery of money due on running and

current but non-mutual accounts, in such circumstances, the residual

article viz. Article 113 applies to such suits.

25. Under Article 113, the period for limitation for filing a suit is

three years and the same begins to run when the right to sue would

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page16 of 23

accrue when claim was denied in response to the legal notice dated

26.06.1985 on 13.07.1985 but since Rs. 7,000/- was paid on

13.07.1985 and 24.07.1985 (Rs. 2,000/- on the former date and Rs.

5,000/- on the latter date), limitation would commence from

24.07.1985. The suit being filed on 02.09.1985, governed for purposes

of limitation by Article 113 the suit would be within limitation.‖

35. Article 113 prescribes the computation of limitation for filing a

suit as three years beginning to run from when the right to sue would

accrue. In the present set of facts, legal notice dated 09.01.2019 was not

denied, and the fact that this notice was sent years after the period during

which debts accrued, cannot be construed as having an effect of

extending the date from which limitation may be computed.

36. Apropos this interpretation, reference is drawn to the ledger

account exhibited by the respondent, according to which the last payment

by the appellants appears to be a sum of 1,67,480/-paid on 17.05.2016.

Considering that payments were not made stricto sensu per invoice, and

that sums were paid to discharge accruing obligations represented by the

balance due at the foot of the ledger account, it is trite that limitation can

be said to accrue from the date of last payment, as this speaks to an

acceptance of obligation, and that the last payment on record would be

the last event of such acceptance.

37. Keeping in mind the ratio of Bharath Skins (supra), 17.05.2016

becomes the operative trigger point for computation of limitation.

Reckoned therefrom, the period of three years expired on 17.05.2019.

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page17 of 23

The suit having been instituted on 23.05.2019 would, prima facie, reflect

a delay of six days.

38. Notwithstanding this, the proviso to Section 12A of the

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 mandates exclusion of the period spent in

pre-institution mediation for the purposes of limitation. The record

indicates that the respondent approached the District Legal Services

Authority, West District, Tis Hazari Courts on 21.02.2019, and a non-

starter report was issued on 08.04.2019. Therefore, the intervening period

from 21.02.2019 to 08.04.2019, being less than three months, ought to be

excluded. Upon such exclusion, the suit instituted on 23.05.2019 falls

within the prescribed period of limitation.

39. However, we do not uphold the reasoning of the learned Trial

Court, that, owing to the account being a running account, and the

implicit application of Article 1 of the Limitation Act that is gatherable

from an intelligent reading of paragraph 16, though not said in so many

words, that limitation would stand to be calculated from the close of the

relevant financial year, i.e., 31.03.2017.

40. Being satisfied on the point of limitation, we shall now consider

the argument of non-service of the notices of pre-institution mediation

upon the appellants. This argument lies in the teeth of the non-starter

report by West District Legal Services Authority dated 08.04.2019,

which specifically records notices to the appellants on two occasions,

also recording the appellants‘ non-appearance on both counts.

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page18 of 23

41. The non-starter report is a document carrying the sanction of the

concerned district legal services authority, a creature of statute, and

would not stand vitiated by a mere allegation of fraud, or any allegation

contrary to the observations contained in such report.

42. Section 29 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, is relevant

in this context and reads thus:

"Section 29. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic

record made in performance of duty- An entry in any public or

other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a

fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the

discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance

of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such

book, register or record or an electronic record, is kept, is itself a

relevant fact."

43. Section 23 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, operates as

a deeming fiction to the extent of deeming members and officers of legal

service authorities as public servants as under Section 21 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860.

44. These provisions imbue the non-starter report with a higher degree

of credibility, which if assailed, must be done with ample proof and

cogent reasoning to discredit its content. In the present case, there

appears to be nothing more than a general averment of non-service of

pre-institution mediation notice, coupled with vague allegations of the

non-starter report being procured through fraud.

45. There is a significant burden upon the appellants to prove that no

such notices were received if they wish to succeed on this line of

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page19 of 23

argumentation. Neither is such burden discharged by the averments

contained within their written statement before the learned Trial Court,

nor through the contents of the present appeal.

46. Addressing allegations regarding defective goods being supplied

by the respondent, it is borne out of the written statement before the

learned Trial Court, as well as the contents of the present appeal that the

appellants have expended not a single breath in substantiating this

averment. Aside from leading some handwritten complaints by

customers into evidence, there is no proof of these complaints being put

to the respondent.

47. All that remains for us to ascertain is the merit, if any, to

arguments concerning deficiencies in the respondent‘s plaint, and the

respondent‘s compliance with Order dated 23.12.2021, which records

non-compliance with earlier order dated 28.10.2020 despite last

opportunity, and also imposes costs of ₹ 2,000/- on the respondent.

48. As to the first portion of this argument, regarding the submission

of the plaint not being appended with an affidavit of truth, we are, quite

frankly, amused.

49. The appellants, notwithstanding this submission, have itself

chosen to append the respondent‘s statement of truth with the present

appeal at Annexure A-6. The presence of this document is also

confirmed from a perusal of the learned Trial Court‘s record, as well as

the content of the learned Trial Court‘s order dated 20.01.2022.

