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A.F.R.
Court No. - 44
Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 6351 of 2007
Appellant :- Naresh Chandra
Respondent :- State of U.P.
Counsel for Appellant :- R.P.S. Chauhan,Narendra Kumar,Rabindra
Bahadur Singh,Shahabuddin
Counsel for Respondent :- Govt. Advocate
Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker,J.
Hon'ble Nalin Kumar Srivastava,J.
(By Nalin Kumar Srivastava, J.)
1.This criminal appeal has been preferred by the
appellant against the judgement and order dated
13.09.2007 passed by the Additional District & Sessions
Judge, Court No.9, Moradabad in Session Trial No.127
of 2004 (State vs. Naresh Chandra) (case crime no. 211
of 2003) convicting and sentencing the appellant for the
offence punishable under Section 302 IPC to undergo
life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- with
stipulation of default clause.
2.Brief facts of the case, as unfolded by the
informant Shyam Lal son of Daulat in the First
Information Report (in short 'F.I.R.'), are that on
9.10.2003 at about 9.30 a.m. while the informant
alongwith his son Natthu and daughter-in-law
Shakuntala was standing at Sirswan crossing in village
Manpur in front of Stall (khokha) of Pandit Ji, Naresh,
son of his brother Masih Charan, suddenly came from
behind the Stall and catching the hair bun of
Shakuntala, stabbed with knife many times on her body
due to which she fell down on another side of the road.
The son of the informant made noise but no one
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turned-up to save her. When the informant rushed
towards the Chauki Manpur situated nearby, he saw one
Inspector and two Sepoy coming there. Having seen the
policemen, Naresh ran away at once towards the Vidhya
Niketan School but the policemen caught him alongwith
the knife. Recovery memo Ext. A-4 was prepared and,
thereafter, informant took away injured Shakuntala to
hospital where she was declared dead. The dead body
of deceased was sent to Manpur Chauki and accused
Naresh was also brought to the Police Station
concerned.
3.On the basis of the written report (Ext. ka-1)
scribed by one Rajveer Singh, chik First Information
Report (Ext. Ka-5) was registered at Police Station
concerned on 9.10.2003 at 12.10 p.m. mentioning all
the details as described in Ext. Ka-.1. G.D. entry was
also made at the same time, which is Ext. Ka-6.
4. Investigation was entrusted to sub-Inspector
Sanjiv Kumar (PW-7). He inspected the spot and
prepared site plan - Ext. ka-7. He also prepared the
inquest report of the deceased (Ext. ka-8) and papers
relating to post mortem Ext. A-9 to Ext. A-14. The
Investigating Officer also took the sample of plain earth
and bloodstained earth from the place of occurrence
and prepared the memo Ext. ka-15.
5.Autopsy report (Ext. ka-19) was prepared by Dr.
Allauddin Saifi after performing the post mortem of the
deceased on 10.10.2003 at 2.00 p.m. On examination
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of the dead body of the deceased, following ante-
mortem injuries were found:
“i.A stabbed wound 3.0 x 2.0 cms. x cavity deep in left
axilla.
ii.A stabbed wound 3.5 x 2.5 cms. x muscle deep on
anterior surface of left arm 4.0 cms below top of shoulder
(Not exposed).
iii.Multiple abrasion in an area 20 x 6.0 cms. on posterior
lateral surface of left arm with elbow
iv.An abrasion 6.0 x 4.0 cms. on left side of back of
chest 8.0 cms. below left shoulder.”
6.In the opinion of the doctor, death was caused due
to haemorrhage and shock as a result of ante-mortem
injuries.
7.After completing the investigation, charge-sheet
(Ext. ka-16) against the appellant was filed. Concerned
Magistrate took the cognizance. The case being
exclusively triable by sessions court, was committed to
the Court of sessions.
8.Appellant appeared before the trial court and
charge under Section 302 IPC was framed against
him. He denied the charge and claimed his trial.
9.Trial proceeded and in order to prove its case
prosecution has examined in all seven witnesses,
namely, PW-1 Shyam Lal (informant), PW-2 Natthu
(eye witness), PW-3 Dr. Alauddin, PW-4 Sub-Inspector
Anil Kumar Yadav (eye witness), PW-5 Constable
Shyam Singh (eye witness), PW-6 H.C.P. Khem Singh
(scribe of F.I.R.) and PW-7 Sub-Inspector Sanjiv Kumar,
the Investigating Officer.
The following documents were exhibited :
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10.Written report Ext. A-1, Recovery and arresting
memo Ext. A-2, Ext. A-3 and Ext. A-4, F.I.R. Ext. A-5,
G.D. Ext. A-6, site plan - Ext. A-7, inquest report Ext.
A-8, photo lash Ext. A-9, paper No.33 Ext. A-10, challan
lash Ext. A-11, letter to R.I. Ext. A-12, letter to C.M.O.
Ext. A-13, sample seal Ext. A-14, seizure memo of plain
and bloodstained soil Ext. A-15, charge sheet Ext. A-16,
Analysis report from Forensic Science Laboratory Ext.
A-17 and Ext. A-18, Autopsy report Ext. A-19.
11. After closure of evidence, incriminating materials
appearing in the prosecution evidence were put to the
appellant in his statement under Section 313 CrPC. He
denied all the incriminating evidence including the
alleged recovery of knife by claiming it to be false and
bogus and also claimed false implication due to enmity.
