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S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 411

NARESH CHANDRA GANGULI

v.

THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS

(and connected petition)

(B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR,

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)

Preventive Detention-Object and ground of such detention­

Distinction·-Ground, Meaning

of-Copy of order to be served on

detenu-Contents-Preventiw Detention Act,

r950 (4 of r950),

SS. 3, 7.

The appellant was detained under s. 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Pre­

ventive Detention Act, 1950. The copy of the grounds of the ~

order of detention served on him stated that he was detained as

he had been acting in a way prejudicial to

the maintenance of

public order as evidenced by the particulars stated in its four

paragraphs. Paragraph 1 stated,

inter alia, that the appellant

had, in a meeting of the refugees vilified

the Prime Minister of

India for his unsympathetic attitude towards the sufferings of

the refugees and gave expression to violent feelings regarding his

person while referring to

the recent Nehru-Noon Pact;

para­

graph 2 stated that he called upon the members of his party to

build up a strong movement against the implementation of the

pact and tried to rouse passion by alleging

the Prime Minister

had no sympathy for West Bengal; paragraph 3 stated

that at

another meeting he denounced the pact and stressed the need of

forming a militia with the youths

of the country for the safety

of the people living in border areas and paragraph

4, that he

intended to proceed to Delhi on the date mentioned, and was

likely to instigate plans endangering the personal safety

of the

Prime Minister. The High

Court, on an application under ss. 491

and 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the issue of a

writ of

habeas corpus, while upholding the order of detention, held

that the said paragraphs were really

·not the grounds of deten­

tion but merely pieces of evidence on which the only ground of

detention, namely, acting in a manner prejudicial to the mainten­

ance of public order, was based, that paragraph 4 was merely an

inference of fact having a bearing on the ground

of detention. It

was contended, inter alia, on appeal that paragraph 4 was

extremely vague and devoid

of particulars, and that the allega­

tions made had no rational connection with the objects mention­

ed in s. 3 of the Act and so he was deprived of his right to make

an effective representation.

All this was, however, denied on

behalf of the State.

Held, that the High Court had overlooked the difference

between the objects of d()tention specified in els. (a) and (b) of

s. 3(1) of the Act and the statement of facts which constitute

the grounds envisaged by s. 7 of th~ Act.

z959

11fay zo

I959

412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]

Sections 3 and 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, read

together, contemplate

that the copy of the order passed by the

Nare;h

Chandm ·detaining authority under s. 3(2) of the Act to be served on the

Ganguli

v.

Tlie SloU of

West Bengal

an& Others

Sinha J.

detenu should contain, (1) a· preamble reciting in terms one or

more of the sub-clauses of els. (a) and (b) of s. 3(1) as its object or

objects, (2) the grounds contemplated by s. 7, namely, the conclu­

sions of fact, which

Jed to the passing of the

order' of detention,

informing'the detenu as

to why he was detained, and (3) parti­

culars, if and where necessary, but not those referred to in

sub-

ss. (3) and (4) of s. 3 of the Act.

In the instant case, however, the error of confusion made by

the High Court could not invalidate its order since the grounds

of detention, characterised

by the High Court as recitals of fact,

read together, were in no.way ambiguous, indefinite

or irrelevant

• to the object of the detention, namely, the maintenance of public

order

and did not deprive the detenu of his right of representa-

tion.

·

The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya [1951] S.C.R.

167, considered.

Dwarka Das

Bhatia v. The State of Jammu Kashmir. [1956]

S.C.R. 948, held inapplicable.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal

Appeal No.

59 of 1959.

Appeal from

the judgment and order dated the

January 8, 1959, of the

Calcutta High Court in Crimi­

nal Misc. Case No. 126 of 1958.

AND

PETITION No. 51 QF 1959.

Petition under Article 32

of the Constitution of India

for the enforcement

of Fundamental Rights.

Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, for the

appellant and petitioner.

