2023INSC812 1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2006 OF 2023

N. RAMKUMAR ....APPELLANT

versus

THE STATE REP. BY

INSPECTOR OF POLICE

....RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ARAVIND KUMAR, J.

1.Heard.

2.This appeal is at the instance of a Convict-

Accused and is directed against the judgement and

order passed by the Madurai bench of Madras High

Court dated 28.10.2015 in Criminal Appeal (MD)

No.334 of 2013 whereunder the High Court dismissed

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the appeal filed by the appellant herein thereby

affirming the judgement and order of conviction and

sentence passed by the First Additional District Judge

(NCR) Tiruchirappalli in Case No.226 of 2010.

3.The facts in brief, shorn of unnecessary details

leading to the filing of this appeal are as under:

4.The case of the prosecution was that the

deceased Sangeetha was in love with the appellant

and she was unhappy with the conduct of the

appellant and her mother had also warned them in

this regard. It is further case of prosecution that

deceased stopped seeing the appellant and broke her

relationship with the appellant and deceased was

talking to her neighbour one Mr. Sudhakar and being

agitated with the said turn of events, appellant is said

to have trespassed into the house of the deceased on

19.06.2010 at about 10.30 p.m. and questioned her

conduct of talking to another person. It is stated by

the prosecution that appellant in a fit of rage, held the

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deceased by her ears and dashed her head against

the wall and fled away from the spot. PW-1 and PW-2

had admitted the deceased to the hospital and after

three days the complaint was lodged resulting in

registration of FIR No.1659 of 2010 for the offence

punishable under Sections 294(b), 448, 323 and

506(1) of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred

to as “IPC”) and Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu

Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act against the

appellant.

5.It is stated by the prosecution that on 28.06.2010

deceased who was under treatment started vomiting

blood and struggled to breathe and expired on

29.06.2010 at 3.30 a.m. On her demise the

Investigating Officer (PW-12) altered the charge to one

under Sections 294(b), 448, 323, 506(1) IPC, and 302

IPC and Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of

Harassment of Woman Act.

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6.The appellant – accused came to be tried for the

said offence and on the basis of the testimony of the

mother of the deceased (PW-1) and also taking into

consideration the deposition of neighbour (PW-2) who

claimed to have seen the accused fleeing away from

the scene of offence by taking into consideration the

attendant circumstance, learned First Additional

District Judge convicted the accused for the offence

punishable under Sections 450 & 302 IPC. The

accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of

Rs.50,000/- and in default to undergo simple

imprisonment for six months for the offence under

Section 450 and sentenced him and to undergo

imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.60,000/-

and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six

months for the offence under Section 302 IPC. The

sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

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7.The legality of the said judgment was questioned

before the High Court of Madras in Criminal Appeal

(MD) No.334 of 2013 and on re-appreciation of the

entire evidence, the High Court affirmed the judgment

of the Sessions Court by arriving at a conclusion that

it was the appellant who had caused the injury to the

deceased resulting in her death and the act of

accused in trespassing to the house of the deceased

was for committing the murder, had been clearly

established. It was also opined by the High Court that

deceased had given up her love for the accused and

she had developed relationship with one Mr. Sudhakar

which enraged the accused to wreak vengeance and

for this reason he had gone all the way to the house

of the deceased with a determination to eliminate her

and as such it would fall within the first limb of

Section 300 IPC and thus, he was liable to be

punished under Section 302 IPC. Hence, this appeal.

6

8.We have heard the arguments of learned

Advocates. It is the contention of Shri M. A.

