2023 INSC 889 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1786 OF 2023

NARESH @ NEHRU .... APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA …. RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1787-1788OF 2023

IRSHAD AND ANOTHER .... APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA …. RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Aravind Kumar, J.

1. Judgment dated 09-01-2020 rendered in Criminal Appeal

Nos.1063 of 2017, 997 & 1043 of 2017 by the High Court of Punjab

and Haryana, Judicature at Chandigarh is under challenge in these

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appeals, whereunder the accused Nos.4, 5 and 6 (appellants herein)

who were convicted for the offences punishable under Section 302

read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) by

the Sessions Court came to be affirmed.

GIST OF PROSECUTION CASE:

2. On 22-04-2016, ASI Ram Kishan while on patrolling duty at 75

feet road, had received a telephonic information that in the village

Maheshwari certain persons had fired a gun-shot at a boy and upon

reaching there, statement of Mohit @ Kala came to be recorded which

was to the effect that at about 6.40 pm his cousins Ajay and Suraj were

talking in front of the house of Ex. Sarpanch Karan Singh and they

were near the house of Dharmender and he (Mohit) saw Ajay and Suraj

running towards the house of Dharmender as they were being chased

by three youngsters on a bullet motorcycle. It was also stated by Mohit

@ Kala that bullet motorcycle was being driven by Ravi, Shoaib Khan

was the pillion rider and one unknown person was sitting behind them.

It was further stated that two more motorcycles having two riders each,

with batons in their hands were following the Bullet motorcycle. It was

also alleged that unknown person sitting on the Bullet motorcycle got

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down and fired at Ajay with country-made revolver, which hit his head

and Ajay fell in front of the house of Dharmender. Suraj hid in

Dharmender’s house and on raising the alarm the assailants sped away

on their motorcycles towards Bhiwadi; it is also stated by Mohit @

Kala that injured Ajay was shifted to the hospital; it is further stated

that Ravi was studying in his school and was his junior and he used to

bully and threaten all. Mohit also stated that Ajay and Suraj had a fight

with Ravi on the day of ‘Dulhandi’ and he had threatened to kill them

and Ravi along with his companions had fired at Ajay with intend to

kill him. Based on the said statement FIR under Sections 148, 149, 307

of IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act came to be registered and on the

death of Ajay (on 23-04-2016) Section 302 of IPC was substituted in

place of Section 307 IPC and accused persons were apprehended; on

the disclosure statement of first accused (Pawan) country made pistol

was recovered and as per the statement of accused No.2 (Dharmender)

wooden stick was recovered apart from four motorcycles. One of the

accused-Shoaib was produced before the Juvenile Justice Board and

Ravi was tried by the Children’s Court under the provisions of the

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The

charge was framed against six accused persons and in all 18 witnesses

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were examined on behalf of the prosecution. The statements of the

accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for

short ‘Cr.P.C.’) came to be recorded and the accused having denied the

incriminating material appearing in evidence against them, had pleaded

not guilty. After hearing the learned advocates appearing for the

accused persons and the public prosecutor and on appreciation of the

evidence laid before the court, the learned Sessions Judge by judgment

dated 06-10-2017 convicted the accused persons for the offences

already noticed hereinabove and said order of conviction and sentence

imposed came to be affirmed by the High Court under the impugned

order vide judgment dated 09-01-2020. Hence, these appeals have

been preferred by accused Nos.4 to 6.

3. We have heard Mr. Siddharth Mittal and Mr. Vikas Walia,

learned Advocates appearing for the accused-appellants in Criminal

Appeal Nos.1786 of 2023 and 1787-1788 of 2023 respectively, and

Ms. Manisha Aggarwal Narain, learned Additional Advocate General

appearing for the State of Haryana, Respondent.