B. Sen and P. K. Bose, for the respondents.

1959. May 20. The

Judgment of the

Court was

delivered

by

SINHA J.-This appeal, on a certificate of fitness

granted by the Calcutta High Court, is directed against

the order of that Court, dated January, 8, 1959, in

Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 126of1958, refusing

to issue a writ in the nature of habeas corpus in respect

')f one

Ram

Prasad Das (who will hereinafter be refer­

red

to as ' the petitioner '). This

Court, by an order

' .

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR1'S.~ 413

dated April 20, 1959, directed that the application of

the petitioner under Art. 32 of the Constitution, for a

similar writ in respect of the same person, be posted

for hearing immediately

after the aforesaid criminal

appeal,

and that it shall not be necessary that the

peti­

tioner be produced before this Court at the time of the

hearing of the writ petition. Hence, both the matters,

relating as

they do, to the same subject-matter, have

been heard together

and will be disposed of by this

judgment.

It appears that Naresh

Chandra Ganguli, an advo­

cate, practisiilg in the Calcutta High Court, made an

application under ss. 491 and 561A of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, as a frien"d, on behalf on the peti­

tioner, in detention in the Dum Dum Central Jail in

24 Parganas, under the orders of the Government of

West Bengal. The application was made to the Calcutta

High Court on the following allegations: The peti­

tioner is the Secretary of the West Be,ngal Committee

of the Bharatiya Jana Sangha, one of the four big

political parties, as recognized

by the Election

Commis­

sion of India. On or about October 7, 1958, towards

evening, when

the petitioner was coming out of the

Basanta

Cabin, a tea stall, at the crossing of the

College Street and Surya Sen Street, after having

addressed a meeting

at the

College Square, he was

stopped on

the street by the police and was taken to

the office of the

Special Branch (Police) on Lord Sinha

Road. From there, he was sent to the Dum Dum

Central Jail, where he was served with an order, being

Order No.

83 dated October 7, 1958, purporting to have

been made by the Commissioner of Police,

Calcutta,

under the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act

(No. IV,

of

1950) (hereinafter referred to as' the Act').

The order is in these terms :-

"ORDER Dated 7-10-58.

No.83.

Whereas I am satisfied with respect to the person

known as Sri Ram Prasad Das, son of late Bepin

Behari Das

of Village

P-S-P Dist. and of 6,

Murlidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta that with a view to

preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial

N aresh Chandra

Ganguli

v.

The State of

West Bengal

antl Others

Sin/la J.

I959

Naresh Chandra

Ganguli

v.

The State of

West Bengal

and Others

Sinha].

414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]

to the maintenance of Public Order it is necessary .so

to do.

Now therefore in exercise

of the Powers conferred

by Section 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act

1950

(IV qf 1950) I made this order directing that the said

Sri

Ram

Prasp,d Das be detained.

Given under my hand and seal of office.

Sd/-Illegible,

Commissioner

of Police,

Calcutta."

On or about October 8, 1958, the petitioner was served,

in

the Dum Dum Central Jail, with a further order,

being Order No.

85 dated October 8, 1958, which is as

follows:

" Government of West Bengal.

Office of the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta.

Dated 8-10-58.

No. 85.

Grounds for detention under clause (ii) of clause

(a)

of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Preventive

Detention Act,

1950 (Act IV of 1950).

To

Sri Ram Prasad Das S/o Bepin Behari Das, of

6, Muralidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta.

You

are being detained in pursuance of a deten­

tion order made in exercise

of power conferred by

Section 3(2) (c) of the P.D. Act

1950 (Act IV of 1950)

on the ground that you are acting in a manner pre­

judicial

to the maintenance of public order, as

evidenced by the particular8 given below:-

1. That on

13-9-58 you attended a meeting of

Eastern Indian Refugee Council held at the Refugee

office

at 6 Murlidhar

Sen Lane and vilified Prime

Minister of India for his allegedly turning a deaf ear

to the untold miseries of the refugees and while

referring to

the recent agreement between the

Prime

Ministers of India and Pakistan you vented feelings

of violence against the Prime Minister of India by

emphasising that in order to save the refugees and

the territories of the Indian Union, Sri Nehru should

be murdered,

if necessary and so the need of another

Nathuram Godse was felt

now.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 415

2. That in course of discussion with members of

your party on 17-9-58 at 6, Murlidhar Sen Lane, you

stated that the Indian Prime Minister had made a

Present of certain Indian enclaves to Pakistan in

pursuance

of the policy of appeasement which has

been initiated

by the Late Mahatma Gandhi and

called upon the members to build up strong

move­

ment against the implementation of Nehru-Noon

Pact. You also tried to rouse passions by alleging

that the Indian Prime Minister had no sympathy

for West Bengal.