Chinnasamy, learned counsel appearing for the

appellant, that there has been delay in filing the

complaint and on this ground alone the theory of the

prosecution cannot be considered as trustworthy. He

would also contend that conviction of the accused is

based on the sole testimony of PW-1 and the

contradictions in her testimony is manifestly clear and

is not trustworthy and cannot be relied on to convict

the appellant. The very fact that PW-1 was against the

love affair of her daughter with the accused having

been admitted by her would disclose the inimical

attitude against the accused. With regard to there

being blood in the floor of the kitchen is belied by the

statement of PW-12 (investigating officer) and so also

the statement of PW-5 who have not whispered a

word in that regard. He would also draw the attention

of the Court that theory of the prosecution as put

forth in the complaint lodged by PW-1 is that the

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accused had punched her daughter on the face and

she fell on the kitchen slab. However, in her evidence

she has deposed that accused held the ears of the

victim and dashed her against the wall. Though, PW-1

claimed that deceased was taken in an auto rickshaw,

non-examination of the driver of auto rickshaw would

create a doubt in the prosecution theory. Neither the

clothes of the accused nor of the victim was sent for

chemical analysis. He would also contend that in the

event this Court were to affirm the findings of the

courts below, he would pray for sentence being

converted to the one under second part of Section

304 of the IPC in as much as the accused had no

knowledge that his act is likely to cause death, as

such it would be culpable homicide not amounting to

murder.

9.Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent would support the impugned order and

has prayed for affirming the same. He would also

8

contend that the evidence tendered by the

prosecution has not been impeached and the

prosecution witnesses have stood the test of cross-

examination and as such the impugned order

deserves to be affirmed. He would further contend

that the accused having been in love with the

deceased was unable to digest the fact that she had

developed intimacy with her neighbour Sudhakar and

being dejected the accused had taken the extreme

step of eliminating the deceased and the reasons

assigned by the High Court while affirming the

judgment and sentence awarded by the Sessions

Court would not be required to be interfered with.

Hence, he has prayed for rejection of the appeal.

10. At the outset, it requires to be noticed that

while issuing notice of this appeal on 21.11.2016, it

was restricted for the purpose of conversion of the

offence. Hence, within this limited sphere this appeal

has to be examined, namely, as to whether

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judgement, order and sentence passed by the

Sessions Court and affirmed by the High Court

requires to be affirmed or the sentence is to be

converted and punishment to be awarded under

Section 304 of IPC and if so, which part of Section 304

IPC?

11.In the aforesaid background, it would be necessary

to discern the evidence available on record. The final

opinion given by the doctor for the cause of death as

evident from exhibit P-9 reads as under:

“The deceased would appear to have died

of “head injury”. (viscera report enclosed-

alcohol in other format was not detected”).

12.The doctor (PW-11) who conducted the post-

mortem of the deceased has deposed that he is the

author of the report Ex. P-9. He has also deposed that

injuries found therein can be inflicted when a person

slips and falls on the kitchen slab. He has admitted

that two injuries which he had identified had been

inflicted a week before, and were in the process of

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healing. PW-10 who is the doctor at Cauvery Hospital,

Trichy and had examined the deceased, has deposed

that deceased was conscious when he examined her

on 26.06.2010. He has also deposed that deceased

was in a good speaking condition. In the teeth of

aforesaid medical evidence available on record, the

testimony of eye-witness, namely, mother of the

deceased-PW-1 requires to be examined. A perusal of

the same would indicate she has deposed that on

19.06.2010 at 10:30 pm when she and her deceased

daughter were at home, accused had visited their

house and questioned her daughter as to why she was

talking to the neighbour Sudhakar and not talking to

him. She further deposes that after saying so, he

punched on her daughter’s face and held both her

ears and dashed her hard against the kitchen wall and

immediately her daughter fell down and her head was

broken and right ear was cut. It is thereafter she is

said to have shifted her daughter to Geetanjali

hospital and next day to KMC Hospital. The testimony

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of the uncle of the deceased – PW-2 which is on record

would disclose that he was returning from work at

10:45 pm on 19.06.2010 and he saw the accused

coming out of his mother in law’s house and heard her

cry and as such he rushed to her house and saw the

deceased lying in a fainted condition. On enquiry, PW-

1 is said to have informed him (PW2) about the attack

made by the accused.

