No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
S.C.R. . SUPREME COURT REPORTS 391
NANALAL ZAVER AND ANOTHER
v.
BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.
AND OTHERS.
[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA and DAS, JJ.]
Indian Companies Act (VII of 1913), s. _ 105-C-Company
Outsidet· trying to get control of management by p11rchasing shores
-Issue of further shares-Offer of new shares to es;isting share
holders-Validity of resolution and offer-Company in need of
funds-Additional motit1e to pret1ent outsidet· getting control-Bona
fides of resolution-Scope of s. 105-C.
A company was incorporated with a capital divided into 10,000
shares. After 5,404 shares had been subscribed, the directors of
the company, finding that a businessman. who had several other
businesses and who was likely to use the funds of this company
for his own businesses, was trying to get control of this company
by purchasing its shares, resolved to issue the remaining 4,596
shares and qffered . these shares to the existing shareholders in the
proportion of four new shares for every five she.res held by them.
Two of
the shareholders of the company instituted
.a suit age.inst
the company and the directors for the following reliefs: (i) a. decla
ration that the resolution of the directors and the offer of shares
contravened
the provisions of section
105·.c of the Indian Com
panies Act, 1913, and was therefore ultra vires and illegal; (ii) a.
declaration that the. offer of she.res was not made bona fide or in
the interests of the company and was therefore illegal ; a.nd (iii) to
restre.in the defenda.nts from allotting any shares in pursue.nee of
their offer :
Held
per KANIA
C.J., MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAB JJ.
that inasmuch as the sh!Lres resolved to be issued were offered to
the existing shareholders only, and not to any outsider a.nd these
shares were also offered to the existing shareholders in proportion
to the she.res held by each member without making any discrimi
natior.<,, between them the two requirements of section 105-C were
complied with and the resolution e.nd offer did not contravene tba.t
section even though 272 shares remained undistributed as a. result
of the offer
of four new shares for every five shares.
1950
May 4.
1950
N anal al Zaver
And A1wther
v.
Bo1nba y Life
Assurance Co,
A.nd Others
I<an;a C. J.
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1950]
Held also per KANIA C.J., MAHAJAN, Mux1rnRJEA and
DAS JJ.-that the fact that one of the motives of the directors
in issuing further shares was to prevent an outsider who ha.d
not yet become a shareholder, from getting control of the
company did not render the resolution or the offer illegal inasmuch
as such
a motive could not in itself be said to be not in the
inherests of the company and even assuming that such a. motive
was
bad this
n.dditional motive could not render the resolution
and offer illegal as the company was in fact in need of further
funds and it was necessary in the interests of the company to
issue further shares.
J.,dgment of th• Bombay High Co!f.rt affirmed.
APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay: (Civil Appeal No. LXIX of 1949).
This was an appeal from the judgment
and decree
of
thE: High Court of Bombay dated 1 lth March, 1949,
(Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in Appeal No. 85 of
1947, confirming a "decree of the said High Court in its
Original Jurisdiction dated 10th November, 1947. The
facts of
the case and arguments of the counsel are set
out in the judgment.
N.
P. Engineer (M. !JI. Desai and H.]. Umrigar
with him) for the appellants. -
l. C. Setalvad (G. N. Joshi with him) for respond
ents Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 and 9.
1950. May 4. The Court delivered the following
Judgments:
KANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from the decision
of
the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay. The
respondent
company was incorporated in
1908 with an
authorised capital of Rs. IO lakhs divided into 10,000
shares of Rs. 100 each. By 1945, 5,404 .shares were
subscribed
and Rs. 25 per share were called on each of
them.
Four thousand five hundred and ninetysix
shares out of the authorised capital thus remained
unissued. From
about July, 1944, Mr. Padampat
Singhania, a businessman interested in many
companies, began to purchase shares of the company
from
the holders thereof on a
large scale. This naturally •
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 393
put up the price of the shares considerably. On the
18th September, 1944, at a board meeting of the direc
tors the chairman drew attention of his co-directors to
the
attempt thus made by an outsider to corner the
shares
of the company. In pursuance of a resolution
passed
at the meeting, the chairman issued a
circular to
the existing shareholders acquainting them of the true
. position and suggesting that if they wanted to part
with the shares they might get in touch with the
chairman. A circular was accordingly issued with the
result
that two rival groups were thus offering to buy
shares from those who were desirous of selling them.
The shares on which about Rs.
12 or 14 were paid per
annum as dividend began to be quoted in the market
at about Rs.
2,000 per share in March, 1945. Mr.
,Singhania had not submitted to the company for
registration
of the transfers to his name the shares
purchased
by him. In the meantime on the 8th Janu
ary, 1945, an application was submitted
by the
company
to the Examiner of
Capital Issues for sanction
of a fresh issue
of capital.
Several reasons were men
tioned in that application to show why the company
iequired additional capital. Such application had
become necessary owing to war regulations. The
Government granted the sanction on the 16th February,
1945,
and the communication was received by the
company on the
20th of February. On the next day a
board meeting was held
at which the directors decided to issue the remaining 4,596 shares at a premium
of Rs. 75 per share and to call Rs. 25 per share on them.
Pursuant to this resolution a circular was issued to
the shareholders on the same day with copies of the form
of application . and renunciation referred to in the
resolution
and in the circular. The shares were offered
to
the shareholders shown on the register of members
in the proportion of four further shares for every five
shares held
by them ..
·· The last date for submission of
the application and payment was 10th March, 1945.
The Uirectors and their friends in the next few days
applied
and were allotted 1,648 shares. By the 6th of March, 1945, 2,204 shares were allotted to shareholders
who
had applied for the same.
1950
Nanalal
Zaver
,tfld Anothe 1 .
v.
Bombay Life
Assurance Co.
And Others
Kanta C.J.
1950
N an.alal Z ave,.
And Another
v.
Boin.bay Life
Assurance Co.
And Others
l{ania C. J.
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950j
The appellants are two shareholders of the com
pany. They filed the suit,
out of which this present
appeal has arisen,
" for themselves and all other
aggrieved shareholders of the company." The defen
dants are the company and eight directors. It is
contended in
the plaint that the whole issue of these
further shares and the idea of increasing the capital of
the company was mala
fide and with the object of
retaining
the control and management of the company
in the hands of defendants 2
to 9. It is further con
tended
that the resolution of the directors and the offer
of shares contained in the circuluar letter were
in
contravention of section
105-C of the Indian Companies
Act. There were further prayers restraining the
company and directors from proceeding with the
allotment of shares. It was contended that the com
. pany was not in need of capital and the issue of further·
shares was not made bona fide for the benefit or in the
interest of the company but had been made " merely
with the object
of retaining or securing the second
defendant
and his friends the control of the first
defendant
company."
Considerable evidence was led in the trial Court
on rhe question of bona fides. The trial Court held
that the issue of new shares was bona fide and the
appellate Court has also come to the conclusion that
the object of the directors in issuing the new shares was
not merely with
the object of retaining or securing to
the second defendant and his friends the control of the
first defendant company. They held that the com
pany was in need of capital. The suit was consequently
dismissed
and that decision was affirmed by the High
Court on appeal.
The decision of the appellate Court has been
challenged before us on both grounds.
The learned
counsel appearing for
the appellants did not contest
the concurrent finding
of fact of both the lower
Courts
to the effect that the company was in need of ctlpital.
It was however urged on their behalf that as the issue
of these shares, although not
admitted in the written
f
,_
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 395
statement but admitted in the course of evidence, was
for
the purpose of preventing the control of the
company going in
the hands
of Mr: Singhania, the
directors had not acted
bona' fide and solely in the
interest of the company. I have read the judgment prepared by Das J. and I agree with his conclusion
·and line of reasoning on this part of the case. In my
opinion,
the contention of the appellants on this point
was rightly
rejected by both the lower Courts and that
contention must fail.
That leaves the question whether the issue of these
shares was in contravention of section 105-C of the
Indian Companies Act. That section rnns as follows:-
" Where the directors decide to increase the
capital
of the company by the issue of further shares
such shares shall
be offered to the members in propor.
tion to the existing shares held
by each member
(irrespective
of class) and such offer shall be made by
notice specifying the number of shares fo which the
member is entitled
and 1imiting a time within which
the offer
if not accepted,
Will be deemed to be declined ;
and after the expiration of such time, or on receipt of
an intimation from the member to whom, such notice
is given1hat he declines to accept the shares offered,
the directors may dispose
of the same in such manner
as
they think most beneficial to the
company."
On behalf of the respondents three answers were
submitted. The first was
that the section deals with
the
-case of increase of capital by the directors beyond
the authorised limit and as in the present case the new
shares were issued within the authorized limit
of capital, ·the section has no application. The second was
that the terms of the section should be construed in a
practical way . and. there was no. difference between
Regulation 42 in Table A of the Companies Act
and
section
105-C in respect of the scheme to offer the
proportion_ of shares to the existing shareholders.
It
was
iifgued that so long as they were offered " as nearly
as circumstances admit " the directors had complied
with
the requirements of the section and therefore
their action was not
illegal. The third answer was
that in fact the directors had not committed any
50
19;;0
N a1Url al Z aver
A11d Aflother
v.
Bomb" y I;ife
Assurance Ca..
; nd Others
/(ania C. J.
1950
Nanalal Za1•cr
And Another
v.
Bo1nba y L(fe
·Assuran:c Co.
A1td Others
J(auia C. J.
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950}
breach of the terms of section 105-C up to now and
therefore their action cannot be held to be illegal. In
view of my conclusion on the third point it is not
necessary to express any opinion on the first two
answers. submitted on behalf of the respondents. It
seems to me that section 105-C, interpreted strictly as
contended
by the appellants, casts on the directors
two obligations.
They have to offer the shares issued
to the shareholders on the register of the company and
not to anyone else, and secondly, the offer must be '
in the same proportion to all the shareholders
and
there should be no discrimination amongst them. It
is not contended that by the offer made by the direc
tors
fo the shareholders there has been any discrimi
nation amongst
the shareholders on the register of the
company. It was contended on behalf of the appellant
that the directors had failed to offer all the shares
resolved
to be issued by them to the existing share
holders and therefore the requirements of the section
had not been complied with. It was argued that the
directors having resolved to issue 4,596 shares, they
had to offer that whole lot at once to the shareholders
on the register
and the result of the offer made by them
was to retain in their hands 272-4/5 shares. In my
opinion, this contention is unsound. By their resolu
tion of
the 21st February, 1945, the directors.resolved
to issue.4,596 shares out of the authorized capital of
the company. They have offered shares to the existing
shareholders in the proportion of four new shares
to five
shares held
by them. Inasmuch as the offer does not
absorb the whole lot of 4,596 shares I
am unable to
construe the offer as an offer of the whole
fot at once
to the existing shareholders. Unless the whole lot
of shares in pursuance of
the offer could be accepted
and taken up I am unable to consider the offer con
tained in
the circular as an offer of the 4,596 shares.
