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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 7989 of 2002

PETITIONER:

Nagappa

RESPONDENT:

Gurudayal Singh & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/12/2002

BENCH:

M.B. SHAH, B. P. SINGH & H.K. SEMA.

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.19562 of 1999)

Shah, J.

Leave granted.

Question involved in this appeal is whether one time

payment of compensation to a poor agriculturist would be sufficient to

meet the future medical expenses? It is true that lump-sum

compensation contemplating future eventualities can be granted but at

the same time Is it permissible under the Act to grant recurring

medical expenses to such a victim? Secondly, whether amendment to

the claim petition could be granted at the appellate stage?

Before we deal with this question, we would narrate a few facts.

The appellant, a poor agriculturist, along with some other persons was

travelling in a bullock cart on 6.2.1985 which met with an accident

with a truck as a result of which he suffered injuries including the

injury on right foot and right ankle exposing soft tissues and bones

which was subsequently required to be amputated. Other persons

also sustained injuries and the bullock cart was also damaged. The

appellant, alongwith other injured persons, filed claim application

bearing MVC No. 321 of 1985 before the Claims Tribunal,

Chitradurga. The Tribunal passed an award dated 26.3.1990 granting

a sum of Rs. 15,000/- for injury, pain and suffering, Rs. 5000/- for

loss of enjoyment of life and Rs. 5000/- for loss of earnings and Rs.

5000/- for medical treatment, totaling Rs. 30,000/- with interest at the

rate of 9 % per annum from the date of application. Against that

award, appellant preferred MFA No. 2237/90 before the High Court

of Karnataka at Bangalore. The High Court enhanced the

compensation and awarded Rs.82,000/- towards the loss of amenities

of life, loss of future earnings, pain and sufferings. Apart from this

sum, it was ordered that the appellant shall be entitled to a further sum

of Rs.18000/- for purchase of artificial leg. It has come on record that

the appellant was an agriculturist and that according to the medical

evidence, he had suffered 80 to 85 per cent permanent disability. The

medical evidence further reveals that his right leg was amputated and

he was required to change the artificial leg once in 2 to 3 years.

Before we deal with the question of compensation, we would

refer to second contention which is raised in this appeal.

Amendment to the Claim Petition claiming enhanced

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compensation:-

At the time of hearing of this matter, learned counsel for the

appellant has filed an application seeking permission to amend the

claim petition and for enhancement of claim to the tune of Rs.5 lacs as

compensation. Before the trial Court, the Claim was only for a sum of

Rs.one lac.

The learned counsel for the Insurance company contended that

the appellant cannot be permitted to amend the claim petition and

claim enhanced compensation. As against this, learned counsel for

the appellant submitted that under the Act there is no prohibition for

amending the claim petition and in any case Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is

applicable to such claim petition under Karnataka Motor Vehicles

Rules. Hence, it is the discretion of the Court to permit amendment of

the claim petition in appropriate case.

Firstly, under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,

(hereinafter referred to as "the MV Act") there is no restriction that

compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the

claimant. In an appropriate case where from the evidence brought on

record if Tribunal/court considers that claimant is entitled to get more

compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. Only

embargo isit should be 'Just' compensation, that is to say, it should

be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. This

would be clear by reference to the relevant provisions of the M.V.

Act. Section 166 provides that an application for compensation

arising out of an accident involving the death of, or bodily injury to,

persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any

property of a third party so arising, or both, could be made (a) by the

person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the

property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or

any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent

duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal

representatives of the deceased, as the case may be. Under the

proviso to sub-section (1), all the legal representatives of the deceased

who have not joined as the claimants are to be impleaded as

respondents to the application for compensation. Other important part

of the said Section is sub-section (4) which provides that "the Claims

Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-

section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under

this Act." Hence, Claims Tribunal in appropriate case can treat the

report forwarded to it as an application for compensation even though

no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed.

Sub-section (6) of Section 158 reads thus:

"158. Production of certain certificates, licence and

permit in certain cases. ..

(6) As soon as any information regarding any

accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is

recorded or report under this section is completed by a

police officer, the officer incharge of the police station

shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from

the date of recording of information or, as the case may

be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal

having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned

insurer, and where a copy is made available to the

owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such

report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and

Insurer."