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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS:

4. Mr. Siddharth Mittal, learned counsel for the appellant

appearing for Naresh @ Nehru Accused No.4, contends that the trial

court and High Court had committed an error in convicting him

without considering the statement of Mohit @ Kala (PW-9) in proper

perspective whereunder he had not named the appellant and the CCTV

footage did not conform to Section 65 B of the Indian Evidence Act

which even otherwise did not reflect A-4’s of presence. He also

contends that no Test Identification Parade (TIP ‘for short’) was

conducted, and PW-9 had only identified this accused (A-4) in the

court. Mr. Mittal learned counsel would also contend that said witness

(PW-9) was shocked or perplexed when his statement came to be

recorded as admitted by him and reliance could not have been placed

on said evidence for convicting the appellant. He would further

contend that A-4 had no common object to share with the main

accused, Pawan (PW-1), who is said to have fired at Ajay (deceased).

Mr. Mittal, learned counsel would also contend that PW-9 was an

interested witness as he was a close relative of the deceased, and

various discrepancies, including the improvement in his statement

made before court, ought to have been the ground to summarily brush

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aside his testimony. Mr. Mittal, learned advocate would point out that

discrepancies in PW-9's statement had clearly surfaced which was

evident from his admission of not informing the police about the

Splendor vehicle being driven by the appellant and this fact was

conveniently ignored by the courts below. Mr. Mittal, learned counsel

would also contend that CCTV footage relied upon by prosecution

was recorded on a mobile phone by PW-8 and converted into a CD,

which was not in conformity with Section 65B of the Evidence Act

and it was allegedly recorded on 26.04.2016 but handed over to the

police on 01.06.2016 and during this interregnum period the

possibility of said recording being tampered could not have been ruled

out. Even otherwise the face of the assailants was not identifiable in

the CCTV footage as found by the trial court itself and, therefore, no

inference could have been drawn to implicate the appellant(A-4).

5. He would contend that the alleged motive attributed to the

accused persons is due to a quarrel that had ensued between the

deceased, Suraj, Ravi, and Nabbu on the day of Dulhandi and there was

no evidence placed on record by prosecution to suggest any common

object had been shared by the appellants with other accused persons.

He would contend that appellant has not been alleged to have been

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armed with any weapon, so no inference could have been drawn about

the common object to commit the offence. He would submit that the

reasoning adopted by the courts below to convict the accused by

overlooking the fact that TIP had not been conducted and only on the

ground of PW-9 having known the remaining accused by face before

the incident was erroneous, though the testimony of PW-9 would

suggest that accused persons were not previously known to him and his

admission in evidence that came to know about them only when they

were arrested and their names were published in the newspaper. The

non-disclosure of the names of the accused persons at the first instance

creates reasonable doubts as to the appellant's identity. The learned

counsel for the appellant (A-4) would also contend that there was

unexplained delay in recording PW-9's statement, namely it was

recorded at 11:30 p.m., despite the incident having taken place at 6:30

p.m. and PW-9 was present during this period. The alleged confessional

statement of the appellant is of no value in the light of Section 25 of the

Evidence Act and said statement does not indicate any common object

having been shared by the appellant with other assailants. Hence, he

prays for his appeal being allowed and the appellant (A-4) being

acquitted.

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6. Mr. Vikas Walia, learned counsel appearing for the appellants,

namely, Irshad and Sonu Kumar (accused numbers 5 and 6

respectively) in Criminal Appeal Nos.1787-1788 of 2023, contends that

courts below had erred in not considering the fact that a person liable

for being punished for the offence of being a member of an unlawful

assembly under Section 149 IPC would be necessary to prove that such

persons had acted in pursuance of a common object. He would further

contend that prosecution had failed to prove that appellants were aware

of Pawan's (Accused No.1) possessing the pistol and he had the

intention/object to kill Ajay and such intention could not be inferred.

He would contend that appellants' involvement in the unlawful

assembly and sharing a common object to kill Ajay could not be

inferred in the circumstances of the case, particularly when there was

no evidence to support the stand of the prosecution that appellants were

aware of pistol being in possession of Pawan (A-1).

7. He would further contend that the prosecution failed to prove

that the members of the unlawful assembly had assembled to

accomplish the common object of killing Ajay, as attributed to them.

