Page No.# 1/17

GAHC010224962024

2025:GAU-AS:5189

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

Case No. : RSA/220/2024

MUSST ASIA KHATUN

W/O LATE JAMUDDIN, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2, URANGBASTI, PS

NOWBOICHA, DIST LAKHIMPUR, ASSAM

VERSUS

PATRIK URANG AND 4 ORS

S/O LATE SIMON URANG, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2, URANGBASTI, PS

NOWBOICHA, DIST LAKHIMPUR, ASSAM

2:KELMEN URANG

S/O LATE PHILIP URANG

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI

PS NOWBOICHA

DIST LAKHIMPUR

ASSAM

3:BILIYAM URANG

S/O LATE ANTA SIUJ URANG

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI

PS NOWBOICHA

DIST LAKHIMPUR

ASSAM

4:ALBINOD URANG

S/O LATE ANTA SIUJ URANG

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI Page No.# 1/17

GAHC010224962024

2025:GAU-AS:5189

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

Case No. : RSA/220/2024

MUSST ASIA KHATUN

W/O LATE JAMUDDIN, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2, URANGBASTI, PS

NOWBOICHA, DIST LAKHIMPUR, ASSAM

VERSUS

PATRIK URANG AND 4 ORS

S/O LATE SIMON URANG, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2, URANGBASTI, PS

NOWBOICHA, DIST LAKHIMPUR, ASSAM

2:KELMEN URANG

S/O LATE PHILIP URANG

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI

PS NOWBOICHA

DIST LAKHIMPUR

ASSAM

3:BILIYAM URANG

S/O LATE ANTA SIUJ URANG

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI

PS NOWBOICHA

DIST LAKHIMPUR

ASSAM

4:ALBINOD URANG

S/O LATE ANTA SIUJ URANG

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI

Page No.# 2/17

PS NOWBOICHA

DIST LAKHIMPUR

ASSAM

5:PAULUCH URANG

S/O LATE ANTA SIUJ URANG

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI

PS NOWBOICHA

DIST LAKHIMPUR

ASSA

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A GANGULY, MR. A DHANUKA

Advocate for the Respondent : MS. P BHATTACHARYA ( ALL RESPONDENTS), MR. T J

MAHANTA(ALL RESPONDENTS),MR. A BORUA ( ALL RESPONDENTS),MS P SARMA ( ALL

RESPONDENTS)

Linked Case : RSA/216/2024

NURUL AMIN

S/O ABDUL GOFUR

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI

PS NOWBOICHA

DIST LAKHIMPUR

ASSAM

VERSUS

PATRIK URANG AND 4 ORS

S/O LATE SIMON URANG

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI

PS NOWBOICHA

DIST LAKHIMPUR

ASSAM

2:KELMEN URANG

Page No.# 3/17

S/O LATE PHILIP URANG

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI

PS NOWBOICHA

DIST LAKHIMPUR

ASSAM

3:BILIYAM URANG

S/O LATE ANTA SIUJ URANG

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI

PS NOWBOICHA

DIST LAKHIMPUR

ASSAM

4:ALBINOD URANG

S/O LATE ANTA SIUJ URANG

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI

PS NOWBOICHA

DIST LAKHIMPUR

ASSAM

5:PAULUCH URANG

S/O LATE ANTA SIUJ URANG

RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NO. 2

URANGBASTI

PS NOWBOICHA

DIST LAKHIMPUR

ASSAM

------------

Advocate for : MR. A GANGULY

Advocate for : MS. P BHATTACHARYA (ALL RESPONDENTS) appearing for

PATRIK URANG AND 4 ORS

BEFORE

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH

Advocate for the appellant(s) : Mr A Ganguly.

Advocate for the respondent(s) : Ms P Bhattacharya.

Date of Hearing and Judgment : 29.04.2025

Page No.# 4/17

JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)

Heard Mr A Ganguly, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellants, in both the appeals and Ms P Bhattacharya, the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5, in both the appeals.

2. Both the appeals are directed against the common judgment and Decree

dated 01.08.2024, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division),

Lakhimpur, at North Lakhimpur (hereinafter, referred to the Learned First

Appellate Court), in Title Appeal No. 4/2024, thereby confirming the judgment

and decree, 04.01.2024, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division No.

1), Lakhimpur, at North Lakhimpur (hereinafter, referred to as the Learned Trial

Court), in Title Suit No. 39/2019. As both the appeals arise out of Title Suit No.

