2025 INSC 927

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL N O. 3343 OF 2025

(Arising out SLP (Crl.) No. 10595 of 2025)

NARAYAN YADAV …APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Page 1 of 35

J.B. PARDIWALA, J.,

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the

following parts:-

INDEX

A. FACTUAL MATRIX .............................................................. 2

B. ANAYLYSIS ......................................................................... 6

a. Confessional FIR is not Admissible in Evidence ............................. 7

b. Evidence of an Expert Witness is only Advisory in Nature ............ 20

c. Implication of Section(s) 27 and 8 of the Act of 1872 ................... 22

d. Incorrect application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC ...... 25

C. CONCLUSION .................................................................... 34

Page 2 of 35

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High

Court of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 1538 of 2021 dated

16.01.2025 (hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Judgment ”) by

which the appeal preferred by the appellant herein against the

judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court came to

be partly allowed by altering the conviction of the appellant herein

from Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “the

IPC”) to Section 304 Part I of the IPC.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The appellant (original accused) himself lodged a First Information

Report (FIR) dated 27.09.2019 with Korba Kotwali Police Station,

District Korba, which came to be registered for the offence

punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The FIR reads thus:

“On 27.09.2019 I came to the P.S. Kotwali on the

orders of Chowki Incharge for getting the Nalsi

number in Crime No. 0/19 for the offence under

Sections 302 and 380 IPC respectively. Nalsi number

detailed that I am residing in the house of my relative

Rajnath Yadav situated near the Pump House,

Korba. I earn my livelihood as a milk supplier. I

started work with Ram Babu Sharma, Thekedar past

15-20 days. Ram Babu Sharma used to call me for

having drink at his house. Ram Baby invited me at

his place on 24.09.2019. I went to his house at about

9.30 PM situated at Parshuram Nagar. We both sat

and drank. Meanwhile I showed my girlfriend’s pic

from my mobile. Then he said that get your girlfriend

at my place and leave her with me for one night.

Hearing this quarrel started between us and we

started to fight. Then I picked up a knife kept in his

house for cutting vegetables and inflicted blows on

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his neck and stomach in anger and killed him by

hitting a log of wood on his head, legs and private

part. Thereafter I dragged his dead body near the

bedside and covered it with a cloth that I took out

from an almirah. Then I ransacked his room and took

away his purse containing Rs. 7000 and keys of the

Bolero car. I locked the room from outside and got the

Bolero outside and locked the main door and ran

towards Bilaspur in Bolero. I met with an accident at

Raipur Road, ahead of Bilaspur. When I regained

consciousness in morning I found myself in Saragaon

Hospital where my mother and Yuvraj Yadu both

were present. Today morning I came to Korba after

getting discharged from the hospital. I informed about

the incident to my mausa Rajnath Yadav, Rahul

Chaudhari and Anuj Yadav and also informed the

CSEB Chowki. Then I went to Ram Babu’s house with

police people and pointed out the dead body. My

vehicle is at the place of accident. I am filing the

report. Investigation to be done.”

4. Upon registration of the FIR, lodged by the appellant himself, at the

concerned Police Station referred to above, the investigation

commenced. It appears that the investigating officer, after arresting

the appellant, took him to the house of the deceased. After breaking

open the house, the dead body of the deceased was found lying in

a pool of blood inside his residence. A panchnama of the scene of

offence was prepared in the presence of panch witnesses. The knife

allegedly used by the appellant to inflict injuries on the deceased

was recovered from the place of occurrence, i.e., the deceased’s

house. The clothes and other articles were also collected in

presence of the panch witnesses by preparing a panchnama, and

were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical analysis.

The clothes of the appellant were discovered at his instance from

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the residence of his uncle, Rajnath Yadav, by drawing a

panchnama.

5. The inquest panchnama of the dead body of the deceased was drawn

in the presence of the panch witnesses. The body of the deceased

was then sent for post-mortem examination. The post-mortem

report Exhibit-PW 34 recorded the following injuries found on the

body of the deceased:

“1. An incised wound was present on the right Side

of his forehead measuring 6 X 2 cm, deep to the bone,

in a vertical position.

2. An incised wound was present on the left side of

his forehead, the size of which was 3 X 1 cm, deep to

the bone, in a vertical position.

3. An incised wound was present on the skin of the

right parietal bone of the head, which was 4 X 2 cm,

deep to the bone, in a vertical position.

4. An incised lesion was present on the skin of the

left parietal bone, which was 5 X 2 cm in size, deep

to the bone, in a vertical position, which was on the

middle part of parietal bone.

5. An incised wound was present on the anterior part

of the abdomen at the iliac fossa part which was 4 X

2 X 2 cm in size.

6. An incised wound was present on the upper right

side of the chest, below the clavicle bone, the size of

which was 4 X 2 deep to the upper part of the lung.”

6. The cause of death, as stated in the post-mortem report and duly

proved by Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10), was shock resulting from

excessive bleeding from the right side of the chest and injury to the

upper lobe of the right lung.

7. Upon completion of the investigation, chargesheet came to be filed

by the investigating officer, and the filing of chargesheet for the

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offence enumerated above culminated in the Sessions Case No. 9 of

2020.

8. The Sessions Judge, Korba, proceeded to frame charge against the

appellant for the offences mentioned above. The appellant pleaded

not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. In the course of

trial, the prosecution examined the following witnesses:

i. PW-1, Rahul Kumar Chaudhari, panch witness (turned hostile);

ii. PW-2 Kamlesh Kumar, son of the deceased;

iii. PW-3 Ravishanker Sriniwas, panch witness;

iv. PW-4 Rampradeep Sharma, panch witness;

v. PW-5 Ramniwas Sharma, panch witness;

vi. PW-6 Jalashwar Sakar, panch witness;

vii. PW-7 B.R. Chaudhary, Police witness

viii. PW-8 Sudama Prasad, Police witness

ix. PW-9 Ashok Pandey, Police witness

x. PW-10 Dr. R.K. Divya, Medical Officer who performed post-

mortem

xi. PW-11 Hemant Patle, Police witness

9. The prosecution also adduced a few documentary evidence.

10. Upon completion of the recording of the oral evidence, further

statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In his statement, the appellant

claimed that he had been falsely implicated in the alleged crime

and asserted his complete innocence.