12.Appellant in his defence has examined DW-1
Shomit Kumar, DW-2 Dal Chandra, DW-3 Narendra
Sharma and DW-4 Constable Brajmohan Rana. DW-4
has proved the copy of G.D. as Ext. kha-1.
Evidence led by the Prosecution :
13.PW-1 Shyam Lal is the informant and eye witness
of the occurrence. In his examination in chief he has
stated that he reached the spot after receiving the
information of murder and he did not see as to who has
murdered the deceased. No one even told him the
name of the accused. In his deposition he has proved
the written report as Ext. A-1 and has stated that he
had dictated the report to Rajveer Singh and
whatsoever he has stated the same was written in the
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report. He has also stated that on his report F.I.R. was
lodged. The witness was declared hostile by the
prosecution and in his cross examination he denied so
many contents of the written report Ext. ka-1. On the
recovery memo of murder weapon ‘knife’ he has
identified his thumb impression which has been
exhibited as Ext. A-2 but he has deposed that his
thumb impression was taken on a blank paper by the
police. When the witness was cross-examined by the
defence, he has stated that since he was not in a fit
mental condition, he could not understand as to what
was written in the Tehrir and the villagers had dictated
the report to Rajveer Singh.
14.PW-2, minor son of the informant, is also said to
be the eye witness of the occurrence. He is also a
hostile witness and has categorically stated that at the
time of occurrence he was not present over there and
he does not know as to who murdered the deceased.
He has also shown his ignorance about the presence of
his father Shyam Lal on the spot. In his cross-
examination the witness has identified his signature
over the recovery memo and Ext. A-3 has been marked
over it but he has denied his statement under Section
161 CrPC given to the Investigating Officer. This witness
has also stated that his signature was obtained on a
blank paper at the Police Chauki, Manpur. Accused
Naresh was not arrested before him and no knife was
recovered from the accused before him.
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15.PW-3 Dr. Alauddin Saifi has performed the autopsy
of deceased and has proved the autopsy report as Ext.
A-19.
16.PW-4 S.I. Anil Kumar Yadav is said to be present
over the place of occurrence at the time of crime. He
has stated in his examination in-chief that on 9.10.2003
about 9.30 a.m. while coming to P.S. Bhagatpur from
Chauki Manpur alongwith Constable Shyam Singh and
Constable Brijesh Kumar Tyagi, he saw from a distance
of 50 yards (gaj) that at Sirswan Mod one person was
stabbing a lady with knife and other person and a boy
were shouting to save her. The aggressor fled towards
Tanda but the policemen chased and caught him in
front of Vidhya Niketan College at about 9.45 a.m., with
a knife in his right hand. He was arrested on the spot.
Murder weapon ‘knife’ was also taken into possession
by the police and seizure memo Ext. A-4 was prepared
on the spot. This witness has also proved the murder
weapon ‘knife’ as Material Ext.-1. In his cross-
examination PW-4 has stated that he did not give any
information to Tanda Police and he brought the
deceased alongwith the accused to the Hospital.
Deceased at that time was alive.
17.PW-5 Shyam Singh is also said to be the eye
witness of the occurrence. In his deposition he has
corroborated the evidence of PW-4 and has proved the
factum of arrest of accused as well as recovery of
murder weapon from his possession. He, claiming
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himself to be the eye witness of the occurrence, has
identified his signature over recovery memo Ext. A-1.
18.PW-6 Head Constable Khem Singh is the scribe of
the F.I.R. and has proved the chik F.I.R. and G.D. Rapat
No. 24 at 12.10 p.m. as Ext. A-5 and Ext. A-6
respectively. In his cross-examination he has deposed
that the scribe of report Rajveer Singh did not come to
the police station alongwith the complainant.
19.PW-7 Sub-Inspector Sanjiv Kumar, the
Investigating Officer of the case, has proved the
proceedings of investigation in his examination-in-chief
and also proved the site plan – Ext. A-7. Inquest of the
body of the deceased has been performed by this
witness and papers relating to the post mortem have
also been prepared by him. He has proved the inquest
report, photo nash, Form No. 33, challan nash, letter
to R.I., letter to C.M.O. and specimen seal as Ext. A-8
to A-14 respectively in his evidence. He has also
collected the bloodstained and plain soil from the place
of occurrence and its seizure memo Ext. A-15 has also
been proved by him. In his cross-examination he has
stated that as per the memo, the deceased was taken
to the hospital by her father in-law Shyam Lal and his
companions but the police had not accompanied the
informant Shyam Lal, according to the memo. He has
also narrated that in the memo the doctor has endorsed
that the stabbing was caused by an unknown person.
Evidence led by the Defence :
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20.DW-1 Shomit Kumar, DW-2 Dal Chandra and DW-3
Narendra Sharma, the witnesses produced by the
accused, have stated in their deposition that at the time
of occurrence they were present on the spot and had
seen an unknown person stabbing a lady and accused
Naresh Chandra was not present over there at that
time. They have also stated that they know the accused
very well and they were present at their respective
shops at the time and place of occurrence.
21.DW-4 Constable Brajmohan Rana has deposed
that on 9.10.2003 at 10.00 a.m. sweeper Awadhesh
working at C.H.C. Tanda had given a memo to him at
the police station bearing seal of C.H.C. Tanda and
signature of doctor, which was entered by him in G.D.
Rapat No.17 at 11.00 a.m.. The information was sent to
police station Bhagat Pur, District Moradabad through
wireless. DW-4 has proved the carbon copy of the G.D.
as Ext. kha-1.