39 of 2019, and challenges the judgment and decree dated 01/08/2024, passed

by the Learned First Appellate Court, both the appeals are taken up together to

ascertain as to whether any substantial question of law can be formulated in

terms with Section 100 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “the

Code”). For the purpose of ascertaining the said, this Court finds it relevant to

take note of the facts, which led to the filing of the present appeals. For the

sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to, in the same status as

they stood before the Learned Trial Court.

3. The respondents herein, as plaintiffs had filed a suit before the Learned

Trial Court, which was registered and numbered as Title Suit 39 of 2019,

seeking declaration of their right, title and interest, over the suit land, as

described in the plaint, along with recovery of Khas possession; for a decree for

cancellation of the mutation of the defendants, as well as for permanent

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injunction. The case of the plaintiffs in the suit was that a plot of land

admeasuring 7 Bighas 0 Katha 4 Lechas, was the ancestral property of the

plaintiffs. One Simon Orang, who was the father of the plaintiff No. 1 and the

grandfather of the plaintiff Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 was the pattadar of the said land.

After the death of Simon Orang, the names of the plaintiffs were mutated. On

04.04.2013, the name of the defendant No. 1 was mutated by the Circle Officer,

Naoboicha, over a plot of land admeasuring 1 bigha, 2 kathas, 10 lechas, which

is a part of the ancestral property of the plaintiffs, admeasuring 7 Bighas 0

Katha 4 Lechas. It was alleged that on 17.07.2013, the defendant No. 2's name

was also mutated against another plot of land admeasuring 4 bighas, 4 kathas 4

lechas. This land which was also mutated in the name of the defendant No. 2,

was a part of the ancestral land belonging to the plaintiffs. At this stage, it is

very pertinent to mention that a land in question fell within the tribal belt, as

constituted by the State Government, in terms with Chapter X of the Assam

Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 (for short, “the Regulation”). Taking into

account that the mutation was carried out behind the back of the plaintiffs as

alleged, the plaintiffs filed a Review Appeal No. 4 of 2015, but as the plaintiffs

were not satisfied with the outcome of the said Appeal. It was also alleged in

the plaint that the plaintiff had also filed a Misc Case No. 127/2014, under

Section 107/145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “the

CrPC”), before the Court of the Additional District Magistrate, but the prayer so

made in the said application was rejected by an order dated 28.09.2018. It was

also alleged that the plaintiffs paid land revenue over the suit land, till 2013 and

since then the Mouzadar refused to accept payment of land revenue from the

plaintiffs. It is under such circumstances, the plaintiffs have sought for the relief,

as already mentioned hereinabove.

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4. The defendants filed their joint written statement. In the said written

statement, it was alleged that the father of the plaintiff Nos. 3, 4 and 5, namely,

one Atmasius Orang (since deceased), who was the Pattadar, during his lifetime,

sold his share, which is the suit land to the defendant No. 1 and the defendant

No. 2, and handed over the possession. It was further mentioned that Late

Atmasius Orang also signed the Chitha book, and in the year 2013, the name of

the defendants were mutated over the suit land. It was also mentioned that as

more than three years have passed since the date of mutation, and the right,

title and interest of the defendants is, therefore, proved. At Paragraph No. 5 of

the written statement, the defendants pleaded that the father of the plaintiff

Nos. 3, 4 and 5, had handed over the possession to the defendants and signed

the Chitha and as such, the defendants have right, title and possession over the

suit land. It was also mentioned at Paragraph No. 6 that the plaintiffs had filed

RA Nos. 4/2015 and 5/2015, but did not take any steps to prosecute the same

and hence, they were dismissed. At Paragraph No. 7, it was mentioned that the

proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for

short, “the CrPC”), were dismissed, on the ground that the plaintiffs could not

prove their possession. It was also mentioned that in the said proceedings

under Section 145 of the CrPC, it was held that the defendants were in

possession of the suit land, since 20 years. At Paragraph No. 8 of the written

statement, it was further mentioned that the suit land being a land, falling

within the Chapter X of the Regulation, the civil court's jurisdiction was barred.

5. On the basis of the pleadings above noted, the Learned Trial Court framed

6 (six) issues, which are reproduced hereinunder:-

“i) Whether there is cause of action for filing the suit?

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ii) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and manner?

iii) Whether the suit is barred by the law of limitation?

iv) Whether the plaintiffs have the right, title and interest over the suit

land?

v) Whether the defendants have right, title and ownership by the right of

purchase from the pattadars?

vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get any relief and if so what?”