That however does not establish the contention of
the
appellai:its. I find not~in? in the section to justify
the conclusion that the directors must offer all the
shares resolved to be issued in one lot to the share
holders. I can conceive of numerous cases where a _;
limited company with a growing business does not
S.C.R. SUP~EME COURT REPORTS 397
require its capital to be called up at once. For instance,
soon aftel a company is formed it may issue shares of,
say a lakh of rupees required for the construction of
the buildings,
and after
. a year when it requires
ft'.lrther capital for payment of machinery etc. it can
issue further shares. I do
not think the section as
worded prevents
the directors from issuing shares to
existing
shar~holders from time to time in that way. As
noticed before, the object of
the section is to prevent
discrimination amongst shareholders and prevent
the
djrectors from offering shares to outsiders before
they are offered to the shareholders. So long as these
two requirements are complied with, the action
of the directors in selecting the time when
they will
issue the shares as also the proportion in which
they
should be issued is a matter left to their discretion and
it is not the province
;of the Court to interfere with the
exercise of that discretion. This is of course subject
to
the general exception that the directors are not to
act against the interest of the company or mala
· fide.
No such question arises in this case and therefore it
is unnecessary to discuss that aspect of the situation.
In my opinion tp.erefore on this. third ground this con-
tentio~. of the appellants should be rej~cted.
The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with
costs.
1950
N anal al Z avu
And Another
v.
Bombay Llfe
Assu,.an -:e Co-.
And Ot/lus
[(a11ia C. J,
MAHAJAN J .-This is an appeal by special leave M11T1ajm1 J
from the judgment and decree of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. arid Tendolkar J.)
dated 11th March, 1948, confirming the judgment of
the said High Court in its Original Jurisdiction
(Bhagwati
J.) dated
IGth Nov~mber, 1947.
The two · questions canvassed in this appeal are:
(1) whether the issue of further shares by the directors
was
in contravention of the provisions of section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act, and (2) whether
this issue was not made bona fide. Both these ques
tions 'were answered in favour of the respondents by
the High Court.
'~ The Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd., the first
c;iefendant in the case, was incorporated in the year
--
1950
Jo.i~a11al11l Zl1't't'I"
And A11otlter
v.
Bo111hay l.rje
Ass11ranc.! Co,
And Others
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950)
1908 as a limited company with an authorized capital
of ten lakhs. Five thousand four hundred and four
shares
had been issued till the year 1945 and they
were paid up to Rs. 25 each. The second defendant
is the chairman of
the board. of directors which is
comprised
of defendants 2 to 9. The company has a
life fund
of Rs.
230 lakhs.
In the year 1944 Sir Padampat Singhania, an
industrialist of Kanpur, attracted by the soundness
of this concern, began purchasing
the shares of the
company with a view to acquiring a controlling inter
est in its management. Soon after competition
started for the purchase of the shares of the company
between the Singhania group and the Maneklal Prem
chand group who were in management of this company.
The result of this competition was
that shares which
.were ordinarily quoted at
250 went up as much as to
2,000 in March, 1945. A circular was issued by the
directors to the shareholders apprising them of the
activities of the Singhania party and suggesting that
those who wanted to sell their shares should sell them
in the first instance
to the chairman. This circular
does not seem to have
had much effect as the share
holders
wanted to reap the maximum benefit which
would come
to them as a result of this competition
between two rich parties.
By the end of December,
1944, the Singhania group
had purchased 2,517 shares
as against 2,397 held
by Maneklal Premchand's party.
The Singhania group had thus acquired a majority of
the shares in the company though these had not yet
been transferred in their name.
On 8th January, 1945,
the chairman
at his own instance and after consulting
some of
the directors made an application to the
Examiner of Capital Issues for permission for a fresh
issue of capital. This was allowed
on
20th February,
1945. As soon as sanction of the Examiner of Capital
Issues was obtained for increasing the capital of the
company, a meeting of the directors was held OJ} 21st
February, 1945, and it adopted the following resolu
tion:--
1. That the capital of the company be increased
from Rs. 5,40,400 to Rs. 10,00,000 by the issue of the
'
/
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 399
remaining 4,596 ordinary shares of Rs. 100 each at a
premium of Rs. 75 per share.
2.
That as on the existing shares of Rs.
100 each
Rs. 25 is paid up, to call Rs. 22 per, share on these
new shares also.
3.
That these new shares shall rank pari passu
in all respects with the existing shares ofthecompany,
but they shall be entitled to rank for dividend as
from
1st April, 1945.
4. ·That these new shares shall be offered in the
first instance by a circular to the shareholders of the
~ompany as shown on the register of members on 20th
February, 1945, in
the proportion of four new shares
to every five shares held by them in the capital of the
company on
that date.
5.
That in the case of any shareholder holding
less
than five
shares, or whose holding of shares shall
not be complete multiples of five shares, then frac
tional certificates shall be issued to such shareholders
in respect of their rights for fraction of a share, each
fractional certificate representing one-fifth of a share.
6.
That a sum of Rs.
100 per share (Rs. 25
towards capital and Rs. 75 for premium) shall be pay
able along with application for these new shares.
7. That all applications for shares in accordance
with this offer (including applications for shares made
in respect of
and accompanied by
fracticmal certi
ficates
and applications for shares accompanied by a renunciation) must be presented to and payment
made
at the registered office of the company in Bombay
on or before the
10th March, 1945. . Any shareholder
or person in whose favour a renunciation has been signed
not
applyin,g Qil or before the 10th March, 1945, in
terms of tlie{(Tfer shall be· deemed to have declined to
participate in tliis new issue and all fractional certifi
cates not presented as required on or before 10th March,
1945,
will
c~ase to have any validity and will not entitle
the hC\Jder to any rights.
~· That any balance of the shares remaining out
·Of this issue not applied for by the: 10th March, 1945,
shall be disposed of
by the directors as they may
con
sider best in the interests of the company.
1950
Nanalal Zaver
And Another
v.
Bomhay Life
Assurance Co.
A11tl Others
.UahajanJ.
1950
Nanalal Zavcr
And Another
Y,
&tuba y Life
Assurance Co,
And Others
J\lahajanJ.
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950J
· 9. That the draft circular to the shareholders
with the enclosures (form A being the form
of
application, form B form of renunciation and form of
fractional certificates with application form) placed
on the table by the manager and actuary be approved
and initialled by the chairman. 10. That the manager and actuary be and is
hereby directed
to issue forthwith the necessary circu
lars
to the shareholders.
11.
That a committee consisting of the
chair
man and any one of the directors or the chairman
and any two of the directors be and are hereby appoint
ed to scrutinise the application for the new shares
which
may be received and to make allotment of these
new shares.
* * * *
."
It is the validity of this resolution that is the sub
ject matter of the present dispute; The plaintiffs, who
are two shareholders of the company owing allegiance
to
the
Singhania group, filed the suit out of which this
appeal arises challenging this issue of further shares,
principally on two grounds,
viz. (1) that. the new
issue contravenes the provisions
of section
105-C of the
Indian Companies Act, and (2) that the issue of shares
was not
bona fide made in the interests or for the bene
fit of
the first defendant company, but was resolved
upon merely with the object of retaining
or securing
to
the second defendant and his friends control of the
first defendant company. As already stated, both
these contentions were negatived
by the trial Judge
and the suit was dismissed and this decision was
affirmed on appeal.
The answer
to the first question
pepends on the
meaning to be given to the words used in section
105-C of the Indian Companies Act as to its scope.
The section was introduced in the
Indian
Companies
Act in the year 1936. Antecedent to this period the
question of issue of new shares by the directors was
dealt with by article 42 of the Articles of Assqciation
given in
the schedule to the Indian Companies Act,
1913. The article was
in these terms:-
'
" Subject to any directions to the contrary that· '
may be given by the resolution sanctioning the ..
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 401
increase of share capital, allnew shares shall, before
issue, be offered to such persons as at the date of the
offer are entitled to receive notice from the company
of general meetings in proportion, as nearly as the
drcumstances admit, to the amount of the existing
shares to which
they are
entitled."
As its language indicates, the article only applied
to cases where
the capital of the company was in
creased
by a resolution of the
company·. It had no
application to cases where
the directors issued further shares within the authorised limits. The new section
introduced in 1936 is in these
terms:-. "Where the directors decide to increase the capi.,
tal of the company by the issue of further shares such
shares shall
be offered to the members in proportion to
·the existing shares held by
each member (irrespective
·of class) and such offer shall be made by notice speci
fying
the number of shares
· to which the member is
entitled,
and limiting a time within which the offer, if not accepted will be deemed to be declined, and .after
the expiration of such time or on receipt of an intima
tiou from the member to whom such notice is given
that he declines to accept the shares offered, the direc
tors may dispose of the same in such manner as they
think most beneficial to the company."
It qualifies the discretion of the directors in the
matter of issue .of capital by enjoining on them that if
they decide to ·issue further shares, the existing share
holders should
be given the first option to buy them.
The language employed in
th~ section admits of. three
possible interpretations : (
1) that its scope is limited
tQ
cases where there is an increase in the capital of the
-company according to the provisions of section 50; (2)
that the section covers within its ambit all issue of
further qi.pital whether made by increasing the nomi
nal capital or by. issuing further shares with.in the
authorised capital ; (3) that the section has appllcation
only to ,cases where the directors issue· further shares
within the authorized limit.
· The learned counsel for the respondents contended
that the whole int(lnt and purpose of the section was to
limit the discretion 'of directors in' regard fo the· issue
1950
Nana/al Zavcr
And 111zotlla
\',
Bombay Ufe
A ssurancc Co.
A>ul Others
ltlalinja"l·
1950
Nanalal Zaver
And Anotlu·1·
v.
Boiirba y Life
Asst'1·ance Co.
And Others
Mahajan J.