22.On the basis of aforesaid evidence, learned trial
court came to the conclusion that the prosecution has
succeeded to establish the guilt against the accused
person on the basis of cogent, consistent and reliable
evidence and charge against accused was proved
beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly conviction
order was passed.
23.Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the
impugned judgment and order on various grounds. It
has been argued that prosecution version rests upon
the ocular testimony of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4.
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PW-1 and PW-2 are hostile witnesses and do not
support the prosecution version at all. PW-3 and PW-4
are the police officials, who are the chance witnesses
and their presence over the place of occurrence is not
proved by any cogent evidence. No independent
witness has been examined by the prosecution in
support of its case. It has also been submitted that the
place of occurrence is doubtful and there is no clinching
evidence as to fact that the alleged occurrence
happened at the same place as the prosecution claims.
It has further been argued that the accused had no
motive to kill the deceased. It has further been
submitted that medical evidence does not corroborate
the ocular version. It has also been submitted that the
learned trial court has illegally relied upon the
statement of accused given to the Investigating Officer
during the course of investigation and in arbitrary and
illegal manner has passed the conviction order on the
basis thereof.
24.Per contra, learned AGA appearing for the State
respondent has vehemently argued that the prosecution
case was proved on the basis of cogent and reliable
evidence. There is no merit in the appeal and the
appeal is liable to be dismissed.
25.We have carefully gone through the record and
have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival
contentions of the parties.
26.Place of occurrence has always been an essential
part of the prosecution story, which is necessary to be
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proved by prosecution by cogent evidence in order to
succeed.
27.Reliance has been placed upon Syed Ibrahim vs.
State of Andhra Pradesh, JT 2006 (6) SC 597 where it
has been expressly held that it would not be proper to
accept the prosecution case when the place of
occurrence itself has not been established. Also in Asraf
Biswas vs. The State of West Bengal, 2016 SCC OnLine
Cal. 4342 which was relied upon by the learned
counsel for the appellant, it was found from the
evidence on record that the place of occurrence was not
proved beyond all reasonable doubts. The Calcutta High
Court held that “Once it is held that the place of
occurrence has not been established beyond all
reasonable doubts, then the other circumstances are
hardly sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused”.
28.In light of the aforesaid observations, the learned
counsel for the appellant has pointed-out that in the
present matter the place of occurrence is highly
suspicious and from the evidence on record a genuine
doubt arises in respect of the certainty of the place of
occurrence. He has submitted that in the F.I.R. (Ext. A-
5) place of occurrence is mentioned at Sirsawa Tiraha,
Village Manpur, P.S. Bhagat Pur, District Moradabad. In
the written report Ext. A-1 it has been mentioned that
at the time of occurrence, informant alongwith his son
and daughter-in-law, was standing in front of Khokha of
Pandit Ji at Sirsawa Tiraha, Village Manpur and that was
the place where the incident occurred. It has also been
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mentioned in Ext. A-1 that when the accused tried to
escape towards Vidhya Niketan School, two policemen
caught him.
29.Learned counsel for the appellant, referring to the
written report Ext. A-1 has submitted that after the
occurrence informant immediately rushed towards
Police Chauki, Manpur but in the site plan (Ext. A-7)
this fact has not been shown. It has also been
submitted that place of occurrence has not been proved
by the so called eye witnesses of the incident, namely,
PW-1 and PW-2.
30.We made a close scrutiny of the oral and
documentary evidence on record in view of the
aforesaid submissions made by the learned counsel for
the appellant.
31.PW-1 and PW-2 have been declared hostile and
have stated that they were not present on the spot at
the time of occurrence. What is the value of their
evidence as hostile witness will be evaluated later on in
this judgment but so far as the place of occurrence is
concerned PW-1 in the opening part of his deposition
has clearly stated that occurrence happened at Manpur
Tiraha.
32.PW-4 and PW-5 are the two policemen, who
happened to be present on the spot when crime was
being committed by the accused and they are the
persons who caught the accused with the murder
weapon. PW-4 has clearly stated that he had seen one
person stabbing a woman by knife at Sirawa Turn (Mod)
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and when he tried to escape and ran away towards
Tanda, he and his associate policeman chased and
caught him in front of Vidhya Niketan College alongwith
knife. PW-5, who was accompanying PW-4 at the time
of occurrence, has also narrated the same facts in his
statement.
33.PW-7 the Investigating Officer has proved the site
plan Ext. A-7 in his deposition. It is pertinent to
mention that nothing adverse has been stated by this
witness in his cross-examination on the point of place of
occurrence.
34.A perusal of the site plan Ext. A-7 reveals that the
Khokha (small shop), where the informant was said to
be standing alongwith his son and deceased, is situated
at Tiraha and at the same place the accused assaulted
the deceased and she fell down. Accused ran away
towards Vidhya Niketan College trying to escape but
policemen, who were coming from Chauki Manpur, saw
the incident and grabbed him in front of Vidhya Niketan
College. All this topography has been shown in clear
terms in Ext. A-7 with specific points and in this way
the place of occurrence as mentioned in Ext. A-1 and
Ext. A-5 finds support from the oral evidence as well as
from the site plan Ext. A-7. Learned AGA has also
pointed out that seizure memo of plain and
bloodstained soil has been proved as Ext. A-15 by PW-7
the Investigating Officer, as PW-7 has deposed that
from the place of occurrence he had collected it and
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thus the place of occurrence is fixed with the aid of
Ext. A-15 also.