There was no evidence suggesting a sharing of common object between

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the accused. The CCTV footage, which was relied upon by the

prosecution, does not inspire confidence to accept the story of the

prosecution, since, faces appearing in the video was not clear and this

itself would be a good ground to allow appeals and set aside the

conviction of the appellants. He would also contend that appellants

were not residents of the village where the incident took place and

there is no whisper in the statement of PW-9 recorded under Section

161 of Cr.P.C. on this aspect. Hence, he prays for appeal preferred by

A-5, and A-6 be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:

8. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and

on perusal of the judgments of the courts below, it would emerge

therefrom, that conviction of all the accused is based on the testimony

of PW-9 and recovery of the motor-cycles and the motive for the crime

attributed by PW-9 in his statement recorded on the date of incident. In

this background, we have perused the judgments of the courts below by

bestowing our anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised at

the Bar.

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9. At the outset, it requires to be noticed that motive that has been

attributed against the accused persons for the killing of Ajay was, he

(Ajay) and Suraj had a fight with Ravi on the day of Dulhandi, where

Ravi had threatened to kill them and in furtherance of said threat, he is

said to have come along with other co-accused, and a person sitting on

the bullet motor-cycle had fired at Ajay from the pistol, while Ravi

was driving the Bullet motorcycle. PW-9 had also deposed that Ajay

was in the company of Suraj, who ran alongside the deceased and hid

himself in Dharmender's house. However, the police did not record the

statement of Suraj, and he was not even cited as a witness on behalf of

the prosecution. This would be the first gap in the prosecution story or

a defective investigation.

9.1 The prosecution relied on Statement of Mohit @ Kala

(PW-9) and courts below accepted him as a star witness to convict the

accused. PW-9's testimony was shrouded with inconsistencies and

he had not named the appellants in the FIR and had failed to identify

Naresh @ Nehru as the driver of the Splendor motorcycle. He had

identified Irshad and Sonu Kumar in court but had not named them in

his statement Ex.PM made before police. In his cross-examination,

PW-9 admitted of not informing the police about the Pulsar

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motorcycle and two other Splendor motorcycles. He stated in his

statement Ex.PM that victim Ajay and his friend Suraj were being

chased by three motorcycles, namely Bullet, Splendor and Pulsar

motorcycles respectively. However, in the statement made before the

court, he improvised his version by deposing that the victim was

being chased by four motorcycles. In the cross-examination, PW-9

admitted to have informed the police about deceased having been

chased by four motorcycles and reiterated the contents of his

statement in Ex.PM as true. These inconsistencies give rise to

suspicion and raises doubt in the prosecution story.

9.2 PW-9 had named only Ravi and Shoaib in his statement Ex.PM,

and for the first time before court he had identified Naresh (A-4),

Irshad and Sonu (A-9 and A-6). He admitted in his cross-examination

that he only knew Ravi and Shoaib before the incident, and had known

about the names of the other accused persons when they were arrested.

This raises doubts about PW-9's presence at the scene of the incident

itself. Undisputedly no recovery was made from Irshad and Sonu.

Contradictions in PW-9's statement is glaring. In his deposition he

admits his statement was written by the police at 10:45 PM on

22.04.2016, whereas PW-12 (ASI Ram Kishan) deposed that written

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statement EX.PM was handed over to the police by the complainant’s

party at 11:30 PM on 22.04.2016. PW-9 and also deposes that police

arrived at the scene of crime between 10:30-11:00 PM, creating serious

doubt about the recording of PW-9's statement at the place of crime as

claimed by the prosecution.

9.3 As noticed hereinabove, the evidence of the eye-witness should

be of very sterling quality and calibre and it should not only instil

confidence in the court to accept the same but it should also be a

version of such nature that can be accepted at its face value. This Court

in the case of Rai Sandeep @ Deepu alias Deepu Vs. State (NCT of

Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 21 has held:

“22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness”

should be of very high quality and caliber whose version

should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering

the version of such witness should be in a position to

accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test

the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness

would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the

truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What

would be more relevant would be the consistency of the

statement right from the starting point till the end, namely,

at the time when the witness makes the initial statement

and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and

consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused.