Page 6 of 35

11. The Trial Court, upon overall appreciation of both oral as well as

the documentary evidence on record, reached the conclusion that

the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, and

accordingly, it held the appellant guilty of the offence of murder

and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.

12. The appellant being aggrieved by the judgment and order of

conviction passed by the Trial Court, preferred an appeal before

the High Court. The High Court partly allowed the appeal and

altered the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 of the IPC

to Section 304 Part I of the IPC, giving benefit of Exception 4 to

Section 300 of the IPC.

13. In such circumstances referred to above the appellant is before

this Court with the present appeal.

B. ANAYLYSIS

14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and

having gone through the materials on record the only question that

falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed

any error in passing the Impugned Judgment.

15. The entire judgment of the High Court could be termed as

erroneous on several grounds. There are errors apparent on the

face of the Impugned Judgment. The first mistake was that the

High Court examined the medical evidence on record in detail and

then proceeded to directly corroborate it with the contents of the

FIR lodged by the appellant himself. In doing so, the High Court

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fully convinced itself that the appellant’s statements in the form of

a confession, as contained in the FIR, were entirely corroborated

by the medical evidence. Consequently, the Court concluded that

the appellant had committed the alleged crime. In arriving at such

a conclusion, the High Court ov erlooked some fundamental

principles of criminal jurisprudence.

a. Confessional FIR is not Admissible in Evidence

16. The FIR was exhibited in evidence (Exhibit P-14) through the oral

evidence of the investigating officer PW-9, Ashok Pandey. PW-9

proved his signature on the FIR and also identified the signature

of the first informant i.e., the appellant-herein. However, the other

contents of the FIR could not have been proved through the

testimony of the investigating officer. A plain reading of the FIR

indicates that it contains a confession by its maker i.e., the

appellant-herein, regarding the commission of the alleged offence.

17. A statement in an FIR can normally be used only to contradict its

maker as provided in Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

(for short, “the Act of 1872”), or to corroborate his evidence as

envisaged in Section 157 of the Act of 1872. In a criminal trial,

however, neither of these is possible as long as the maker of the

statement is an accused in the case, unless he offers himself to be

examined as a witness [See: Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., 1957 SCC

OnLine SC 42]. J.L. Kapur, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench

in that decision has observed:

“A first information report is not a substantive piece

of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the

statement of the maker under Section 157, Evidence

Act, or to contradict it under Section 145 of that Act.

Page 8 of 35

It cannot be used as evidence against the maker at

the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to

corroborate or contradict other witnesses. In this

case, therefore, it is not evidence.”

(Emphasis supplied)

18. The High Court failed to take into consideration two landmark

decisions of this Court – one in Faddi v. State of M.P., 1964 SCC

OnLine SC 123, and the other in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of

Bihar, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 109 .

19. In Faddi (supra), this Court stated that:

“If the FIR given by the accused contains any

admission as defined in Section 17 of the Evidence

Act there is no bar in using such an admission

against the maker thereof as permitted under Section

21 of the Act, provided such admission is not

inculpatory in character. In the judgment their

Lordships distinguished Nisar Ali case [AIR 1957 SC

366] in the following lines:

“But it appears to us that in the context in which

the observation is made and in the

circumstances, which we have verified from the

record of that case, that the Sessions Judge had

definitely held the first information report lodged

by the co-accused who was acquitted to be

inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and that the High

Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment, this

observation really refers to a first information

report which is in the nature of a confession by

the maker thereof. Of course, a confessional first

information report cannot be used against the

maker when he be an accused and necessarily

cannot be used against a co-accused.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Page 9 of 35

20. In Aghnoo Nagesia (supra), this Court sounded a note of caution

that when the statement in the FIR given by an accused contains

incriminating materials and it is difficult to sift the exculpatory

portion therefrom, the whole of it must be excluded from evidence.

21. In Faddi (supra), the issue before this Court was whether the FIR

lodged by the accused himself therein was admissible in evidence.

In the facts of the said case, this Court held that the objection to

the admissibility of the FIR lodged by the appellant was not sound,

as the FIR only contained a few admissions, and those admissions

did not amount to a confession so as to render the entire FIR

inadmissible in evidence. We quote the relevant observations made

by this Court in Faddi (supra) as under:

“14. It is contended for the appellant that the first

information report was inadmissible in evidence and

should not have been therefore taken on the record.

In support, reliance is placed on the case reported

as Nisar Ali v. State of U.P [AIR 1957 SC 366]. We

have considered this contention and do not see any

force in it.

15. The report is not a confession of the appellant. It

is not a statement made to a police officer during the

course of investigation. Section 25 of the Evidence Act

and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do

not bar its admissibility. The report is an admission

by the accused of certain facts which have a bearing

on the question to be determined by the Court viz.

how and by whom the murder of Gulab was

committed, or whether the appellant's statement in

Court denying the correctness of certain statements'

of the prosecution witnesses is correct or not.

Admissions are admissible in evidence under Section

21 of the Act. Section 17 defines an admission to be

a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests

any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact,

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and which is made by any of the persons, and under

the circumstances, thereafter mentioned, in the Act.

Section 21 provides that admissions are relevant and

may be proved as against a person who makes them.