35.We, therefore, do not find any force in the
contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant
regarding the fixation of place of occurrence.
36.The prosecution has a definite case that the
deceased was assaulted with knife by the accused and,
therefore, it is very significant to search out from the
evidence on record whether the death of the deceased
was caused by use of knife or not. Learned counsel for
the appellant has vehemently argued that the medical
evidence on this point does not support the prosecution
version and at this juncture the whole prosecution story
fails.
37.The post mortem report is on record, which has
been proved by the Dr. Alauddin Saifi – PW-3. PW-3
while proving the autopsy report Ext. A-2 has clearly
and in specific terms stated that death of the deceased
was caused due to haemorrhage and shock and injury
no. 1 and 2 may have been inflicted by knife. He has
also pointed out that death may have occurred on
9.10.2003 at 12.00 noon. It is to be reminded here that
injury no. 1 and 2 are stab wounds. PW-3 in his cross
examination has clarified that injury no. 1 and 2 were
sufficient to cause death.
38.It is noteworthy that in the inquest report Ext. A-8
the panchas have also opined that death of deceased
seems to be caused by stabbing.
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39.Learned trial court has discussed the prosecution
evidence with a view to find out whether it is in
conformity with the medical evidence or not and has
correctly opined that the prosecution version finds
corroboration with the medical evidence. Hence, we are
of the considered view that the prosecution story is fully
supported with the medical evidence and on this point
the objections raised by the learned counsel for the
appellant are proved to be futile.
40.The point, which has been most vehemently
argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that
there is no independent witness of the occurrence
except PW-1 and PW-2, who are the father-in-law and
brother-in-law of the deceased respectively. Two other
persons allegedly the eye witness of the occurrence are
the police personnels and are only the chance witnesses
and their presence on the spot is highly improbable. No
other independent witness has been examined and
more over PW-1 and PW-2 have been declared hostile
by the prosecution and they do not support the
prosecution version at all.
41.PW-1, the informant / father in-law of the
deceased, has stated in his examination in-chief that he
reached the spot after being informed regarding the
murder of his daughter-in-law. He did not see as to who
was the author of the crime. He has been declared
hostile by the prosecution. In his cross examination he,
though identifying his thumb impression on seizure
memo of knife Ext. A-2, has stated that it was a plain
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paper when his thumb impression was taken over it. He
also resiled from his statement made to the
Investigating Officer under Section 161 CrPC and has
also stated in the cross-examination that the written
report was written by Rajveer Singh on the dictation of
villagers and he never narrated this fact to Rajveer
Singh, the scribe, that this was the accused Naresh who
had assaulted his daughter in-law with knife and was
caught on the spot.
42.PW-2 was also declared hostile by the prosecution
when he stated in his examination in- chief that at the
time of occurrence he was not present over there and
he even does not know who has murdered the
deceased. He has also resiled from his statement under
Section 161 CrPC and has identified his signature as
Ext. A-3 over the seizure memo – Ext. A-2. It has also
been stated by him that his signature was obtained by
police on plain paper. He has also deposed that accused
was never arrested before him nor any recovery of knife
was made from him.
43.In an honour killing case reported as Bhagwan
Dass vs. State (NCT) of Delhi, AIR 2011 SC 1863 (C),
the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the mother of
the accused stated before the police that her son (the
accused) had told her that he had killed the deceased
but when she was confronted with this statement in
Court she resiled from her earlier statement and was
declared hostile. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that her
subsequent denial in the Court is not believable
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because she obviously had afterthoughts and wanted to
save her son (the accused) from punishment. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that “we are of the
opinion that the statement of Smt. Dhillo Devi to the
police can be taken into consideration in view of the
proviso to Section 162(1) CrPC and her subsequent
denial in Court is not believable because she obviously
had afterthoughts and wanted to save her son (the
accused) from punishment.”
44.The principle laid down in the aforesaid judgment
is clearly applicable in this case where PW-1 and PW-2,
father and brother of the accused, respectively are
trying to save the accused and with this motive they
have resiled from their statement given to the
Investigating Officer under Section 161 CrPC.
45.The law, so far as the evidentiary value of a
hostile witness is concerned, is settled. In a catena of
decisions the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this High
Court have held that the evidence of a hostile witness
would not be rejected if spoken in favour of prosecution
but it can be subjected to close scrutiny and that
portion of the evidence, which is consistent with the
case of prosecution, may be accepted. In C. Muniappan
v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567, the Hon’ble Apex
Court settled the legal position as “the evidence of a
prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely
because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile
and cross-examined him. The evidence of such
witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off
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the record altogether but the same can be accepted to
the extent their version is found to be dependable on a
careful scrutiny thereof.”
46.In State of Gujarat vs. Anirudhsing and another,
(1997)6 SCC 514, it has been held that :
“29. In view of the above settled legal position,
merely because some of the witnesses have
turned hostile, their ocular evidence recorded by
the court cannot be held to have been washed off
or unavailable to the prosecution. It is the duty of
the court to carefully analyse the evidence and
reach a conclusion whether that part of the
evidence consistent with the prosecution case, is
acceptable or not. It is the salutary duty of every
witness who has the knowledge of the
commission of crime, to assist the State in giving
evidence; unfortunately for various reasons, in
particular deterioration in law and order situation
and the principle of self-preservation, many a
witness turn hostile and in some instances even
direct witnesses are being liquidated before they
are examined by the Court……………..”
