2024 INSC 817 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6333 OF 2013

N. THAJUDEEN …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

TAMIL NADU KHADI AND VILLAGE

INDUSTRIES BOARD …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. Ms. T. Archana, learned counsel for the appellant and

Mr. Vipin Kumar Jai, learned counsel for the respondent

were heard at length.

2. The plaintiff-respondent, Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village

Industries Board, instituted a suit for declaration of its title

over the suit property measuring about 3750 square feet

comprising in Survey No. 16/1 situated in Kotlambakkam

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Panchayat, District Cuddalore and for recovery of its

possession. The said suit was filed on the basis of a registered

gift deed dated 05.03.1983 allegedly executed by the

defendant-appellant which was said to have been accepted

by the plaintiff-respondent.

3. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court vide Judgment and

order dated 23.08.1994 primarily on the ground that the

alleged gift deed was not valid as it was never accepted and

acted upon. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the plaintiff-

respondent preferred an appeal before the District Judge

which was allowed vide Judgment and order dated

05.08.1997. The appellate Court reversed the judgment and

order of the court of first instance and decreed the suit. The

second appeal filed by the defendant -appellant was

dismissed on 11.01.2011 by the High Court. In decreeing the

suit, the gift was held to be valid with a finding that it was

acted upon and accepted and as such in the absence of any

clause in the gift deed authorizing revocation, it could not

have been revoked as alleged vide revocation deed dated

17.08.1987.

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4. The delay of 207 days in filing the Special Leave Petition was

condoned and the leave to appeal was granted vide order

dated 05.08.2013. Thus, the civil appeal has come up for

consideration before us.

5. The moot question which arises for our consideration in this

appeal is whether the registered gift deed dated 05.03.1983

was duly acted upon and accepted and is a valid document

which continue to exist despite its revocation on 17.08.1987

as the donor had not reserved the right to revoke the same.

6. The registered gift deed dated 05.03.1983 is Exhibit A-1. It

has been executed by the defendant-appellant. A perusal of

the gift deed reveals that the donor has gifted the suit

property in favour of the plaintiff-respondent for the

purposes of manufacturing of Khadi Lungi and Khadi Yarn

etc., with the condition that the plaintiff-respondent shall not

transfer the suit property for its own self-interest. The gift

deed stipulates that neither the donor nor his legal heirs have

any right or interest or will continue to have any right or

interest in the suit property from the time and date of the gift

deed. The gift deed further states that the gift is with full

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consent of the donor and that from the date of the gift itself,

the plaintiff-respondent accepts the suit property for the use

as aforesaid.

7. A simple and complete reading of the aforesaid gift deed

would reveal that the gift is absolute with no right reserved

for its revocation in any contingency. The only purpose

stipulated therein is that the property gifted shall be used for

manufacturing Khadi Lungi and Khadi Yarn etc.

8. It is worth noting that the gift deed itself states that from the

date of the gift deed the suit property is accepted by the

plaintiff-respondent for the purpose of manufacturing Khadi

Lungi and Khadi Yarn etc., which duly proves that the gift

was accepted. It was also acted upon as pursuant thereof the

plaintiff-respondent had applied for mutation to the revenue

authorities. In addition to the above, the plaintiff-respondent

issued a memo on 16.09.1983, Exhibit A-4 which also proves

that the possession of the suit property was taken over and

that it proceeded to raise construction thereon.

9. Exhibits A-2 to A-4 prove that the possession of the suit

property was taken over by the plaintiff-respondent on the

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date of the gift itself which is sufficient evidence that the gift

was acted upon and accepted by the plaintiff-respondent.

The plaintiff-respondent, pursuant to the aforesaid gift deed

and its acceptance has even applied to the revenue

authorities for the mutation of its name which further

fortifies the fact that the gift was duly accepted.

10. Considering the above, in view of the findings recorded by the

first appellate Court and the High Court that the gift deed

was duly acted upon and accepted by the plaintiff -

respondent, the conclusion is that the said gift deed cannot

be held to be invalid for want of acceptance. Thus, on the

basis of the aforesaid gift deed, the plaintiff-respondent

acquired absolute right and title over the suit property.

11. Now the question arises as to whether the aforesaid gift deed

has been validly revoked vide revocation deed dated

17.08.1987, and if so, what would be its impact upon the

rights of the plaintiff-respondent in respect of the suit

property.

12. No doubt, the gift validly made can be suspended or revoked

under certain contingencies but ordinarily it cannot be

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revoked, more particularly when no such right is reserved

under the gift deed. In this connection, a reference may be

made to the provisions of Section 126 of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882

1 which provides that a gift cannot be

revoked except for certain contingencies enumerated therein.

13. It is important to reproduce Section 126 of the Act, which

reads as follows:

“126. When gift may be suspended or revoked. -

The donor and donee may agree that on the

happening of any specified event which does not

depend on the will of the donor a gift shall be

suspended or revoked; but a gift which the parties

agree shall be revocable wholly or in part, at the

mere will of the donor, is void wholly or in part, as

the case may be.

A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases

(save want or failure of consideration) in which, if

it were a contract, it might be rescinded.

Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked.