6. During the trial, the plaintiffs adduced the evidence of 6 (six) witnesses

and exhibited various documents. On behalf of the defendants, 5 (five)

witnesses were examined and various documents were also exhibited.

7. The Learned Trial Court, after dealing with the evidence on record, passed

the judgment and decree on 04.01.2024, declaring that the plaintiffs have right,

title and interest over the suit land; the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the Khas

possession over the suit land by evicting the defendants; the mutation of the

names of the defendants over the suit land was held to be illegal and liable to

be cancelled and further, the plaintiff was also granted a decree for permanent

injunction, as was sought for.

8. Being aggrieved, the appellants herein, who were the defendant Nos. 1

and 2, preferred an appeal, being Title Appeal No. 4 of 2024, before the

Learned First Appellate Court. The Learned First Appellate Court, vide the

judgment and decree dated 01.08.2024, dismissed the appeal and confirmed

the judgment and decree passed by the Learned Trial Court. It is under such

Page No.# 8/17

circumstances, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have filed these two separate

appeals, by invoking the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code, being RSA

No. 220 of 2024 and RSA No. 2016/2024, respectively.

9. In the backdrop of the above, this Court finds it relevant to take note of

that in both the appeals, identical questions of law have been proposed to be

substantial questions of law involved in the appeals. The questions of law so

proposed in both the memo of appeals are reproduced hereinunder:

i) Whether the Ld. Courts below committed gross error of law in

failing to consider the effect of the admitted position that the

Appellants/Defendants were in continuous adverse possession of the

suit land since the last 20 years?

ii) Whether the Ld. Courts below committed gross error of law in

failing to consider the effect of the admission of the respondents/

plaintiffs admitted position that the Late Atmasius Orang had himself

delivered possession of the suit land to the Appellants/Defendants

and hence his legal heirs would be estopped from claiming their

right, title and interest over the suit land?

iii) Whether the Ld. Courts below committed gross error of law in

failing to consider that the respondents/plaintiffs utterly failed to

plead and prove that their suit claiming a decree of possession was

not barred by the law of limitation, more so in view of the stand of

the Appellants/defendants that they were in possession of the suit

land since the last 20 years?

10. The question which arises is, as to whether the questions of law so

proposed, can at all be formulated as substantial questions of law in terms with

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Section 100 (4) of the Code. For appreciating the said, this Court finds it

relevant to take note of the submission made by Mr A Ganguly, the learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, in both the appeals. Mr Ganguly

has submitted that the materials on record would show that the plaintiffs have

also admitted in their evidence that the defendants were in possession over the

suit land for a period of 20 years, and as such, the possession of the defendants

are required to be taken as adverse to the plaintiffs as well as their

predecessors, which both the Courts failed to take into account. He further

submitted that in a suit based upon title, along with the reliefs for possession,

the plaintiffs are required to prove when the plaintiffs were dispossessed and in

absence thereof, no decree can be granted in favour of the plaintiffs for

recovery of possession. Additionally, Mr Ganguly further submitted that a

perusal of the plaint would show that there is no compliance to the provisions of

Order VII Rule 1 (e) of the Code, and, as such, the suit could not have been at

all decreed in favour of the plaintiffs.

11. In view of the said submissions, let this Court now consider as to whether

on the basis of the said submission so made by the learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the appellants, the questions of law so proposed can be

formulated.

12. The first question so proposed, pertains to whether the Courts below had

committed gross error of law, in failing to consider that the appellants were in

continuous adverse possession of the suit land since the last 20 years. This

Court, in the previous segments of the instant judgment, have duly taken note

of the pleadings of the defendants, who are appellants herein. In the written

statement filed by the defendants, there is not a single whisper, as to when the

Page No.# 10/17

defendants claim that the possession had become adverse to the plaintiffs or

their predecessors in interest.

13. It is a trite principle of law, as would be seen from the judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of T Anjanapppa and Others –Vs-

Somalingappa and Another; reported in (2006) 7 SCC 570, that mere

possession, however long it may be, does not necessarily mean that it is

adverse to the true owner and the classical requirement of acquisition of title by

adverse possession is that such possession are in denial of the true owner's

title.