Illustrations (c), (d) and (e) to Section 21 are of the

circumstances in which an accused could prove his

own admissions which go in his favour in view of the

exceptions mentioned in Section 21 to the provision

that admissions could not be proved by the person

who makes them. It is therefore clear that admissions

of an accused can be proved against him.

16. The Privy Council, in very similar circumstances,

held long ago in Dal Singh v. King Emperor [LR 44 IA

137] such first information reports to be admissible in

evidence. It was said in that case at p. 142:

“It is important to compare the story told by Dal

Singh when making his statement at the trial with

that what he said in the report he made to the

police in the document which he signed, a

document which is sufficiently authenticated. The

report is clearly admissible. It was in no sense a

confession. As appears from its terms, it was

rather in the nature of an information or charge

laid against Mohan and Jhunni in respect of the

assault alleged to have been made on Dal Singh

on his way from Hardua to Jubbulpur. As such

the statement is proper evidence against him….

It will be observed that this statement is at

several points at complete variance with what Dal

Singh afterwards stated in Court. The Sessions

Judge regarded the document as discrediting his

defence. He had to decide between the story for

the prosecution and that told for Dal Singh.”

Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the

facts of that case were distinguishable in some

respects from the facts of this case. Such a

distinction, if any, has no bearing on the question of

the admissibility of the report. The report was held

admissible because it was not a confession and it

was helpful in determining the matter before the

Court.

Page 11 of 35

17. In Nisar Ali case [AIR 1957 SC 366] Kapur, J.

who spoke for the Court said, after narrating the

facts:

“An objection has been taken to the admissibility

of this report as it was made by a person who

was a co-accused. A first information report is not

a substantive piece of evidence and can only be

used to corroborate the statement of the maker

under Section 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict

it under Section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used

as evidence against the maker at the trial if he

himself becomes an accused, not to corroborate or

contradict other witnesses. In this case, therefore,

it is not evidence.”

It is on these observations that it has been contended

for the appellant that his report was inadmissible in

evidence. Ostensibly, the expression ‘it cannot be

used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he

himself becomes an accused’ supports the

appellant's contention. But it appears to us that in the

context in which the observation is made and in the

circumstances, which we have verified from the

record of that case, that the Sessions Judge had

definitely held the first information report lodged by

the co-accused who was acquitted to be inadmissible

against Nisar Ali, and that the High Court did not

refer to it at all in its judgment, this observation really

refers to a first information report which is in the

nature of a confession by the maker thereof. Of

course a confessional first information report cannot

be used against the maker when he be an accused

and necessarily cannot be used against a co -

accused. Further, the last sentence of the above-

quoted observation is significant and indicates what

the Court meant was that the first information report

lodged by Qudratullah, the co-accused, was not

evidence against Nisar Ali. This Court did not mean

— as it had not to determine in that case — that a

first information report which is not a confession

cannot be used as an admission under Section 21 of

the Evidence Act or as a relevant statement under

any other provisions of that Act. We find also that this

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observation has been understood in this way by the

Rajasthan High Court in State v. Balchand [AIR 1960

Raj 101] and in State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Singh [AIR

1962 Raj 3] and by the Allahabad High Court

in Allahdia v. State [1959 All LJ 340] .

18. We therefore hold that the objection to the

admissibility of the first information report lodged by

the appellant is not sound and that the Courts below

have rightly admitted it in evidence and have made

proper use of it.”

(Emphasis supplied)

22. We now proceed to look into the decision of this Court in Aghnoo

Nagesia (supra). The following observations of this Court at

paragraphs 9 to 18 are relevant and are quoted below:-

“9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the

provisions of law dealing with confessions made by

an accused. The law relating to confessions is to be

found generally in Ss. 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act

and Ss. 162 and 164 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence

Act are to be found under the heading "Admissions".

Confession is a species of admission, and is dealt

with in Ss. 24 to 30. A confession or an admission is

evidence against the maker of it, unless its

admissibility is excluded by some provision of law.

Section 24 excludes confession caused by certain

inducements, threats and promises. Section 25

provides: "No confession made to a police officer shall

be proved as against a person accused of an offence".

The terms of S. 25 are imperative. A confession made

to a police officer under any circumstances is not

admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers

a confession made when he was free and not in

police custody, as also a confession made before any

investigation has begun. The expression "accused of

any offence" covers a person accused of an offence at

the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence

when he made the confession. Section 26 prohibits

Page 13 of 35

proof against any person of a confession made by

him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made

in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The

partial ban imposed by S. 26 relates to a confession

made to a person other than a police officer. Section

26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed by S.

25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section

27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the

ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26.It provides that

when any fact is deposed to as discovered in

consequence of information received from a person

accused of any offence, in the custody of a police

officer, so much of such information, whether it

amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly

to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.

Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids

the use of any statement made by any person to a

police officer in the course of an investigation for any

purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of the

offence under investigation, save as mentioned in the

proviso and in cases falling under sub-s. (2), and it

specifically provides that nothing in it shall be

deemed to affect the provisions of S. 27 of the

Evidence Act. The words of S. 162 are wide enough

to include a confession made to a police officer in the

course of an investigation. A statement or confession

made in the course of an investigation may be

recorded by a Magistrate under S. 164 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure subject to the safeguards

imposed by the section. Thus, except as provided by

S. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession by an accused

to a police officer is absolutely protected under S. 25

of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the course of

an investigation, it is also protected by S. 162 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to any

other person made by him while in the custody of a

police officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made

in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These

provisions seem to proceed upon the view that

confessions made by an accused to a police officer or

made by him while he is in the custody of a police

officer are not to be trusted, and should not be used

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in evidence against him. They are based upon

grounds of public policy and the fullest effect should

be given to them.

10. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

provides for the recording of the first information. The

information report as such is not substantive

evidence. It may be used to corroborate the informant

under S. 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him

under S. 145 of the Act, if the informant is called as

a witness. If the first information is given by the

accused himself, the fact of his giving the information

is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct

under S. 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is a

non-confessional statement, it is admissible against

the accused as an admission under S. 21 of the

Evidence Act and is relevant, see Faddi v. State of

Madhya Pradesh, Cri. Appeal No. 210 of 1963, dated

24-1-1964: (AIR 1964 SC 1850), explaining Nisar Ali

v. State of U. P., (S) AIR 1957 SC 366 and Dal Singh

v. King Emperor, 44 Ind App 137: (AIR 1917 PC 25).

But a confessional first information report to a police

Officer cannot be used against the accused in view of

S. 25 of the Evidence Act.

11. The Indian Evidence Act does not define

"confession". For a long time, the Courts in India

adopted the definition of "confession" given in Art. 22

of Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence. According

to that definition a confession is an admission made

at any time by a person charged with crime, stating

or suggesting the inference that he committed that

crime. This definition was discarded by the Judicial

Committee in Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperor, 66

Ind App 66 at p. 81: (AIR 1939 PC 47 at p. 52). Lord

Atkin observed:

".......no statement that contains self exculpatory

matter can amount to confession, if the

exculpatory statement is of some fact which if

true would negative the offence alleged to be

confessed. Moreover, a confession must either

admit in terms the offence, or at any rate

substantially all the facts which constitute the

offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating

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fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not

of itself a confession, e.g., an admission that the

accused is the owner of and was in recent

possession of the knife or revolver which caused

a death with no explanation of any other man's

possession." These observations received the

approval of this Court in Palvinder Kaur v. State

of Punjab (1), 1953 SCR 94 at p. 104; (AIR 1952

SC 354 at p. 357). In State of U. P. v. Deoman

Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14 at p. 21: (AIR 1960

SC 1125 at pp. 1128-1129). Shah, J., referred to

a confession as a statement made by a person

stating or suggesting the inference that he has

committed a crime.

12. Shortly put, a confession may be defined as an

admission of the offence by a person charged with

the offence. A statement which contains self -

exculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession, if

the exculpatory statement is of some fact which, if

true, would negative the offence alleged to be

confessed. If an admission of an accused is to be

used against him, the whole of it should be tendered

in evidence and if part of the admission is

exculpatory and part inculpatory, the prosecution is

not at liberty to use in evidence the inculpatory part

only. See Hanumant Govind v. State of M. P. 1952

SCR 1091 at p. 1111: (AIR 1952 SC 343 at p. 350)

and 1953 SCR 94 : (AIR 1952 SC 354). The accused

is entitled to insist that the entire admission including

the exculpatory part must be tendered in evidence.

But this principle is of no assistance to the accused

where no part of his statement is self-exculpatory;

and the prosecution intends to use the whole of the

statement against the accused.

13. Now, a confession may consist of several parts

and may reveal not only the actual commission of the

crime but also the motive, the preparation, the

opportunity, the provocation, the weapons used, the

intention, the concealment of the weapon and the

subsequent conduct of the accused. If the confession

is tainted the taint attaches to each part of it. It is not

permissible in law to separate one part and to admit

Page 16 of 35

it in evidence as a non-confessional statement. Each

part discloses some incriminating fact, i.e., some fact

which by itself or along with other admitted or proved

facts suggests the inference that the accused

committed the crime, and though each part taken

singly may not amount to a confession, each of them

being part of a confessional statement partakes of the

character of a confession. If a statement contains an

admission of an offence, not only that admission but

also every other admission of an incriminating fact

contained in the statement is part of the confession.

14. If proof of the confession is excluded by any

provision of law such as S.24, S. 25 and S. 26 of the

Evidence Act, the entire confessional statement in all

its parts including the admissions of minor

incriminating facts must also be excluded, unless

proof of it is permitted by some other section under as

S. 27 of the Evidence Act. Little substance and

content would be left in Ss. 24, 25 and 26 if proof of

admission of incriminating facts in a confessional

statement is permitted.

15. Sometimes, a single sentence in a statement may

not amount to a confession at all. Take a case of a

person charged under S. 301-A of the Indian Penal

Code and a statement made by him to a police officer

that "I was drunk: I was driving a car at a speed of

80 miles per hour. I could see A on the road at a

distance of 80 yards; I did not blow the horn: I made

no attempt to stop the car; the car knocked down A".

No single sentence in this statement amounts to a

confession; but the statement read as a whole

amounts to a confession of an offence under S. 304-

A of the Indian Penal Code, and it would not be

permissible to admit in evidence each sentence

separately as a nonconfessional statement. Again,

take a case where a single sentence in a statement

amounts to an admission of an offence. 'A' states "I

struck 'B' with a tangi and hurt him". In consequence

of the injury 'B' died. 'A' committed an offence and is

chargeable under various sections of the Indian Penal

Code. Unless he brings his case within one of the

recognised exceptions, his statement amounts to an

Page 17 of 35

admission of an offence, but the other parts of the

statement such as the motive, the preparation, the

absence of provocation, concealment of the weapon

and the subsequent conduct, all throw light upon the

gravity of the offence and the intention and

knowledge of the accused, and negatives the right of

private defence, accident and other possible

defences. Each and every admission of an

incriminating fact contained in the confessional

statement is part of the confession.