13.Having given our anxious consideration as

regards the genesis of the incident and the role

attributed to the appellant herein and testimony of

the doctors who treated her and also who performed

the post-mortem of the deceased, discloses that

doctor has noted two injuries on the deceased: (i) cut

injury in the left ear measuring 3 centimetres and; (ii)

Two wounds in left head roughly measuring 7

centimetres and near to that another small injury.

The injuries, as noted in Post-Mortem Report Ex.P-9

are as under:

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“(i) Sutured wounds: - On the lobule of

right ear 2 cm in length. On removal of the

sutures, edges are irregular, 0.5 cm in

breadth and muscle deep, on the left tem-

poral region of the scalp, 7 cm in length. On

removal of the sutures, edges are irregular,

2 cm in breadth and bone deep, on the left

parietal region of the scalp, 2 cm in length.

On removal of the sutures, edges are ir-

regular, 1 cm in breadth and bone deep.

(ii) Resolving bruising of left temporal, left

parietal and left side of occipital regions of

scalp. Sub-dural haemorrhage and Sub

arachnoid haemorrhage on both cerebral

and cerebellar hemispheres. Fracture base

of skull-left middle cranial fossa present.”

14.The cause of death assigned in the post-mortem

report as already noticed is “died of head injury”. It is

a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and

“murder” is its species and all “murders” are

“culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides” are

not “murders” as held by this court in Rampal Singh

Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 289. The

intention of the accused must be judged not in the

light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what

is supposed to be the circumstances.

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15.In the case of Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu AIR

1956 SC 488 at page 490 the following observations

have been made:

“Of course, we have to distinguish between

motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is

something which prompts a man to form an

intention and knowledge is an awareness of

the consequences of the act. In many cases

intention and knowledge merge into each

other and mean the same thing more or

less and intention can be presumed from

knowledge. The demarcating line between

knowledge and intention is no doubt thin

but it is not difficult to perceive that they

connote different things. Even in some

English decisions, the three ideas are used

interchangeably and this has led to a

certain amount of confusion.”

16.It requires to be borne in mind that the test

suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that

the legislature has used two different terminologies,

‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments

are provided for an act committed with an intent to

cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and

for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is

likely to cause death without intent to cause such

bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be

14

unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal

terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would

be one of the circumstances to be taken into

consideration while determining or inferring the

requisite intent. Where the evidence would not

disclose that there was any intention to cause death

of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had

knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death,

the accused can be held guilty under second part of

Section 304 IPC. It is in this background that the

expression used in Indian Penal Code namely

“intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there

being a thin line of distinction between these two

expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given

facts and circumstances, would disclose that the

ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such

act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not

attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within

Part 3 of Section 300 IPC, it must be proved that there

was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury

15

which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient

to cause death. In other words, that the injury found

to be present was the injury that was intended to be

inflicted. This Court in the case of Pulicherla

Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy vs State of Andhra

Pradesh, AIR 2006 SC 3010 has observed:

“Therefore, the court should proceed to

decide the pivotal question of intention,

with care and caution, as that will decide

whether the case falls under Section 302 or

304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or

insignificant matters — plucking of a fruit,

straying of cattle, quarrel of children,

utterance of a rude word or even an

objectionable glance, may lead to

altercations and group clashes culminating

in deaths. Usual motives like revenge,

greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally

absent in such cases. There may be no

intention. There may be no premeditation.

In fact, there may not even be criminality.

At the other end of the spectrum, there

may be cases of murder where the accused

attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by

attempting to put forth a case that there

was no intention to cause death. It is for the

courts to ensure that the cases of murder

punishable under Section 302, are not

converted into offences punishable under

Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable

homicide not amounting to murder, are

treated as murder punishable under Section

302. The intention to cause death can be

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gathered generally from a combination of a

few or several of the following, among

other, circumstances: (i) nature of the

weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was

carried by the accused or was picked up

from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is

aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the

amount of force employed in causing injury;

(v) whether the act was in the course of

sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for

all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by

chance or whether there was any

premeditation; (vii) whether there was any

prior enmity or whether the deceased was a

stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave

and sudden provocation, and if so, the

cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it

was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the

person inflicting the injury has taken undue

advantage or has acted in a cruel and

unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused

dealt a single blow or several blows. The

above list of circumstances is, of course,

not exhaustive and there may be several

other special circumstances with reference

to individual cases which may throw light

on the question of intention. Be that as it

may.