14. The Supreme Court in the case of Chatti Konati Rao and Others –Vs-

Palle Venkata Subba Rao; reported in (2010) 14 SCC 316, further detailed

out what are the requirements of claiming adverse possession. Paragraph - 14

of the said judgment being relevant, is reproduced hereinunder:

”14. In view of the several authorities of this Court, few whereof

have been referred above, what can safely be said that mere possession

however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true

owner. It means hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in

denial of the title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse

possession the possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and

in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The

possession must be open and hostile enough so that it is known by the

parties interested in the property. The plaintiff is bound to prove his title

as also possession within 12 years and once the plaintiff proves his title,

the burden shifts on the defendant to establish that he has perfected his

title by adverse possession. Claim by adverse possession has two basic

Page No.# 11/17

elements i.e. the possession of the defendant should be adverse to the

plaintiff and the defendant must continue to remain in possession for a

period of 12 years thereafter.”

15. In the backdrop of the above, it is very pertinent to take note of that

merely because, the plaintiffs admit that the defendants are in possession of the

suit property for the last 20 years, cannot be considered that the possession of

the defendants are adverse to the plaintiffs or even their predecessors-in-

interest. This Court, further finds it relevant to take note of that in the pleadings

of the defendants, not only, there is nothing mentioned, as to when their

possession had become adverse, but on the other hand, it is seen that the

defendants have claimed title through the plaintiffs as well as through the

predecessors in interest of the plaintiff Nos. 3, 4 and 5, as would be apparent

from a perusal of Paragraph No. 4 and Paragraph No. 6 of the written

statement.

16. In the case of Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil and Others–Vs- Balwant

and Another; reported in (1995) 2 SCC 543, the Supreme Court,

categorically observed that the claim of independent title and adverse

possession at the same time, amounts to contradictory pleas. It was observed

that when the possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be

considered to be adverse and the reason being that, a person whose possession

can be referred to a lawful title, will not be permitted to show that his

possession was hostile to another title. It was also observed that, when a

person enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that

title by pretending that he had no title at all. In the instant case, a perusal of

the pleadings would show that the defendants had claimed the rights on the

basis that the land had been sold by the predecessors of the plaintiff Nos. 3, 4

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and 5, in favour of the defendants. However, no such deed of same was

exhibited. It is, however, very interesting to take note of that there was a Chitha

mutation done in the year 2013, on a basis that the predecessors of the plaintiff

Nos. 3, 4 and 5 had signed before the revenue authorities in the Chitha book. It

is relevant to take note of that the suit was filed in the year 2019 and the Chitha

mutation was done in the year 2013. So, under such circumstances, till 2013,

the defendants have duly acknowledged that the plaintiffs as well as the

plaintiffs’ predecessors-in-interest had the title over the land, and as such, the

question of law, so proposed as regards adverse possession, or for that matter,

that the defendants had adverse possession, merely on the basis that they had

possession over 20 years, cannot be framed as a substantial question of law in

terms with Section 100 (4) of the Code.

17. The second question of law, so proposed, pertains to as to whether the

plaintiffs were estopped from claiming their right, title and interest over the suit

land, on the basis that they admitted during the cross examination that, Late

Atmasius Orang had himself delivered possession of the suit land to the

defendants. This Court has duly considered that in order to vest a title over an

immovable property to another person, such vesting has to be within the

confines of law. In the instant case, the defendants claimed that Late Atmasius

Orang had sold the land to them, however, there were no documents produced

to substantiate the same. The suit land which is situated in an area, where both

the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the Registration Act, 1908 duly applies.

Under such circumstances, the transfer or vesting of the title upon the

defendants has to be in a manner recognized by law. Merely delivering a

possession of the suit land by Late Atmasius Orang, would not confer any rights

upon the defendants to have ownership over the suit property, inasmuch, as the

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title over the suit property continues to be to remain with the plaintiffs, pursuant

to the death of their predecessor-in interest. Under such circumstances, the

second question of law, so proposed to be substantial question of law, cannot

be formulated as a substantial question of law, involved in the instant appeals.

18. The third question of law, so proposed to be a substantial question of law,

pertains to, as to whether the suit, seeking recovery of possession was barred

by the laws of limitation, in view of the admission that the defendants were in

possession of the suit land since the last 20 years. As already mentioned, while

dealing with the first question of law, so proposed, however long the possession

may be, it does not convert into a adverse possession, unless and until it is

pleaded and proved in accordance with law. Under such circumstances, the third

question of law, so proposed in the memo of the appeals, cannot also be

formulated as a substantial question of law, involved in the instant appeals.