Nothing contained in this section shall be

deemed to affect the rights of transferees for

consideration without notice.”

1

Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’

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14. Section 126 of the Act is drafted in a peculiar way in the sense

that it contains the exceptions to the substantive law first

and then the substantive law. The substantive law as is

carved out from the simple reading of the aforesaid provision

is that a gift cannot be revoked except in the cases mentioned

earlier. The said exceptions are three in number; the first part

provides that the donor and done e may agree for the

suspension or revocation of the gift deed on the happening of

any specified event which does not depend on the will of the

donor. Secondly, a gift which is revocable wholly or in part

with the agreement of the parties, at the mere will of the

donor is void wholly or in part as the case may be. Thirdly, a

gift may be revoked if it were in the nature of a contract which

could be rescinded.

15. In simpler words, ordinarily a gift deed cannot be revoked

except for the three contingencies mentioned above. The first

is where the donor and the donee agree for its revocation on

the happening of any specified event. In the gift deed, there

is no such indication that the donor and donee have agreed

for the revocation of the gift deed for any reason much less

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on the happening of any specified event. Therefore, the first

exception permitting revocation of the gift deed is not

attracted in the case at hand. Secondly, a gift deed would be

void wholly or in part, if the parties agree that it shall be

revocable wholly or in part at the mere will of the donor. In

the present case, there is no agreement between the parties

for the revocation of the gift deed wholly or in part or at the

mere will of the donor. Therefore, the aforesaid condition

permitting revocation or holding such a gift deed to be void

does not apply. Thirdly, a gift is liable to be revoked in a case

where it is in the nature of a contract which could be

rescinded. The gift under consideration is not in the form of

a contract and the contract, if any, is not liable to be

rescinded. Thus, none of the exceptions permitting

revocation of the gift deed stands attracted in the present

case. Thus, leading to the only conclusion that the gift deed,

which was validly made, could not have been revoked in any

manner. Accordingly, revocation deed dated 17.08.1987 is

void ab initio and is of no consequence which has to be

ignored.

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16. The non-utilisation of the suit property for manufacturing

Khadi Lungi and Khadi Yarns etc., the purpose set out in the

gift deed, and keeping the same as vacant may be a

disobedience of the object of the gift but that by itself would

not attract the power to revoke the gift deed. There is no

stipulation in the gift deed that if the suit property is not so

utilised, the gift would stand revoked or would be revoked at

the discretion of the donor.

17. In the end, we come to another limb of the argument that the

suit as filed by the plaintiff-respondent is hit by limitation

and as such the first appellate court and the High Court

manifestly erred in decreeing the same.

18. In context with the point of limitation, the court of first

instance has formulated issue no. 4 which reads as under:

“Whether the suit is barred by limitation?”

19. Admittedly, the present suit for declaration and recovery of

possession of the suit property was filed by the plaintiff-

respondent on 25.09.1991. The court of first instance held

that as the same was not filed within three years from the

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date of revocation of the gift deed, i.e., 17.08.1987 (Exhibit

B-2), the suit is barred by limitation.

20. Once it is held that the gift deed was validly executed

resulting in the absolute transfer of title in favour of the

plaintiff-respondent, the same is not liable to be revoked, and

as such the revocation deed is meaningless especially for the

purposes of calculating the period of limitation for instituting

the suit.

21. The limitation for a suit for declaration is provided under Part

III of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. It is governed

by Articles 56-58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Under

all the aforesaid three Articles, the limitation for a suit for

declaration is three years. The limitation provided under

Articles 56 and 57 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act is in

respect to declaration regarding forgery of an instrument

issued or registered and validity of the adoption deed. Article

58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes the

limitation for decree of declaration of any other kind and

therefore, the suit for declaration of title would essentially fall

under Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act and the

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limitation would be three years from the date when the right

to sue first accrues.

22. In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration

of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of

possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for

declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to

mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an

ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be

governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The

further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession

based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years

in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

23. In C. Mohammad Yunus vs. Syed Unnissa And Ors

2 it has

been laid down that in a suit for declaration with a further

relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article

governing the suit for such further relief. In fact, a suit for a

declaration of title to immovable property would not be

barred so long as the right to such a property continues and

2

AIR 1961 SC 808

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subsists. When such right continues to subsist, the relief for

declaration would be a continuing right and there would be

no limitation for such a suit. The principle is that the suit for

a declaration for a right cannot be held to be barred so long

as Right to Property subsist.

24. Even otherwise, though the limitation for filing a suit for

declaration of title is three years as per Article 58 of the

Schedule to the Limitation Act but for recovery of possession

based upon title, the limitation is 12 years from the date the

possession of the defendant becomes adverse in terms of

Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Therefore,

suit for the relief of possession was not actually barred and

as such the court of first instance could not have dismissed

the entire suit as barred by time.

25. No other point was raised and argued before us.

26. Thus, in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the

case, we do not find any error or illegality on part of the first

appellate court and the High Court in decreeing the suit of

the plaintiff-respondent.

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27. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed as devoid of merit.

28. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

.........………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

...……………………………….. J.

(UJJAL BHUYAN)

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 24, 2024.