47.Virtually it is a legal duty of the Trial Judge or the
Appellate Judge to scan the evidence, test the anvil of
human conduct and reach a conclusion whether the
evidence brought on record even if the witnesses
turning hostile would be sufficient to bring home the
commission of crime. In continuity of this discussion
this fact is also to be examined whether ocular evidence
of PW-4 and PW-5 are credible of evidence or not on
the two fold tests : (i) they are police personnel, and
(ii) they are the chance witnesses.
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48.In the impugned judgment the trial court has
discussed the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 at length and
has found that according to the written report Ext. A-1
accused is the son of Masih Charan, who is the brother
of informant and PW-2 is the son of PW-1, hence,
accused is the nephew of PW-1 and cousin of PW-2. The
trial court has also found that deceased Shakuntala is
the wife of accused. On the basis of the scrutiny of
evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, the learned trial court has
come to the conclusion that PW-1 probably does not
want his nephew to be convicted for murder of the
deceased and that is why he turned hostile. It is also
noteworthy that PW-1 in his examination in-chief has
clearly stated that it was he who dictated the written
report Ext. A-1 to scribe Rajveer Singh and whatsoever
he had spoken was written over it but in his cross
examination he resiled from his earlier statement and
stated that the written report was dictated by the
villagers. Learned counsel for the appellant failed to
explain as to why the earlier statement made by PW-1
in his examination-in-chief should not be relied upon.
This makes it clear that PW-1 has deliberately trying to
hide the truth and at this juncture we find ourselves in
full agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the
learned trial court so far as the evidence of PW-1 is
concerned. Same is the position of PW-2, whose
signature finds place over the arresting and recovery
memo Ext. A-2. In his cross examination he has stated
that his signature was obtained by the police at Chauki
Manpur but according to his statement if he was not
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present on the spot, how and why he reached police
chauki, Manpur and when his signature was obtained on
Ext. A-2 has not been clarified by this witness. Hence,
this witness is also trying to hide the correct facts of the
case. In Rajesh Yadav and another vs. State of U.P.,
2022 SCC OnLine SC 150 the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held as under:
“21…………………... Once evidence is
completed, the said testimony as a whole is
meant for the court to assess and
appreciate qua a fact. Therefore, not only
the specific part in which a witness has
turned hostile but the circumstances under
which it happened can also be considered,
particularly in a situation where the chief
examination was completed and there are
circumstances indicating the reasons behind
the subsequent statement, which could be
deciphered by the court. It is well within the
powers of the court to make an
assessment, being a matter before it and
come to the correct conclusion.”
49.According to the prosecution story at the time of
occurrence PW-4 and PW-5, the police personnels, were
coming from Police Chauki, Manpur when they saw the
occurrence and caught the accused with the murder
weapon. In this way they may be termed as ‘chance
witness’. Whether a chance witness is devoid of trust and
only by levelling him as chance witness whether his
evidence can be shattered as without any foundation,
has been discussed in the judgment of State of A.P. vs.
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K. Srinivasulu Reddy and another, (2003) 12 SCC 660
wherein the Apex Court has held that :
“(13)………….In a murder trial by
describing the independent witnesses as
“chance witnesses” it cannot be implied
thereby that their evidence is suspicious
and their presence at the scene doubtful.
Murders are not committed with previous
notice to witnesses; soliciting their
presence. If murder is committed in a
dwelling house, the inmates of the house
are natural witnesses. If murder is
committed in a street, only passers-by will
be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be
brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on
the ground that they are mere “chance
witnesses”.
50.When we translate the aforesaid principle with
their application to the facts of this case, we gather an
impression that the learned trial court has rightly relied
upon the evidence of PW-4 and PW-5. It is to be noted
that for the purpose of the present case PW-4 and PW-5
shall be taken as independent witnesses. There was not
even single suggestion to these witnesses that they
had any animosity to the accused. There was no reason
why these witnesses could falsely implicate the accused
in a murder case. Learned counsel for the appellant has
vehemently argued that no Rawangi G.D. has been
produced before the Court to show that PW-4 and PW-5
were coming indeed from Police Chauki, Manpur. We do
not find any force in this contention. Mere absence of
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Rawangi G.D. on record so as to show the presence of
PW-4 and PW-5 on the spot at the time of occurrence
does not affect the prosecution case adversely. The
whole evidence of PW-4 and PW-5 is reliable and
trustworthy. They were not present on the spot as
police personnels but they are simply eye witnesses of
the occurrence. They may be dealt with for violation of
any rule to leave the Police Chauki without rawangi G.D.
but this does not make their presence on the spot
improbable, if a murder suddenly took place before
them. They have not only grabbed the accused red
handed in front of Vidhya Niketan College but also
recovered the murder weapon ‘knife’ from his
possession and arrest and seizure memo Ext. A-2 was
also prepared by PW-4. The T.I. and signatures of PW-1
and PW-2 and of the police personnels present over
there were also obtained. No material contradiction or
unnatural statement may be found in the version of
PW-4 and PW-5. They are wholly reliable witnesses of
fact and their ocular version finds support from other
evidence available on record.
51.It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Gujarat vs. Anirudhsing case (supra) that
merely because the witnesses are police officers, their
evidence cannot and must not be rejected outright as
unreliable or unworthy of acceptance. It requires to be
subjected to careful evaluation like any other witness of
occurrence.