17. This Court in the case of Pratap Singh @ Pikki

v. State of Uttarakhand (2019) 7 SCC 424 had

noticed that the deceased-victim had suffered total 11

injuries and had been convicted for offences under

Section 304 Part-II/Section 34 IPC apart from other

17

offences. It was noticed that some altercation took

place and the groups entered into scuffle without any

premeditation and convicted accused for the offence

punishable under Section 304 Part-II/Section 34 IPC.

Taking into consideration that the appellants therein

were young boys and had served sentence of more

than three years and five months and there was no

previous enmity, persuaded this Court that the

quantum of sentence is excessive and accordingly

sentenced them to the period already undergone for

the offence under Section 304 Part-II/ Section 34 IPC

by observing thus:

“27. We do find substance in what being

submitted by the learned counsel for the

appellant and in the first place, it is to be

noted that the trial Court, while awarding

sentence to the appellant has not made any

analysis of the relevant facts as can be

discerned from the judgment (page 96 −97

of the paper book) dated 12th January,

1998. Even the High Court has not

considered the issue of quantum of

sentence. From the factual position which

emerge from the record, it is to be noticed

that they were young boys having no

previous enmity and were collectively

sitting and watching Jagjit Singh night. On

some comments made to the girls sitting in

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front of the deceased, some altercation

took place and they entered into a scuffle

and without any pre −meditation, the

alleged unfortunate incident took place

between two group of young boys and it is

informed to this Court that the appellant

has served the sentence of more than three

years and five months. Taking into

consideration in totality that the incident is

of June 1995 and no other criminal

antecedents has been brought to our

notice, and taking overall view of the

matter, we find force in the submission of

the appellant that the quantum of sentence

is excessive and deserves to be interfered

by this Court.”

18. In the case of Deepak v. State of Uttar

Pradesh reported in (2018) 8 SCC 228 it came to be

noticed by this Court that incident had taken place in

the heat of the moment and the assault was by a

single sword blow in the rib cage was without any

premeditation and incident had occurred at the spur

of the moment, and thus inferred there was no

intention to kill and as such the offence was

converted from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II

IPC and the appellant was ordered to be released

forthwith by sentencing them to the period of

conviction already undergone. It was held:

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“7. On consideration of the entirety of

the evidence, it can safely be concluded

that the occurrence took place in the heat

of the moment and the assault was made

without premeditation on the spur of time.

The fact that the appellant may have

rushed to his house across the road and re-

turned with a sword, is not sufficient to in-

fer an intention to kill, both because of the

genesis of the occurrence and the single as-

sault by the appellant, coupled with the du-

ration of the entire episode for 1½ to 2 min-

utes. Had there been any intention to do

away with the life of the deceased, nothing

prevented the appellant from making a

second assault to ensure his death, rather

than to have run away. The intention ap-

pears more to have been to teach a lesson

by the venting of ire by an irked neighbour,

due to loud playing of the tape recorder.

But in the nature of weapon used, the as-

sault made in the rib-cage area, knowledge

that death was likely to ensue will have

to be attributed to the appellant.

8. In the entirety of the evidence, the facts

and circumstances of the case, we are

unable to sustain the conviction of the ap-

pellant under Section 302 IPC and are satis-

fied that it deserves to be altered to Sec-

tion 304 Part II IPC. It is ordered accord-

ingly. Considering the period of custody un-

dergone after his conviction, we alter the

sentence to the period of custody already

undergone. The appellant may be released

forthwith if not required in any other case.

9. The appeal is therefore allowed in part

with the aforesaid modification of the con-

viction and sentence.”