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1950]
of further shares
in those cases alone
where there was
an increase in the nominal capital of the company by
recourse to the provisions of section 50 of the Indian
Companies Act. It was argued that the phrase "increase
of capital" has been employed by the legislature in
section 50 and some other sections preceding section
105-C with reference only to the nominal capital of a
company and'
that this expression had not been used
with reference
to the subscribed capital anywhere in
the Act and therefore the scope of section
105-C should
be limited to cases where the increase in the capital is
brought about under section 50 of the Act and new
shares are created and issued
by the directors. In Sircar and Sen's Indian Companies Act, 1937 Edn. at
page 309 the learned authors observe as follows :-
" The words •further shares' must be read in con
junction with the words 'decide
to increase the capital
of the company.' They must mean shares which are
issued for the purpose of increasing the capital beyond
the authorized
capital." .
Mr. Ghosh on Indian Company Law, 8th Edn. at
page 263 has stated as follows :-
" The object of this new section appears to be to
make the salient provisions of Regulation 42 in Table A
compulsory. The section as drafted is liable to the con
struction
that
whenever· the directors !lecide to in
crease the capital of
the company by the issue of fur
ther shares, even if it be a part of the authorized
capital,
the new shares must be first offered to the
existing shareholders. But this section should be read
in conjunction with clause (a) of section
50 under sub
section (2) of which the directors have no power to in
crease the share capital of the company. Therefore it
seems that the words •further shares' mean shares
beyond the authorized capital of the company."
Whatever might be the opinion expressed by these
commentators,
the matter has to be decided on the
language
of the Act itself. As already
pointtd out,.
the learned counsel for the respondents contended that
the above was the correct view as to the scope of the ,
' section. The learned counsel for the appellants how-
ever urged
that on a
proper interpretation of the
...
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 403
section its scope could not be limited only to cases of
issue of further shares
by creation of new shares by in
creasing the nominal capital of
the company, but that
the language employed in the section also included
within
its ambit cases where there was a further issue
of shares by the directors, within the authorized
capital. The learned counsel laid considerable emphasis
on
the expression
" further shares " used in the section
and suggested that these words have been used advise
dly instead of the expression "new shares " in order
to bring within the scope of the section increases in the
capital of a company whether within the authorised
limit or outside it.
The
third interpretation of the section finds sup
port from the language employed by the legislature in
the opening part of the section, wherein it is said :
" Where the directors decide to increase the capital of
the company
by the issue of further shares .......
" The
directors can only decide to increase the capital
at their
own initiative when they issue further shares out of
the authorised capital. In no other case can the direc
tors themselves decide as
to the increase in the capital
ot a company. Under section 50 the capital can only be
increased
by a resolution of the company.
Once the
company has increased the nominal capital, then the
directors can issue shares within the new limit. There
fore the authority of the directors, strictly speaking,
in
respect to the increase of capital is limited to an
increase within the authorised limit. They cannot by
their own decision increase
the nominal
cap-ital of the
company. In view of this language the third inter
pretation of the section seems more plausible.
The expression "capital of a company " is an am
biguous phrase
and may mean either issued capital or
authorized capital according to the context. It has
been used in different senses in various parts of
the
· Act. In what sense it has been used in this section is
by no means an easy matter to decide, particularly in
view of
the fact that in spite of the introduction of this · ~ction in the Indian Companies Act in the year 1936r
article 42 still remains
as one of the articles to be
adopted by companies if they do not choose otherwise
51
1950
Nana/al Zat'el"
And Another
v.
Bombay Life
Assurance C<>..
A11tl Others
Mahaja1'].
!950
Na1ialal Zavcr
And Another
v.
Boml1a y Life
Assurance Co.
And Others
Mahajan/,
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950)
and this refers to cases of increase in the nominal capi
tal of a company. In my opinion, for the purpose of
deciding the present case it is not necessary to pro
nounce on the question as to the precise scope of the
section because I consider that on any interpretation of
it the appellants' contention has to be negatived. If the
interpretation suggested by the learned counsel for the
respondents is accepted, then the plaintiffs' contention
on the first question fails, because here there has been
no increase in
the capital of the company under
section
50. Conceding however for the sake of argu
ment
(but not deciding) that the scope of the section
is as
it has been contended for by
Sir Noshirwan, the
question still remains " To what extent has there been
a contravention of its provisions
by the directors in
the present
case." So far as I have been able to see,
the resolution passed
by the directors is in accordance
with the provisions of
the section and does not
injuriously affect
the shareholders or the company,
and they cannot be said to have any cause of grievance
against it.
In other words, in my opinion, the resolu
tion substantially complies
with the provisions of
section
105-C of the Indian Companies Act. The
directors offered all the new shares to the shareholders
in
the ratio of 4 to 5, as the shares of the company
were held in multiples of five
to a larger extent than in
any other multiple. The result of fixing this ratio is
that 272 shares remain outside the offer. In whatever
other proportion
the shares were offered, still a few
shares were.bound
to remain unoffered. If a liberal inter
pretation is placed on the section, then
it has to be held
that the directors'
resolution substantially complies
with its provisions. On the other hand, if a technical and
literal interpretation is placed on the section, then the
directors were bound to offer the shares in the ratio of
4596/5404 in spite of the practical difficulties
that might
result in the actual working out of such a proportion,
and irrespective also of whatever absurdities or ano
malies
might thus result. I am of the opinion that the
section has to be given a workable construction and
a.
construction that is businesslike in preference to a literal
construction which might lead to a deadlock. In each .
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 405
case it should be seen whether the directors have substan
tially complied with
the provisions of the section or not.
The basic idea underlying
the section is that
whatever is given, is given to all the existing share
holders
and is distributed equally and equitably be
tween them.
It cannot be denied that all the share
holders were offered
the further shares arid that they
were offered equally and equitably. Whatever is the
balance remains with the company with
the result that
the capital remains unincreased to this extent. In such
a situation it is difficult
to hold that the resolution
passed
by the directors has contravened the provisions
of section
105-C and has caused any detriment or in
jury either, to the company or to the shareholders. Even
if
the resolution passed by the directors is held to be
in technical breach of the section, as it has caused no
injury
to anybody, the resolution cannot be held to be
void.
Under the law as it existed prior to 1936, if a
company iecorporated in its Articles of Association
article 42 mentioned in
the schedule to the Indian
Companies Act, then in the case of issua of new shares
the directors' discretion was curtailed inasmuch as
they were bound to offer these shares in the first in
stance in proportion as nearly as the circumstances ad
mitted to the amount of the existing shares to the exist
ing shareholders
but in all other cases their discretion
remained unfettered.
It was open to a company not to
adopt article 42 and thus fetter the discretion of the
directors even in
the case of the issue of new capital.
After
1936. it has been made obligatory on the directors
to give the first option to buy further shares to the
existjng shareholders and without any favour to any
one.
That being the intent and purpose of the section,
it has been fully carried out by the directors in the
present instance and has been carried out in a business
like way because
the ratio in which they offered the
shares is the ratio which works to the convenience of
the largest number of shareholders as the shares of the
company are held mostly in multiples of five.
If the
~shares were issued in any other ratio, that would have
created some difficulty in the way of shareholders who
held shares in multiples of
five and who owned 2, 110
1950
N anal al Z aver
And Another
v.
Bombay Ufe
Assurn1t -;e Co-.
And Others.
M alwjan J.
] 950
Nanalal Zaver
And Another
v.
Bo11iba y Life
Ass11ran ;e Co.
And Others
Mahajan}.
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]
shares. They would have been obliged to collect frac
tions before they could claim a whole share and thus
make an application within the time allowed to exer
cise the option. Where the language of a statute in its
ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads
to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of
the enactment, or to some inconvenience or
absurdity,
hardship or
injustice, presumably not intended, a
construction may be put upon
it which modifies the
meaning
of the words, and even the structure of the
sen
tence. In my opinion, the section when it says "such.
shares shall be offered to the members " should be
construed liberally and not literally, as such an inter
pretation would make th~ section workable and
would not in any way affect its intent and purpose,
the phrase "such. shares" meaning those shares which
admit of being so offered in a businesslike way.
It was argued that a liberal interpretatibn of the
section would result in the directors allottii:ig the bal
ance of shares remaining out of the further shares
unoffered to their own friends
and relations and it
would operate to the detriment of the other
share
holders. In this connection reference was made to
para 8 of the resolution above mentioned. In my
opinion this paragraph does not bear out the conten
tion of the appellants because it has reference only 'to
shares not applied for, obviously shares not offered
and which could not be
taken up by the shareholders
cannot fall under
that description. That paragraph
applies only to cases where the shares could
be applied
for
and then no application was made in respect of
them.
It was not disputed that the directors
in., the
present case had not sold these shares to any one and
that these have remained unissued. It was urged
strongly
by the learned counsel for the appellants that
the section being imperative and its language being
unambiguous,
the
Court was bound to place a literal
interpretation on
it and 'the argument of. hardship or
inconvenience should not weigh with it. It was further
suggested that the directors could always give effect
to.,
the provisions of the section by increasing the capital
in a manner and to the extent that the further shares
..
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 407
<:ould be offered to the shareholders in such a propor
tion that all the shares offered could be taken up by
them. In other words, it was contended that the section
not only fetters the powers of the directors in
the matt·er of sale of shares but it also restricts their discretion
in the
matter of increase of capital and as to the
number
of further shares. This contention, if accepted,
would mean
that the legislature by enacting section
105-C indirectly enjoined on the directors that when
·ever they decide to increase capital by issue of further
shares they should make the increase only to such an
·extent and in a manner as to enable the existing
shareholders to take the whole of it. If that was the
inten~ion of the section, there was nothing easier for
the legislature to say so. The section, on the other
1 hand, recognizes that the directors have a discretion in
the matter of the increase of capital when it says,
"'' when the directors decide to increase the capital of
a company." It means that it is within their absolute
discretion to take the decision whether to increase the
·capital or not. It is also within their discretion to say
to what limit and to what extent they will increase the
-capital. It is also for them to decide how many shares
and of what value ±h.ey will issue. Once they have
taken their decision,
it is then and then only that.
sec
tion 10s~c comes into operation. At that stage they
have to offer the new shares to
the shareholders and at
that stage they can offer them
i.J;i a businesslike manner
io all of them equitably and equally and if out of the
shares offered some cannot be taken up by the share
holders as they
do not fit in the ratio in which
th~
·Offer ha:; been made, the only result isthat those shares
Temain unoffered and thus unissued. I am therefore
-0f the opinion that the learned Judges of the Court of
appeal were right when they held
that under section 105-C the shares have to be offered to the existing
shareholde1s as nearly as the circumstances would
admit and that the section has to be given a business
like construction
and should be construed liberally and i. that the charge of contravention of section 105-C can
not be levelled against
the directors -so long as they .ha,ve not disposed of the unoffered balance contrary tb
1950
N analal Z aver
A11d Another
v.