3.

That on 26-9-58 you attended another meeting

of the South Durtolla Branch of the Jana Sangha at

Jatin Mitter

Park, where you denounced the afore­

said agreement between the two Prime Ministers-and

stressed the need of forming a militia with the

youths of the count.ry for the safety of the people

living in border areas

and urged all to enrol

them­

selves for the said purpose.

4. That you intend to proceed to Delhi on 9-10-58

and that you are likely to instigate plans which may

adversely affect

the personal security of the

Prime

Minister of India.

Your action above is bound to result in the main.

tenance

of public order being prejudicially affected.

You

are hereby informed that you may make a

representation to

the State Government against the

detention order and that such representation should

be addressed

to the Assistant

Secy. Home (Special)

Department, Government of West Bengal, and for­

warded through the Supt. of the Jail in which you

are detained as early as possible.

You

are also informed that u/s

10 of the P.D. Act

1950 (IV of 1950) the Advisory Board shall, if you

desire

to be heard hear you in person and that if

you desire to be so heard by the Advisory Board you

should intimate such desire in your representation

to

the State Government.

Sd/-Illegible,

Commissioner of Police, Calcutta."

r959

N aresh Chandra

Ganguli

v.

The State of

West Bengal

and Others

Sinha].

z959

N11resh Chandra

Ganguli

v.

Th• SlaJ• of

West Bengal

ond Others

416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]

On or about October 11, 1958, the petitioner was

served with another order which is in these terms :

"Government of West Bengal.

Home Department, Special Section.

Order

Calcutta, 11-10-58.

No. 1882 H. S.

In exercise of the power conferred by Section 3(2)

of the· Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (IV of 1950),

the Governor is pleased to approve order No. 83

dated the 7-10-58 made under Section 3(2) of the

said Act by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta

directing

that

Sri Ram Prasad Das son of Late

Bepin.Behari Das of6, lVIurlidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta

be detained.

By

order of the Governor.

Sd/-Illegible

Dy. Secty. to

the Govt. of West

Bengal."

The petitioner made a representation in writing

against the order of detention aforesaid, denying and

refuting the grounds of his detention, set out above.

He

particularly denied the allegation contained in

ground .No. 1 aforesaid, as totally false, and stated

that there was no meeting, as alleged, on September 13,

1958,

and that he had not made any speech

attri­

buted to him in the said ground. He also denied that

he had advocated in any meeting for the formation of a

militia,

as alleged. But he claimed that he had a right

to express his views about the policy of the

Govern­

ment or the Prime Minister, relating to Pakistan and/

or about Nehru-Noon Pact or similar other Agreements.

He denied that he indulged in any violent speeches, or

that he tried to rouse passions. His further contention

was

that the ground

No. 4 was extremely vague in the

absence of any particulars about how, where and when

and in what manner, he was likely to instigate any

plan which was to adversely affect the personal

security

of the Prime Minister of India, and the nature

or particulars of any such contemplated plan.

In his application to the High Court, the petitioner

also submitted

that the grounds supplied to him, had

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 417

no rational connection with the objects mentioned in

s. 3 of the Act, and that, therefore, he was deprived

of his right to make an effective representation. He

also alleged that he was a member of a political party

opposed to the party in power, and held definitely

pronounced views about

the failure of the Government

to tackle the problem of refugees, as also about the

relationship between the Government

aIJ.d the State of

Pakistan. He also claimed to be a leader of the

refugees, and as such, had been relentlessly criticising

the policies of the present Government. He further

asserted

that the order of detention passed against

him, was a clear case

of political victimisation. He

alleged further that the order of detention, on the face

of it, was mala fide, and was a clear infringement of

his fundamental right to freedom of speech and

asso­

ciation, guaranteed by the Constitution.

