2025 INSC 1302 Page 1 of 14

Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1266 OF 2014

NANDKUMAR @ NANDU MANILAL MUDALIAR

…Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT …Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

N.V. ANJARIA, J.

The appellant herein has challenged the

judgment and order dated 04.12.2009 passed by the

Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Criminal

Appeal No.137 of 2000. Thereby the High Court

confirmed the judgment and order dated 31.01.2000 of

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the City Sessions Court, Ahmedabad in Sessions Case

No.25 of 1999, convicting the appellant for the offences

punishable under Sections 302 and 504, Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC’). The

appellant-convict came to be sentenced to

imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.2000/- and in

default to undergo simple imprisonment for one year.

In respect of the offence under Section 504, IPC he was

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one

year, to pay fine of Rs.1000/- and to undergo the simple

imprisonment in default for three months, both the

sentences were to run concurrently.

2. The charge was framed against the

appellant under Sections 504, 324, IPC and Section 302,

IPC subsequently added at exhibit-1, for committing

murder of one Louis Williams in the late night of

13.06.1998 at the residence of said Louis - the

complainant.

3. As per the prosecution story, on

12.06.1998 at about 8.00 p.m., the appellant and his

brother Tanvel were quarrelling with each other. One

Rajesh, who was a nephew of the complainant-

deceased, intervened. At that time the accused stated

to have inflicted injuries on the thigh to the said Rajesh

by using knife. No police complainant was lodged

against the accused in that regard as it was an internal

Page 3 of 14

quarrel. Rajesh took treatment in a private hospital, and

after taking treatment, had been sleeping in his house.

In the intervening night of the same day at about 1.00

p.m. the accused named Nandkumar @ Nandu went to

the house of the deceased, and hurled abusive

language. The complainant got up to come out of his

house. As the appellant was abusive, the deceased

interfered. The appellant inflicted stab injury by knife

on the deceased on the left side of the back and on the

right hand. The appellant thereafter ran away from the

place taking the knife.

3.1 It was stated that there was no vehicle

available since it was late night to take the victim Louis

to the hospital, however a person in the neighbour who

had a rickshaw helped to take the injured Louis to the

L.G. Hospital, accompanied by his sister Gajraben (PW

2). The police constable on duty of the hospital

informed the Kanabha police station telephonically

about admission of the said Louis to the hospital, who

had been inflicted with stab wound. A Wardhi was sent,

which was received by the police officer concerned on

the morning of the next day on 13.06.1998. The First

Information Report was recorded thereafter, as the

competent police officer went to the hospital. At that

time, offence under Sections 324 and 504 came to be

registered as per C.R. No.I-107/98.

Page 4 of 14

3.2. The injured victim having been treated for

the said injuries, came to be discharged from the

hospital. An operation was performed by the doctor

regarding injuries. It appears that the complainant-

victim was again admitted to the hospital and died

while receiving the treatment in the afternoon of

26.06.1998. The cause of the death was indicated to be

Septicemia. The charge for the offence under Section

302, IPC was added. The post-mortem of the dead body

of the deceased was conducted. The appellant

voluntarily surrendered at the police station on

29.06.1998 going there with knife and the said weapon

was thus recovered.

3.3 The charge against the appellant was

framed for the offences under Sections 504, 324 and

302, IPC. The trial was held in which the prosecution

examined 14 witnesses. In the statement under Section

313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the

appellant pleaded innocence and said that he was

falsely implicated. At the end of the trial, as stated

above, the appellant was convicted and sentenced in

respect of the offences under Sections 302 and 504, IPC,

whereas came to be acquitted in respect of the offence

under Section 324, IPC.

3.4 While convicting the appellant, the Trial

Court, after discussing the evidence, took the view that

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the knife injury was caused on the abdomen of the

deceased and the said injury was found by the doctor

to be sufficient in formal course to cause death.

According to the Trial Court, merely because the

deceased succumbed to the injuries after 10 days of the

incident, it could not be said that the injury was not such

which would cause death of a person in the normal

course. It was further reasoned that the nature of the

main injury, as per the medical evidence, was possible

by the sharp knife which was muddamla article No.3

and that the appellant-assailant injured the stomach of

the deceased and that the stitches were taken and the

spleen was removed. According to the Trial Court, the

murder was committed intentionally and knowingly.

3.5 When the Judgment and order of the Trial

Court was appealed against before the High Court, the

High Court did not find any discrepancy in the

testimony of Gajraben (PW 2) who was stated to be eye-

witness. By relying on her testimony as well as the

testimony of Rajesh (PW4) and further reading together

the medical evidence, held that the offence of murder

against the appellant was established. The High Court

noted that the injuries suffered by the victim

subsequently developed into septic condition and the

victim died of Septicemia.

Page 6 of 14

4. Heard learned counsel for the respective

parties.

5. Looking at the material evidence and

relevant aspects of the case, the accused was inflicted

with three injuries by the appellant with knife. The

evidence of Dr. Dharmila Shah (PW 8) mentioned the

injuries sustained by the deceased as available from

the medical report. The injuries were (i) speared

wound of the size of 5 x 2 cm below the belly and on the

left side, (ii) cut wound of 2 x ½ x .25 cm of L shape on

the hand, (iii) crushed wound of the size of 3 x 1 x ½ cm

on the right hand. It was suggested in the evidence of

PW 8 that when the belly was opened and the injuries

were examined, further noticed was the cut of 5 cm on

the back and that it was bleeding. There was a speared

wound of the size of 2 x ½ x 1 cm on the stomach. There

was also an injury on the small intestine which was a

related wound.

5.1 PW 8 stated that when the deceased was

admitted for primary treatment in the hospital, he was

admitted by one Dr. Brijesh Patel, as injured patient

who had gone to America. It was stated that the patient

was in a conscious state when admitted as patient for

treatment of the injuries and that Gajraben had given

consent for the operation of the deceased. The

deceased was admitted on 13.06.1998 and remained as

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injured patient till 26.06.1998, who died on 26.06.1998

at around 12.15 p.m. while being treated as he

developed septic condition in the wounds.

5.2 While the Trial Court has accepted the

evidence of Gajraben (PW 2) and Rajesh (PW 4) and the

High Court has proceeded to confirm the reasoning by

affirming the conviction and sentence, a factual

contention is coming forth that both PWs 2 and 4 were

relatives of the deceased therefore, interested

witnesses. Gajraben was sister of the deceased who

took him to the hospital and also signed the concerned

papers for the operation. Rajesh (PW4) was his

nephew. It was sought to be highlighted that there was

no independent eye-witness other than the said two

witnesses. It was emphasised that the death occurred

after gap of thirteen days.

5.3 While advocate for the appellant in the

first place assailed the very conviction, as alternatively

submitted that in any case, the appellant could have

been convicted and sentenced for an offence lesser

than under Section 302, IPC. It was submitted that even

if the act on the part of the appellant leading to the

death of the victim was ‘culpable homicide’, it did not

amount to offence of ‘murder’.

5.4 In Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code,

1860, Section 299 defines ‘culpable homicide’.

Page 8 of 14

‘Murder’ is defined under Section 300, IPC. The

exceptions are provided in Section 300, IPC as to under

which circumstances the ‘culpable homicide’ would not

become murder. Section 304, IPC deals with situations,

where the ‘culpable homicide’ does not amount to

murder. In other words, it would not fall within the

definition of ‘murder’. Section 300, IPC, although

defines the offence which would become ‘culpable

homicide amounting to murder’, it has, as stated above

several exceptions.

5.5 Section 304, IPC has two parts namely;

Section 304 Part I and Section 304 Part II. The distinction

between these two Parts of Section 304, IPC is required

to be considered having regard to the provisions of

Sections 299 and 300, IPC. Whether the offender had

intention to cause death or he had no such intention

brings out the vital distinction.

5.6 In Kesar Singh & Anr. v. State of Haryana

1

,

this Court observed thus,

“The distinguishing feature is the mens rea. What

is prerequisite in terms of clause (2) of Section 300 is

the knowledge possessed by the offender in regard

to the particular victim being in such a peculiar

condition or state of health that the intentional harm

caused to him is likely to be fatal. Intention to cause

1

(2008) 15 SCC 753

Page 9 of 14

death is not an essential ingredient of clause (2).

When there is an intention of causing a bodily injury

coupled with knowledge of the offender as regards

likelihood of such injury being sufficient to cause the

death of a particular victim would be sufficient to

bring the offence within the ambit of this clause.”

(Para 10)

5.6.1 For the above purpose, the exceptions

contained in Section 300, IPC are taken into

consideration. In the same judgment, the Court further

explained the distinction between ‘culpable homicide

amounting to murder’ and ‘not amounting to murder’,

stating,

“Culpable homicide is genus, murder is its specie.

The culpable homicide, excluding the special

characteristics of murder, would amount to culpable

homicide not amounting to murder. The Code

recognises three degrees of culpable homicide.

When a culpable homicide is of the first degree, it

comes within the purview of the definition of Section

300 and it will amount to murder. The second degree

which becomes punishable in the first part of Section

304 is culpable homicide of the second degree. Then

there is culpable homicide of third degree which is

the least side of culpable homicide and the

punishment provided for is also the lowest among

the punishments for the three grades. It is punishable

under the second part of Section 304.” (Para 11)

Page 10 of 14

5.7 In other words, where the two ingredients

namely that the infliction of bodily injury on deceased

was caused intentionally and secondly that it was

sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of

nature, are satisfied, the offence would amount to

murder. There may be circumstances which may

emerge from the facts and evidence of a given case that

the offence becomes ‘culpable homicide not

amounting to murder’.

5.8 In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab

2

and

further in Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of

Maharashtra

3

, this Court stated that divided into two

Parts, Section 304, IPC deals with the situations where

‘culpable homicide’ would not be a murder. The

conceptualisation of the ‘culpable homicide not

amounting to murder’ were explained in the following

way, as quoted in para 4 of the Kesar Singh

1

,

“If an injury is inflicted with the knowledge and

intention that it is likely to cause death, but with no

intention to cause death the offence would fall within

the definition of Section 304 Part I, however, if there

is no intention to cause such an injury, but there is

knowledge that such an injury can cause death, the

offence would fall within the definition of Section 304

Part II. Thus, is intention. If intention to cause such an

2

AIR 1958 SC 465

Page 11 of 14

injury as is likely to cause death, is established, the

offence would fall under Part I but where no such

intention is established and only knowledge that the

injury is likely to cause death, it would fall under Part

II.”

6. In the context of the above parameters as

to what would constitute murder under Section 302, IPC

and under what circumstances the ‘culpable homicide’

would not amount to murder, recollecting the basic

facts of the present case, looking to the kind and nature

of injuries referred to above which is available from the

medical evidence, it could not be said that the injuries

were not of the nature which were sufficient to cause

death in ordinary course. The assailant used knife and

inflicted serious injuries on the body of the deceased,

including below the belly. Looking to the act on part of

the appellant, it has to be concluded that the accused

was liable to be attributed with the knowledge that the

injuries which he was to inflict by using the weapon in

hand, would be sufficient to result into death in

ordinary course.

6.1 At the same time, the sequence of incident

highlights that there was an altercation involving the

nephew of the appellant and the deceased in the

evening time and subsequently in the night at around

10 p.m., the appellant went to the house of the accused

Page 12 of 14

where he started abusing the deceased and ultimately

assaulted him to inflict the injuries with knife. There was

an element of impulse, anger and self-provocation on

part of the appellant.

6.2 Given the above aspects and in the totality

of facts and circumstances emerging in the whole

incident, it would not be correct to presume or view in

respect of the conduct on part of the appellant that the

appellant acted with premeditation to kill or that he

acted in assailing the deceased with an intention to

cause death. The degree of the offence committed

could not be said to be partaking the act of murder as

defined under Section 300, IPC, since it could be

concluded that the intention to cause death was

missing. The appellant could not have been convicted

and sentenced under Section 302, IPC.

6.3 The other attending aspects which may be

relevant in judging the nature of the offence committed

by the appellant were that the injuries did not result

into instantaneous death of the deceased. Thus, the

attack by the appellant remained with the knowledge

but without intention to cause death. Admittedly, the

death of the deceased was after 13 days. Not only that

he died while under treatment in the hospital but he

had developed septic conditions in the injuries

Page 13 of 14

suffered by him. The cause of death was medically

identified as ‘Septicemia’.

7. Taking above factors cumulatively, this

Court is of the view that the conviction of the appellant

deserves to be converted from under Section 302, IPC

to under Section 304 Part I, IPC. The act on part of the

appellant has to be treated as ‘culpable homicide not

amounting to murder’ falling under Section 304 Part I,

IPC. This Court holds accordingly.

8. This Court in its order dated 13.06.2014

while granting leave noted that the appellant had

already served in jail for more than 14 years and came

to be enlarged on bail.

9. As a result of the above discussion, the

conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section

302, IPC is set aside and the same is converted into one

under Section 304 Part I, IPC.

10. The sentence of 14 years already

undergone by the appellant shall be treated as

sufficient and subserve the interest of justice. The bail

bond of the appellant furnished to the Trial Court shall

stand discharged.

Page 14 of 14

11. The present appeal is accordingly allowed

to the above extent.

In view of disposal of the appeal as

above, all pending interlocutory applications would not

survive and are accordingly disposed of.

………………………………….., J.

[ K. VINOD CHANDRAN ]

………………………………….., J.

[ N.V. ANJARIA ]

NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 10, 2025.

(VK)