Bombay Life
Assurance Co.
A".d Others
lYlahajan J.
1950
N anal al Z aver
And Another
v.
Bo111!Jay Life
Assrv-t11icc Co.
And Others
MaliajanJ.
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950)
the provisions of the section. The result . is that the
first contention of the learned counsel stands negatived.
The next question whether
the action of the direc
tors in passing the resolution was not
bona fide seems
to be concluded by concurrent findings of fact of the
Courts below to the effect that the resolution was
passed because
the company needed additional funds
at the moment when the new issue was decided upon
and that the issue of shares was not due solely to the
desire on the part of the directors to keep themselves
in the saddle.
It is not the practice of this
Court ordinarily to
interfere with concurrent conclusions on questions of
fact reached
in the
Courts below unless those conclu
sions have been reached on extraneous considerations
or by violating rules of procedure or by committing
any breach of some provision of law : vide Srirnati
Bibhabati Devi v. K urnar Rarnendra Narayan Roy (
1
).
The learned counsel for the appellants while conceding
that it was not open to him to challenge concurrent
findings of fact of
the
Courts below, urged that the
whole case has been looked at by them from an erro
neous angle. It was contended that the Courts below
had misdirected themselves in their approach to the·
decision of the issue of bonafides. In this connection
emphasis was
laid on the following observations in
the·
judgment of the learned Chief Justice and on similar
observations occurring elsewhere
:-
"In this particular case it is urged and urged with
considerable force that the reason whiCh actuated the
directors on the 21st
February, 1945, in resolving to
issue new shares was the fear
that the Singhania group
would capture the company
and oust
the present direc
tors from
their vantage point and take control of the
company itself. It may be that one of the factors that
weighed with the directors was that consideration. It
may even be that it weighed with them a great deal.
It may also be that the directors selected this particu
lar time viz. the 21st February, 1945, for the issue of
•
these shares because of the impending danger of the
(1) 73 I.A. H6.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT l<.EPORTS 409
majority of shares going into the hands of the Singha
nia group with
the necessary consequences. If, with
all
that, it is established before the
Court that in fact
on the 21st February, 1945, the company was in need
-of funds, that the funds were required for the working
of the company, then
the
Court will not interfere with
-the discretion exercised
by the directors, because the
principle is obvious that if the new shares have been
issued because the company needs funds, then
it can
not be said that the discretion vested in the directors
has been exercised not in
the interests of the company
or for the
purpo$e of the company. It is only when
that discretion is exercised solely for the personal ends
-of directors, for their personal aggrandisement, for
keeping themselves in power, then undoubtedly
that discretion cannot be said to have been exercised for
-the purpose of or in the interests of the company."
Reference was also made to the concluding part of
the same judgment which runs thus
:-
"Undoubtedly this is a case of high finance and.
we have been given a glimpse
of what high finance
can
be and there is great justification in what Mr. Amin
.has said as tq the manner in which some of the things
were done with regard to
the affairs of this company. :But ultimately we must come down to the one short
and simple question, was the company in need of funds
at the time when the directors decided upon the issue
of new shares,
and in my opinion there can be no doubt
on
the evidence led this case that the answer to that
question must be in the affirmative. If that be the
position all other consideratio_ns can be of
no avail or
-Of very little avail as against this central fact in this
~ase and as I am satisfied as to the central fact, I
would agree with the learned
judge who took the same
view
and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs
have failed to discharge the burden which
lily upon
theni of establishing that the issue of new shares was
not bona fide and not in the interests of and for the
benefit
of the
compan:y."
It was argued that the learned Judges were not
-right in thinking that all other considerations were of
1950
N analal Z er-Jet
And Another
v.
Bombay Life
Assurance Co.
And Others
MahajauJ.
1950
Nanalal Zaver
;.lnd Anotlii.:r
v.
Bo1111'ay l~zfe
Assurance Co.
And Others
r.talu1ja11 J.
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1950J
no avail and shoqlg be practically kept out of consider
ation once
it
was-established that the company needed
funds.
It was said that it having been found that at
the time of the aforesaid resolution the directors were
·
considerably influenced by the consideration of keep--
ing out the Singhania group from capturing
the com
pany,
and by the consideration of keeping themselves
in the saddle, it should have been held that they were
acting
with an ulterior motive, and that their decision
as to the need of the company for further funds was.
vitiated
by reason of the ulterior motive.
It is convenient here to state what the true
ap
proach should be to a question of this nature when it
arises in a case. It is well settled that in exercising
their powers whether general
or special, the directors·
must always bear in mind that they hold a fiduciary
position
and must exercise their powers for the benefit
of
the company and for that alone and that the
Court
can intervene to prevent the abuse of a power when
ever such abuse is held proved,
but it is equally settled
that where directors have a discretion and are bona
fate'
acting in the exercise of it, it is not the habit of the
Court to interfere with them. When the company is
in no need
of further capital, directors are not entitled
to use their power of issuing shares merely for
the
purpose of maintaining themselves and their friends in
management over the affairs of the company, or merely
for
the purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing
majority
of shareholders.
It appears to me that the learned Judges in the
Court below approached the decision of this question
in
the light of the principles stated above and
the
contention of the learned counsel therefore does not
seem right. Where
the directors are not chargeable·
for breach of
trust so far as the company is concerned
and where their action is for the benefit of the com
pany, then merely because in promoting the interests
of the company they also
prom~te their own interests
it cannot be held that they have not acted bona fide.
As it has been said in Hirsche v. Sims (
1
), if the true
effect of the whole evidence is that the defendants truly
(1) (189') A.C. 65•.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 411
and reasonably believed at the time that what they
did was for the interest of the company, they are not
chargeable with dolus malus or breach of trust merely
because in promoting the interest
of the company they
were also promoting their own, or because
they after
wards sold shares
at prices which gave them large
profits.
Both
the
Courts below have found as a fact that
to a certain extent in resolving to issue new shares the
directors were actuated by a fear that the Singhania
group would capture the company
and oust the present
directors from their vantage point and take control
of the company itself.
It was argued that this
motive was an ulterior motive and the exercise of
power
by the directors to achieve this objective by the
issue of further shares was an exercise of power for
the
purp.::>se for which it was not conferred. This argu
ment would have had force if this was the main pur
pose of the directors in issuing the further shares,
but
this is not the case here. As found by the High
Court,
the central fact working in the mind of the directors
was the necessity of further funds for the company
at
the moment they passed the resolution. That being so,
it seems to me that the existence of the other motive
does not make the action of the directors in respect of
the issue of further shares mala fide.
Moreover, in the present case it seems to
me that
the directors were on the defensive. They felt that
the attempt of the Singhanias to capture the control
ling interest in the company
by paying high prices for
its shares must have been with a purpose, i.e., to make
use
of the funds of the company in their own concerns.
Some evidence
of this exists on the record. They
thought
that it was their duty as directors to protect
the company from such an attack and they felt that it
was beneficial to the company to protect it
from such
an attack. They did not keep the matter in secret but
informed all the shareholders about it. They first
attemptea to enter into the field of competition with
the Singhanias but it seems that they were not wholly
successful in their objective. They
then decided to
issue further capital 'by taking into consideration the
53
1950
/Ii .. a1u1lal Za'f)r•'"
A11d Another
v.
Bombay Life
Assurance Co ..
A11d Others
Mahajan/.
1950
.Nana/al Zav11r
1-111d AnothiJr
v.
Bonzba y Life
.Assurtu1ce Co,
And Otltcrs
Mal1ajanJ.
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950)
interest and the needs of the company
and its require
ments in respect
of capital at the moment. They also
thought that by this
· action they would also be
able to keep out the Singhanias from capturing
the
company. They were under no obligation to
Singhanias
who had not yet even been entered as shareholders on
the register of shareholders. There was no dolus malus
in their mind as directors of the company, as affect
ing the company or its shareholders. On the other
hand, they honestly considered it to be in the best
interests of the company to meet such an attack.
The result therefore is
that it cannot be held that this
is one of those unusual cases where this
Court should
not give weight
to the concurrent findings of fact by
the
Courts below, or that it is a case where it can be
held that the High Court in arriving at its findings has
committed a breach of
any rule of procedure or law
and that there is no evidence to support the findings
that have been arrived at.
The result therefore
is that this appeal fails and is
dismissed
with costs.
DasJ.
DAS J.-1 agree that this appeal must be dis-
missed. As, however,
my decision rests on slightly
different reasons, I desire
to state them in my
judgment.
For the purpose of appreciating the questions
involved in
this appeal which has been brought
by the plaintiffs it will suffice to set out the following
facts.
The Bombay Life Assurance
Company, Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as " the company ") was
incorporated in 1908
with an authorised capital of
Rs.
10,00,000 divided into 10,000 shares of Rs. 100
each. By 1945, 5,404 shares in all were subscribed,
and Rs. 25 per share had been paid on them. This
left 4,596 shares out of the
total authorised capital yet
to be issued. The plaintiffs are two of the shareholders
of
the company. Respondents 2 to 9 are the.directors
of the company of whom respondent 2 is the chair
man of the board of directors. It appears that
-
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 413
from July, 1944, shares in the company began to be
purchased from the holders thereof by ·or in the
interest of SrFPadampat Singhania. This attempt to
buy up the shares on a large scale naturally resulted
in a sudden rise in the price of tP.e shares. This
abnormal rise in
the price could not but attract the
attention
of the board of directors.
On September 18,
1944, a board meeting was held at which the chairman
drew
the attention of his co-directors to the serious
implications
of the attempt of an outsider group to
corner the shares of the company.
It was decided at
that meeting that a circular should be issued
to the
· shareholders acquainting them of the tru«;l position and
the chairman was authorised to sign the circular.
Accordingly, on September 19, 1944, a circular was
issued
to the shareholders drawing their attention to
what was happening and exhorting them, in
· case they
wanted
to dispose of their holdings, to offer them to · the chairman. The result of the chairman and other
directors entering the arena was a race for purchase of
shares of the company which inevitably led
to a pheno-
·
menarrise in the price of the shares. · The shares
which in 1944 were quoted
at Rs.