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19.This Court in a recent judgement in the case of

Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the

Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of

2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defined the

context of the true test to be adopted to find out the

intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act

as under:

“60. Few important principles of law

discernible from the aforesaid discussion

may be summed up thus:

(1) When the court is confronted with the

question, what offence the accused could

be said to have committed, the true test is

to find out the intention or knowledge of the

accused in doing the act. If the intention or

knowledge was such as is described in

Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC,

the act will be murder even though only a

single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is

bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing

his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots

‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously.

Here, there will be no difficulty in holding

that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was

to kill him, though only single injury was

caused. The case would, therefore, be of

murder falling within Clause (1) of Section

300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’

sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’

while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking

aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly

plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and

runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The

injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in

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ordinary course of nature to cause death.

There may be no difficulty in holding that

‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular

injury found to be caused and that the said

injury was objectively sufficient in the

ordinary course of nature to cause death.

This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause

(3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him

guilty of the offence of murder although

only single injury was caused.

(2) Even when the intention or knowledge

of the accused may fall within Clauses (1)

to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of

the accused which would otherwise be

murder, will be taken out of the purview of

murder, if the accused's case attracts any

one of the five exceptions enumerated in

that section. In the event of the case falling

within any of those exceptions, the offence

would be culpable homicide not amounting

to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section

304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is

such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of

Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence

under Part II of Section 304 if the case is

such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section

300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or

knowledge of the accused may be such that

only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the

IPC, may be attracted but not any of the

clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that

situation also, the offence would be

culpable homicide not amounting to murder

under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an

offence under Part I of that section, if the

case fall within 2nd part of Section 299,

while it would be an offence under Part II of

Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part

of Section 299 of the IPC.

(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an

accused person falls within the first two

clauses of cases of culpable homicide as

described in Section 299 of the IPC it is

22

punishable under the first part of Section

304. If, however, it falls within the third

clause, it is punishable under the second

part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the

first part of this section would apply when

there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the

second part would apply when there is no

such intention, but there is ‘guilty

knowledge’.

(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that

particular injury was intended, and

objectively that injury was sufficient in the

ordinary course of nature to cause death,

the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section

300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence

would be murder.

(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the

following classes of cases : (i) when the

case falls under one or the other of the

clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by

one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii)

when the injury caused is not of the higher

degree of likelihood which is covered by the

expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course

of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower

degree of likelihood which is generally

spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause

death’ and the case does not fall under

Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii)

when the act is done with the knowledge

that death is likely to ensue but without

intention to cause death or an injury likely

to cause death.

To put it more succinctly, the difference

between the two parts of Section 304 of the

IPC is that under the first part, the crime of

murder is first established and the accused

is then given the benefit of one of the

exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while

under the second part, the crime of murder

is never established at all. Therefore, for

the purpose of holding an accused guilty of

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the offence punishable under the second

part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused

need not bring his case within one of the

exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.

(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it

is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When

chances of happening are even or greater

than its not happening, we may say that

the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching

the conclusion, the court has to place itself

in the situation of the accused and then

judge whether the accused had the

knowledge that by the act he was likely to

cause death.

(7) The distinction between culpable

homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and

murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always

to be carefully borne in mind while dealing

with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC.

Under the category of unlawful homicides,

both, the cases of culpable homicide

amounting to murder and those not

amounting to murder would fall. Culpable

homicide is not murder when the case is

brought within the five exceptions to

Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though

none of the said five exceptions are pleaded

or prima facie established on the evidence

on record, the prosecution must still be

required under the law to bring the case

under any of the four clauses of Section 300

of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If

the prosecution fails to discharge this onus

in establishing any one of the four clauses

of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to

4thly, the charge of murder would not be

made out and the case may be one of

culpable homicide not amounting to murder

as described under Section 299 of the IPC.