There should not be any prevarication in the version of

such a witness. The witness should be in a position to

withstand the cross-examination of any length and

howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance

should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the

occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence

of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and

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every one of other supporting material such as the

recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence

committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion.

The said version should consistently match with the version

of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should

be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial

evidence where there should not be any missing link in the

chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the

offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a

witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such

similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a

witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose

version can be accepted by the court without any

corroboration and based on which the guilty can be

punished. To be more precise, the version of the said

witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain

intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral,

documentary and material objects should match the said

version in material particulars in order to enable the court

trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the

other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty

of the charge alleged.”

PW-9, the cousin of the deceased, was examined as an eyewitness to

the crime. However, the presence of PW-9 at the scene raises doubt

due to contradictions. Although Suraj, who was also the deceased's

cousin, was accompanying the deceased, PW-9 never tried to contact

him to ascertain the names of the accused persons. This raises a

serious doubt about his presence that has been ignored by the courts

below. The presence of PW-9 at the scene raises doubts and raises

questions about the veracity of his evidence. This is the second

lacunae in the prosecution case.

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9.4 The courts below have relied on CCTV footage to convict the

appellants and co-accused persons. However, we are of the considered

view that said evidence could not have been relied upon, as it was

infested with serious doubts and the very manner in which it came into

existence itself would raise a serious doubt not only about its source

but also raises a serious doubt about the presence of the appellants at

the scene of crime. PW-8, who made a video from his mobile phone of

the CCTV footage on 22.04.2016 and has claimed to have handed over

the recorded CD (Ex.P.3) to the police on 01.06.2016. However, the

video (CD) has not been forwarded by the police to the Forensic

Science Laboratory. He (PW-8) claims to have downloaded the video

from his mobile phone and transferred to his laptop and then prepared

CD (Ex.P.3). Neither laptop nor mobile phone was produced by

prosecution or had been seized by the police during the course of

investigation. The trial court's conclusion is based on inconsistent

evidence and there is lack of clarity in the evidence of PW.8. He has

identified his signature on the certificate Ex. P-L (furnished as required

under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act) which certificate was

prepared by police official Mr. Aman and he has not been examined.

The CD(Ex.P.3) was played in the trial court and observation recorded

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by Sessions Judge which is to the following effect would acquire great

significance.

“COURT OBSERVATION:- from the video clips the faces

of assailants and complainants are not decipherable.”

(Emphasis supplied by us)

9.5 He (PW-8) admits in his cross-examination that certificate Ex.

PL was prepared by a police official, and he (PW-8) had affixed his

signature to Ex.PL. He also admits that faces of the assailants are not

visible and identifiable and the registration numbers of the

motorcycles are also not visible. It is pertinent to note at this juncture

itself that Investigating Officer (PW-15) also admits in his cross-

examination that faces of the accused are not identifiable from the

video. The said video according to PW-8 was taken from the CCTV

camera located in the house of Dharmendra and he (Dharmendra) was

never cited as a witness by the prosecution. This is the third stage of

the deficient investigation and blame has to be necessarily laid at their

door and the benefit of the doubt has to be extended to the accused

persons.

9.6 The confessional statement of the accused and co-accused came

to be recorded when they were in police custody. This court in

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Mehboob Ali & Another Vs. State of Rajasthan (2016) 14 SCC 640

has held:

“12. Section 25 of the Evidence Act provides that no

confession made to a police officer shall be

proved as against a person accused of any offence. Section

26 provides that no confession made by any person while he

is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the

immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as

against such person. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, it

lays down how much of an information received from

accused may be proved.

13. For application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act,

admissible portion of confessional statement has to be found

as to a fact which were the immediate cause of the discovery,

only that would be part of legal evidence and not the rest. In

a statement if something new is discovered or recovered

from the accused which was not in the knowledge of the

police before disclosure statement of the accused is recorded,

is admissible in the evidence.