On November 28, 1958, the petitioner was brought

to the Writers' Buildings in Calcutta, and placed before

the Advisory Board as constituted under the Act. The

petitioner was heard in person

by the Advisory Board

on

that date, and on the next day, that is, November

29, 1958,

after the hearing by the Advisory Board,

another order, being order No. 1967 H. S., dated

November 29, 1958, made

by the Governor of West

Bengal, was issued, confirming

the aforesaid

order of

detention No. 83 dated October 7, 1958, set out above,

and continuing the petitioner's detention till the expira­

tion of 12 months from the date of detention. On

those allegations, the petitioner submitted to the High

Court that the orders aforesaid, relating to his detention

in

the Dum Dum

Central Jail, were "illegal, invalid,

ultra Vires, void and inoperative."

An affidavit in opposition, on behalf of the State

of West Bengal and other opposite parties, was sworn

to by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta-opposite

party No. 3 in the case. In the aforesaid affidavit,

the deponent averrred that he was satisfied on the

records and materials placed before him that the

petitioner was a person likely to act in a manner

prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and

that with a view to preventing him from doing so, it

s~

I959

N aresh Chandra

Ganguli

v.

The State of

West Bengal

and Others

Sinha].

'959

N aresh Chandra

GanguH

v.

The State of

West Bengal

and Olhers

Sinha].

418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]

was necessary to make the order of detention on the

grounds mentioned in the Order No. 85 dated October

8,

19.58 (set out above). He also averred that the orders

of detention aforesaid, together with the grounds and

all other relevant particulars, were reported by him to

the Government of West Bengal, which, after duly

considering the same, duly approved of the orders of

detention. It was also stated in the affidavit that the

petitioner personally .appeared before the Advisory

Board on November 28, 1958, and the Advisory Board,

upon a consideration of the records and materials

placed before it,

and the representation made by the

petitioner, and after hearing the petitioner in person,

reported

to the Government of West Bengal that in

the opinion of the Advisory Board, there was sufficient

cause for the detention of the petitioner. The Com­

missioner of Police further stated in the affidavit that

he had duly passed and signed the orders of detention

after considering the records and materials in respect

of the petitioner, in exercise of the powers conferred

under the Act, bona.fide and without any malice what­

soever, on being satisfied about the necessity of the

said orders of detention. He also stated that he denied

all

statements of facts to the contrary, contained in

the affidavit in support of the petition, and he

under­

took to produce the original records in the Court at

the hearing. Allegations of victimisation on political

grounds,

and that the. order of detention was

mala fide

a:ti.d in infringement of the fundamental rights of the

petitioner, were specifically denied.

The matter was heard by a Division Bench of the

Calcutta High Court (Guha Roy and H.K. Sen, JJ.),

which, by its order dated January 8, 1958, discharged

the Rule. In the course of its judgment, the High

Court made the following observations :-

"On a reading of the order however, it is quite

clear

to us that paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 do not

state the grounds of the order. There is only one

ground of the order and that is that the petitioner

was acting in

a manner prejudicial to the mainte­

nance of public order and the remaining paragraphs

of the order make it quite clear that what are stated

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS 419

in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 constitute different pieces

of evidence by which the authority making the

order came to the conclusion that the petitioner was

acting

in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance

of public order and therefore should be detained

under the

Act."

Hence, the High Court, on a construction of s. 3 of the

Act, came to the conclusion that the grounds of deten­

tion in respect of the petitioner, were not vague, and

that the statement in para. 4 of the detention order

No. 85 dated October 8, 1958, quoted above, was not

a ground but only a piece of evidence out of several

such pieces

of evidence on which the ground of

deten­

tion was based. It was further pointed out that

para. 4 aforesaid, was not by itself a ground of the

order, but merely an inference of fact which had some

bearing on

the ground of the order. The High

Court

also pointed out that there was no ambiguity in the

recitals, including these in para. 4 aforesaid. In that

view of the matter, the order of detention of the peti­

'tioner was upheld, and the Court further held that the

question whether the whole order was bad on the

ground that one of th~ grounds was too vague, did not

a.rise in the case.