16. If the confession is caused by an inducement,

threat or promise as contemplated by S. 24 of the

Evidence Act, the whole of the confession is excluded

by S. 24. Proof of not only the admission of the offence

but also the admission of every other incriminating

fact such as the motive, the preparation and the

subsequent conduct is excluded by S. 24. To hold that

the proof of the admission of other incriminating facts

is not barred by S. 24 is to rob the section of its

practical utility and content. It may be suggested that

the bar of S. 24 does not apply to the other

admissions, but though receivable in evidence, they

are of no weight, as they were caused by

inducement, threat or promise. According to this

suggestion, the other admissions are relevant but are

of no value. But we think that on a plain construction

of S. 24, proof of all the admissions of incriminating

facts contained in a confessional statement is

excluded by the section. Similarly, Ss. 25 and 26 bar

not only proof of admission of an offence by an

accused to a police officer or made by him while in

the custody of a police officer but also admissions

contained in the confessional statement of all

incriminating facts related to the offence.

17. A little reflection will show that the expression

"confession" in Ss. 24 to 30 refers to the confessional

statement as a whole including not only the

admissions of the offence but also all other

admissions of incriminating facts related to the

offence. Section 27 partially lifts the ban imposed by

Ss. 24, 25 and 26 in respect of so much of the

information whether it amounts to a confession or

Page 18 of 35

not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered in

consequence of the information, if the other conditions

of the section are satisfied. Section 27 distinctly

contemplates that an information leading to a

discovery may be a part of the confession of the

accused and thus fall within the purview of Ss. 24,

25 and 26. Section 27 thus shows that a confessional

statement admitting the offence may contain

additional information as part of the confession.

Again, S. 30 permits the Court to take into

consideration against a co-accused a confession of

another accused affecting not only himself but the

other co-accused. Section 30 thus shows that matters

affecting other persons may form part of the

confession.

18. If the first information report is given by the

accused to a police officer and amounts to a

confessional statement, proof of the confession is

prohibited by S. 25. The confession includes not only

the admission of the offence but all other admissions

of incriminating facts related to the offence contained

in the confessional statement. No part of the

confessional statement is receivable in evidence

except to the extent that the ban of S. 25 is lifted by

S. 27.”

(Emphasis supplied)

23. The legal position, therefore, is this – a statement contained in the

FIR furnished by one of the accused in the case cannot, in any

manner, be used against another accused. Even as against the

accused who made it, the statement cannot be used if it is

inculpatory in nature nor can it be used for the purpose of

corroboration or contradiction unless its maker offers himself as a

witness in the trial. The very limited use of it is, as an admission

under Section 21 of the Act of 1872, against its maker alone, and

only if the admission does not amount to a confession.

Page 19 of 35

24. To put the aforesaid in simpler terms, an FIR of a confessional

nature made by an accused person is inadmissible in evidence

against him, except to the extent that it shows he made a

statement soon after the offence, thereby identifying him as the

maker of the report, which is admissible as evidence of his conduct

under Section 8 of the Act of 1872. Additionally, any information

furnished by him that leads to the discovery of a fact is admissible

under Section 27 of the Act of 1872. However, a non-confessional

FIR is admissible against the accused as an admission under

Section 21 of the Act of 1872 and is relevant.

25. Thus, the first error that the High Court committed was to read

the contents of the FIR lodged by the appellant into evidence. As

observed earlier, the FIR lodged by the appellant amounts to a

confession, and any confession made by an accused before the

police is hit by Section 25 of the Act of 1872. There was no question

at all for the High Court to seek corroboration of the medical

evidence on record with the confessional part of the FIR lodged by

the appellant.

26. Once we say that the contents of the FIR are hit by Section 25 of

the Act of 1872, being a confession before a police officer, the only

remaining evidence on record is the medical evidence and the oral

evidence of the panch witnesses.

Page 20 of 35

b. Evidence of an Expert Witness is only Advisory in

Nature

27. At this stage, we may look into some curious findings recorded by

the High Court in its Impugned Judgement. We quote the relevant

paragraphs as under:

“16. Now, the next question for consideration would

be whether the accused/appellant herein is the

perpetrator of the crime in question, which the

learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by

relying upon the testimony of Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10),

who conducted post-mortem had opined that the

cause of death is shock due to right side of

haemothorax due to laceration of apex lobe of right

lung secondary to incised wound over upper part of

right side of front of chest. The Doctor ultimately

opined through his report the nature of death to be

homicidal. Thus, on the basis of testimony of Dr R.K.

Divya (PW-10), it is clear that it is the appellant herein

who on the fateful date and time has caused grievous

injuries to the deceased, due to which he died. As

such, the learned trial Court has rightly held that it is

the appellant/accused who has caused injuries over

the body of the deceased and caused his death.

Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.

26. Conviction of the appellant is based on the

evidence of Dr. R.K. Divya (PW -10), who has

conducted postmortem on the body of deceased, vide

Ex.P/34 and he found following injuries on the dead

body of the deceased.

27. According to Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10). the cause of

death of deceased is shock due to right side of

haemothorax due to laceration of apex lobe of right

lung secondary to incised wound over upper part of

right side of front of chest and nature of death was

homicidal. It has been also opined by the concerned

Doctor that the injury caused to the deceased has

been by the sharp edged weapon and the same may

be caused by knife.

28. Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light

of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of

Page 21 of 35

the Supreme Court in the above stated judgments, it

is quite vivid that the appellant himself has lodged a

First Information Report alleging that, on the date of

incident, some quarrel took place between the

appellant and the deceased on the ground of showing

the photograph of his girlfriend to the deceased and

the deceased stated to bring his girlfriend and left her

with him for one night, then out of anger and on

sudden quarrel, the appellant assaulted the

deceased with a knife on his chest, by which, he

received grievous injury and died on the same day of

the incident on account of excessive bleeding due to

injury on his chest. It further appears from the fact on

record that appellant after committing the crime in

question, has lodged the report and upon his

memorandum some incriminating articles have been

recovered from his instance and upon further

investigation, second memorandum has been

recorded, by which, his clothes were recorded. It is

apparent that though there was no premeditation on

the part of the appellant to cause death of deceased,

but he had given false version.”