It appears that due importance is not given to sub-section (4)

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of Section 166 which provides that the Tribunal shall treat any report

of the accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158,

as an application for compensation under this Act.

Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to

"make an award determining the amount of compensation which

appears to it to be just". Therefore, only requirement for determining

the compensation is that it must be 'just'. There is no other limitation

or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation.

Secondly, under Section 169, the Claims Tribunal in holding

any inquiry under Section 168 is required to follow the rules that are

made in this behalf and follow such summary procedure as it thinks

fit. In the present case, it has been pointed out that Rule 253 of

Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 empowers the Claims Tribunal

to exercise all or any of the powers vested in a Civil Court under the

provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Rule 254 inter alia

makes specific provision that Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is applicable to

such proceedings. In this view of the matter, in an appropriate case,

depending upon the facts and the evidence which has been brought on

record and in the interest of justice, Court may permit amendment of

claim petition so as to award enhanced compensation. Further, for

amendment of the pleadings, it is settled law that unless it causes

injustice to other side or it is not necessary for the purpose of

determining real issue between the parties, Court would grant

amendment. It is also to be stated that under the M. V. Act there is no

time limit prescribed for claiming compensation. Therefore, there is

no question of enhanced claim being barred by limitation.

This Court in Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern

Indian Transport Insurance Co. [(1971) Suppl. SCR 20] observed as

under: -

".the pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party

would depend upon data which cannot be ascertained

accurately but must necessarily be an estimate or even

partly a conjecture

The determination of the question of compensation

depends on several imponderables. In the assessment of

those imponderables, there is likely to be a margin of

error."

Hence, as stated earlier, it is for the Tribunal to determine just

compensation from the evidence which is brought on record despite

the fact that claimant has not precisely stated the amount of damages

of compensation which he is entitled to. If evidence on record

justifies passing of such award, the claim cannot be rejected solely on

the ground that claimant has restricted his claim. Form 63 of the

Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, which is for filing an

application for compensation, does not provide that claimant should

specify his claim amount. It inter alia provides that he should mention

his monthly income as well as the nature of injury sustained and

medical certificates.

In case, where there is evidence on record justifying the

enhanced compensation for the medical treatment which is required

because of the injury caused to a claimant due to the accident, there is

no reason why such amendment or enhanced compensation should not

be granted. In such cases, there is no question of introducing a new or

inconsistent cause of action. Cause of action and evidence remain the

same. Only Question is application of law as it stands.

Mr. P.K. Chakravarty, learned counsel appearing for the

Insurance Company, in support of his contention that the Tribunal has

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no jurisdiction to award higher amount of compensation than what is

claimed even though it is not likely to cause prejudice to the

Insurance Company, heavily relied upon the decision rendered by the

Full Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Dr. Urmila J. Sangani v.

Pragjibhai Mohanlal Luvana and others [AIR 2000 Gujarat 211]. In

that case, the High Court after considering relevant decisions on the

subject observed thus:

".We may mention that when the claimant feels

that he is entitled to more compensation than what is

claimed in the petition, it is always open to him/her to

amend the claim petition and if the same is in consonance

with the equity, justice and good conscience, there is no

reason why the Claims Tribunal should not grant

amendment. Before compensation more than claimed is

awarded, the opposite parties should be put to notice, the

requisite additional issue/issues should be raised and the

parties should be permitted to adduce their evidence on

the additional issues, but if no such opportunity is given,

the procedure would obviously suffer from material

irregularity affecting the decision."

From the aforesaid observations it cannot be held that there is a

bar for the Claims Tribunal to award the compensation in excess of

what is claimed, particularly when the evidence which is brought on

record is sufficient to pass such award. In cases where there is no

evidence on record, the Court may permit such amendment and allow

to raise additional issue and give an opportunity to the parties to

produce relevant evidence.

In support of her contention, the learned counsel for the

appellant Mrs. Kiran Suri referred to the decision of Bombay High

Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and another v.

Kisan Gangaram Hire and others [1987 ACJ 311] wherein the Court

dealt with similar contention and observed thus:

"8. What is further necessary to note is that

what gives a cause of action for preferring an application

for claim for compensation is the accident by motor

vehicle or vehicles and not a particular monetary loss

occasioned by such accident. While the compensation in

all no fault claim cases is fixed and uniform, in fault

claim cases the losses may vary from case to case. The

particular losses are merely the consequence of the

accident which is the cause of action. This being so, the

amounts of compensation claimed are nothing but the

particulars of the claim made. By its very nature, further

the amount of compensation claimed cannot always be

calculated precisely. In many cases it can at best be a fair

estimate..."