(8) The court must address itself to the

question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of

Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant

24

must intend the particular injury inflicted on

the deceased. This ingredient could rarely

be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it

is a matter of inference to be drawn from

the proved circumstances of the case. The

court must necessarily have regard to the

nature of the weapon used, part of the body

injured, extent of the injury, degree of force

used in causing the injury, the manner of

attack, the circumstances preceding and

attendant on the attack.

(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention

that makes a culpable homicide a murder.

The intention to cause injury or injuries

sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to

cause death also makes a culpable

homicide a murder if death has actually

been caused and intention to cause such

injury or injuries is to be inferred from the

act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.

(10) When single injury inflicted by the

accused results in the death of the victim,

no inference, as a general principle, can be

drawn that the accused did not have the

intention to cause the death or that

particular injury which resulted in the death

of the victim. Whether an accused had the

required guilty intention or not, is a

question of fact which has to be determined

on the facts of each case.

(11) Where the prosecution proves that the

accused had the intention to cause death of

any person or to cause bodily injury to him

and the intended injury is sufficient in the

ordinary course of nature to cause death,

then, even if he inflicts a single injury which

results in the death of the victim, the

offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly

of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the

exceptions applies.

25

(12) In determining the question, whether

an accused had guilty intention or guilty

knowledge in a case where only a single

injury is inflicted by him and that injury is

sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

cause death, the fact that the act is done

without premeditation in a sudden fight or

quarrel, or that the circumstances justify

that the injury was accidental or

unintentional, or that he only intended a

simple injury, would lead to the inference of

guilty knowledge, and the offence would be

one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.”

20. Thus, it emerges from the case law analysed

herein-above for converting the sentence imposed

under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II the facts

unravelled during trial will have to be seen. In the

facts of the case on hand, it is discernible that there

was no premeditation to cause death or the genesis of

occurrence and the single assault by the accused and

duration of entire episode, were factors to adjudge the

intention. The offence can be brought clearly within

the ambit of Section 304 Part-II IPC. In the instant

case it can be noticed that appellant and the

deceased were in love with each other. The fact that

deceased had stopped talking to the appellant and

26

she was talking to her neighbour Mr. Sudhakar had

ignited the mind of the appellant to be furious about

the conduct of the deceased and he was upset about

this change of attitude of the deceased. Even

according to the testimony of PW-1, who is none other

than mother of the deceased there was altercation

between the appellant and the deceased and

exchange of words between appellant and deceased

with regard to their love affair. On being confronted

by the appellant as to why the accused had stopped

talking to him and as to why she was trying to

develop friendship with Sudhakar and the answer

given by the deceased had resulted in appellant’s

getting infuriated and in that spur of the moment he

caught hold of her hair and banged her head to the

wall which resulted in blood oozing out and on seeing

this he ran away from the scene of the incident. Thus,

the single assault by the appellant coupled with the

duration of the entire period having occurred for

about 2-3 minutes would not be sufficient to infer that

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he had the intention to kill the deceased. Had there

been any intention to do away with the life of the

deceased, obviously the appellant would have come

prepared and would have assaulted the deceased with

pre-meditation. Yet another factor which cannot go

unnoticed, the appellant had obviously approached

the deceased and intended to confront her as to why

she was not talking to him though they were in love

and also to clear the doubts about she being friendly

with Mr. Sudhakar (neighbour) and in this factual

scenario, heated exchange of words have taken place

and enraged by her reply the appellant has banged

her head on the wall in a fit of fury, which cannot be

inferred that he had any intention to take away her

life, particularly when he was in love with her.

21. In the aforesaid analysis of law and facts, we

are of the considered view that the present appeal

deserves to be allowed in part. The conviction of the

appellant under 302 is altered/converted to one under

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Section 304 part II of the Indian Penal Code for the

altered conviction, the appellant is sentenced to the

imprisonment to the period already undergone and

shall be released forthwith if not required in any other

case.

22.The appeal is partly allowed, in the above terms.

……………………………J.

[S. RAVINDRA BHAT]

……………………………J.

[ARAVIND KUMAR]

NEW DELHI;

September 06, 2023