The petitioner moved

the Calcutta High

Court for a

certificate

that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court. The Chief Justice of the High Court, delivering

the order of the Division Bench of that Court, granting

the necessary certificate, observed that the view of the

High Court that para. 4 aforesaid, was not a ground

of detention but only one of the items of evidence in

support of the ground, raised a serious question to be

determined

by this

Court, particularly because a view

contrary to the one taken by the High Court in the

instant case, appeared to have been taken by this Court

and by the Calcutta High Court itself in a number of

decisions. That is how this appeal has come to this

Court. Besides preferring the aforesaid appeal, the

petitioner moved this Court under Art. 32 of the

Constitution, praying for a writ in the nature of habeas

corpus, and a Constitution Bench, by its order dated

April 20, 1959, directed

that this appeal be posted for

I959

Nares

Ii Chandra

Ganguli

v.

The

Stale of

West Bengal

and Othe..1

Sinha].

z959

N aresh Chandra

Ganguli

v.

The State of

Wesl Bengal

and Ot!ie,.s

Sinha.].

420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]

hearing by a Constitution Bench, on May 11, 1959, on

a cyclostyled paper book, and that the filing of the

petition of appeal and the statements of cases be dis­

pensed with. The Court further ordered that the

application under Art. 32 of the Constitution, be

posted for hearing immediately

after the criminal

appeal.

That is how both the matters have been

placed one

after the other for hearing before us.

The order under appeal takes the view

that the

various grounds of detention, are stated in s. 3 (l)(a)

(i) (ii) (iii) and (b) of the Act, and that there can be no

grounds apart from those. The High Court then, on

a reading of the Order No. 85, set out above, has held

that paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are not the grounds of

detention, as contemplated by s. 3 of the Act, but that

they only constitute different pieces of evidence by

which the authority making the order came to the

conclusion that the petitioner was acting in a manner

prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, which

was

the only ground on which the order of detention

in question was founded. The High

Court was right

in its literal construction of the order impugned in

this case, which proceeds to recite the four numbered

paragraphs, preceded by the introductory clause "as

evidenced by the particulars given below." But the

case of The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar

Vaidya('),

has laid it down that cl. (5) of Art. 22 of

the Constitution, confers two distinct though

inter­

related rights on the petitioner, namely, (I) the right

to be informed of the grounds on which the order of

detention has been made, and (2) the right to be en­

abled, at the earliest opportunity, to make a represen­

tation against the order. This Court further pointed

out in that case, that the grounds which have a ratio­

nal connection with the objects mentioned in s. 3,

have to be supplied. As soon as that is done, the first

condition

of a valid detention is complied with. The

second condition of such a detention is fulfilled only

after the detenu has been supplied with such

inform­

ation as will enable him to make a representation.

If the information supplied in order to enable a detenu

(1) (1951) S.C.R. 167.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 421

to make a represention, rloes not contain sufficient

particulars,

the detenu is entitled to ask for further

particulars which

will enable him to make a represen­

tation. Therefore,

if there is an infringement of either

of the two rights, and any one of the two conditions

precedent to a valid detention,

as aforesaid, has not

been fulfilled, the detenu has a right to approach this

Court for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. In

other words, the grounds for making an order of

detention, which have to be communicated to the

detenu as soon as practicable, are conclusions of facts,

and are not a complete recital of all the relevant facts.

Therefore,

the grounds, that is to say, those conclu­

sions

of facts, must be in existence when the order of

detention is made, and those conclusions of facts have

to be communicated to the detenu as soon as may be.

This

Court, and naturally, the High. Courts, have

treated the recitals in the orders of detention, with

particular reference to the several clauses and sub-clau­

ses

of s. 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act, as stating the

object to be

achieved in making the order of detention.