250 per share went
up to Rs. 2,000 per share in March, 1945. I.t may be
noted here
that the shares purchased by the Singhania
group
were not submitted for registration of the trans
fers with the result
that their names have not yet been
entered on
the register of members. In the meantime,
on
January 8, 1945, an
applic;,i.tion was submitted by
the company to the Examiner of Capital Issues for
sanction for
a. fresh issue of capital, setting forth several
reasons
for
whieh such . capital was required by the
company. The required sanction dated :February 16,
1945, was received
by the company on February
20,
1945, and on the next day (February 21, 1945) a
board meeting was held
at which the directors
decided·
to issue the remaining 4,596 shares at a premium of
Rs.
75 per share and to call-up Rs. 25 per share on
them. The minutes
of the board meeting (Ex.
0) are
printed
at pages
301-2 of the Paper Book. Pursuant
to this resolution of the board a circular (Ex. Q) was
issued to the shareholders on the same day with copies
!950
Naualal Zat 1£~r
AIJd An-0tlter
v.
Bombay Life
AsSt11·a1tce C0r.
Aud Others
Das/.
1950
Na1tt1lal Zaver
And Another
v.
Bo1nba y Lift
Assurance Co.
Arid Others
DasJ.
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950)
of the form of application and form of renunciation
referred to in
the resolution and in the circular. These
further
shares, were offered to the shareholders shown
on the.register of members in the proportion of four
further shares to every five shares then held .by them.
The last date for submission of the applications and
necessary payments for the shares so offered was fixed
for March
IO, 1945. It is said that on the very next
day after the board meeting 1,648 shares were allotted
and that between February 22, and March 6, 1945, 2,204 shares were allotted to the shareholders who had
applied for the same. The suit out of which the
present appeal has arisen was filed on March 5, 1945.
The plaintiffs are two of the members of the
company suing " for themselves and all other aggrieved
shareholders" of the company. The defendants are
the company and the eight directors. The reliefs
prayed for are as follows, inter alia :
(a) That it may be declared that the resolution
of the directors and the offer referred to in para 6
hereof contravenes
the provisions of section
105-C of
Indian Companies Act and was and is ultra vires, and
illegal ;
(b) That it may be declared that the said offer
of shares referred
to in para 6 hereof is not bona fide
or in the interest of the defendant company and is
ultra vires and illegal ;
(c) That the defendants 2 to 9 may be restrain
ed by an injunction from allotting any
shares or doing
any further act in pursuance of the said offer."
It will be noticed that none of the shareholders
other
than the directors to whom further shares had
been allotted before the filing of the suit has been
made a
party to the suit. Further, even as against
the defendants 2 to 9 the consequential relief by way
of cancellation of the allotments of further shares to
them and the rectification of the register in respect
thereof
has not been prayed for by the plaintiffs.
The contentions of the plaintiffs as set forth in
the plaint on which the above prayers were founded
may be summarised shortly as follows :
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 415
(i) the company was not in need of capital,
(ii) the issue of further shares was not made
bona fide for the benefit or in the interest of the com
pany
but had been made
" merely with the object of
retaining or secqring to the second defendant and his
friends the control of the first defendant company,"
and
(iii) the issue and · offer of farther shares are
illegal and void for contravention of
the provisions of
section
105-C of the Indian Companies Act. It is
necessary to examine each
of these contentions and to
ascertain their effect.
-
Re (i): Both the Courts below.have found it as a
fact that at the time the directors resolved upon the
issue
of further shares the company was in need of capital for the purposes mentioned in the company's
application to the Examiner of Capital Issues referred
to above. This concurrent finding of
fact has not been
contested before us and the next contention of the
appellants will have to be examined in
that light.
Re (ii) : It is not disputed that the company's
need for funds standing
by itself will afford a good
motive to the directors to issue further shares. The
contention, however, is
that if that motive was not the
sole motive
but was mixed up with any other motive, it
was an abuse
of the powers of the directors to issue fur
ther shares. This plea is clearly a departure from
the case made in the plaint. There the case was that
there was no need for funds at all and the sole motive
of the directors was merely to retain their own control
over the affairs of the company.
It will, however, be
a hypertechnicality to shut out this piea altogether.
The plea of mixed motive raises three questions,
namely-
( a) whether apart from the motive of finding
further capital
for the company, there was any, and,
if so,
what_
other motive,
(b) was that other motive vitiated by bad faith,
and -
(c) if it was so vitiated, whether the presence of
it nullified the good motive and rendered the issue of
further shares illegal
and void.
1950
N analal Z ave1'
And Another
'I•
BombP:V Life
Assurance Co.
And Others
Das.].
1950
N analal Zaver
And Another
v.
Bo1nbay Life
Assurance Co,
And Others
Das].
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950J
The contention of the plaintiffs before Bhagwati
J. as before us, was that the company was not in need
of any further capital in February, 1945, and
that the
directors of
the company decided to issue the further
capital
merely with a view to retain control of the
management of the company in their hands.
On the evi
dence before him, Bhagwati
J. found that the motive of
the directors was rather to keep the Singhania group out
of the control of
the company than to retain their own
control. The race for
the purpose of purchasing the
shares was not merely for the purpose of increasing their
holdings for holdings' sake but was really with a view to
prevent the Singhania group from
obtainirig a majority
of shares which would give them the control of the
management of the company and enable them to utilise
the life funds
of the company for the purposes of the
various industrial concerns of the Singhania group.
The result
of keeping out the Singhania group might
well
be_ to strengthen the position of the directors and
to keep them in the saddle, but the proximate motive
was to exclude the Singhanias. The distinction is real
and quite understandable. The appeal
Court does not
appear to have dissented from this view of the
matter
.and I do not see any reason to take a different view.
It follows, therefore, that apart from the
rrtotive of
raising fresh capital for
the purposes and benefit of the
company, the directors also had another motive,
namely,
to prevent the Singhania group, who are
strangers to the company, from intruding into its
affaii:s so as to be able to assume a controlling hand
in its management for their own purposes rather than
for the benefit of the company.
On the evidence on
· record the existence of this motive side by side with
the motive of raising further capital cannot be denied.
The question
then arises whether in acting up to
it the directors were actuated by bad faith. In com
ing
to a conclusion on this point it has to be borne
in
mind_ that the Singhania group had only pur
chased some shares from various existing shareholders
but did not submit the transfers of registration so
q.s to
get their names put upon the register of members: It
is· clear that until the Singhania group get their names
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 417
entered in the register of members, they are not share
holders
but are complete strangers to the company.
It has been held in Percival v. Wright(
1
) that ordinari
ly the directors are not trustees for individual share
holders.
Even if
the· directors owe some duty to the
existing shareholders on the footing of there being
some fiduciary relationship between
them as stated in
some cases [see for example In re
Greshain Life Assur
ance Society] (
2
), I see no cogent reason for extend
ing this principle and imputing any kind of fiduciary
relationship between
the directors and persons who are
complete strangers
to the company. In my judgment,
therefore,
the conduct of the respondents 2 to 9 cannot
be judged on the basis of any assumed fiduciary
rela
tionship existing between them and the Singhania
group.
In my opinion, the respondents 2 to 9 owed
no
duty to the
Singhania group and, therefore, the
motive to exclude them cannot be said to be 1nala fide .
per se. In North-West Transportation Company, Ltd.
v. Beatty (
3
) the Judicial Committee observed at
p. 601:
" But the constitution of the company enabled the
defendant J.H. Beatty to acquire this voting power;
there was no limit upon the number of shares which a
shareholder
might hold, and for every share so
held he
was entitled
to vote,
tbe charter itself recognised the
defendant as a holder of 200 shares, one-third of the
aggregate number; he had a perfect right to acquire
further shares,
and to exercise his voting power in such
.a manner as to secure the election of directors whose
views upon policy agreed with his own,
and to support
those views at any shareholders'
meeting."
Beatty referred to in the above passage was a
director.
It follows therefore, that the fact of the
directors entering into a competition with the Singhania
group in purchasing the shares of the company was
quite legitimate
and was not
mala fide. It was urged,
however,
that the issuing of further shares, although
the company required further capital, was, in the cir
cumstances, evidence of
bad faith. Bhagwati J. dealt
(I) L.R.
(1902) 2 Ch. ,21. · (2) L.R. S Ch. App. 4'6 at p. ~~9.
(3) L.R. 12 A.O. 589.
1950
Nana/al Zavc1
And Another
v.
Bombay Life
Assura11.ci! Co.
A1'd Others
DasJ.
!950
N analal Zaver
A11d Another
v.
B0111ba y Life
Assurance Co.
Aud Others
Das}.
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]
with the various acts of the directors relied upon by
the plaintiffs as indicating bad faith on the part of the
directors and on a consideration of all of them was
" unable to come to the conclusion that the issue of
· new shares was decided upon by the directors not bona
fide
in the interests of the company and merely with a
view to keep
the control of the affairs of the company
in their
hands." The learned Judge, therefore, came
to the conclusion that the :issue of further shares and
the offer thereof made on the 21st February, 1945, was.
not ultra vires and illegal. Some of these facts on
which
the charge of mala fide was sought to be founded
were urged before the appeal
Court by learned counsel
for the appellants. The learned Chief Justice discussed
the matters and concluded by saying that he agreed
with the trial Judge that the plaintiffs had failed to
discharge the burden which lay upon them of establish
ing
that the issue of new shares was not bona fide and
not
in the interests, and for the benefit, of the company_
I do not see
any cogent reason for taking a different view on the facts. The position, shortly put, was that
the Singhania group, who were outsiders and to whom
the directors owed no duty, were out to corner the·
shares of the company for their own ends. To thwart
that object of the Singhania group by making it more
and more difficult for them to acquire more shares the
directors took advantage of the existing needs of the
company for further capital and decided µpon to issue
further shares. The issue of further shares served tw<>
purposes, namely, the purpose of finding the necessary
finance,
and to exclude the interlopers, both of which
purposes, according to the directors, were for
the bene
fit of the company. Rightly or wrongly, the directors
felt
that it was not in the interests of the company
t<>
allow the Singhania group a controlling hand in the
management of the affairs of the company. Their ap
prehension evidently was that the Singhania group, ~f
and when they became shareholders, would use their
voting power in their own interests and to the detri
ment of the company
by utilising the life fund of the
company for the purposes of their various other
in
dustrial concerns. I find nothing in the evidence on
1
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 419
record to doubt the honesty of the directors in holding
this view and, that being so, I see nothing improper if
the directors in the interests of the company and the
existing shareholders tried to prevent what, according
to them, would be a catastrophe. Indeed, if the directors
honestly
held that view-and as already stated I have
no reason to
think that they did
not-· they would, in
my opinion, have been guilty of dereliction of duty to
the company and to the existing shareholders if they
did not exert themselves to prevent such evil. In my
judgment the motive to prevent the Singhania group,
who \Vere outsiders, from acquiring a control over the
company cannot, as between the directors and the
company and the existing shareholders, be stigmatised
as mala fide. .