14. Section 27 of the Evidence Act refers when any “fact” is

deposed. Fact has been defined in Section 3 of the Act. Same

is quoted below:

“‘Fact’.— ‘Fact’ means and includes—

(1) any thing, state of things, or relation of things, capable of

being perceived by the senses;

(2) any mental condition of which any person is conscious.

Illustrations

(a) That there are certain objects arranged in a certain order

in a certain place, is a fact.

(b) That a man heard or saw something, is a fact.

(c) That a man said certain words, is a fact.

(d) That a man holds a certain opinion, has a certain

intention, acts in good faith or fraudulently, or uses a

particular word in a particular sense, or is or was at a

specified time conscious of a particular sensation, is a fact.

(e) That a man has a certain reputation, is a fact.

‘Relevant’.—One fact is said to be relevant to another when

the one is connected with the other in any of the ways

referred to in the provisions of this Act relating to the

relevancy of facts.”

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In the instant case, the confessional statement of the accused relied

upon by the prosecution was admittedly recorded after the arrest of

those accused persons when accused 4, 5, and 6 were in police

custody. Hence, said statement would become inadmissible having

regard to the provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act,

of 1872. Section 25 of the Act in no uncertain terms makes it clear

that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against

a person accused of any offence. Likewise, Section 26 states that any

such statement is inadmissible if given while in police custody. For

this proposition, the judgment of this Court in Indra Dalal vs. State

of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 31 can be looked up.

10. As already noticed hereinabove prosecution has attempted to

drive home the guilt of the accused based on accused persons having

shared a common object, by pressing into service Section 149 of

IPC. This provision does not create a separate offence but only

declares vicarious liability of all members of unlawful assembly for

acts done in common object. Thus, in order to attract Section 149 of

the Code it must be shown by the prosecution that the incriminating

act was done to accomplish the common object by such unlawful

assembly. It must be within the knowledge of the other members as

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one likely to be committed in furtherance of the common object.

Even if no overt act is imputed to the accused, the presence of the

accused as part of the unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction.

The inference of a common object has to be drawn from various

factors such as the weapons with which the members were armed,

their movements, the acts of violence committed by them, and the

end result. This court in Roy Fernandes vs. State of Goa and Others

(2012) 3 SCC 221 has held:

“18. That leaves us with the question whether the

commission of murder by a member of an unlawful

assembly that does not have murder as its common object

would attract the provisions of Section 149 IPC?

19. Section 149 IPC reads:

“149.Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence

committed in prosecution of common object.—If an offence

is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in

prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such

as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be

committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at

the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of

the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.”

A plain reading of the above would show that the provision

is in two parts. The first part deals with cases in which an

offence is committed by any member of the assembly “in

prosecution of the common object” of that assembly. The

second part deals with cases where the commission of a

given offence is not by itself the common object of the

unlawful assembly but members of such assembly “knew

that the same is likely to be committed in prosecution of the

common object of the assembly”.

20. As noticed above, the commission of the offence of

murder of Felix Felicio Monteiro was itself not the common

object of the unlawful assembly in the case at hand. And yet

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the assembly was unlawful because from the evidence

adduced at the trial it is proved that the common object of the

persons comprising the assembly certainly was to either

commit a mischief or criminal trespass or any other offence

within the contemplation of clause (3) of Section 141 IPC,

which may to the extent the same is relevant for the present

be extracted at this stage:

“141. Unlawful assembly.—An assembly of five or more

persons is designated an ‘unlawful assembly’, if the common

object of the persons composing that assembly is—

First.—***

Second.—***

Third.—To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or

other offence;”

21. From the evidence on record, we are inclined to hold

that even when commission of murder was not the common

object of the accused persons, they certainly had come to the

spot with a view to overawe and prevent the deceased by use

of criminal force from putting up the fence in question. That

they actually slapped and boxed the witnesses, one of whom

lost his two teeth and another sustained a fracture only

proves that point.