The order of detention may also contain recitals of

facts

upon which it is based. If the order of deten­

tion also contains the recitals of facts upon which it is

founded,

no further question arises, but if it does not

contain the recitals of facts which form the basis of

the conclusions of fact, justifying the order of deten­

tion,

then, as soon as may be (now, under s. 7, within

a

maximum period of five days from the date of

detention), the person detained has to be informed of

those facts which are the basic facts or the reasons on

which

the order of detention has been made.

Section

3 of the Act requires the authority making ~n order

of detention, to state the fact of its satisfaction that it

is necessary to make the order of detention of a parti­

cular person,

with a view to preventing him from

acting

in a manner prejudicial to one or more of the

objects contained in clauses and sub-clauses of s. 3 (1)

(a) and (b) of the Act.

Section 7 requires that the

person detained should be communicated the grbunds

on which

the order of detention has been made, so

as

to afford him the earliest opportunity to make a

z959

N aresh Chandra

Ganguli

v.

The Stale of

West Bengal

and Others

Sinha].

z959

N aresh Chandra

Ganguli

v.

The State of

West Bengal

and Others

-,

Sinha].

422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(U)

representation against the order, to the appropriate

Government. The statement of facts contemplated

by s. 7, would, thus, constitute the grounds, and not

the matters contained in one or more of the clauses

and sub-clauses under s. 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act.

Section 3 also requires that when an order of detention

has been made,

the

State Government concerned has

to be apprised of the order of detention as also of the

grounds on which the order of detention has been

made, together with such

other particulars as have

a

bearing on the order and the grounds. And finally,

after the order has been approved by the State

Government, that Government, in its turn, has to

report to the Central Government the fact of the

detention, together with the grounds on which the

order of detention had been made ; and such other

particulars as, in the opinion of the State Govern­

ment, have a bearing on the necessity for the order.

Thus,

on

a consideration of the provisioi:is of ss. 3 and

7 of the Act, it may be observed that the detenu

has

to be served with

a copy of the order passed by the

authority contemplated by sub-s. (2) of s. 3, containing,

firstly, recitals

in terms of one or more of the

sub­

clauses of cl. (a) and (b) of s. 3(1), which we may call

the 'preamble', and secondly, the grounds contem­

plated by s. 7, namely, the conclusions of fact which

have led to the passing of the order of detention,

informing

the detenu as to why he was being

detained.

If the grounds do not contain all the

particulars necessary for enabling the detenu to make

his representation against the order of his detention,

he

may ask for further particulars of the facts,

an<;i

the authority which passed the order of detention is

expected

to furnish all that information, subject, of

course, to the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 7 ; that is to say, the person detained shall not be entitled to the

disclosure of such facts as the authority making the

order, considers against public interest to disclose.

Thus,

the order of detention to be served upon the persol'I. detained would usually consist of the first two

parts, namely, the preamble and the grounds, but it

may also consist of the third part, namely, the

---

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 423

particulars, if and when they are required or found to be

necessary.

But it has to be noted that the particulars

referred

to in sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 3, would not be

identical with

the particulars which we have called the

third part of the order. The

State Government, as also

the Central Government, would, naturally, be placed

in possession of all the relevant facts and particulars

on which the order of detention has been passed. But

those particulars may ·contain such details of facts as

may not be communicated, in public interest, to the

person detained.

From what has been said above, it is clear that the

High Court was in error in so far as it treated what we

have called 'the preamble' as the grounds of detention

contemplated

by s. 7 of the Act. But this error, as

will presently appear, has not affected the legality,

propriety or correctness

of the order passed by the

High Court in the habeas corpus proceedings before it.

The High Court, as already indicated, after making

those observations which we have held

to be erroneous,

proceeded further

to say that there was no ambiguity

in

the recitals of facts, as the High Court characterised

them and which we have called the grounds.

The contention raised before

the High Court has

been repeated before us,

that the grounds contained in

para. 4, are vague

and indefinite, not enabling the

person detained to make his representation. It will

appear from

the paragraph aforesaid that the peti­

tioner intended

to proceed to Delhi on

October 9, 1958,

with a view to instigating plans against the personal

security

of the Prime Minister. It is clear that the

place, date and purpose of the planned nefarious

activity, have all been stated as clearly as could be

expected.