The High Court observed that in all such cases, it is necessary

to keep the doors open for the claimant to make the claims, on

grounds not stated earlier or for more amounts under heads already

specified in the application.

The aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court was relied

upon and referred to by the Orissa High Court in Mulla Md. Abdul

Wahib v. Abdul Rahim and another [1994 ACJ 348] and G.B.

Patnaik, J. (as he then was) observed that the expression "just

compensation" would obviously mean what is fair, moderate and

reasonable and awardable in the proved circumstances of a particular

case and the expression "which appears to it to be just" vests a wide

discretion in the Tribunal in the matter of determining of

compensation. Thereafter, the Court referred to the decision in

Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd (supra) and held that the pecuniary

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loss to the aggrieved party would depend upon data which cannot be

ascertained accurately but must necessarily be an estimate or even

partly a conjecture, and if this is so, then it will be unreasonable to

expect the party to state precisely the amount of damages or

compensation that it would be entitled to. The Court also held that

there are no fetters on the power of the Tribunal to award

compensation in excess of the amount which is claimed in the

application.

Similarly, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Devki

Nandan Bangur and others v. State of Haryana and others [1995

ACJ 1288] observed that the grant of just and fair compensation is

statutory responsibility of the Court and if, on the facts, the Court

finds that the claimant is entitled to higher compensation, the Court

should allow the claimant to amend his prayer and allow proper

compensation.

For the reasons discussed above, in our view, under the M.V.

Act, there is no restriction that Tribunal/Court cannot award

compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of

the Tribunal/Court is to award 'Just' compensation which is

reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. Further, in

such cases there is no question of claim becoming time barred or it

cannot be contended that by enhancing the claim there would be

change of cause of action. It is also to be stated that as provided under

sub-section (4) to Section 166, even report submitted to the Claims

Tribunal under sub-section (6) of Section 158 can be treated as an

application for compensation under the M.V. Act. If required, in

appropriate cases, Court may permit amendment to the Claim Petition.

Is it permissible under the Act to award compensation by

instalments or recurring compensation to meet the future

medical expenses of the victim?

To an agriculturist, loss of leg vitally affects not only his

working capacity but also his livelihood. In this context, Lord

Denning M.R. in Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and Islington Area

Health Authority [(1979) 1 All ER 332] quoted with approval the

observations of Parke B, which are as under: -

'Scarcely any sum could compensate a labouring

man for the loss of a limb, yet you do not in such a case

give him enough to maintain him for lifeYou are not

to consider the value of existence as if you were

bargaining with an annuity officeI advise you to take

a reasonable view of the case and give what you

consider fair compensation.'

However, it is to be clearly understood that M.V. Act does not

provide for passing of further award after final award is passed.

Therefore, in a case where injury to a victim requires periodical

medical expenses, fresh award cannot be passed or previous award

cannot be reviewed when the medical expenses are incurred after

finalisation of the compensation proceedings. Hence, only alternative

is that at the time of passing of final award, Tribunal/Court should

consider such eventuality and fix compensation accordingly. No one

can suggest that it is improper to take into account expenditure

genuinely and reasonably required to be incurred for future medical

expenses. Future medical expenses required to be incurred can be

determined only on the basis of fair guess-work after taking into

account increase in the cost of medical treatment.

This position is made clear in Union Carbide Corporation and

others v. Union of India and others [(1991) 4 SCC 584 para 131]

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where this Court observed as under: -

".In an action for negligence, damages must be

and are assessed once and for all at the trial of such an

issue. Even if it is found later that the damage suffered

was much greater than was originally supposed, no

further action could be brought. It is well settled rule of

law that damages resulting from one and the same cause

of action must be assessed and recovered once and for

all. Two actions, therefore, will not lie against the same

defendant for personal injury sustained in the same

accident."

