CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES 1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

1. CWP-18478-2015

Naresh Kumar and others

....Petitioners

Versus

Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited and others

....Respondents

2. CWP-18476-2015

Jagjeet Singh Kushwaha and others

....Petitioners

Versus

Haryana Power Generation Corporation Limited and others

....Respondents

3. CWP-18432-2015

Sumit Goyal and others

....Petitioners

Versus

Haryana Vidyut Parsaran Nigam Limited and others

....Respondents

4. CWP-4712-2021

D.N. Singh

....Petitioner

Versus

Haryana Power Generation Corporation Limited and others

....Respondents

5. CWP-24870-2023

Rajinder Verma

....Petitioners

Versus

Haryana Vidyut Parsaran Nigam Limited and others

....Respondents

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES 2

1.Date when judgment was reserved12.01.2026

2.Date of pronouncement of

judgment

15.01.2026

3.Date of uploading judgment 15.01.2026

4.Whether operative part or full

judgment is pronounced

Full

5.Delay, if any, in pronouncing of

full judgment and reasons thereof

Not Applicable

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR

Present:Mr. R.K. Malik, Sr. Advocate

with Mr. Sandeep Dhull, Advocate

for the petitioner(s)

in CWP Nos.18478, 18476, 18432 of 2015.

Mr. Maninder Singh Saini, Advocate

for the petitioner in CWP-4712-2021.

Mr. Pravindra Singh Chauhan, Advocate General,

Haryana with Mr. Sanjiv Kaushik, Addl. A.G., Haryana

and Ms. Rajni Gupta, Advocate

for respondents in CWP-18478-2015, CWP-18476-2015

CWP-18432-2015, CWP-4712-2021 & CWP-24870-2023.

Mr. Piyush Khanna, Addl. A.G., Haryana

for respondents No.1 and 2 in CWP-18476-2015.

Mr. Rajesh Gaur, Advocate

for the respondents in CWP-18478-2015,

CWP-24870-2023 and CWP-4712-2021.

HARPREET SINGH BRAR J. (Oral)

1. This order shall dispose of the above-mentioned writ

petitions as they arise from a similar factual matrix. However, for the

sake of brevity, the facts are taken from CWP-18478-2015.

2. The writ petition (CWP-18478-2015) has been filed under

Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ in

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES 3

the nature of mandamus directing respondents No.1 and 2 to implement

the decision of their Board of Directors dated 25.11.2009 (Annexure

P-4) and to grant the revised pay scales and all consequential benefits.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3. Briefly stated, the genesis of the dispute lies in the

bifurcation and re-organisation of the erstwhile Haryana State

Electricity Board (HSEB). Admittedly, HSEB was first bifurcated into

Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. (HVPNL) and Haryana Power

Generation Corporation Ltd. (HPGCL). Later, HVPNL was trifurcated

into HVPNL, Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. (UHBVNL) and

Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. (DHBVNL). Persons in the

officers category including the petitioners, were allocated to these

successor companies on an “as is where is” basis.

4. To maintain coordination and uniformity in organisational

matters, including pay scales, across the four power utilities (HVPNL,

HPGCL, UHBVNL, DHBVNL), the Government of Haryana, Power

Department, vide letter dated 09.05.2009 (Annexure P-1), decided to

constitute a Coordination Committee of the Managing Directors of these

utilities. This Committee was constituted on 11.05.2009 (Annexure P-

2). The Coordination Committee, in its recommendations (Annexure P-

3), inter alia, recommended the revision of pay scales for Finance,

Audit and Accounts Officers to bring them at par with Engineering

cadres.

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES 4

5. These recommendations were placed before the Board of

Directors (hereinafter ‘BoD’) of DHBVNL and in its meeting held on

25.11.2009 (Annexure P-4), the BoD approved the recommendations. It

was decided that Accounts Officers shall be entitled to the pay scale of

Rs 15600-39100+ Grade pay of Rs.6400/- (PB-3) after rendering 5

years service and further entitled to the scale of Rs. 37400-67000 +

Grade Pay of Rs. 8700/- (PB-4) after rendering 12 years service. Senior

Accounts Officers were held entitled to the scale of Rs. 37400-67000 +

Grade Pay of Rs. 8800/-. Despite the BoD's approval, the decision was

not implemented. The case of the petitioners is that the Managing

Director, although under no obligation, referred the BoD's decision to

the Haryana Bureau of Public Enterprises (HBPE) for approval

(Annexure P-5). The HBPE did not approve the proposal (Annexure P-

6). Consequently, the pay revision for the petitioners was stalled on the

ground that HBPE's approval was pending/not granted.

6. An identical situation arose in Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran

Nigam Ltd. (UHBVNL), where its BoD had also approved similar pay

revisions based on the Coordination Committee's recommendations.