28. The High Court should have been mindful of the fact that a doctor

is not a witness of fact. A doctor is examined by the prosecution

as a medical expert for the purpose of proving the contents of the

post-mortem report and the medical certificates on record, if any.

An expert witness is examined by the prosecution because of his

specialized knowledge on certain subjects, which the judge may

not be fully equipped to assess. The evidence of such an expert is

of an advisory character. The credibility of the expert witness

depends on the reasons provided in support of his conclusions, as

well as the data and material forming the basis of those

conclusions. An accused cannot be held guilty of the offence of

murder solely on the basis of medical evidence on record. So far as

Page 22 of 35

the panch witnesses are concerned their depositions do not inspire

any confidence.

29. Most of the panch witnesses turned hostile. If at all, the public

prosecutor wanted to prove the contents of the panchnamas after

the panch witnesses turned hostile, he could have done so through

the evidence of the investigating officer. However, the investigating

officer also failed to prove the contents of the panchnamas in

accordance with law. Thus, there is nothing on record by way of

evidence relating to any discovery of fact is concerned. In other

words, no discovery of fact at the instance of the appellant,

relevant and admissible under Section 27 of the Act of 1872, has

been established.

c. Implication of Section(s) 27 and 8 of the Act of 1872

30. The learned counsel appearing for the State, strenuously urged

before us to take into consideration the conduct of the appellant

which, according to him, is relevant under Section 8 of the Act of

1872. He led stress on the following circumstances:

i. The appellant himself went to police station and lodged the

FIR;

ii. While, at the scene of offence panchnama was being drawn,

appellant pointed out that the body of the deceased was lying

in between the two walls inside the house of the deceased;

iii. The appellant led the Investigating Officer and the panchnama

witnesses to the house of his uncle, Rajnath Yadav, and

pointed out the place where he had kept his clothes worn at

the time of the incident.

Page 23 of 35

iv. A bloodstain was also found on the shirt of the appellant,

however, the learned counsel fairly conceded that there is

nothing to indicate that the bloodstain matched with the blood

group of the deceased.

31. The first and most fundamental flaw in the testimony of all the

aforementioned prosecution witnesses is that none of them have

specifically deposed to the exact statement allegedly made by the

appellant, which purportedly led to the discovery of a fact relevant

under Section 27 of the Act of 1872.

32. Section 27 of the Act of 1872 reads thus:

“27. How much of information received from accused

may be proved.––Provided that, when any fact is

deposed to as discovered inconsequence of

information received from a person accused of any

offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much of

such information, whether it amounts to a confession

or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby

discovered, may be proved.”

33. The conditions necessary for the applicability of Section 27 of the

Act of 1872 are:

i. That consequent to the information given by the accused,

it led to the discovery of some fact;

ii. The fact discovered must be one which was not within the

knowledge of the police and the knowledge of the fact for

the first time was derived from the information given by the

accused;

iii. The discovery of a fact which is the direct outcome of such

information;

Page 24 of 35

iv. Only such portion of the information as connected with the

said discovery is admissible;

v. The discovery of the fact must relate to the commission of

some offence.

34. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon the decision

of this Court in Murli v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2009)

9 SCC 417, which held that the contents of the panchnama are

not the substantive piece of evidence. It reads thus;

“34. The contents of the panchnama are not the

substantive evidence. The law is settled on that

issue. What is substantive evidence is what has been

stated by the panchas or the person concerned in the

witness box.[…]”

(Emphasis supplied)

35. In the aforesaid context, our attention was drawn to a decision of

this Court in the case of A. N. Venkatesh & Anr. v. State of

Karnataka, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 714, which states thus:

“9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the

conduct of the accused person is relevant, if such

conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in

issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the

circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused pointed

out to the police officer, the place where the dead

body of the kidnapped boy was found and on their

pointing out the body was exhumed, would be

admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective of

the fact whether the statement made by the accused

contemporaneously with or antecedent to such

conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 or not

as held by this Court in Prakash Chand v. State (UT

of Delhi) [Prakash Chand v. State (UT of Delhi), (1979)

3 SCC 90 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 656] . Even if we hold that

the disclosure statement made by the appellant -

accused (Exts. P-15 and P-16) is not admissible under

Page 25 of 35

Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant

under Section 8.”

(Emphasis supplied)

36. In this context, we deem it necessary to sound a note of caution.

While the conduct of an accused may be a relevant fact under

Section 8 of the Act of 1872, it cannot, by itself, serve as the sole

basis for conviction, especially in a grave charge such as murder.

Like any other piece of evidence, the conduct of the accused is

merely one of the circumstances the court may consider, in

conjunction with other direct or circumstantial evidence on record.

To put it succinctly, although relevant, the accused’s conduct

alone cannot justify a conviction in the absence of cogent and

credible supporting evidence.

d. Incorrect application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of

the IPC

37. We could have concluded the judgment at this stage by allowing

the appeal and thereby acquitting the appellant of all the charges

against him. However, we consider it necessary to make certain

observations regarding Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC. We

wish to explain why the High Court could not have invoked

Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC and altered the conviction

from Section 302 to 304 Part I of the IPC. Had there been any

other oral or documentary evidence on record connecting the

appellant herein with the alleged crime, we would have dismissed

his appeal. Even while dismissing his appeal and holding him

guilty of the offence of murder, we would not have been in a

position to interfere with the erroneous application of Exception 4,

as there is no appeal at the instance of the State challenging the

Page 26 of 35

acquittal under Section 302 of the IPC. Nevertheless, it is

necessary to explain why the High Court committed an error in

bringing the case within Exception 4 of Section 300 of the IPC.