At two places in his judgment the learned Acting
Chief Justice expressed the view that if it were esta
blished before
the
Court that the company needed fur
ther capital, all other considerations could be of no
avail or of very little avail as against that central fact.
Tendolkar
J. did not consider it necessary to deal with tht various acts of the directors relied upon as evi
dence of their
mala fules, because he was of the view
that assuming
that the directors did all those acts
with the object of keeping the Singhania group out of
control of
the company, the moment it
was establish
ed that the company was in need of further capital
for legitimate purposes, the fact that the directors uti
lised such need for
the purpose of establishing them
selves more firmly in
the saddle did not render the
issue of further capital either ultra vires or invalid.
Learned counsel for
the plaintiffs contends that the
learned Judges in the
Courts below entirely overlooked
the point that the presence of such bad motive would
nullify
the good motive of finding capital necessary
for
the company and this mixture of motives would
render the issue
of further shares illegal and void. This
leads me to a consideration of the third sub-head on
the assumption that what I
have called the additional
motive was a bad motive.
It is well established that directors of a company
are in a fiduciary pJsition vis-a-vis the company and
53
1950
N analal Zavc·y
And Another
v.
Bombay Li/•
Assurance Co ..
And Others
DasJ.
1910
Nana/al Zaver
Ancl Another
v.
Bo1nba y Life
.Assiirance Co.
And Others
Das J,
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1950]
must exercise their power for the benefit of the com
pany.
If the power to issue further shares is exercised
by the directors not for the benefit of the company
but simply and solely for their personal aggrandisement
and to the detriment of the company, the
Court ·will
interfere and prevent the directors from doing so. The
very basis
of the
Court's interference in such a case is
the existence of the relationship of a trustee and of
ces(ui que trust as between the directors and the
company.
The first case to be referred
to is that of Fraser
v. Whalley('). In that
case a new company was in
corporated in 1859
by an Act of Parliament. By that
Act also certain existing railway companies were au
thorised
"to acquire, take and hold shares in the
undertaking of the company, and
for such purpose to
create new shares in their undertakings." The existiQg companies in 1861 passed resolutions authorising
their directors to exercise this power. The resolutions
were, however,
not acted upon and the existing com
panies
did not
iEsue n ~w shares in their undertakings
for the purpose
of taking up any share in the new
company
and all the shares of the new company were
issued to persons other
than the existing companies.
In short, the shares which it was contemplated would
be taken up by the existing companies were no longer
available. Subsequently, in 1862, another Act of
Parliament was passed authorising the new company
to make a branch line and for that purpose to raise
fresh capital
by the creation and issue of new shares.
But this new Act gave no fresh power to the existing
companies to
toke up any of these new shares to be
issued by the new company. One Savin held the
majority of shares in the existing companies and there
was dispute between him
and the directors. The gene
ral meeting of the company was shortly going to be
held
and the directors knew that at the ensuing general
meeting
their policy would be repudiated by the
majority of shareholders
and they would be turned out.
from
their office. It was in these circumstances thaf
the directors purporting to act on the resolutiens of
(1)
(186l) 2 H. & M. 10.
•
' \,
~
('
'\-
i
-.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 421
1861, resolved to issue new shares. Suit was filed on
behalf of the shareholders
to restrain the directors from
issuing
any new shares.
On a motion for injunction
Wood V. C. granted an interlocutory injunction. In
course of his judgment the learned Judge observed:
" The directors are informed that at the next
general meeting
they are likely to be removed, and, . therefore, on the very verge of a general meeting, they,
without giving notice
to anyone, with this indecent
haste and scramble which is shewn
by the times at
which the meetings were held, resolve that shares are,
on the faith of this obsolete power entrusted to them
for a different purpose,
to be· issued for the
very pur
pose of controlling
the ensuing general meeting.
I have no doubt
that the
Court will interfere to
prevent so gross a breach of trust. I say nothing on
the question whether the policy advocated by the
directors, or
that which I am told is to be pursued by
Savin, is the more for the interest of the company.
That is a matter wholly for the
shareholders. I fully
concur in the principle laid down in
Foss v. Harbottle
(2 Hare, 461) as to that, but if the directors can clan
destinely and
at the last moment use a stale resolution
for the express purpose of preventing the free action
.of
the shareholders, this
Court will take care that, when
the company cannot interfere, the Court will do so."
It will be noticed that· this decision proceeds
entirely
on the grounds
tha~ the resolutions of 1861 on
which
the directors purported to act were obsolete, for
they
had not so long been acted upon and also because
the shares contemplated by
that resolution were not
availaHc, and that even if the resolutions were still
effective and gave authority
to the directors to issue
new shares, the directors could only
do so for the pur
pose
of acquiririg shares in the new company and not
for the purpose of controlling the ensuing general
meeting and preventing
the free action of the share
holders. There was no evidence whatever in
that case
that the issue of shares was at all for the benefit of the
company. The issue of shares in that case was not
for the purpose of taking up shares in the new company
for which purpose alone
the power conld be. exercised,
1950
Na11a/al Zav<:I'
And Another
v.
Bombay Life
Assttra11cc COi..
1lnd Others
Das/.
1950
Nana/al Zavcr
And Another
v.
Bo11zba y Lif~
Assuran::e Co
An,I Others
DasJ.
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950)
but that it was being exercised, wholly and solely for
quite a different purpose, namely, of maintaining them
selves in
office.
Punt v. Symons & Co. Limited (
1
)
was a motion
for an interim injunction
to restrain the holding of a
meeting of
the defendant company for confirming the
resolution for issue of shares.
On the evidence it was
quite clear " that these shares were not issued bona
fide for
the general advantage of the company, but
that they were issued with the immediate object of
controlling the holders of
the greater number of shares
in the company,
and of obtaining the necessary statu
tory majority for passing a special resolution while, at
the same time, not conferring upon the minority the
power to demand a
poll." Byrne]. granted an injunc
tion restraining the defendant from holding the confirm
atory meeting
and observed :
" I am quite satisfied that the meaning, object,
and intention of the issue of these shares was to enable
the shareholders holding the smaller amount of shares
to control the holders of a very considerable majority.
A power of
the kind exercised by the directors in this
case, is one which must be exercised for the benefit of
the company ; primarily it is given them for the pur
pose of enabling them to raise capital when required
for
the purposes of the company. There may be occa
sions when
the directors may fairly and properly issue
shares in the case
of a company constituted like the
present for other reasons. For instance, it would not
be at all an unreasonable thing to create a sufficient
number of shareholders to enable
sta,tutory powers to
be exercised, but when I find a limited issue of shares
to persons who are obviously meant and intended
to secure the necessary statutory majority in a parti
cular interest, I do not think that is a fair and bona
fal,P exercise of the power."
The learned Judge concluded with the following
words:
" If I find as I do that shares have been issued
under
the general and fiduciary power of the directors
for
the express purpose of acquiring an unfair majority
(I) L.R. (1903] 2 Ch. 506.
...
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS '123
for the purpose of altering the rights of parties under
the articles, I think I ought to interfere."
Piercy v. S. Mills & Co. Ltd. (
1
) was a witness
action before Peterson J. It was indeed a gross case.
On the evidence Peterson .J. found that it was manifest
" that the shares were allotted simply and solely for
the purpose of retaining control in the hands
of the
existing
directors." After stating the facts, the learned
Judge
said: " The question is whether the directors were
justified in acting as they did, or whether their conduct
was a breach of the fiduciary powers which they pos
sessed under the articles.
What they did in fact
was
to override the wishes of the holders of the majority of
the shares of the company for the time being by the
issue
of fresh shares issued solely for that
purpose."
Then after referring.to Fraser v. Whalley and Pmit
v. Symons & Co. Ltd. (supra), the learned Judge
concluded:
"The basis of both cases is, as I understand, that
directors are not entitled to use their powers of issuing
shares
merely for the purpose of maintaining their
control or the control of themselves and their friends -0ver the affairs of the company, or merely for the
purpose of defeating the wishes of the
existing
majority
of shareholders. That is, however, exactly
what has happened in the present case. With the
merits of the dispute as between the directors and the
plaintiff I have no concern whatever. The plaintiff and
· his friends held a majo;rity of the shares of the company,
·and they were entitled, so long as that majority
remained, to have their views prevail in accordance
with th{)regulations of the company, and it was not,
in· my opinion, open to the directors, for the purpose of
-conyerting a minority into a majority, and solely for the
,purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing majority,
to issue the shares which are in dispute in the present
,action;"
In the result, the shares allotted to the defendants
were declared void.
(1) L.R.
(ltiOJ 1 Ch. 77.
1950
N a11al al Z avc1"
;ind Anotlrcr
v.
Bombay Life
Assurance Co.
A1'd Others
Das J.
1950
N
analal Z
aver
Ana Another
v.
Bot1WaJ' Life
Assurance Co.
And Others
Das/.
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1950)
It will oe noticed that in each of the: three cases
the act of the directors was not only not of advantage
to the company but was in essence to its detriment in
that it was calculated to reduce the existing majority
into minority and to prevent the majority of the existing
shareholders from exercising their discretion. with res
pect to what they conceived to be in the best interests of
the company. Those cases w~e not cases of mixed moti
ves
at all. The only motive operating in those cases in
the minds of the directors was detrimental to the inter
ests of existing shareholders and, therefore,
to the com
pany itself.
Our attention was drawn to .Palmer's Com
pany Law, 18th Edition, p. 183, where it is stated that
"in exercising their powers, whether general or special,
directors
must always bear in mind that they are in a
fiduciary position, and must exercise
their powers for
the benefit of
the company, and for that
alone." Rely
ing on the words "and for that alone," it is urged
that the power to issue shares must be exercised
wholly and solely for the benefit of
the company, that
there must not be any other motive whether or not
that other motive is injurious to the company and
that if that power is exercised for that purpose and
also for some other purpose then irrespective of the
nature of that other purpose the directors would be
guilty of an abuse of their power. I am not prepared
to read the passage in the way urged by learned
counsel for the plaintiffs. None of the cases cited
on
that point in Palmer's
Company Law was concerned
with mixed motives at all. In none of th.em was there
any motive beneficial to the company or to the existing
shareholders.