When HBPE rejected it, the affected employees filed CWP No.9262 of

2012, (‘Pawan Kumar & Ors. vs. UHBVN Ltd. & Ors ’.). The

Coordinate Bench of this Court, vide judgment dated 12.09.2013

(Annexure P-7), allowed the writ petition, holding that as per the

Articles of Association (hereinafter ‘AoA’), the BoD was the competent

authority to revise pay scales and HBPE had no role to play. This

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES 5

judgment was upheld by the Division Bench in LPA No.383 of 2014

(Annexure P-8) and the SLP against it was dismissed by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court on 14.08.2015 (Annexure P-9). Consequently, the

benefit was extended to the similarly situated employees in UHBVNL.

7. While the petitioners’ writ petition was pending, the BoD of

DHBVNL, in a meeting held on 02.06.2016 (communicated vide order

dated 06.07.2016, Annexure P-11), withdrew its earlier decision dated

25.11.2009 on the ground of the corporation's weak financial position

and inability to bear the extra burden. Aggrieved by the non-

implementation of the 2009 decision and its subsequent withdrawal, the

petitioners have filed the present writ petition, seeking the reliefs as

prayed for.

CONTENTIONS

8. Learned counsel for the petitioners inter alia contends that

the BoD is the supreme executive body empowered to appoint, fix

salaries, and determine service conditions of employees. Reliance in this

regard is placed on Article 43(14) of the Articles of Association of

DHBVNL. The BoD, being the competent authority, took a conscious

decision on 25.11.2009. Once such a decision is taken, it is binding and

must be implemented. The respondents' failure to do so is illegal and

arbitrary, violating the petitioners’ legitimate expectations and accrued

rights.

9. It was vehemently argued that the HBPE has no jurisdiction

to interfere with or veto the pay revision decisions of the BoD of an

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES 6

independent government company. The reference to HBPE was itself

without authority and the BoD’s decision cannot be held hostage to the

approval of HBPE. Learned counsel submitted that the aforesaid issue is

no longer res integra and stands squarely covered by the judgment of

this Court in CWP No.9262 of 2012, titled as ‘Pawan Kumar & Ors.

vs. UHBVN Ltd. & Ors.’ which has attained finality up to the Supreme

Court. The legal principle that the BoD is the competent authority and

HBPE has no say has been conclusively settled. There is no justification

for DHBVNL to take a contrary stand, leading to hostile discrimination

against the petitioners vis-à-vis their counterparts in UHBVNL.

10. Learned counsel also referred to Section 24 of the Haryana

Electricity Reforms Act, 1997 and the corresponding Transfer Scheme

Rules of 1998 and 1999 (Clause 11(a) and Clause 8(5)) and contended

that these provisions mandate that the terms and conditions of service,

including pay, of transferred employees shall not be less favourable and

that uniformity should be maintained amongst the successor companies.

Since similarly situated Accounts Officers/Senior Accounts Officers in

UHBVNL are receiving the revised scales, denying the same to the

petitioners violates this statutory mandate.

11. It is argued that the posts of Accounts Officers are filled

through a common selection process via a combined advertisement for

all power utilities (Annexure P-10). After selection, candidates are

deputed to different utilities. When recruitment, qualifications, and

duties are identical, there is no rationale for denying parity in pay scales

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES 7

across the utilities. This creates an absurd and unjust situation where

officers selected together are paid differently based solely on the

company they are allocated to.

12. It is further submitted that the subsequent decision of the

BoD (Annexure P-11) regarding the withdrawal of the earlier decision

dated 25.11.2009 was made to circumvent the judgment of this Court in

Pawan Kumar (supra) and is on the face of it illegal and liable to be set

aside. It is argued that the primary reason for withdrawal, i.e, ‘weak

financial position,’ is demonstrably wrong. The financial data for 2009-

10 (loss of 633.17 crores) and 2015-16 (loss of 480 crores) shows the

financial position had improved when the benefit was withdrawn.

Furthermore, UHBVNL, with higher accumulated losses, continues to

grant the benefit. Moreover, the accrued right under the 2009 decision

was withdrawn without granting any opportunity of hearing to the

petitioners.

13. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents submits that the

writ petition has become infructuous because the very decision (dated

25.11.2009) which the petitioners seek to enforce, was withdrawn by the

competent authority (the BoD) itself vide its subsequent decision dated

02.06.2016/06.07.2016 (Annexure R-1/P-11). The BoD is fully

competent under Article 41(3) & 43 of the AoA to review and withdraw

its earlier decisions, especially in the interest of the Nigam.

14. Relying on notifications/circulars issued by the Finance

Department, Government of Haryana, dated 20.10.1989, 15.12.2000,

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES 8

22.08.2005, 02.06.2006, and 07.01.2016, it was submitted that all

proposals concerning creation/upgradation of posts and revision of pay

scales in State Public Enterprises must be approved by the Standing

Committee of the HBPE after due approval by the Administrative

Department. Furthermore, it was pointed out that DHBVNL carried out

an amendment to its Articles of Association on 29.09.2020 by inserting

Clause 68 (Annexure R-1/7), which expressly mandates that the BoD

shall refer matters like pay revision to the State Finance

Department/HBPE through the administrative department. The

amendment is reproduced as under:

“68 Board of Directors along with its recommendations

shall refer for consideration and approval of all such

matters like revision of pay scales, creation/upgradation of

the posts etc. to the State Finance Department/HBPE

through the administrative departments which are

mandatorily required to be so referred in accordance with

the specific instructions issued from time to time.”