38. Section 299 of the IPC explains culpable homicide as, causing

death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with

the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause

death, or with the knowledge that the act complained of is likely to

cause death. The first two categories require the intention to cause

death, or the likelihood of causing death. While, the third category

confines itself to the knowledge that the act complained of is likely

to cause death. On the facts of this case, the offence of culpable

homicide is clearly made out.

39. Section 300 of the IPC explains murder and it provides that

culpable homicide is murder if, the act by which the death is

caused is done with the intention of causing death, or the act

complained of is so imminently dangerous that it must in all

probability cause death, or “such bodily injury as is likely to cause

death”. There are some exceptions when culpable homicide is not

murder and we are concerned with Exception 4 which reads:

“Exception 4. - Culpable homicide is not murder if it is

committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in

the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and

without the offender having taken undue advantage

or acted in a cruel or unusual manner." Explanation.

- It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the

provocation or commits the first assault.”

Page 27 of 35

40. Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC applies in the absence of any

premeditation. This is very clear from the words used in the

provision itself. It contemplates that the sudden fight must occur

in the heat of passion, or upon a sudden quarrel. The Exception

deals with a case of provocation not covered by Exception 1,

although it would have been more appropriately placed after that

exception. It is founded upon the same principle, as both involve

the absence of premeditation. However, while Exception 1 involves

total deprivation of self-control, Exception 4 refers to that heat of

passion which clouds a person’s sober reason and urges them to

commit acts they would not otherwise commit. There is

provocation in Exception 4, as there is in Exception 1, but the injury

caused is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact,

Exception 4 addresses cases where, notwithstanding that a blow

may have been struck or provocation given at the outset of the

dispute, regardless of how the quarrel originated , yet the

subsequent conduct of both parties’ places them on an equal

footing with respect to guilt.

41. A “sudden fight” implies mutual provocation and the exchange of

blows on both sides. In such cases, the homicide committed is

clearly not attributable to unilateral provocation, nor can the

entire blame be placed on one side. If it were, Exception 1 would be

the more appropriate provision. There is no prior deliberation or

intention to fight; the fight breaks out suddenly, and both parties

are more or less to blame. One party may have initiated it, but had

the other not aggravated the situation by their own conduct, it may

not have escalated to such a serious level. In such scenarios, there

Page 28 of 35

is mutual provocation and aggravation, making it difficult to

determine the precise share of blame attributable to each

participant. The protection of Exception 4 may be invoked if death

is caused: (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c)

without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a

cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with

the deceased.

42. To bring a case within Exception 4, all the ingredients mentioned

therein must be satisfied. It is important to note that the term

“fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC is not

defined in the IPC. A fight necessarily involves two parties – it takes

two to make a fight. The heat of passion requires that there must

be no time for the passions to cool, and in such case, the parties

may have worked themselves into a fury due to a prior verbal

altercation. A fight is a combat between two and more persons,

whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate

any general rule as to what constitutes a “sudden quarrel”. This is

a question of fact, and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must

necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the

application of Exception 4, it is not enough to show that there was

a sudden quarrel and no premeditation. It must also be shown that

the offender did not take undue advantage or act in a cruel or

unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in

the provision means “unfair advantage”.

43. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is

confronted with the question whether the offence is “murder” or

Page 29 of 35

“culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, it will be convenient

to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be

considered at the first stage is, whether the accused committed an

act which caused the death of another person. Proof of a causal

connection between the act of the accused and the resulting death

leads to the second stage, for considering whether that act of the

accused amounts to “culpable homicide” as defined in Section 299

of the IPC. If the answer to this question is, prima facie, found in

the affirmative, the next stage involves considering the application

of Section 300 of the IPC. At this stage, the court must determine

whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within

the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of “murder”

contained in Section 300. If the answer to this is in the negative,

the offence would be “culpable homicide not amounting to

murder”, punishable under either the first or the second part of

Section 304, depending respectively on whether the second or the

third clause of Section 299 is applicable. However, if the answer is

in the positive, but the case falls within any of the exceptions

enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be “culpable

homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under the Part I

of Section 304 of the IPC.

44. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr.,

reported in (1976) 4 SCC 382 , this Court, while drawing a

distinction between Section 302 and Section 304, held as under:-

“12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, "culpable

homicide" is genus and "murder" its specie. All

"murder" is "culpable homicide" but not vice- versa.

Speaking generally, "culpable homicide" sans

Page 30 of 35

"special characteristics of murder", is "culpable

homicide not amounting to murder". For the purpose

of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of

this generic offence, the Code practically recognises

three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what

may be called, "culpable homicide of the first degree".

This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which

is defined in Section 300 as "murder". The second

may be termed as "culpable homicide of the second

degree". This is punishable under the first part of

Section 304. Then, there is "culpable homicide of the

third degree". This is the lowest type of culpable

homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also,

the lowest among the punishments provided for the

three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is

punishable under the second part of Section 304.”

(Emphasis supplied)

45. In Budhi Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh , reported in

(2012) 13 SCC 663, this Court has held as under:-

“18. The doctrine of sudden and grave provocation is

incapable of rigid construction leading to or stating

any principle of universal application. This will

always have to depend on the facts of a given case.

While applying this principle, the primary obligation

of the court is to examine from the point of view of a

person of reasonable prudence if there was such

grave and sudden provocation so as to reasonably

conclude that it was possible to commit the offence of

culpable homicide, and as per the facts, was not a

culpable homicide amounting to murder. An offence

resulting from grave and sudden provocation would

normally mean that a person placed in such

circumstances could lose selfcontrol but only

temporarily and that too, in proximity to the time of

provocation. The provocation could be an act or series

of acts done by the deceased to the accused resulting

in inflicting of injury. Another test that is applied more

often than not is that the behaviour of the assailant

was that of a reasonable person. A fine distinction

Page 31 of 35

has to be kept in mind between sudden and grave

provocation resulting in sudden and temporary loss

of selfcontrol and the one which inspires an actual

intention to kill. Such act should have been done

during the continuation of the state of mind and the

time for such person to kill and reasons to regain the

dominion over the mind. Once there is premeditated

act with the intention to kill, it will obviously fall

beyond the scope of culpable homicide not amounting

to murder.....”

(Emphasis supplied)

46. In the case of Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in

(1993) 4 SCC 238, this Court held as under:-

“8. The counsel attempted to bring the case within

Exception 4. For its application all the conditions

enumerated therein must be satisfied. The act must

be committed without premeditation in a sudden fight

in the heat of passion; (2) upon a sudden quarrel; (3)

without the offender's having taken undue

advantage; (4) and the accused had not acted in a

cruel or unusual manner. Therefore, there must be a

mutual combat or exchanging blows on each other.

And however slight the first blow, or provocation,

every fresh blow becomes a fresh provocation. The

blood is already heated or warms up at every

subsequent stroke. The voice of reason is heard on

neither side in the heat of passion. Therefore, it is

difficult to apportion between them respective

degrees of blame with reference to the state of things

at the commencement of the fray but it must occur as

a consequence of a sudden fight i.e. mutual combat

and not one side track. It matters not what the cause

of the quarrel is, whether real or imaginary, or who

draws or strikes first. The strike of the blow must be

without any intention to kill or seriously injure the

other. If two men start fighting and one of them is

unarmed while the other uses a deadly weapon, the

one who uses such weapon must be held to have

taken an undue advanta ge denying him the

Page 32 of 35

entitlement to Exception 4. True the number of

wounds is not the criterion, but the position of the

accused and the deceased with regard to their arms

used, the manner of combat must be kept in mind

when applying Exception 4. When the deceased was

not armed but the accused was and caused injuries

to the deceased with fatal results, the Exception 4

engrafted to Section 300 is excepted and the offences

committed would be one of murder. 9. The occasion

for sudden quarrel must not only be sudden but the

party assaulted must be on an equal footing in point

of defence, at least at the onset. This is specially so

where the attack is made with dangerous weapons.

Where the deceased was unarmed and did not cause

any injury to the accused even following a sudden

quarrel if the accused has inflicted fatal blows on the

deceased, Exception 4 is not attracted and

commission must be one of murder punishable under

Section 302. Equally for attracting Exception 4 it is

necessary that blows should be exchanged even if

they do not all find their target. Even if the fight is

unpremeditated and sudden, yet if the instrument or

manner of retaliation be greatly disproportionate to

the offence given, and cruel and dangerous in its

nature, the accused cannot be protected under

Exception 4....”

(Emphasis supplied)

47. This Court, in the case of Surain Singh v. State of Punjab,

reported in (2017) 5 SCC 796 has observed that:

“The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is

caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden

fight, (c) without the offenders having taken undue

advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, and

(d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To

bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients

mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that

the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC

is not defined in IPC......... A fight is a combat between

two and more persons whethe r with or without

Page 33 of 35

weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general

rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden

quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel

is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the

proved facts of each case. For the application of

Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was

a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It

must further be shown that the offender has not

taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual

manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used

in the provision means "unfair advantage".”

(Emphasis supplied)

48. Section 304 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for culpable

homicide not amounting to murder. Part I of this Section provides

that if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention

of causing death, or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause

death, then the punishment may extend up to imprisonment for

life. On the other hand, Part II of Section 304 provides that if the

offending act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause

death, but without any intention to cause death or to cause such

bodily injury as is likely to cause death, then the punishment may

extend to imprisonment for 10 years.

49. The High Court considered only the first part of Exception 4 to

Section 300 of the IPC. This part refers to the absence of

premeditation in a sudden fight arising from a sudden quarrel in

a heat of passion. However, it does not end there. The exception

further requires that the offender must not have taken undue

advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Having regard

to the manner in which the assault was carried out, could it not

Page 34 of 35

be said that the offender i.e., the appellant-herein took undue

advantage and also could be said to have acted in a cruel or

unusual manner. The deceased was unarmed, it was not mutual

fight between two individuals that would bring the case within the

ambit of Exception 4. The deceased was absolutely harmless when

the appellant inflicted injuries all over his body indiscriminately.

50. Therefore, if at all the High Court intended to extend the benefit

of any of the Exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, it ought to have

considered Exception 1 of Section 300 of the IPC. However, it is

not necessary for us to delve into Exception 1 i.e., grave and

sudden provocation since, we have already reached the

conclusion that the case in hand is, one of no legal evidence and

therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted. We refer to

Exception 1 merely to illustrate that, if at all, it was this exception

that could have been examined. It is alleged that while the

appellant and the deceased were consuming alcohol at the

deceased's residence, the appellant showed the deceased a

photograph of his girlfriend. The deceased allegedly made an

obscene remark, “get your girlfriend to my place and leave her with

me for one night.” Such a statement might have provoked the

appellant, who then picked up a vegetable-cutting knife lying in

one corner of the house and inflicted injuries upon the deceased.

This aspect could have been considered in that context.

C. CONCLUSION

51. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the

Impugned Judgement passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh

Page 35 of 35

in Criminal Appeal No. 1538 of 2021 dated 16.01.2025 is not

sustainable in law.

52. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.

53. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges, and he be set free

forthwith if not required in any other case. The bail bonds stand

discharged, if any.

54. The Registry shall circulate one copy each of this judgment to all

the High Courts.

………………………………J.

(J.B. Pardiwala)

………………………………J.

(R. Mahadevan)

New Delhi:

5

th August 2025.