22
52.Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us
through the evidence on record and has submitted that
no motive has been assigned to the accused to commit
the alleged crime. He has pointed out that no witness
even PW-1 and PW-2, who are said to be family
members of the deceased, no where mentioned in their
entire deposition that the accused had any enmity with
the deceased or he had any motive to kill her.
53.Although learned trial court has relied upon the
statement of accused given to the Investigating Officer
during course of investigation to determine the motive
behind the crime, yet it has been submitted by the
learned AGA that the present case rests upon the direct
evidence wherein motive has no significance. Emphasis
has been laid down upon the decisions of the Apex
Court in Bikau Pandey Vs. State of Bihar (2003) 12 SCC
616, Anil Rai Vs. State of Bihar (2001) 7 SCC 318 and
Deepak Verma Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2011)
10 SCC 129.
54.If we go through the evidence of PW-4 and PW-5,
we have no hesitation to say that both the witnesses
have given ocular evidence regarding the occurrence.
They have seen the accused stabbing the deceased and
have also caught him on the spot with murder weapon.
They are reliable and trustworthy witnesses having no
grudge or enmity with the accused. In these
circumstances, we feel that the prosecution was never
under any obligation to prove the motive in the present
case and accordingly no force is found in the plea of the
23
learned counsel for the appellant so far as the motive is
concerned.
55.The genuineness of the written report Ext. A-1 and
the F.I.R. Ext. A-5 has also been put under challenge by
the learned counsel for the appellant, who has referred
the statement of PW-1 and submitted that this witness
has given contradictory statements in his examination
in-chief and cross- examination as to whether written
report was dictated to the scribe Rajveer Singh by him
or it was dictated by the villagers. It has been pointed
out earlier that if any witness turns hostile, as PW-1
was declared, the portion of his evidence which
supports the prosecution version may be acted upon. In
his examination in-chief PW-1 has clearly stated that he
himself had dictated the written report to the scribe
Rajveer Singh. Learned counsel for the appellant was
unable to explain as to why this portion of his
examination in-chief could be rejected or overlooked.
The occurrence is said to be happened on 9.10.2003 at
9.30 a.m. and F.I.R. Ext. A-5 has been lodged on the
same day at 12.10 p.m.. It is mentioned in Ext. A-5
that the police station is at a distance of 10 kilometers
from the place of occurrence and in the evidence it has
been shown that the deceased was immediately taken
to the hospital after the occurrence to save her life but
she could not be survived and, hence, the F.I.R. is
prompt and not a result of deliberations or after
thought. PW-6, the scribe of the F.I.R., has proved chik
F.I.R. and registration G.D. as Ext. A-5 and Ext. A-6 and
there is no adversity in his testimony.
24
56.Learned AGA has drawn our attention towards the
F.S.L. report Ext. A-18, which reveals that blood clots
were found over all the materials sent to the forensic
laboratory i.e. plain and bloodstained soil, knife,
clothings of the deceased and belongings found over
her body. No doubt the F.S.L. report has also supported
the prosecution version.
57.Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently
argued that from the defence side four witnesses in all
have been examined and documentary evidence has
also been adduced but the learned trial court has
completely ignored the same and he has misinterpreted
the defence evidence. It has also been argued that the
evidence adduced by the defence also gets the same
weight as the prosecution evidence. Reliance has been
placed on a decision of the Apex Court in Munshi Prasad
vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 351.
58.Learned counsel for the appellant has referred the
evidence of DW-1, DW-2, DW-3 and DW-4.
59.DW-1 Shomit Kumar has stated that he is the
Barber and at the time of occurrence he was at his shop
when an unknown person stabbed a woman with knife
and on noise his neighbours Dal Chandra and some
other persons reached there and he escaped from
there. He is acquainted with the accused Naresh
Chandra and he was not present at the place of
occurrence. He has also stated that the police has
enquired with him. In his cross-examination he has
stated that accused Naresh comes to his shop for hair
25
cutting and he does not know his wife. On the fateful
day he had opened his shop at about 9.00 a.m. he had
heard that some person had stabbed a woman by knife
and he does not know whether the accused was caught
with knife or not.
60.DW-2 Dal Chandra has stated that he knows the
accused Naresh present in the Court. He was not
present at the time of occurrence. He has stated that
he has a shop at Sirswa Chauraha and the occurrence
took place about 3- 3 ¼ year s before at about 9.30
a.m.. One stranger had stabbed a woman on the road
by knife and when she cried, Shomit, Narendra Sharma
and he himself and several other persons scolded him
and he ran away with knife in his hand. The police had
enquired with him. In his cross-examination he has
stated that he resides outside the house of accused
Naresh but he had never seen the wife of Naresh and
he does not know the woman who got injured.
61.DW-3 Narendra Sharma has a beetle shop at
Sirsawa Chauraha. He has stated that on 9.10.2003
about 9.30 a.m. when he was present at his shop, he
saw that a male stranger stabbed a lady by knife, who
had come from the direction of village Niwad and ran
away. The occurrence was seen by Dal Chandra, Shomit
etc. and by him also. They went to the police chauki
and on their information police came over there and
brought the injured lady to the hospital. He knows the
accused Naresh, who is present in the Court but he was
not present on the date, time and place of the
26
occurrence. He has also stated that he had narrated the
entire story to the Investigating Officer. In his cross
examination he has stated that at that time there was a
huge crowd over the Chauraha.
62.Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the
real picture, which comes out from the evidence of
DW-1, DW-2 and DW-3 is that the accused was not
present at the place and time of occurrence and he is
not the guilty of the alleged offence. DW-1, DW-2 and
DW-3 are the independent witnesses and there is no
reason to disbelieve their version.