22. What then remains to be considered is: whether the

appellant as a member of the unlawful assembly knew that

the murder of the deceased was also a likely event in

prosecution of the object of preventing him from putting up

the fence? The answer to that question will depend upon the

circumstances in which the incident had taken place and the

conduct of the members of the unlawful assembly including

the weapons they carried or used on the spot. It was so stated

by this Court in Lalji v. State of U.P. [(1989) 1 SCC 437 :

1989 SCC (Cri) 211] in the following words: (SCC p. 441,

para 8)

“8. … Common object of the unlawful assembly can be

gathered from the nature of the assembly, arms used by them

and the behaviour of the assembly at or before scene of

occurrence. It is an inference to be deduced from the facts

and circumstances of each case.”

23. The Court elaborated the above proposition in Dharam

Pal v. State of U.P. [(1975) 2 SCC 596 : 1975 SCC (Cri)

704] as: (SCC p. 603, para 11)

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“11. Even if the number of assailants could have been less

than five in the instant case (which, we think, on the facts

stated above, was really not possible), we think that the fact

that the attacking party was clearly shown to have waited for

the buggi to reach near the field of Daryao in the early hours

of 7-6-1967, shows pre-planning. Some of the assailants had

sharp-edged weapons. They were obviously lying in wait for

the buggi to arrive. They surrounded and attacked the

occupants shouting that the occupants will be killed. We do

not think that more convincing evidence of a preconcert was

necessary. Therefore, if we had thought it necessary, we

would not have hesitated to apply Section 34 IPC also to this

case. The principle of vicarious liability does not depend

upon the necessity to convict a required number of persons.

It depends upon proof of facts, beyond reasonable doubt,

which makes such a principle applicable.

(See Yeshwant v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 3 SCC 639 :

1972 SCC (Cri) 684] and Sukh Ram v. State of U.P. [(1974) 3

SCC 656 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 186] ) The most general and basic

rule, on a question such as the one we are considering, is that

there is no uniform, inflexible, or invariable rule applicable

for arriving at what is really an inference from the totality of

facts and circumstances which varies from case to case. We

have to examine the effect of findings given in each case on

this totality. It is rarely exactly identical with that in another

case. Other rules are really subsidiary to this basic verity and

depend for their correct application on the peculiar facts and

circumstances in the context of which they are enunciated.”

In the instant case by the impugned order, the High Court has held

that every member had inhibited the common intention to

accomplish the unlawful object. The facts on hand would disclose

that the motive alleged was a quarrel that ensued between Ravi and

Nabbu with Ajay and Suraj on the day of Dulhandi and Ravi is said

to have threatened to kill Ajay. This factor would clearly disclose

that the appellants herein were not involved in the fight that occurred

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on the day of Dulhandi and as such no motive could be attributed to

the appellants. The prosecution had failed to prove that the appellants

herein had shared a common object with other members of the

alleged unlawful assembly. To convict a person under Section 149

IPC prosecution has to establish with the help of evidence that firstly,

appellants shared a common object and were part of unlawful

assembly and secondly, it had to prove that they were aware of the

offences likely to be committed is to achieve the said common

object. Both these ingredients are conspicuously absent and there is

no evidence to connect the petitioners with the deceased or the co-

accused. Undisputedly, no overt act has been attributed to the

appellants, and in unequivocal terms PW-9 admits in his cross-

examination that none of the accused except Pawan had caused

injury to the deceased and there was only a single shot fired from the

pistol. Hence, we are of the considered view that the prosecution had

failed to prove the guilt of the appellants herein beyond reasonable

doubt, and non-consideration of the lacuna in the prosecution case in

proper perspective by the Trial Court and the High Court as analysed

hereinabove has resulted in miscarriage in the administration of

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justice namely conviction of the appellants which cannot be

sustained.

11. Resultantly, the appeals are allowed and the judgment passed

by the Sessions Court in SC No.21 of 2016 dated 09.05.2017 as

affirmed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in

CRA-D Nos.1063 of 2017, 997 of 2017 and 1043 of 2017 are hereby

set aside and consequently appellants are acquitted of the offences

alleged and are ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any

other case.

……………………….J.

(S. Ravindra Bhat)

…………………..……J.

(Aravind Kumar)

New Delhi,

October 09, 2023