Further, compensation to a victim of a motor vehicle accident

or in case of a fatal accident to the legal representatives is awarded

under two heads, namely, Special damages which are suffered by

the victim or the legal representatives and General damages which

include compensation for pain and sufferings, loss of amenities,

earning capacity and prospective expenses including expenses for

medical treatment. With regard to the first part of the damages, that

is, special damages suffered by the victim or the legal representative,

it can be easily proved on the basis of the evidence which is in

possession of the claimant. However with regard to the second part

general damages/compensation, it would be a matter of conjectures

depending on number of imponderables. In Lim Poh Choo case

(supra), Lord Denning observed as under: -

"The practice is now established and cannot be

gainsaid that, in personal injury cases, the award of

damages is assessed under four main heads: first, special

damages in the shape of money actually expended;

second, cost of future nursing and attendance and

medical expenses; third, pain and suffering and loss of

amenities; fourth, loss of future earnings."

While calculating such damages, the Tribunal/Court is required

to have some guess work taking into account the inflation factor. This

aspect is well discussed by M.J. Rao, J. (as he then was)] in P.

Satyanarayana v. I. Babu Rajendra Prasad and another [1988 ACJ

88 (A.P.)]. The learned Judge has given a Classification of Injuries :

A Useful Guide and has observed thus:

"24. If a collection of cases on the quantum of

damages is to be useful, it must necessarily be classified

in such a way that comparable cases can be grouped

together. No doubt, no two cases are alike but still, it is

possible to make a broad classification which enables one

to bring comparable awards together. Such

classifications have been made by Bingham in his Motor

Claims Cases, Munkman in his Employer's Liability and

Kemp & Kemp in their Quantum of Damages. (Munkman

p.181).

26. Cases relating to injuries have been

classified into four categories, i.e.: (a) total wrecks; (b)

partial wrecks and (c) where limbs and eyes and other

specific parts of the body are lost, which can be sub-

grouped according to the type of limb lost and (d) smaller

injuries which cannot be specifically grouped but for

which compensation can be assessed by comparison with

injuries of loss of limbs, e.g., comparing permanent

'wrist injuries' with 'loss of hand', or comparing a

temporary broken arm with the loss of the arm etc. Such

comparisons are often made by judges. Munkman points

out that in America, Mr. Melvin M. Belli, an eminent

lawyer, classified injuries into 11 categories as (1) Back;

(2) Traumatic amputation of leg; (3) Paralysis; (4) Hand

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or arm off; (5) Death; (6) Multiple fractures; (7) Burns;

(8) Personality change; (9) Blindness; (10) Brain injury

and (11) Occupation diseases. By 1967, awards (say) for

blindness had risen to 930,000 dollars (Munkman pp.181-

182). Today after 20 years, these awards must have gone

up further. The 'total wreck' category comprises of cases

of complete incapacity for work and virtually no

enjoyment of life, e.g., paralysis, severe brain injury

causing insanity, multiple injuries leaving the victim a

total cripple. The 'partial wreck' cases are also cases

where the entire body is affected and not one set of limbs

alone as in the third category. Cases of brain injuries

resulting in a personality change and multiple injuries

with grave disfigurement fall in this second category.

The third category does not present much difficulty for

sub-classification. The fourth category deals with minor

injuries in a limb which be compared with major injuries

in the same limb.

Past InflationRelevancy of Date of Accident:

27. The dates of accident resulting in similar

injuries have great relevancy. For example, if a particular

conventional sum of (say) Rs.10,000/- was awarded

towards the non-pecuniary damages of loss of expectation

of life, loss or amenities and pain and sufferingall put

togetherin a case of amputation of a leg consequent to

an accident in 1970, the award to be made for an identical

loss today would have to be upgraded from the 1970 value

to its value in 1987, having regard to the erosion of the

value of the rupee. This can be done by comparing the

cost of living index in 1970 with that in 1987.

Charlesworth on Negligence, 6th Edn.,1977, para 14, says,

the 'conventional figures' must keep 'pace with the times

in which we live'. He says that this can be well illustrated

by considering the class of injury resulting (say) in the

loss of sight in one eye and the conventional sum lay

around 2000 about a quarter of a century ago but today

in 1977 it will probably exceed 5000 or it ought to do.