In my view what that passage means
is that the power must be exercised for the benefit of
the company and that as between the directors and
the company there must be no other motive which
may operate to the detriment of the company. If the
directors exercise the power for the benefit of the com
pany
and at the same time they have a subsidiary
motive which in no way affects the company
or its
interests or the existing shareholders then the very basis
of interference of the Court is absent, for, as I have
pointed out,
the
Court of equity only intervenes in order
I
r
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 425
to prevent a breach of trust on the part of the directors
.and
to protect the
cesliti que trust, namely the com
pany and possibly the existing shareholders. If as
between
the directors and the company and the
existing shareholders there is no breach of trust or bad
faith there can be no occasion for the exercise of the
equitable jurisdiction of the
Court. I find support for
my views in the following observations of their Lord
ships of the Judicial Committee in Hirsche v. Sims(
1
):
"If the true effect of the whole evidence is, that
the defendants truly and reasonably believed at the
time
that what they did was for the interest of the
company,
they are not chargeable with dolus
nialus or
breach of
trust merely because in promoting the
interest of
the company they were also promoting their
own, or because they afterwards sold shares
at
priCes
which gave them large profits."
Ori the facts of this case the concurrent finding is
that the company was in need of funds and, therefore,
the issue of further shares was clearly necessary and
is referable to such need. The further motive of keep
ing
out the Singhania group, who are not yet share
holders
but are strangers, does not prejudicially affect
the company or the existing shareholders and the
presence
of such further moti\'e cannot vitiate the
good motive
of finding the necessary funds for the
company.
In my judgment it is impossible to hold
that the issue of fresh shares was, in the circumstances,
illegal or
v0id.
Re (iii) :-Learned counsel for the plaintiffs
contends
that both the
Courts below were in error in
holding
that there has been no contravention of the
provisions
of section
105-C of the Indian Companies
Act. That section is in the following terms:-
" vVhere the directors decide to increase the capital
of the company
by the issue of further shares snch
shares shall be offered to the
memlwrs in proportion
to the existing shares held by each member (irrespec
tive
of class) and such offer shall be made by notice
specifying
the number of shares to which the member is
entitled,
and limiting a time within which the offer, if
(1)
(1894] A.C. 654, at pp. 660.GGl.
1950
Nana/al Zat't'r
And Anotlic•
v.
Bombay L1je
Assurance Co.
And Others
DasJ.
1950
N analal Z aver·
And Another
v.
Bombay Life
Assurance Co.
And Others
Das].
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1950l
not accepted, will be deemed to be declined ; and after
the expiration of such time, or on receipt of an
intimation from the merober to whom such notice. is
given that he declines to accept the shares offered, the
directors may dispose of the same in such manner as
they think most beneficial to the company."
This section was added to the Indian Companies.
Act in 1936.
The first question is whether
the section contem
plates increase of capital above the authorised
limit,
or only below the authorised limit. Learned Attorney~
General appearing for the company urges that the words
"further shares" must be read in conjunction with
the words " decide to increase the capital of the
company " and, so read, must mean shares which are·
issued for the purpose of increasing the capital beyond
the authorised capital. He contends that section
)05-C has no application to this case. Section 50 deals
with, among other things, alteration of
the conditions
of the Memorandum
of Association of the company by
increasing its share capital by the issue of new shares.
The very idea of
alteration of the memorandum by the
issue of new shares clearly indicates that it contem
plates
an increase of the share capital above the auth
orised capital with which the company got itself regis
tered. This increase can only be done
by the company
in a general meeting as provided in sub-section
(2)
of section
50. This increase above foe authorised
limit cannot possibly be done by the directors on
their own responsibility. Section 105-C, however,
speaks of increase
of
capital by the issue of further
shares. The words used are capital and not share capital
and further shares and not new shares. It speaks of
increase
by the
directors.· Therefore, the section only
contemplates such increase of capital as is
within the
competence of the directors
to decide upon. It clearly
follows from
this that the section is intended to cover
a case where the directors decide
to increase the
capital by issuing further shares within the authorised
limit, for
it is only within that limit that the directors
can decide to issue further shares, unless
they are
precluded from doing even that by the regulations of
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 427
the company. It is said that section 105-C becomes
applicable
after the company in a general meeting has
decided upon altering
its memorandum by
in
creasing its . share capital by issuing new shares.
If the company at a general meeting has decided
upon
the increase of its share capital by the
issue of new shares, then it is wholly inappropriate
to talk of the directors deciding to increase
capital, because
the increase has already been
decided 'upon
by the company itself. Further, after
the company has at a general meeting decided to
increase its share capital by the issue of new shares,
the increased capital becomes its authorised capital
and then if the directors under section
105-C decide to
increase
the capital by the issue of further
shares,
then this decision is nothing more than a decision to
raise capital within the newly authorised limit.
Finally, if section 105-C were to be held applicable to
the case of an increase of capital above the authorised
limit then such construction
will lead to anomalous
results
so far as the companies which have adopted
Table
A, for the section is not consonant with
Regula
ticn 42 of Table A which, as will be shown hereafter,
applies to increase of capital beyond the authorised lim
it. If the Legislature intended that sedion 105-C should
apply to all companies in the matter of increase of
capital above the authorised limit, then the simplest
thing would have been to make Regulation 42 a
compulsory regulation, instead of introducing a section
which in its terms differs from Regulation 42
an<l
which therefore makes the position of companies which
have adopted Table A anomalous. It appears to me,
tbc.:rdore, for reasons stated above, that section 105-C
becomes applicable only when the directors decide to
~ncrease capital \Vithin the authorised limit by the
issue of further shares. In this view of the matter that
section is clearly applicable to the facts of this case.
The next question is whether the directors have,
in
t11e
matter of issuing and offering further shares in
the pre::ent case, been guilty of any contravention
of the provisions of this section. Learned counsel for
5(
1950
N anal al Zave,.
And Another
v,
Bombay Life
A.~surance C<A
And Others
Das}.
1950
Nana/al Ztroer
And Another
v.
Bombay Life
.Asstwance C:o.
And Others
Das}.
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]
the plaintiffs contends tpat they have, because they
have not offered the whole lot of shares to the share
holders in proportion
to the existing shares held by
them. It is pointed out that although the directors
decided to issue 4,596 further shares they have only
offered four shares to every five
shares held by the
shareholders which works out at 4,323~ shares which
leaves 272i shares in the hands of the directors
which they have reserved power unto themselves ti;>
dispose of in such manner as they think fit. Learned
Attorney-General appearing for
the company sub
mits:
(a) That section
105-C should be construed in
the light of Regulation 42 in Table A of the Indian
Companies Act, 1913 ;
(b) That in order to prevent absurdity and to
give business efficacy to the section, the words " as
nearly as circumstances
admit
" should be read into
the section ; and
( c) That in any event the directors have not con
travened the provisions of the section even if the same
be literally construed.
Each of these points requires serious consideration.
As to
the first point it should be remembered that
section
105-C was introduced in thi: .Act only in 1936.
There is no counterpart
of it in the English Act even
now.
Prior to 1936 there was no check on the powers
of
the directors to issue blocks of shares, within the
authorised limit, to themselves or to their nominees,
unless their powers were circumscribed
by the Articles
of Association.
One of the mischiefs of the managing
agency system which prevails in
this country was that
the managing agents, who usually dominated the
board of directors, could, to secure their own position,
induce
the board
to issue blocks of preference shares to
the managing agents or their nominees. To check this
mischief section 105-C was introduced in the Indian
Act in 1936. As regards the increase of capital beyond
j
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 429
the authorised limit it could only be done by the
coµJ.pa.ri.y. The shareholders could, while sanctioning
such increase, protect themselves · by giving special
directions to the directors as to
the mode of disposal
of the new shares.
In the model Regulations set forth
in Table A of the 1882 Act under the heading '' Increase
of
Capital" are grouped three Regulations 26 to 28.
Regulation
27 was
in. the following terms :
"(27) Subject to any directions to the contrary
that may be given by the meeting that sanctions the
increase
of capital, all new shares shall be offered to
the members in proportion to the existing shares held
by them, and
such offer shall be made by notice speci
fying the number of shares to which the member is
entitled, and limiting a time within which the offer, if
not accepted; will be deemed to be declined, and after
the expiration
of such time, or on the receipt of an
intimation from
the member to whom such notice is
given that he declines to accept the shares offered, the
directors may dispose of the same in such manner as
they
think most beneficial to the
company."
In Table A of our present Act under the heading
"Alteration of Capital " are to be found three corres
ponding Regulations 41 to 43. Regulation 42 is as
follows:-
" (42) Subject to any direction to the contrary
that may be given by the resolution sanctioning the
increase of share capital, all new shares shall, before
issue, be offered to such persons as
at the date of the
offer are entitled to receive notices from the company
of general meetings in proportion,
as nearly as the
cir
cu.mstances admit, to the amount of the existing shares
tO Wpich they are entitled. The offer shall be made
by n0tice specifying the number of shares offered, and
limiting a time within which the offer, if not accepted,
will be deemed to be declined,
and after the expiration
of
that time, or on the receipt of an intimation from
the person to }Vhom the offer is made that he declines
to accept the shares offered, the directors may dispose
1~50
Nana/al Z<nnr
And Anuthi:r
v.
Bombay Lift
.Assurance Co,
A"d Oth•rs
Das].
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950)
1950
Narzalul Znt•.:r
And Aiiotl1cr
of the same in such manner as they think most bene
ficial to the company.
The directors
may likewise so
dispose of any new shares which (by reason of the ratio
which the new shares
bear to shares held by persons
entitled
to an offer of new shares) cannot, in the opinion
of the directors, be conveniently offered under this
article."
Bo111b11 ~v Life
Ass11ra11~e Co.
·And Others
DosJ.
The words underlined are new and are not to be
found in Regulation 27 of Table A of the 1882 Act.
The scheme of the 1882 Act, as of our present Act, and
the language used in the two regulations quoted above
clearly indicate, to my mind,
that they deal with that
kind of increase of share capital which involves an
alteration of the conditions of the memorandum which
the company alone can do
by issuing new shares.
These Regulations do not purport to deal with increase
of capital which is within the competency
of the direc
tors to decide upon.
In that kind of increase of capital
beyond the authorised limits these regulations give
the
directors certain latitude, subject, of course, to any
directions to the contrary that may be given by the
resolution of the shareholders in general meeting sanc
tioning such increase. The only difference between
Regulation
27 of 1882 and Regulation 42 of our present
Act is
that under the last mentioned Regulation, in the
absence of any direction to
the contrary, the discretion
of the directors has been widened
by the introduction
of
the words underlined above. This company was
incorporated in
1908 under the Act of 1882. It did
not adopt the Regulations of Table A of the 1882 Act
but article 45
of" its Articles of Association proceeds
more
or less on the lines of Regulation 27 of Table A
of the 1882 Act. The discretion given to the directors
under article 45 is, therefore, obviously narrower
than
that left to the directors under Regulation 42 of Table
A of the present Act. Then came section
105-C in
1936. As already pointed out, that section deals with
. increase of capital within the authorised limit · which
the directors can decide upon without reference to the
. shareholders in a general meeting of the company. :;i.:he
legislature had before it both Regulation 27 of Table
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 431
A of 1882 and Regulation 42 of Table A of the Act of
1913.
It chose to adopt the language of Regulation 27
in preference to
that of Regulation
42. The absence
in section 105-C of the words I have underlined in Re
gulation 42 cannot
but be regarded as deliberate. And
I can conceive of very good reasons for
this departure.
In the case of increase beyond the authorised limit,
that can be done only by the company in general
meet
ing and the shareholders can protect themselves by
giving directions to the contrary and, therefore, subject
to such directions a wider latitude
may safely be given
to the directors.
But in the case of increase of capital
within the authorised limit which the directors may do
without reference to
the shareholders the legislature
did not think
it safe to leave an uncontrolled discretion
to the directors. The mischief sought to be remedied
re
quired this curtailing of the directors' discretion. In
my judgment it is impossible to construe section 105-C /
in the light of Regulation 42 for several reasons.
Regulation 42 and section 105-C do not cover the same
field
and cannot be said to be in pari materia. The
omission of the underlined words was obviQusly
deli
berate. The difference in the language of the two pro
visions in the same statute cannot be overlooked as
merely accidental. And lastly
the reading of these
words
of Regulation 42 in section
105-C will frustrate
what I conceive to be the undertying reason for the
introduction
of the section. In my judgment the first
point urged
by the learned Attorney-General which
found favour with the
Courts below cannot be accepted.
The second point urged
by the learned
Attorney
·General is founded on the supposed necessity of intro
ducing the words "as nearly as the circumstances
admit" to avoid the absurdity which may flow from
a literal construction of section 105-C. It must be
remembered
that the cardinal rule of interpretation of
statutes is to construe its provisions literally and
gram
matically giving the words their ordinary and natural
meaning.
It is only when such a construction leads
to
an obvious absurdity which the legislature cannot
be supposed to have intended
that the
Court in
1950
N a11alal Zavcr'
,fotl Another
v.
Bombay Life
,i:\ssura1tce Co.
Anti Others
DasJ.
1950
Nanulal Zawr
And Another
v.
Bo1nbay Life
Asslfran:e: Co.
AndOt~rs
DasJ.
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950)
interpreting the section may introduce words to give
effect
to what it conceives to be the true intention of the 'legislature. It ·is not any and every inconvenience
that justifies adoption of this extreme rule of construc
tion. The section literally construed is quite intelli
gible and may easily be applied to many cases where
the further shares issued bear a uniform and round
proportion. Merely because a literal construction of
the section leads to inconvenient result in a particular
case cannot, in my opinion, justify the application of
such a drastic rule of construction as is urged by the
Attorney-General. Even in this case there would have
been no inconvenience if the directors decided for the
issue of 4,053 shares which could have been offered in
the proportion of three shares to every four shares held
by each shareholder. It is true that ordinarily it is
for
the directors to judge as to the exact amount of capital
needed
by the company but in arriving at their decision
they cannot overlook
the limitations put upon their
power
by the section with respect to the proportion in
which the further shares are to be offered by them to
the shareholders. Further, the supposed inconvenience
can be easily avoided
by a reference to the share
holders in a general meeting
by asking them to in
crease the share capital beyond the authorised limit
to
such an amount as would permit proportionate dis
posal of the further and new shares. In my opinion
there
is not sufficient force in the contention which
should induce the
Court to depart from the ordinary
and golden rule of interpretation I have mentioned
above.
The last point urged
by the Jearned Attorney
General appears to me to be of substance.
On a strictly
literal construction of the section
the directors must
perforce offer all the further shares to the
shareholder&
in proportion to their respective holdings. Section
105-C comes into operation after the directors have
decided
to issue further shares. The section does not
in terms provide that such offer must be made
all at
once or at any particular point of time and I see no
reason to import
any such requirement in .the section.
S.C.R. SUPH.EME COURT REPORTS 433
The underlying object of the section is to effect equit
able distribution of the further shares. Here the
shares have been offered in the proportion of four shares
to every five shares. There can be no suggestion of
favouritism in this offer.
Every shareholder will get his
proportion if he
so desires. The majority will ren.ain
the
majority if every one takes up the shares offered
to him.
It is true that 272-4/5 shares remain in hand.
At best although issued they have not been offered to
anyone. I do
not agree that under clause 8 of the
directors' resolution the directors can dispose of those
272-4/5 shares
i.n any manner they please before offer
ing
them proportionately to the existing shareholders.
That clause, on a true construction of the resolution as
a whole, covers only those
shares which have been
actually issued but have not been applied for. In point
of fact
the directors have not yet allotted any of these
272-4/5 shares.
If and when the directors allot these
shares otherwise
than in due course of law, i.e., with
out offering them to the shareholders,
the share
holders will then have cause for complaint
and may
then come to
Court for redress. It is said that 272-4/5
shares cannot in.future
be offered to so many
share
holders in a reasonable proportion. If it cannot be
done, these odd shares will remain in hand until
the company at a general meeting decides to increase
the share capital by issuing new shares and then these
odd shares together with new shares will be easily
capable of being offered to
the shareholders propor
tionately. These special considerations which arise in
the case of
this company by reason of its own peculiar
-circumstances cannot, in
my opinion, affect or alter
the meaning
and effect of the section. From all that
I can see, up to the present time, there has been no
contravention
of the provisions of section
105-C. In
my view the directors have substantially complied
with the requirements of the section and the plaintiffs
can have no grievance.
They rushed to
Court prema
turely.
For the reasons stated above, I am clearly of
-0pinion that the conclusions of the Courts below were
1950
Nana/al Z,1~·cr
And Another
v.
Bombay Life
t1.<1s1iraucc Co .
.-1nd Others
DasJ.
1950
N anal al Z avct'
And Anotl1cr
v.
Bonibay Life
Assurance Co.
And Others
Muklierjca J,
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1950]
i:ight and no ground has been made out for interfering
with the same. The result, therefore, is
that this
appeal is dismissed with costs.
MuKHERJEA J.-. I agree that this appeal should be
dismissed and I concur substantially in the reasons
which have been given
by my learned brother Mr.
Justice Das in his judgment.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the Appellants: 5.
P. Varma.
Agent for the Respondents: Rajinder Narain.
The landmark Supreme Court ruling in Nanalal Zaver and Another v. Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd. and Others is a cornerstone of Indian corporate law, profoundly shaping the principles of Directors' Fiduciary Duty and the judicial interpretation of Section 105-C Indian Companies Act 1913. This pivotal judgment, extensively documented on CaseOn, provides critical guidance on the powers of a company's board, especially when their decisions are driven by mixed motives, such as raising capital while simultaneously fending off a hostile takeover. It dissects the delicate balance between acting in the company's best interest and the directors' own preservation of control.
The Supreme Court was tasked with resolving two primary legal questions:
The legal framework central to this case involves two key doctrines of company law:
The Supreme Court conducted a detailed analysis of both the statutory requirements and the common law duties of directors, ultimately upholding the actions of the Bombay Life Assurance Co.'s board.
The appellants argued for a strict, literal interpretation of Section 105-C, contending that the offer was illegal because the 4:5 ratio resulted in 272 shares remaining undistributed. They insisted that *all* shares resolved to be issued must be offered proportionally.
The Court rejected this technical argument, adopting a purposive and practical approach. It held that the two essential requirements of the section were met:
The Court reasoned that the law does not demand a perfect mathematical formula that leaves no remainder, which in many cases would be commercially impractical. As long as the offer was fair and equitable to all existing members, the spirit and purpose of the law were fulfilled. The resolution was, therefore, in substantial compliance with Section 105-C and not illegal.
This was the more complex aspect of the case. The appellants claimed the directors' true motive was to thwart the takeover attempt by a businessman, Mr. Singhania, and entrench their own positions. The Court had to examine the directors' "mixed motives."
Crucially, both the trial court and the High Court had established as a concurrent finding of fact that the company was genuinely in need of additional funds. The Supreme Court, adhering to its practice, did not interfere with this finding. This established a legitimate, primary purpose for the share issue.
The Court then addressed the secondary motive: preventing Mr. Singhania's takeover. It concluded that this additional motive did not invalidate the board's decision. The judgment distinguished this situation from cases where the *sole* purpose of issuing shares is to manipulate voting power. Here, the directors' actions were defensive. They reasonably believed that a takeover by Mr. Singhania, who might use the company's funds for his other ventures, was not in the company's best interest. Acting to protect the company from such a threat was a legitimate exercise of their fiduciary duty.
The Court held that if the primary purpose for an action is legitimate and for the benefit of the company, an additional motive that may also benefit the directors does not automatically render the action *mala fide* or an abuse of power.
Analyzing the nuances of mixed motives in corporate governance can be complex. For legal professionals pressed for time, CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs on rulings like Nanalal Zaver provide a quick yet comprehensive understanding of the court's reasoning on such critical points.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Bombay High Court. It held that the directors' resolution to issue further shares was valid and lawful. The offer did not contravene the provisions of Section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and the directors had not acted in bad faith. Their decision was deemed to be a proper exercise of their fiduciary powers, taken in the best interests of the company to both raise necessary capital and protect it from a perceived external threat.
In this case, the directors of Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd., facing a takeover attempt by an outsider, resolved to issue the company's remaining unissued shares to existing shareholders at a ratio of four new shares for every five held. Two shareholders sued, claiming this violated Section 105-C of the Companies Act because the ratio left some shares unallotted, and that the real motive was to block the takeover, making the act *mala fide*. The Supreme Court held that the share offer met the core requirements of Section 105-C by being proportional and exclusive to existing members. Furthermore, it ruled that since the company had a genuine need for funds (a legitimate primary motive), the additional defensive motive of preventing a takeover did not render the directors' actions an abuse of their fiduciary duty. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
The Nanalal Zaver case remains a vital authority in corporate law for several reasons:
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for any specific legal concerns or questions.
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