63.Learned AGA has countered by arguing that DW-1,
DW-2 and DW-3 are not the reliable witnesses and they
are telling a lie before the Court. They have stated that
the Investigating Officer had enquired from them
regarding the incident but the Investigating Officer PW-
7 no where states that he ever recorded the statement
of any of the three defences witnesses or made any
query form them. No suggestion is given to PW-7 by
the defence side that he had recorded the statement of
DW-1, DW-2 and DW-3 or enquired the matter from
them. Since the arrest of the accused by the police
personnels with the murder weapon ‘knife’ is proved by
the cogent and reliable evidence, this fact must have
been known to the defence witnesses as well but they
do not speak even a single word that the person who
had stabbed the deceased was also caught then and
there by the policemen with knife and this makes their
whole evidence unreliable and false.
27
64.DW-4 Constable Brijmohan Rana has stated that
on 9.10.2003 he was working as Constable Clerk at
Thana Tanda, Rampur and a memo was received by him
by the sweeper Awadhesh bearing seal of C.H.C., Tanda
and signature of doctor regarding death of a deceased
lady, who was admitted by her father-in-law Shyamlal.
Copy of this memo was entered by him in the general
diary Rapat No. 17 at 11.00 am.. Carbon copy of G.D.
has been proved as Ext. kha-1 by DW-4. He has also
stated that through wireless he had se nt the
information to the police station Bhagatpur, District
Moradabad but he was informed that they have already
got the information about the occurrence.
65.Learned AGA submitted that this memo Ext. kha-1
actually supports the prosecution version and shows
that immediately after reaching the hospital the doctor
sent the memo for information to the concerned police
station and hence this document also is of no help to
the appellant. We are in full agreement with the learned
AGA.
66.Learned trial court has also analysed the defence
evidence, oral and documentary, in the impugned
judgment and has correctly found it as not reliable.
67.Therefore, from the defence evidence also the
accused appellant gets no help at all.
68.Learned counsel for the appellant has also argued
that the Investigating Officer has been negligent in
performing the investigation and the investigation is
faulty. However, he could not point out any material
28
defect or irregularity in the investigation of the case.
We also feel that the investigation conducted by the
Investigating Officer in this case suffers with no
material omission or irregularity. If there are some
minor irregularities they are ignorable in the light of all
other reliable and cogent evidence produced by the
prosecution.
69.In a catena of decisions, it has been settled that
for certain defects in the investigation the accused
cannot be acquitted if the prosecution case is proved by
other cogent evidence. In C. Muniappan vs. State of
T.N. case (supra), it has been held that :
“55. There may be highly defective investigation
in a case. However, it is to be examined as to
whether there is any lapse by the IO and whether
due to such lapse any benefit should be given to
the accused. The law on this issue is well settled
that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot
be a ground for acquittal. If primacy is given to
such designed or negligent investigations or to the
omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation,
the faith and confidence of the people in the
criminal justice administration would be eroded.
Where there has been negligence on the part of
the investigating agency or omissions, etc. which
resulted in defective investigation, there is a legal
obligation on the part of the court to examine the
prosecution evidence dehors such lapses,
carefully, to find out whether the said evidence is
reliable or not and to what extent it is reliable and
as to whether such lapses affected the object of
finding out the truth. Therefore, the investigation
is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a
criminal trial. The conclusion of the trial in the
case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the
probity of investigation.”
29
70.Considering the evidence of the witnesses and
also considering the medical evidence including the post
mortem report there is no doubt left in our mind about
the guilt of the convict – appellant Naresh Chandra.
71.However, the question which falls for our
consideration is whether, on reappraisal of the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case, the conviction of
the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code should be upheld or the conviction deserves to be
converted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the
Indian Penal Code. It would be relevant to refer Section
299 of the Indian Penal Code, which reads as under:
"299. Culpable homicide: Whoever causes death
by doing an act with the intention of causing death,
or with the intention of causing such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge
that he is likely by such act to cause death,
commits the offence of culpable homicide."
72.The academic distinction between ''murder' and
''culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has
always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if
Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of
the terms used by the legislature in these sections,
allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions.
The safest way of approach to the interpretation and
application of these provisions seems to be to keep in
focus the keywords used in the various clauses of
Section 299 and 300 of I.P.Code. The following
comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the
points of distinction between the two offences.
Section 299 Section 300
30
A person commits culpable
homicide if the act by which
the death is caused is done-
Subject to certain exceptions
culpable homicide is murder is
the act by which the death is
caused is done.
INTENTION
(a) with the intention of
causing death; or
(1) with the intention of
causing death; or
(b) with the intention of
causing such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death; or
(2) with the intention of
causing such bodily injury as
the offender knows to be likely
to
cause the death of the person to
whom the harm is caused;
KNOWLEDGE KNOWLEDGE
(c) with the knowledge that the
act is likely to cause death.
(4) with the knowledge that the
act is so immediately
dangerous
that it must in all probability
cause death or such bodily
injury as is likely to cause
death, and without any excuse
for incurring the risk of causing
death or such injury as is
mentioned above.
73. From the upshot of the aforesaid discussions, it
appears that the death caused by the accused was not
premeditated, injury caused was not on the vital part of
the body, accused though had knowledge and intention
to cause bodily harm to the deceased but did not want
to do away with the deceased. Hence the instant case
falls under the Exceptions 1 and 4 to Section 300 of
31
IPC. While considering Section 299 IPC as reproduced
herein above offence committed will fall under Section
304 Part-I IPC as per the observations of the Apex
Court in Veeran and others Vs. State of M.P., (2011) 11
Supreme Court Cases 367 which have to be also kept in
mind.
