IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Prasenjit Biswas

CO 4541 of 2025

Nandalal Singhania & Ors.

-Versus-

M/s. Bhajanlal Sajjan Kumar & Anr.

For the Petitioners : Mr. Samir Kr. Dhar.

For the Opposite Party No. 1 : Mr. Matibur Rahaman.

Mr. Sumit Kumar Ray.

Hearing concluded on : 02.09.2026

Judgment on : 15.10.2026

Judgment uploaded on : 15.10.2026

Prasenjit Biswas, J:-

1. The instant Civil Revisional Application has been preferred

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the order

dated 11.08.2025 (Order No. 80) passed by the learned Trial Court

in Ejectment Suit No. 122 of 2009 (Registration No. 3177 of 2014).

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2. By the impugned order, the learned Trial Court disposed of the

application filed by the defendant/tenants under Section 7(2) of the

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, and directed the

defendant to deposit the current rent within the time stipulated

under Section 7(1)(c) of the said Act.

3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order,

the plaintiffs/petitioners have approached this Court by way of the

present revisional application, seeking to assail the legality and

propriety of the impugned order.

4. The factual matrix, as it emerges from the materials on

record, is that the plaintiffs/petitioners instituted Ejectment Suit No.

122 of 2009 against the defendant/respondents for recovery of

vacant and khas possession of the suit property, as described in the

schedule to the plaint. The suit property comprises Flat No. 1,

situated on the ground floor of the building, and Godown No. 10,

also situated on the ground floor, at premises No. 36B, Shakespeare

Sarani, Police Station Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata–700017.

5. Upon receipt of the summons issued by the learned Trial

Court, the defendant entered appearance in the suit on 23.06.2009

and filed applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the West

Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. The plaintiffs/petitioners

contested the said applications by filing their respective written

objections.

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CO 4541 of 2025

6. The learned Trial Court initially adjudicated the application

filed by the defendant under Section 7(2) of the said Act by an order

dated 14.06.2010, which was subsequently modified by a further

order dated 19.07.2010. Being dissatisfied with the orders so

passed, the plaintiffs/petitioners approached this Court by filing a

revisional application, being C.O. No. 2632 of 2010.

7. This Court, upon consideration of the matter, allowed the

aforesaid revisional application, set aside the orders dated

14.06.2010 and 19.07.2010 passed by the learned Trial Court and

remitted the matter to the learned Trial Court for fresh adjudication

of the defendant' application under Section 7(2) of the West Bengal

Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. The learned Trial Court was directed to

afford the parties adequate opportunities to advance their respective

submissions and to dispose of the said application afresh within the

time stipulated by this Court in its order passed in connection with

C.O. No. 2632 of 2010.

8. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, the learned Trial Court

reconsidered the application filed by the defendant under Section

7(2) of the said Act and ultimately disposed of the same by the

impugned order dated 11.08.2025 (Order No. 80). It is this order,

whereby the application of the defendant was allowed and a

direction was issued for payment of the current rent within the

prescribed period that has been challenged by the

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CO 4541 of 2025

plaintiffs/petitioners in the present Civil Revisional Application under

Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

9. Mr. Samir Kr. Dhar, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of

the petitioners, at the very outset, contended that the applications

filed by the defendant under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the West

Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, were barred by limitation and,

as such, ought not to have been entertained by the learned Trial

Court. According to the learned Advocate, the statutory

requirements governing the deposit of rent and the consequences of

default in complying with such requirements were not duly

appreciated by the learned Trial Court while passing the impugned

order.

10. It was further submitted that the learned Trial Court

committed a serious error in allowing the application filed by the

defendant under Section 7(2) of the said Act, notwithstanding the

petitioners' specific objections regarding the invalidity of the

deposits allegedly made by the defendant. Elaborating on this

aspect, learned Advocate contended that the deposits were made in

respect of an incorrect premises number and in the names of

persons who were either not the rightful recipients of the rent or had

already died. It was, therefore, argued that such deposits could not

have been treated as valid and lawful deposits of rent so as to

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CO 4541 of 2025

enable the defendant to claim the benefit of the statutory protection

available under the Act.

11. Learned Advocate further submitted that the earlier orders

passed by the learned Trial Court in connection with the defendant's

application under Section 7(2) of the Act had already been set aside

by this Court in C.O. No. 2632 of 2010. By the order passed in the

said revisional proceeding, this Court had directed the learned Trial

Court to reconsider the application afresh after affording the parties

adequate opportunities to advance their respective submissions and

to dispose of the matter within the stipulated time. According to the

learned Advocate, despite such specific directions, the learned Trial

Court failed to undertake a proper consideration of the relevant

materials on record and the objections raised by the

plaintiffs/petitioners. It was contended that the impugned order was

passed without due consideration of the material facts and

circumstances bearing upon the question of default in payment of

rent and the validity of the deposits made by the defendant.

12. Drawing the attention of this Court to the notice to quit dated

17.03.2009, learned Advocate submitted that the

plaintiffs/petitioners had specifically alleged that the defendant had

been defaulters in payment of rent since February 2003. It was

contended that the allegation of default was not an incidental or

subsequent plea but constituted one of the material grounds on

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CO 4541 of 2025

which the plaintiffs/petitioners sought recovery of possession of the

suit premises. Nevertheless, according to the learned Advocate, the

learned Trial Court failed to properly consider the allegation of

persistent default, as specifically recorded in the notice to quit, while

adjudicating the application under Section 7(2) of the Act.

13. It was further submitted that the agreement dated

09.12.1970, executed between the landlords and the tenants, was

also a material document governing the relationship between the

parties and the nature and extent of the tenancy. Learned Advocate

contended that the terms and conditions of the said agreement,

particularly insofar as they related to the identity and extent of the

tenanted premises and the obligations of the defendant as tenant,

were not duly considered by the learned Trial Court. According to

him, a proper adjudication of the application under Section 7(2)

required due consideration of the relevant contractual terms

alongside the statutory obligations imposed upon the defendant

under the Act of 1997.

14. Referring to the earlier proceedings before the learned Trial

Court, learned Advocate submitted that, by an order dated

14.06.2010, the defendant had been permitted and directed to

deposit the arrears of rent in Court. However, according to the

petitioners, the defendant failed to comply with the said direction in

its entirety. It was contended that the order dated 14.06.2010

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CO 4541 of 2025

reflected the existence of arrears of rent for five months, namely,

February 2006 and the period from February to May 2010, and that

the defendant had been directed to deposit the arrears together with

the requisite interest. Learned Advocate submitted that the

defendant nevertheless failed to make the deposits in accordance

with the said direction.

15. It was further argued that the defendant thereafter filed an

application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,

seeking modification of the order dated 14.06.2010. Although the

said application was allowed and the defendant were granted a

further direction concerning the deposit of rent for the relevant

month of 2006 together with interest, the defendant allegedly failed

to comply with the modified direction as well. According to the

learned Advocate, the repeated failure of the defendant to comply

with the orders passed by the learned Trial Court demonstrated that

the defaults in question could not be treated as mere technical or

inconsequential irregularities. It was, therefore, contended that the

learned Trial Court ought to have examined the consequences of

such non-compliance before granting relief to the defendant under

Section 7(2) of the Act.

16. Learned Advocate further submitted that the deposits made by

the defendant were fundamentally defective inasmuch as they

allegedly related to an incorrect premises number and purported to

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CO 4541 of 2025

cover an area beyond the actual tenanted premises. It was

contended that the defendant had impermissibly enlarged the scope

of their tenancy by including an additional area, namely, the garden

situated within premises No. 36B, Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata–

700017. According to the petitioners, the defendant could not, by

making deposits in respect of an enlarged or incorrectly described

area, alter the identity or extent of the demised premises or claim

that such deposits constituted valid compliance with their statutory

obligations as tenants.

17. It was further contended that the deposits were made in the

names of persons who were allegedly not the proper recipients of

the rent, including persons who had already died. The learned

Advocate submitted that the identity of the landlord or the person

legally entitled to receive the rent, as well as the correct

identification of the tenanted premises, were material considerations

in determining whether the deposits made by the defendant could

be regarded as valid deposits in law. According to him, the learned

Trial Court failed to address these objections in their proper

perspective and erroneously proceeded to allow the application

under Section 7(2) of the Act.

18. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, learned Advocate

for the petitioners argued that the defendant had repeatedly

defaulted in payment and deposit of rent and had failed to comply

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CO 4541 of 2025

with the directions issued by the learned Trial Court on earlier

occasions. He further contended that the alleged deposits were

defective on account of the incorrect description of the premises, the

inclusion of an additional area beyond the tenanted premises and

the use of the names of persons who were allegedly not legally

entitled to receive the rent. According to the learned Advocate,

these circumstances, considered cumulatively, cast serious doubt

upon the validity of the deposits and the entitlement of the

defendant to the relief granted by the learned Trial Court.

19. In support of his contentions, Mr. Samir Kr. Dhar, learned

Advocate for the petitioners, placed reliance upon the decision of a

Coordinate Bench of this Court in Nisha Shah v. Madhuri Chandra

and Others

1

. Learned Advocate submitted that the factual

circumstances and the legal issues arising in the present case were

substantially similar to those considered by the Coordinate Bench in

the aforesaid decision. He contended that the principles laid down

therein supported the petitioners' challenge to the impugned order

and warranted interference by this Court in the exercise of its

supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India.

1

2026 SCC OnLine Cal 622

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CO 4541 of 2025

20. Accordingly, learned Advocate for the petitioners prayed that

the present Civil Revisional Application be allowed, the impugned

order dated 11.08.2025 passed by the learned Trial Court be set

aside, and appropriate consequential orders be passed in accordance

with law.

21. Per contra, Mr. Matibur Rahaman, learned Advocate appearing

on behalf of the defendant/respondent, vehemently opposed the

contentions advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs/petitioners and

submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Trial

Court does not suffer from any illegality, material irregularity, or

infirmity warranting interference by this Court. According to the

learned Advocate, the materials available on record, particularly the

documents duly produced and marked as exhibits before the learned

Trial Court, do not establish that the defendant/respondents were

defaulters in payment of rent. He contended that the question of

default must be determined on the basis of the documentary

evidence available on record and in accordance with the provisions

of the applicable tenancy law.

22. It was further submitted by the learned Advocate that the

defendant/respondents, in their capacity as tenants, had duly

deposited the monthly rent as well as the arrear rent within the

period prescribed under the relevant provisions of the Act. In

support of such submission, he drew the attention of the Court to

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CO 4541 of 2025

the exhibited documents, which, according to him, sufficiently

demonstrate that the defendant/respondents had complied with

their statutory obligations regarding payment and deposit of rent.

He accordingly contended that, in the absence of any legally

sustainable finding of default, the defendant/respondents could not

be treated as defaulters within the meaning of the applicable

statutory provisions.

23. The learned Advocate further argued that the

plaintiffs/petitioners could not derive any advantage from an

allegation of default when the documentary evidence on record,

according to the defendant/respondents, established timely payment

or deposit of the rent and arrears thereof. He submitted that the

learned Trial Court had considered the relevant materials placed

before it and had passed the impugned order upon due

consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore,

unless the plaintiffs/petitioners could demonstrate that the learned

Trial Court had committed a manifest error of law or had failed to

consider any material evidence having a bearing on the issue, there

would be no justification for this Court to disturb the order under

challenge.

24. In support of his submissions, Mr. Matibur Rahaman, learned

Advocate for the defendant/respondents, placed reliance upon the

decisions of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Manikyaram

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CO 4541 of 2025

Chatuspati v. Shrimati Sikha Dev & Ors .

2

, and Nawal Kishore

Agarwalla v. Samarendra Nath Shaw .

3

Relying upon the

aforesaid decisions, he sought to impress upon the Court that the

issue of default in payment of rent must be examined in the light of

the applicable statutory provisions and the materials available on

record, and that the consequences of default cannot be attracted in

the absence of the requisite legal and factual foundation.

25. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the learned Advocate

contended that, since the defendant/respondent had duly deposited

the rent and arrear rent within the time stipulated under the Act and

could not, therefore, be regarded as defaulters, the principal ground

urged by the plaintiffs/petitioners for challenging the impugned

order was unsustainable. He accordingly submitted that the

impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court was justified in

the facts and circumstances of the case and did not call for any

interference by this Court.

26. I have considered the rival submission advanced by both the

parties and have gone through the impugned order passed by the

learned Trial Court.

27. The instant suit was instituted by the plaintiffs/petitioners

against the defendant/respondents for recovery of vacant and khas

2

2011 (2) C.L.J. (Cal) 362

3

1988 (1) C.L.J. 34

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CO 4541 of 2025

possession of the suit property, as described in the schedule to the

plaint. Upon receipt of the summons issued by the learned Trial

Court, the defendant/respondents entered appearance in the suit on

23.06.2009 and filed applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of

the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred

to as ‘the Act of 1997’). Having regard to the date of appearance

and the filing of the aforesaid applications, it appears that the

defendant approached the learned Trial Court within the statutory

period prescribed under the said Act. Accordingly, the objection

raised by the plaintiffs/petitioners regarding limitation, insofar as it

relates to the initial filing of the applications, is not sustainable on

the facts placed before this Court.

28. The principal controversy that arises for consideration is

whether the defendant/respondents were defaulters in payment of

rent and whether the deposits made by them from time to time

were valid and sufficient to discharge their statutory obligations

under the Act of 1997.

29. The specific case of the plaintiffs/petitioners is that the

defendant had been in default in payment of rent since February

2003 that is, following the disposal of the earlier ejectment

proceedings. The materials on record, however, reveal that an

earlier ejectment suit, being Ejectment Suit No. 470 of 1979, had

been instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendant. The said suit

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CO 4541 of 2025

was dismissed by the learned Trial Court, and the appeal preferred

against the judgment and decree passed therein was also dismissed.

It is the case of the defendant that, during pendency of the earlier

proceedings, they continued to deposit rent before the City Civil

Court at Calcutta.

30. In support of their contention, the defendant produced certain

challans relating to the deposits made before the City Civil Court,

Calcutta, in connection with the earlier ejectment suit. The said

challans indicate that rent for the relevant period, including the

months of February 2003 and December 2005, had been deposited

before the appropriate court during pendency of the earlier

litigation. Although the plaintiffs/petitioners disputed the factum of

such deposits and contended that the defendant had failed to

produce sufficient documentary evidence in support thereof, the

defendant relied upon information slips issued by the concerned

department to substantiate their claim.

31. Significantly, during adjudication of the application under

Section 7(2) of the Act of 1997, the defendant examined a witness

as PW-2, who produced the relevant deposit register maintained by

the City Civil Court, Calcutta, concerning the challans submitted in

respect of the rent deposits. The entries contained in the said

register lend support to the defendant' contention that rent for

February 2003 and December 2005 had, in fact, been deposited

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CO 4541 of 2025

before the City Civil Court and information slip was produced to that

extent. No cogent documentary evidence was produced by the

plaintiffs/petitioners to rebut the entries appearing in the register or

to establish that the deposits for the aforesaid months had not been

made.

32. It is apposite to refer to the decision rendered by the Co-

ordinate Bench of this Court in Manikyaram Chatuspati (supra),

wherein the Court, inter-alia, held that the payment of rent by the

opposite party through Court in an earlier suit instituted between

the previous landlord and the opposite party stood established by

the information slip produced by the opposite party. In view of such

documentary evidence demonstrating the deposit of rent through

Court, the finding of the learned Trial Court that no arrears of rent

were due did not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference

by the revisional Court.

33. The aforesaid decision reiterates the principle that, while

determining the question of default in payment of rent, the Court is

required to consider the relevant documentary evidence relating to

the deposit or payment of rent through Court. Where such payment

is duly substantiated by the materials on record, an allegation of

non-payment cannot be accepted in disregard of the evidence

establishing such payment. Accordingly, the Co-ordinate Bench

declined to interfere with the finding of the learned Trial Court

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CO 4541 of 2025

regarding the absence of arrears of rent, as the same was supported

by the documentary evidence available on record.

34. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts and circumstances

of the present case, it appears that, in the absence of any cogent or

convincing material to discredit the documentary evidence produced

by the defendant/opposite party, the learned Trial Court was

justified in taking such evidence into consideration while

adjudicating the question of default in payment of rent. The

evidentiary value of the relevant documents cannot be discarded

merely on the basis of a bare denial by the plaintiffs/petitioners. In

the absence of any material sufficient to contradict or disprove the

relevant entries in the official register, such denial, by itself, is

insufficient to displace the probative value of the documents relied

upon by the defendant/opposite party.

35. In such circumstances, the allegation of non-payment of rent

for the months of February 2003 and December 2005 cannot be

sustained merely on the basis of the objections raised by the

plaintiffs/petitioners, particularly when the documentary evidence on

record supports the case of the defendant/opposite party regarding

payment or deposit of rent. Consequently, no illegality or material

irregularity can be attributed to the finding of the learned Trial Court

on this aspect.

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CO 4541 of 2025

36. It further appears from the materials on record that, after the

relevant period covered by the deposits before the City Civil Court,

the defendant continued to deposit rent before the office of the Rent

Controller from January 2006 to May 2009. The plaintiffs/petitioners,

however, challenged the validity of the said deposits on two principal

grounds. First, it was contended that rent for February 2006 had not

been deposited within the prescribed period. Secondly, it was

argued that the deposits made before the Rent Controller were

invalid because the particulars of the tenanted premises had been

incorrectly described in the challans.

37. With regard to the alleged non-payment of rent for February

2006, the materials on record indicate that the defendant deposited

the rent for the said month as admitted arrears of rent, together

with the requisite statutory interest, in accordance with the

provisions of Section 7(1) of the Act of 1997. The relevant question,

therefore, is whether such deposit, made along with the applicable

interest, satisfied the statutory requirement and whether any

subsisting default remained thereafter. Upon consideration of the

materials referred to above, it appears that the defendant took steps

to discharge their liability in respect of the rent for February 2006 by

making the deposit together with the statutory interest. In the

absence of any further material demonstrating that the said deposit

was insufficient or otherwise legally ineffective, the mere assertion

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CO 4541 of 2025

that the rent for the said month had not initially been deposited

cannot, by itself, establish a continuing default.

38. The next objection raised on behalf of the plaintiffs/petitioners

concerns the description of the suit premises in the challans

submitted before the Rent Controller. It was contended by Mr. Dhar,

learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiffs/petitioners that the

deposits were made in respect of premises described as No. 36A,

Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata, whereas the suit property is situated

at premises No. 36B, Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata. Learned

Advocate further submitted that the description contained in the

challans included Flat No. 1, one garage and garden on the ground

floor, and one godown and servant quarter on the first floor of the

outhouse at premises No. 36, subsequently described as No. 36A,

Shakespeare Sarani. According to the learned Advocate, such

discrepancies rendered the deposits invalid in law.

39. The aforesaid contention, however, must be examined in the

light of the documents forming part of the record and the description

of the tenanted premises as disclosed therein. It is evident that the

defendant referred to the earlier number of the premises in the

challans submitted before the Rent Controller. The

plaintiffs/petitioners have not produced any documentary evidence

to establish that the premises originally bearing No. 36 had

subsequently been renumbered as No. 36B, or that the description

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CO 4541 of 2025

appearing in the challans necessarily referred to a different property

altogether.

40. In the absence of such supporting evidence, the discrepancy in

the present municipal number of the premises cannot, by itself, be

regarded as conclusive proof that the deposits were made in respect

of a property other than the suit premises. The material

consideration is whether the deposits can, upon a proper

appreciation of the relevant documents and the description of the

tenancy, be identified with the tenancy in question. A mere

discrepancy in the description of the premises, without further

evidence demonstrating that the deposits related to an entirely

different tenancy or property, would not necessarily render the

deposits invalid.

41. It is true that a tenant seeking the protection of Section 7 of

the Act of 1997 must comply with the statutory requirements

governing the deposit of rent. At the same time, the validity of a

deposit must be determined upon consideration of the substance of

the transaction and the evidence available on record, rather than on

the basis of a discrepancy in nomenclature alone. In the present

case, the plaintiffs/petitioners have not produced sufficient material

to establish that the earlier premises number mentioned in the

challans referred to a property distinct from the suit premises.

Consequently, the objection concerning the discrepancy in the

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CO 4541 of 2025

premises number does not, on the materials presently available,

furnish sufficient justification for treating all the deposits made

before the Rent Controller as invalid.

42. It further appears from the materials on record that the

defendant continued to deposit rent from June 2009 onwards and

that such deposits extended up to May 2025. The

plaintiffs/petitioners specifically contended that the defendant had

failed to deposit rent for June 2010. The relevant materials,

however, indicate that rent for the said month was deposited on

18.06.2010. In view of the documentary evidence showing the

deposit within the relevant month, the allegation of non-payment of

rent for June 2010 cannot be sustained.

43. Another objection raised by the plaintiffs/petitioners relates to

the deposits made for the period from March 2020 to June 2021. It

was contended that the deposits for the said period were made

beyond the prescribed period and, therefore, ought not to have been

treated as valid deposits under the Act of 1997.

44. In considering this objection, the extraordinary circumstances

prevailing during the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be overlooked. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court, by its orders in Miscellaneous Application

No. 21 of 2022 concerning the extension and exclusion of the period

of limitation during the pandemic, directed that the period

commencing on 15.03.2020 and ending on 28.02.2022 be excluded

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CO 4541 of 2025

for the purpose of computing limitation in the manner specified

therein. Accordingly, the effect of the said orders must be

considered while examining the objection that the deposits relating

to the aforesaid period were delayed.

45. Having regard to the entire factual matrix, it appears that the

defendant produced documentary evidence in support of the

deposits made before the City Civil Court, Calcutta, as well as the

deposits subsequently made before the Rent Controller. The official

deposit register produced during the proceedings supports the

defendant's case regarding the deposits for February 2003 and

December 2005. The materials further indicate that rent for

February 2006 was deposited along with statutory interest and that

rent for June 2010 was deposited on 18.06.2010. The objection

concerning the description of the premises in the challans has not

been substantiated by documentary evidence establishing that the

deposits related to a different property. The objections concerning

the deposits made during the COVID-19 pandemic must likewise be

examined in accordance with the applicable orders of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court and the statutory provisions governing the deposits.

46. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and subject to the

statutory requirements governing the respective deposits having

been duly satisfied, the materials on record do not establish that the

defendant remained in arrears of rent so as to disentitle him to the

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CO 4541 of 2025

relief granted under Section 7(2) of the Act of 1997. The learned

Trial Court, upon consideration of the evidence relating to the

deposits and the objections raised by the plaintiffs/petitioners, was

therefore justified in rejecting the allegation of default, provided that

the deposits in question were found to comply with the applicable

statutory requirements.

47. Accordingly, on the basis of the materials discussed above, the

finding of the learned Trial Court that the defendant was not

defaulter and that no arrears of rent remained payable cannot be

interfered with merely on the grounds urged by the

plaintiffs/petitioners. The impugned order does not warrant

interference on this aspect, subject to the foregoing observations

concerning the statutory validity and timeliness of the deposits.

48. The scope of this revisional jurisdiction is very much limited

and this revisional Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India should not interfere in the order passed by the learned Trial

Court unless there is patent illegality or material irregularity in the

order.

49. After considering the submission advanced by both the parties

and after going though impugned order under challenge passed by

the learned Trial Court I find that there is nothing to interfere with

the impugned order. Accordingly, the revisional application fails.

50. It is, therefore, dismissed.

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51. Considering the circumstances there will be no order as to

costs.

52. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be

given to the parties on payment of requisite fees.

(Prasenjit Biswas, J.)