19. In addition to that, this Court also finds it relevant to take note of the

submission so made by Mr Ganguly to the effect that the plaintiffs having not

pleaded and proved, as to when they were dispossessed, the plaintiffs were not

entitled to a decree in the suit. The said submission, in the opinion of this Court

is totally misconceived, inasmuch, as, in a suit based upon title for recovery of

possession, has two parts. First, adjudication on the question of title and

secondly, once the title is being proved, the said suit takes the colour of an

ejectment suit. Once the suit takes the colour of an ejectment suit, it is for the

defendant to prove that he has a better right to remain in possession of the suit

property. In this regard, this Court finds it relevant to take note of a judgment of

the Supreme Court in the case of Indira vs. Arumugam and Another;

reported in (1998) 1 SCC 614, wherein the Supreme Court observed that

Page No.# 14/17

when a suit is based on title for possession, once the title is established on the

basis of relevant documents and other evidence, unless the defendant proves

adverse possession for the prescriptive period, the plaintiff cannot be non-

suited. This Court, further finds it relevant to take note of the judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandez vs.

Erasmo Jack De Sequeira; reported in (2012) 5 SCC 370, wherein the

Supreme Court categorically observed that in an action for recovery of

possession of an immovable property or for protecting possession thereof, upon

the legal title to the property being established, the possession or occupation of

the property, by a person other than the holder of legal title, will be presumed

to be under and in subordination to the legal title and it will be for the person

resisting a claim for recovery of possession or claiming a right to continue in

possession to establish that he has such a right. Paragraph Nos. 64, 65, 66 and

67 of the said judgment, being relevant are reproduced hereinunder:

“64. There is a presumption that possession of a person, other than

the owner, if at all it is to be called possession, is permissive on behalf of

the title-holder. Further, possession of the past is one thing, and the right

to remain or continue in future is another thing. It is the latter which is

usually more in controversy than the former, and it is the latter which has

seen much abuse and misuse before the courts.

65. A suit can be filed by the title-holder for recovery of possession

or it can be one for ejectment of an ex-lessee or for mandatory injunction

requiring a person to remove himself or it can be a suit under Section 6 of

the Specific Relief Act to recover possession.

66. A title suit for possession has two parts-first, adjudication of

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title, and second, adjudication of possession. If the title dispute is

removed and the title is established in one or the other, then, in effect, it

becomes a suit for ejectment where the defendant must plead and prove

why he must not be ejected.

67. In an action for recovery of possession of immovable property,

or for protecting possession thereof, upon the legal title to the property

being established, the possession or occupation of the property by a

person other than the holder of the legal title will be presumed to have

been under and in subordination to the legal title, and it will be for the

person resisting a claim for recovery of possession or claiming a right to

continue in possession, to establish that he has such a right. To put it

differently, wherever pleadings and documents establish title to a

particular property and possession is in question, it will be for the person

in possession to give sufficiently detailed pleadings, particulars and

documents to support his claim in order to continue in possession.”

20. Taking into account the above propositions of law, it is, therefore, the

opinion of this Court that the said submission so made by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants, is totally misconceived.

21. Lastly, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the submission made by

the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the plaint has not

been drawn up in accordance with Order VII Rule 1 (e) of the Code. This Court

finds it relevant to take note of that no objections were raised in the written

statement or even during the trial, as regards the deficiency in the plaint, being

not in compliance with Order Order VII, Rule 1 (e) of the Code. In this regard,

this Court finds it very pertinent to take note of the judgment of the Supreme

Page No.# 16/17

Court in the case of Santosh Hazari vs Purushottam Tiwari; reported in

(2001) 3 SCC 179, wherein the Supreme Court categorically observed at

Paragraph No. 14, that to be a question of law involved in the case, there must

be at first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should

emerge from the sustainable findings of fact, arrived at by the courts of facts

and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper

decision of the case. It was further observed that an entirely new point raised

for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case,

unless it goes to the root of the matter. Paragraph of 14 of the said judgment

being relevant is reproduced hereinunder:

“A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a

proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be

“substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled

by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material

bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as

the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law

involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the

pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings

of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that

question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new

point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question

involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will,

therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a

question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the

paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious

balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages

Order downloaded on 04-08-2025 10:05:31 PMPage No.# 17/17

and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.”

22. In that view of the matter, the said contentions so raised as regards the

deficiency in the plaint, in so far as non-compliance with Order VII Rule 1(e)

cannot be formulated as a substantial question of law, arises in the instant

appeals.

23. Considering the above, this Court does not find that there is any

substantial question of law, that can be formulated in the instant appeals, for

which both the appeals stand dismissed. However, in the peculiar facts of the

case, this court is not inclined to impose any costs.

24. It is seen that although the appeals have not yet been admitted, but

inadvertently, the records of the Courts below were called for. The Registry shall

return the records.

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant