Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2014 Page 1 of 19

NON- REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 302 OF 2014

NARENDRA SINGH …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MADHYA

PRADESH …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 307 OF 2014

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 309 OF 2014

J U D G M E N T

ARAVIND KUMAR, J.

1. Three Criminal Appeals have been filed against the order of

the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal

Appeal No. 1248 of 2002, wherein the High Court was pleased

Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2014 Page 2 of 19

to set aside the conviction of the accused persons namely

Nagendra Singh (Husband), Narendra Singh (Father-in-Law)

and Lila Singh (Mother-in-Law) u/s 302 of the Indian Penal

Code (IPC) acquitting them of the charge u/S. 302 of IPC.

However, the High Court upheld their conviction u/s 498A of

IPC, reduced the sentence to the period they have already

undergone and maintained the fine of Rs. 1000/- each as

imposed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge.

2. Criminal Appeal No. 302 / 2014 has been filed by Narendra

Singh, the father-in-law of the deceased challenging his

conviction u/s 498A IPC. Criminal Appeal No. 309 / 2014 has

been filed by Pushp Raj Singh Baghel, the brother of the

deceased (defacto complainant) against all three accused

persons challenging their acquittal u/s 302 IPC and Criminal

Appeal No. 307 / 2014 has been filed by the State of Madhya

Pradesh against all three accused persons challenging their

acquittal u/s 302 IPC. Hence, all these three criminal appeals

are taken up together and disposed of by this common order.

3. The case of the prosecution as laid in the charge-sheet is that

the deceased woman had tied the matrimonial knot with

Nagendra Singh on 12.07.2000. To fulfill the burgeoning

demands of dowry, she was subjected to taunts and cruelty by

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her in-laws. Things took a steep turn for her on 15.04.2001

when she sustained burn injuries in the kitchen, i.e., within nine

months of the marriage. As per the prosecution, the husband of

the deceased had stuffed cloth in her mouth, poured kerosene

oil all over her body and set her on fire and was immediately

rushed to the Primary Health Center, Devlond, Madhya

Pradesh for treatment. She was examined by PW-6 / Dr. Rajesh

Mishra, who reported that 55% of her body was burnt, and it

was fatal to her life. There was a smell of Kerosene oil

emanating from her clothes.

4. Legal proceedings were put into motion. The next day, i.e., on

16.04.2001, her dying declaration came to be recorded by the

Executive Magistrate Shri Prabha Shankar Tripathi wherein

the victim stated that her husband, her mother-in-law and her

father-in-law used to demand car and on the day of the incident,

they stuffed cloth into her mouth and poured kerosene and set

her on fire. The same day, the police reached the residence of

the respondents, seized a burnt iron bucket, two plastic boxes

which smelt of kerosene and other oil, burnt jute bag,

matchsticks and burnt pieces of paper. Thereafter they seized

the place of occurrence, i.e. the kitchen. Since her condition

continued to worsen, on 17.04.2001 she was shifted to Gandhi

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Medical Hospital, Rewa for treatment. A second dying

declaration was recorded by Shri KL Suryavanshi who was the

Deputy Superintendent of Police. In the second dying

declaration, there was a contradiction and the victim this time

stated that since her in-laws used to quarrel with her over

insufficiency of dowry, she poured Kerosene on herself and set

herself on fire.

5. On 18.04.2001, FIR No. 51 / 2001 was registered u/s 306 /

498A / 34 IPC and S. 3 / 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

(in short DP Act). She died while being treated in hospital on

22.04.2001. The next day, post-mortem was conducted by PW-

17 / Dr. SK Pathak, who stated that death was caused due to

cardio-respiratory failure as a result of ante mortem burn

injuries on her person. After completion of investigation,

chargesheet came to be filed against all the accused persons

u/S. 302 / 304 / 498A IPC and S. 3 / 4 of DP Act.

6. Ld. Additional Sessions Judge, Beohari (in short Sessions

Court) framed charges u/s 498A/304B and in the alternative u/s

302 / 34 IPC against all the accused persons.

7. The prosecution examined 23 witnesses. The accused persons

denied the prosecution case and they examined two defence

witnesses who deposed that the victim had locked the door of

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the kitchen from inside and committed suicide or that this

incident had taken place accidentally in the kitchen.

8. The Sessions Court convicted the three accused persons u/S.

498A / 302 r/w 34 IPC. However, the accused persons were

acquitted from the charge of S. 304B IPC. They were punished

with rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and a fine

of Rs. 1,000/- each in default of payment of fine to further

undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months u/S. 498A IPC

and imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each,

in default rigorous imprisonment for ten months u/s 302 r/w 34

IPC. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

9. Against the aforementioned judgment, the accused persons

preferred a Criminal Appeal No. 1248/ 2002 before the

Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur

challenging the order of conviction and sentence.

10. The High Court set aside the conviction of the accused persons

under S. 302 of IPC but upheld their conviction u/s 498A of

IPC and reduced the sentence to the period they have already

undergone and maintained the fine of Rs. 1000/- each as

imposed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge.

Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2014 Page 6 of 19

Submissions made by Narendra Singh, the father-in-law of the

deceased person, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 302 / 2014

11. The Appellant - Narendra Singh contended that he was in

service from 15.10.1970 to 10.02.2003 in the office of Land

Acquisition and rehabilitation Division under the State of

Madhya Pradesh. He has rendered a service of almost 32 years.

After the conviction of the petitioner, he was dismissed from

services. He has not received any service benefits nor is he

getting any pension. If the conviction and sentence for the

offence u/S. 498A IPC is not set aside, irreparable loss would

be caused to the petitioner and he will not get any service and

retirement benefits for the service he had rendered for 32 years.

That the deceased was tutored by her parents to name the

accused persons in the first dying declaration to fasten the guilt

on the accused persons including the appellant. The material

contradictions and omissions in the statements of PW-1 /

Brijendra Singh, PW-2 / Sita Singh and PW-3 / Devendra

Singh (father, mother and brother of the deceased person

respectively) u/S. 161 CrPC in the Trial Court to the effect that

the accused persons were demanding dowry. Further, they are

all interested witnesses and their testimony ought not to be

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believed and there is no corroboration. That the medical

evidence has not established that the burns were homicidal.

Submissions made by Pushp Raj Singh Baghel (brother of the

deceased person), the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 309 / 2014

12. That both the dying declarations are inculpatory in nature, and

in the light of the same, the accused persons could not have

been acquitted from the charge of S. 304B or S. 302 IPC. There

is no justification in discarding the dying declaration recorded

by the PW-18/Executive Magistrate Sh. Prabha Shankar

Tripathi. The dying declaration recorded at the first instance is

always uninfluenced and free from concoction and

embellishment. That High Court erred in acquitting the

accused of offences under Section 302 by applying the

principle of benefit of doubt. The accused persons had failed to

discharge their legal burden as contemplated u/S. 113B of the

Evidence Act.

Submissions made by the State (The Respondent in Criminal

Appeals No. 302 / 2014 & 309 / 2014 who is the Appellant in

Criminal Appeal No. 307 / 2014)

13. It is contended that first dying declaration of the deceased dated

16.04.2001 recorded by PW-18 / Executive Magistrate, Shri

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Prabha Shankar Tripathi, it was explicitly mentioned that

husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased used

to demand a car from her parents as dowry and on their failure

to meet the said demand, they had stuffed cloth into her mouth

and poured kerosene all over her and had set her on fire with

the aid of a matchstick. The death had taken place within nine

months of her marriage and presumption arising under Section

113B had not been rebutted by them. There are multiple

infirmities and improbabilities which had crept in the evidence

of the witnesses. The deceased had died of cardio-respiratory

failure and suffocation due to the ante mortem burn injuries as

per the report and there is no reason to disbelieve the same. The

High Court had considered all the mitigative circumstances in

detail and has also given the benefit of the circumstances to the

accused and as such they pray for dismissal of the appeals filed

by the accused and seek for allowing the States’ appeal.

14. We have extensively heard the Learned Counsels and perused

the record.

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Analysis and Findings

15. What we have before us is an unfortunate tale of a young lady,

who, standing at the summit of her youth and expecting a life

of marital bliss and fortune, succumbed to flames within nine

months of her marriage.

16. Initially, the Trial Court held the husband and his parents guilty

of S.302 IPC by placing reliance on the first dying declaration

of the deceased which was recorded on 16.04.2001, and

holding that as per the first dying declaration, the accused

persons were guilty of murdering the deceased by setting her

on fire. However, the same was set aside by the High Court by

observing that firstly, there are two contradictory dying

declarations, and secondly, there is insufficient evidence to

hold the accused persons guilty of murder.

17. The main witnesses of this case are the family members of the

girl, i.e. PW-1 / Brijendra Singh (Father), PW-2 / Sita Singh

(Mother), PW-3 / Devendra Singh (Uncle) and PW-5 /

Pushpraj Singh (Brother) who have concurrently stated that the

deceased woman was being tortured and harassed for dowry,

particularly demanding a Maruti Car. However, their

examination could not withstand the test of the cross-

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examination. Many contradictions have emerged. Firstly, the

witnesses did not state the factum of demand of dowry, or the

fact that the girl was being tortured at the hands of her in-laws

before the police, and secondly they did not have a proper

explanation as to why the said facts were missing from their

statements made before the police. It appears that the

testimonies rendered before the Court were an afterthought, as

the same improvements appear across the statements of all the

witnesses, with a jarring accuracy which was hitherto missing

in the statements recorded before the Police. Another reason

why the testimonies are doubtful is that apart from the family

members, there is not a single witness who can corroborate the

version of the prosecution. While in usual cases, the

testimonies of the family are enough to convict an accused

person, however, as a rule of caution, if there are improvements

or contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution, then the

Courts must look for corroboration through other evidence,

which unfortunately is missing in this case.

18. Interestingly, the prosecution had produced a letter Ex. P-3

which was allegedly written by the deceased lady to her brother

PW-5 / Pushpraj Singh. It reveals her inner state of mind, the

stress of her married life, her discontentment with her in-laws,

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strong enough to pull on one’s heartstrings, but of little

evidentiary value, as the said letter was not subjected to

forensics and was not proved by a Handwriting Expert. The

letter remains unproved, and hence, unreliable.

19. PW-6 / Dr. Rajesh Mishra, working on the post of Assistant

Surgeon at Primary Health Center, was available on duty on

15.04.2001 at 7 AM when deceased lady was brought in a burnt

and unconscious state by the accused persons. If the accused

persons wanted the girl to die, there is no reason for them to

take the deceased lady to the hospital in the first place.

20. The prosecution has also examined the Neighbours, namely

PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9, who have all turned hostile before the

Court and not much could be deciphered from their testimonies

except that the neighbours were of the opinion that the

deceased victim had cordial relations with her in-laws.

21. Whatever may be the cause of her unhappiness, the reason for

her discontent, unless it is directly established that her in-laws

have done something so cruel in nature that she felt, they

cannot be held responsible or liable for abetting her causing

cruelty in the nature of abetting suicide.

22. The lady was in a distressed state of mind, no doubt about that.

Even the neighbour, i.e. PW-10 / Uma Devi had stated that

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whenever she met the deceased, she would complain about

how she doesn’t like living in a small town. Interestingly, it has

also been elicited in the cross-examination of PW-10 / Uma

Devi, who was the neighbour of the accused persons, that on

the date of incident, the accused Narender Singh and Leela

Singh went for a walk with her husband Hari Bhagat Singh.

This corroborates the accused persons’ version of the story and

shows their inability to cause any harm to the girl at the given

point of time.

23. The settled law is that a dying declaration is regarded with

utmost evidentiary value, because it is believed that a person

will not meet the maker with lies in his mouth. However, as a

matter of prudence, if there are some suspicious circumstances

related to a dying declaration, then in that case, the same can

be rejected. Now turning our attention to the facts on hand we

notice that there are two dying declarations on record, one

recorded 16th April, 2001 by PW-18/ Prabha Shankar Tripathi,

the Nayab Tehsilar and Executive Magistrate and the other one

recorded 17th April, 2001 by PW-22/KL Survanshi which

came to be marked as Ex.P-22 & Ex.P-30 respectively. In the

first dying declaration Ex.P-22, the victim says that her in-laws

set her ablaze due to insufficient dowry. The said declaration

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was recorded by PW-18/ Prabha Shankar Tripathi, the

Tehsildar. In the cross-examination, the Tehsildar has deposed

that there were about 4-5 persons who were there with the

deceased in the hospital, and one of them had told the deceased

to depose in a certain way at the time her Dying Declaration

being recorded. This casts a shadow of doubt on the veracity of

the dying declaration. In the second dying declaration, which

was recorded by PW-22/KL Suryavanshi, the deceased

changes her stance and stays that she poured the Kerosene

herself and set herself on fire and thereby committing suicide.

The variation in the two dying declarations in the manner she

died casts doubt on their veracity, but we find the second

declaration more believable than the first one because it

appears that the first one was recorded after the deceased was

tutored to give statement in a particular manner.

24. The law relating to dying declaration has been succinctly

summarised in the case of Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay

1

,

by this court by holding: -

“16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence

Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in

India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in

1

1957 SCC OnLine SC 20

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agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras

High Court, aforesaid,

(1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law

that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of

conviction unless it is corroborated;

(2) that each case must be determined on its own facts

keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying

declaration was made;

(3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that

a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other

pieces of evidence;

(4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as

another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light

of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the

principles governing the weighing of evidence;

(5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a

competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say,

in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as

practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration,

stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration

which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from

all the infirmities of human memory and human character,

and

(6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration,

the court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the

opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example,

whether there was sufficient light if the crime was

committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to

remember the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time

he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his

control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if

he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration

apart from the official record of it; and that the statement

had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the

result of tutoring by interested parties.”

Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2014 Page 15 of 19

25. In the background of aforestated position of law, when the case

on hand is examined, it clearly shows that while conviction can

be solely based on a dying declaration, the court still has to

weigh the same in the light of the surrounding circumstances

and with reference to the principles governing the evidence

tendered by the prosecution. In the present matter, the

allegations made against the appellant - Narendra Singh are

generic in nature. The first dying declaration wherein it was

alleged that the in-laws burnt the deceased, falls foul with the

second dying declaration, wherein the deceased says that she

set herself on fire. It is a settled position of law that

circumstances cannot take the place of proof and in a criminal

trial, the guilt has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The

golden principles for proof by way of circumstantial evidence,

also known as the panchsheel principles, were laid down in the

case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra

2

,

which reads as follows:

“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the

following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against

an accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is

to be drawn should be fully established.

2

(1984) 4 SCC 116

Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2014 Page 16 of 19

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with

the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they

should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except

that the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and

tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except

the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to

leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent

with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all

human probability the act must have been done by the

accused.”

26. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava

3

, it was observed

by this Court in para 9 that:

“9. This Court has, time out of number, observed that while

appreciating circumstantial evidence the Court must adopt

a very cautious approach and should record a conviction

only if all the links in the chain are complete pointing to the

guilt of the accused and every hypothesis of innocence is

capable of being negatived on evidence. Great care must be

taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the

evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences,

the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. The

circumstance relied upon must be found to have been fully

established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so

established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of

guilt. But this is not to say that the prosecution must meet

any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused

however far-fetched and fanciful it might be. Nor does it

mean that prosecution evidence must be rejected on the

3

(1992) 2 SCC 86

Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2014 Page 17 of 19

slightest doubt because the law permits rejection if the

doubt is reasonable and not otherwise.”

(Emphasis supplied)

27. Thus, in a criminal trial, in case there are two inferences

possible, then the one favouring the accused must be followed.

Herein, no direct evidence was produced by the prosecution on

record to implicate the father-in-law for mental cruelty, or to

show that he was somehow directly involved in torturing the

deceased or raising the demand for dowry. It seems that the

father-in-law was roped in the present matter by an extension

of roping the husband of the deceased, as is the case in certain

S. 498A matters. This Court has time and again issued

directions in order to ensure that there is no misuse of this law,

which was purported by the legislature as a tool to ensure the

safety of women in their marital homes and not to take grudges

against all the members of the family even in the absence of

any role attributable to them.

28. It was noticed by this Court that the factum of dowry demand

does not find presence in any of the testimonies of the family

of the deceased. It appears that the same was added in their

examination in chief as an afterthought so that they could

strengthen their case against husband and his family members

Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2014 Page 18 of 19

which was standing on shaky legs due to insufficiency of

evidence. It appears to be a legal gimmick rather than an honest

contradiction caused due to lapse of time and erosion of the

memory, because a fact as important as demand of dowry that

was so traumatic so as to lead to a death of a young lady could

not have been left out of the statement under Section 161 before

the police at the first blush. Rather, had that been a case, the

family of the deceased would have been so eager as to visit

punishment upon the husband and the in-laws that they would

have narrated the entire ordeal to the police in order to avoid

any legal discrepancies later on. This does not seem to be the

case at hand for the simple reason that when questioned in the

cross-examination about the reason of this omission, all the

family members of the deceased categorically pinned the

blame on the police for the non-recording of the statement.

Further, not a single independent witness could depose

anything pertaining to the demand of dowry. In such a scenario

it becomes unsafe for the Court to rely on contradictory

statements of the interested witnesses to visit punishment upon

the husband or the in-laws. For this reason, we are of the

opinion that the demand of dowry was not proved.

Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2014 Page 19 of 19

29. In the light of the above analysis, the evidence is brought on

record would not be sufficient to establish the charge of guilt

under Section 498A of IPC against the Appellant - Narendra

Singh. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 302 / 2014 filed by

Narendra Singh is allowed and his conviction u/s 498A IPC is

set aside. Further, Criminal Appeal Nos. 309 / 2014 and 307 /

2014 are hereby dismissed.

.……………………………., J.

[ARAVIND KUMAR]

.……………………………., J.

[N.V. ANJARIA]

New Delhi;

April 30

th

, 2026.