But it was argued that it was also necessary

to state the details of the plan to be hatched in Delhi.

There

are several answers to this contention. Para­

graph 4 has reference to something which was appre­

hended

but lay in the womb of the future. From the

nature of the fact that it was not an event which had

already.happened but what was apprehended to be in

the contemplation of the detenu and his associates, if

any, no .further details of the plan

could possibly be

I959

N aresh Chandra

Ganguli

v. The Slate of

West Bengal

and Others

Sinha].

I959

N aresh Chandra

Ganguli

v.

The Slate of

West Bengal

and Othets

Sinha].

424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]

disclosed. As was observed in

the decision of this

Coul'.t in The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar

Vaidya(') (at pp. 184 and 185), vagueness is a.

relative term. Its meaning must vary with the facts and

circumstances of each case. What may be said to be

vague in one case,

may not be so in another, and it

could not be asserted as a general rule that a ground is

necessarily vague

if the only answer of the detained

person can be to deny it.

If the statement of facts is

capable

of being clearly understood and is sufficiently

definite

to enable the detained person to make his

representation,

it cannot be said that it is vague.

Further, it cannot be denied that particulars of what

has taken place, can be more definitely stated than

those of events which are yet in the offing. In the very

nature of things, the main object of the Act is to

prevent persons from doing something which comes

within

the purview of any one of the sub-clauses of

cl. (a) of s. 3(1) of.the Act.

It was next contended that some of the grounds at

least are irrelevant. This was not said of the first

paragraph of the grounds, set out above. It was said of

paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 that they are irrelevant to the

main object of the order of detention, namely, the

"maintenance of public order" In our opinion, there

is no substance in this contention either. All the

statements in the four paragraphs of the grounds,

which

have to be read together as being parts of a

connected whole, calling upon persons

to

"build up

strong movement against the implementation of

Nehru-Noon Pact", and to "rouse passions by alleging

that the Indian Prime Minister had no sympathy for

West Bengal", cannot be said to be wholly unconnected

with the maintenance of public order. Similarly,

denouncing

the agreement between the two

Prime

Ministers and stressing the need of forming a militia

with the youths of the country, cannot be said to have

no repercussions on the maintenance 'of public order.

And lastly, any instigation against the personal

safety

of the

Prime Minister of India cannot but have

a deleterious effect on the maintenance of public ordt>r.

(r) (r95r) S.C.R. r67.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 425

It was sought to be argued that any weak link in

the chain of facts and circumstances, said to have been

the basis of the order of detention, would affect the

legality of the whole order. This argument postulates

that there are many grounds which are either vague or

irrelevant. In this connection, particular reliance was

placed on

the observations of this

Court in Dwarka

Dass Bhatia

v. The

State of Jammu and Kashmir (1),

to the effect that if some of the reasons on which the

order of detention had been based, are found to be

non-existent

or irrelevant, the

Court ought to quash

the order, because it is not in a position to know which

of the reasons or the grounds, had operated on the

mind of the authorities 'Concerned, when they decided

the pass the impugned order. As already pointed out,

no such situation arises in this case, because, in our

opinion, none

of the grounds is either vague or

irrelev­

ant. It may also be pointed out that the ground of

irrelevance was not urged before the High Ofrurt, but

even so, we allowed the petitioner's counsel to urge

that ground before us, and having heard him on that

aspect of the matter, we have no doubt that there is

no justification for

the contention that any of the

matters taken into consideration by the authorities

concerned in

the matter of the detention of the

peti­

tioner, was irrelevant.

For the :ceasons given above, it must be held that

there is no merit in this appeal or in the application

under Art. 32

of the Constitution. They

a.re, accord­

ingly, dismissed.

Appeal and applicatian dismissed.

(1) (1956) S.C.R. 948.

54

I959

N aresh Chandra

Ganguli

v.

The Stall of

West Ben1al

and Others

Sinha].