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page20 of 23

50. The appellant‘s argument of the respondent not signing every page

of the plaint does not hold much water. This argument does not find

mention in its written statement and appears to be an afterthought at the

stage of first appeal. Even if taken at its absolute best, this could not

possibly be a ground to invalidate the impugned decree since it is a

curable defect. This is even more because the learned trial Court‘s record

confirms that the evidence affidavit is signed, and that the plaint has been

appended with a statement of truth.

51. Notwithstanding, it is trite that defects relating to verification,

signatures, or non-filing of a Statement of Truth are procedural and

curable in nature, and do not render the plaint non est. The Hon‘ble

Supreme Court as well as this Court has held that such irregularities do

not go to the root of matter, and may be rectified at a later stage, with the

rectification dating back to the institution of the suit, particularly in

commercial matters where procedural compliance is intended to secure

authenticity, rather than to defeat substantive rights.

52. In Vidyawati Gupta & Ors. v Bhakti Hari Nayak & Ors

5

, the

Hon‘ble Supreme Court, with respect to the curable nature of procedural

defects, inter-alia noted the following –

―49. In this regard we are inclined to agree with the consistent view

of the three Chartered High Courts in the different decisions cited by

Mr. Mitra that the requirements of Order 6 and Order 7 of the

Code, being procedural in nature, any omission will not only be

curable but will also date back to the presentation of the plaint. …

5

(2006) 2 SCC 777

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page21 of 23

In our view, as has been repeatedly expressed by this Court in various

decisions, rules of procedure are made to further the cause of justice,

and not to prove a hinderance thereto. Both in Khayumsab and Kailash

although dealing with the amended provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of the

Code, this Court gave expression to the salubrious principle that

procedural enactments ought not to be construed in a manner which

would prevent the Court from meeting the ends of justice in different

situations.

―50. The intention of the legislature in bringing about the various

amendments in the Code with effect from 1-7-2002 were aimed at

eliminating the procedural delays in the disposal of civil matters. The

amendments effected to Section 26, Order 4 and Order 6 Rule 15,

are geared to achieve such object, but being procedural in nature,

they are directory in nature and non-compliance therewith would

not automatically render the plaint non-est, as has been held by the

Division bench of the Calcutta High Court.‖

53. As to the second portion, concerning non-compliance with order

dated 23.12.2021, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the following

orders:

“23.12.2021

Present: Sh Jitender Kumar, Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff.

None for the defendant.

Despite last opportunity, plaintiff has not complied with the

order dated 28.10.2020.

In the interest of justice, subject to cost of Rs.2,000/- to be paid

to the defendant one last opportunity granted to the plaintiff for

compliance of order dated 28.10.2020.

List the matter on 20.01.2022.

At 11.05 AM

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page22 of 23

At this stage Ms Sanjana Tiwari, Ld Counsel for the defendant has

appeared and she has been notified of the order passed today. Put up

on the date fixed i.e. 20.01.2022.‖

XXXXXXX

“28.10.2020

Present: None.

According to Reader, he sent whatsapp message to counsel for

plaintiff and counsel for defendant nos. 1 & 2 but there is no response.

According to Reader, each page of plaint does not bear

signature of plaintiff and same is not accompanied by statement of

truth. Plaintiff to do the needful.

Further, according to Reader, each page of written statement

filed by the defendant nos.1 & 2 does not bear their signatures. Same

is also not accompanied by statement of truth. Defendants to do the

needful.

IN view of non appearance today, application under Order 8

Rule 1 CPC shall be taken up on the next date.

Be put up on 11.01.2021.”

54. The argument of non-compliance with Order dated 23.12.2021 is

directly contradicted by Order dated 20.01.2022, which speaks for itself

and stands reproduced thus:

“20.01.2022

VIRTUAL HEARING

Present: Sh JK Ghalyan,

RFA(COMM) 665/2025 Page23 of 23

Ld Counsel for the plaintiff.

None for the defendant.

Ld Counsel for the plaintiff states that he has complied with

the previous order and filed replication, list of documents and

statement of truth. Same are taken on record. Copy is stated to be sent

to the defendant through courier.

Put up for framing of issues on 12-04-2022.

At 11.30 AM

At this stage, Sh AK Tiwari, Ld Counsel for the defendant has

appeared and he has been notified of the order passed today and

NDOH.‖

55. Therefore, having examined the appellants‘ contentions alleging

that the suit was barred by limitation, that there were discrepancies with

the plaint and the non-starter report qua pre-institution mediation, that

the goods supplied were defective and were based on fake invoices, and

that the respondent failed to comply with order dated 23.12.2021, we are

not persuaded by the appellants‘ case.

56. For the aforesaid reasons, the present appeal fails and is disposed

of, along with pending applications, if any.

AJAY DIGPAUL

(JUDGE)

NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE

(JUDGE)

FEBRUARY 27, 2026/gs/av