Kemp & Kemp on Damages, 1982, Chapter 7, para 7001,

say: If a court is seeking to make a comparison with some

earlier award (for non-pecuniary losses) and if by the date

of the comparison, the currency in which the earlier award

was made has declined by, say, 50 per cent, one must

surely double the earlier award in order to make a valid

comparison. The authors have compiled two tables (at

paras 7007 and 7008), one showing the current level of

general damages for 'pain and suffering' and 'loss of

amenities' in cases of severe injury and the other showing

similar earlier years, and have compared whether courts

are or are not keeping pace with inflation. The authors

ask, why tort-feasors alone, as a class should be excused

from paying the value-based price? In Walker v. John

McLean & Sons Ltd., 1980 ACJ 429 (CA, England), the

court found that while the value of the pound fell by 50%

between 1957 and 1972 (over a period of 15 years), there

was a steeper fall between 1973 to 1978 (within 5 years)

when it again fell by 50% (vide Kemp & Kemp's Tables).

'Conventional' figures, if they do not keep pace with

inflation, might indeed become 'contemptible'. Kemp &

Kemp point out that an award of 16000 in 1879 would be

about 500,000 in 1982. After Walker's case (supra),

courts in England are carefully adjusting awards for 'pain

and suffering' and 'loss of amenities' to keep pace with

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inflation."

Further, the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala in

Valiyakathodi Mohammed Koya v. Ayyappankadu Ramamoorthi

Mohan and others [1991 ACJ 140] considered the principles of

assessment of compensation for deprivation of amenities of life in a

case where an injured boy aged 12 years suffered brain damage

because of the accident and has rightly pointed out that in personal

injury cases there are three categories of general damages: consolatory

damages, compensatory damages and damages for loss of expectation

of life and explained it by illustrating thus:

"The amputation of a hand preventing a plaintiff

from playing cricket would merit consolatory damages;

the same loss preventing a man from carrying on his

employment would merit compensatory damages.

Consolatory and compensatory damages represent

different elements in an award for general damages for

personal injuries and are exhaustive except for the third

head of damages for loss of expectation of life which is

sui generis."

Thereafter, the Court observed thus:

"The award is final. There is no procedure

prescribed to review the award in future which would

enable a substitution of real fact for estimate. Mankind

is denied the privilege of knowledge of the future with

certainty. The result is so much of the award as is

attributed to the future loss and suffering will almost

surely be liable to err. In Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and

Islington Area Health Authority, 1979 ACJ 362 (CA,

England), considering the insuperable complexities of the

problem, Lord Denning, MR, said that the decision

should not be considered as final and it should be

considered as an interim award liable to be reviewed.

The House of Lords in Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and

Islington Area Health Authority, 1980 ACJ 486 (HL,

England), speaking through Lord Scarman said:

'It is an attractive, ingenious

suggestion, but, in my judgment unsound.

For so radical a reform can be made neither

by judges nor by modification of rules of

court'."

In this view of the matter, in our view, it would be difficult to

hold that for future medical expenses which are required to be

incurred by a victim, fresh award could be passed. However, for such

medical treatment, Court has to arrive at a reasonable estimate on the

basis of the evidence brought on record. In the present case, it has

been pointed out that for replacing the artificial leg every two to three

years, appellant would be required to have some sort of operation and

also change the artificial leg. At that time, the estimated expenses for

this were Rs.18000/- and the High Court has awarded the said

amount. For change of artificial leg every two or three years no

compensation is awarded. Considering this aspect, if Rs.One lac is

awarded as an additional compensation, appellant would be in a

position to meet the said expenses from the interest of the said

amount. Equally it is true that the said amount is required to be

properly invested on long-term basis so that recurring medical

expenses could be met. This principle is established in General

Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v.

Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and others [(1994) 2 SCC 176] and this

Court held (in para 23) thus:

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"23. In a case of compensation for death it is

appropriate that the Tribunals do keep in mind the

principles enunciated by this Court in Union Carbide

Corpn. v. Union of India [(1991) 4 SCC 584] in the

matter of appropriate investments to safeguard the feed

from being frittered away by the beneficiaries owing to

ignorance, illiteracy and susceptibility to exploitation. In

that case approving the judgment of the Gujarat High

Court in Muljibhai Ajarambhai Harijan v. United India

Insurance Co. Ltd., [(1982) 1 Guj. LR 756], this Court

offered the following guidelines:

(i) The Claims Tribunal should, in the case of

minors, invariably order the amount of

compensation awarded to the minor be

invested in long term fixed deposits at least

till the date of the minor attaining majority.

The expenses incurred by the guardian or

next friend may, however, be allowed to be

withdrawn;

(ii) In the case of illiterate claimants also the

Claims Tribunal should follow the

procedure set out in (i) above, but if lump

sum payment is required for effecting

purchases of any movable or immovable

property such as, agricultural implements,

rickshaw, etc., to earn a living, the Tribunal

may consider such a request after making

sure that the amount is actually spent for the

purpose and the demand is not a ruse to

withdraw money;

(iii) In the case of semi-literate persons the

Tribunal should ordinarily resort to the

procedure set out at (i) above unless it is

satisfied, for reasons to be stated in writing,

that the whole or part of the amount is

required for expanding and existing business

or for purchasing some property as

mentioned in (ii) above for earning his

livelihood, in which case the Tribunal will

ensure that the amount is invested for the

purpose for which it is demanded and paid;

(iv) In the case of literate persons also the

Tribunal may resort to the procedure

indicated in (i) above, subject to the

relaxation set out in (ii) and (iii) above, if

having regard to the age, fiscal background

and strata of society to which the claimant

belongs and such other considerations, the

Tribunal in the larger interest of the claimant

and with a view to ensuring the safety of the

compensation awarded to him thinks it

necessary to do order;

(v) In the case of widows the Claims Tribunal

should invariably follow the procedure set

out in (i) above;

(vi) In personal injury cases if further treatment

is necessary the Claims Tribunal on being

satisfied about the same, which shall be

recorded in writing, permit withdrawal of

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such amount as is necessary for incurring

the expenses for such treatment;

(vii) In all cases in which investment in long term

fixed deposits is made it should be on

condition that the Bank will not permit any

loan or advance on the fixed deposit and

interest on the amount invested is paid

monthly directly to the claimant or his

guardian, as the case may be;

(viii) In all cases Tribunal should grant to the

claimants liberty to apply for withdrawal in

case of an emergency. To meet with such a

contingency, if the amount awarded is

substantial, the Claims Tribunal may invest

it in more than one Fixed Deposit so that if

need be one such F.D.R. can be liquidated."

Further, in Lilaben Udesing Gohel v. Oriental Insurance Co.

Ltd. and others [(1996) 3 SCC 608] the Court relied upon the said

directions and further held that in Union Carbide Corporation's case

(supra), this Court did not include the clause regarding literate

persons' compensation and directed that it should be given the same

treatment in case the Court found it necessary to do so to protect the

compensation awarded to them. The Court further added one

guideline as under:

"We must add one further guideline to the effect

that when the amount is invested in a fixed deposit, the

bank should invariably be directed to affix a note on the

fixed deposit receipt that no loan or advance should be

granted on the strength of the said FDR without the

express permission of the Court/Tribunal which ordered

the deposit. This will eliminate the practice of taking

loans which may be up to 80% of the amount invested

and thereby defeating the very purpose of the order. We

do hope that the Courts/Tribunal in the country will not

succumb to the temptation of permitting huge

withdrawals in the hope of disposing of the claim. We

are sure that the Courts/Tribunals will realise their duty

towards the victims of the accident so that a large part

of the compensation amount is not lost to them. The

very purpose of laying down the guidelines was to ensure

the safety of the amount so that the claimants do not

become victims of unscrupulous persons and unethical

agreements or arrangements. We do hope our anxiety to

protect the claimants from exploitation by such elements

will be equally shared by the Courts/Tribunals."

In the result, we allow this appeal partly and award additional

compensation of Rs. One lac to the appellant. The said amount shall

be deposited by the Insurance Company with the trial Court and the

trial Court is directed to invest the said amount on long term fixed

deposit in a nearest nationalised bank, in the area where the appellant

is residing, with the condition that the bank will not permit any loan or

advance and the interest on the said amount will be paid annually,

directly to the claimant till he survives. However, on an application

by the appellant this condition could be modified by the Tribunal in

exceptional circumstances, if made out by the appellant. Finally, after

the death of appellant, the amount be disbursed to his legal heirs on

their application.

The aforesaid condition is imposed so as to see that appellant

does not find it difficult to meet periodical medical expenses as

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required by him.

Appeal is allowed accordingly. There shall be no order as to

costs.