74. This takes us to the alternative submission of
learned counsel for the appellant that the quantum of
sentence is too harsh and requires to be modified. In
this regard, we have to analyse the theory of
punishment prevailing in India.
75. In Mohd. Giasuddin Vs. State of AP, [AIR 1977 SC
1926], explaining rehabilitary & reformative aspects in
sentencing it has been observed by the Supreme Court:
"Crime is a pathological aberration. The
criminal can ordinarily be redeemed and
the state has to rehabilitate rather than
avenge. The sub-culture that leads to
ante-social behaviour has to be countered
not by undue cruelty but by
reculturization. Therefore, the focus of
interest in penology in the individual and
the goal is salvaging him for the society.
The infliction of harsh and savage
punishment is thus a relic of past and
regressive times. The human today vies
sentencing as a process of reshaping a
person who has deteriorated into
criminality and the modern community
has a primary stake in the rehabilitation
of the offender as a means of a social
defence. Hence a therapeutic, rather than
an 'in terrorem' outlook should prevail in
our criminal courts, since brutal
incarceration of the person merely
produces laceration of his mind. If you
are to punish a man retributively, you
32
must injure him. If you are to reform
him, you must improve him and, men are
not improved by injuries."
76. 'Proper Sentence' was explained in Deo Narain
Mandal Vs. State of UP [(2004) 7 SCC 257] by
observing that Sentence should not be either
excessively harsh or ridiculously low. While determining
the quantum of sentence, the court should bear in mind
the 'principle of proportionality'. Sentence should be
based on facts of a given case. Gravity of offence,
manner of commission of crime, age and sex of accused
should be taken into account. Discretion of Court in
awarding sentence cannot be exercised arbitrarily or
whimsically.
77. In Ravada Sasikala vs. State of A.P. AIR 2017 SC
1166, the Supreme Court referred the judgments in
Jameel vs State of UP [(2010) 12 SCC 532], Guru
Basavraj vs State of Karnatak, [(2012) 8 SCC 734],
Sumer Singh vs Surajbhan Singh, [(2014) 7 SCC 323],
State of Punjab vs Bawa Singh, [(2015) 3 SCC 441],
and Raj Bala vs State of Haryana, [(2016) 1 SCC 463]
and has reiterated that, in operating the sentencing
system, law should adopt corrective machinery or
deterrence based on factual matrix. Facts and given
circumstances in each case, nature of crime, manner in
which it was planned and committed, motive for
commission of crime, conduct of accused, nature of
weapons used and all other attending circumstances
are relevant facts which would enter into area of
33
consideration. Further, undue sympathy in sentencing
would do more harm to justice dispensations and would
undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law.
It is the duty of every court to award proper sentence
having regard to nature of offence and manner of its
commission. The supreme court further said that courts
must not only keep in view the right of victim of crime
but also society at large. While considering imposition
of appropriate punishment, the impact of crime on the
society as a whole and rule of law needs to be
balanced. The judicial trend in the country has been
towards striking a balance between reform and
punishment. The protection of society and stamping out
criminal proclivity must be the object of law which can
be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence on
criminals and wrongdoers. Law, as a tool to maintain
order and peace, should effectively meet challenges
confronting the society, as society could not long
endure and develop under serious threats of crime and
disharmony. It is therefore, necessary to avoid undue
leniency in imposition of sentence. Thus, the criminal
justice jurisprudence adopted in the country is not
retributive but reformative and corrective. At the same
time, undue harshness should also be avoided keeping
in view the reformative approach underlying in our
criminal justice system.
78.Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the
case and also keeping in view criminal jurisprudence in
our country which is reformative and corrective and not
34
retributive, this Court considers that no accused person
is incapable of being reformed and therefore, all
measures should be applied to give them an
opportunity of reformation in order to bring them in the
social stream.
79. As discussed above, 'reformative theory of
punishment' is to be adopted and for that reason, it is
necessary to impose punishment keeping in view the
'doctrine of proportionality'. It appears from perusal of
impugned judgment that sentence awarded by learned
trial court for life term is very harsh keeping in view the
entirety of facts and circumstances of the case and
gravity of offence. Hon'ble Apex Court, as discussed
above, has held that undue harshness should be
avoided taking into account the reformative approach
underlying in criminal justice system.
80.Recently in Khokan Alias Khokhan Vishwas vs.
State of Chhattisgarh, (2021) 2 Supreme Court Cases
365, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in almost similar
circumstances modified the sentence under Section 302
IPC for life imprisonment for the offence under Section
304 Part-I IPC sentencing the convict to the period
already undergone by him that was 14.5 years in that
case.
81. For the reasons recorded herein above and
following the dictum given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Khokan Alias Khokhan Vishwas case (supra), we hold
35
the accused-appellant, Naresh Chandra, guilty of
commission of offence under Section 304 Part I IPC and
sentence him to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. The
fine and default sentence is maintained. If the accused-
appellant, Naresh Chandra, is not wanted in any other
offence, he shall be set free.
82. Appeal is partly allowed, as modified above.
83. Record and proceedings be sent back to the Court
below forthwith.
Order Date :-30.09.2022
safi
(Nalin Kumar Srivastava, J.) (Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J.)
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