15. Learned counsel submitted that the withdrawal was justified

on the grounds of severe financial distress. The accumulated loss of

DHBVNL as on 31.03.2018 was 13,790 crores (Annexure R-2/1).

Granting the benefit would entail an annual recurring burden of

approximately 72.8 lakhs and arrears of about 2.77 crores (for the

period 01.09.2015 to 31.03.2019), with additional pension liabilities.

The BoD has a fiduciary duty to manage finances prudently and cannot

burden the corporation, which would ultimately lead to higher costs for

the public.

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES 9

16. It was argued that granting the benefit to the accounts cadre

would have a cascading effect and trigger similar demands from other

cadres like Under Secretaries and Senior Private Secretaries, with an

estimated additional liability of 1.03 crores. Further, it was denied that

there is any parity between Senior Accounts Officers and Executive

Engineers (XENs), as the qualifications, nature of work, and recruitment

channels are completely different. Moreover, reliance was placed on a

judgment by a co-ordinate bench of this Court in Ganga Ram vs. State

of Haryana & Ors. (CWP No.17700 of 2017), where a similar claim

for parity with Executive Engineers was rejected, emphasizing the need

for HBPE approval and the distinct legal identity of the companies.

17. Learned counsel contended that each power utility is a

separate legal entity with its own management and financial condition.

A decision taken by UHBVNL or its BoD does not ipso facto create a

legal obligation for DHBVNL to follow suit.

OBSERVATION & ANALYSIS

18. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have

perused the record with their able assistance. The doctrine of ‘Equal Pay

for Equal Work’ is deeply rooted in the constitutional philosophy and

reflects the values that the State stands for. While Article 14 of the

Constitution of India forbids arbitrary discrimination sans an intelligible

differentia, Article 39(d) highlights the intention of the framers to

provide equal pay for equal work, for men and women alike. The said

provisions read as follows:

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES

10

“Article 14- Equality before law

The State shall not deny to any person equality

before the law or the equal protection of the laws

within the territory of India.

Article 39- Certain Principles of Policy to be

Followed by the State

The State shall, in particular, direct its policy

towards securing—

(d) that there is equal pay for equal work for

both men and women;”

19. Certainly, Article 39(d) forms a part of Directive Principles

of State Policy and is non-justiciable in itself, however, the doctrine of

Equal Pay for Equal Work has been elevated into an enforceable

constitutional right by means of Article 14 and 16, aided by the

constitutional promise of social justice. A three-Judge bench of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India 1982(1)

SCC 618, while speaking through Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, made

the following observations in this regard:

“8. It is true that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'

is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a

fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal.

Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims 'equal pay for

equal work for both men and women' as a Directive

Principle of State Policy. 'Equal pay for equal work for

both men and women' means equal pay for equal work

for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive

principles, as has been pointed out in some of the

judgments of this Court have to be read into the

fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article

14 of the Constitution enjoins the state not to deny any

person equality before the law or the equal protection of

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES

11

the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be

equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating

to employment or appointment to any office under the

State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must

mean some thing to everyone. To the vast majority of the

people the equality clauses of the Constitution would

mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they

do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will

have some substance if equal work means equal pay.

Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for

trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for

dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a

particular Governmental policy in the matter of grant of

licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the

Executive, whether the takeover of the empires of industrial

tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other

questions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this

country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the

like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern

to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of

the Constitution have any significance to them. The

preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution

of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign

Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word 'Socialist'

must mean something. Even if it does not mean 'To each

according to his need' , it must atleast mean 'equal pay for

equal work'. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is

expressly recognised by all socialist systems of law, e.g.,

Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour Code, para 2 of

Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, Section 67 of the

Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German

Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the

Rumanian Code. Indeed this principle has been

incorporated in several western labour codes too. Under

provisions in Section 31(g.No. 2d) of Book 1 of the French

Code du Travail, and according to Argentinean law, this

principle must be applied to female workers in all

collective bargaining agreements. In accordance with

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES

12

Section 3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal

Republic, and clause 7, Section 123 of the Mexican

Constitution, the principle is given universal significance

(vide : International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy p. 265).

The preamble of the Constitution of the International

Labour Organisation recognises the principle of 'equal

remuneration for work of equal value' as constituting one

of the means of achieving the improvement of conditions

"involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large

numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the

peace and harmony of the world are imperiled" .

Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the

Preamble and Article 39(d) we are of the view that the

principle 'Equal pay for Equal work' is deducible from

those Article and may be properly applied to cases of

unequal scales of pay based on no classification or

irrational classification though these drawing the

different scales of pay do identical work under the same

employer.”

(emphasis added)

20. Thus, allowing a State employer to pay unequal wages for

identical work would essentially amount to validating whimsical

discrimination which would force vulnerable workers into involuntary

submission, compelling them to choose between survival and self-

respect. Such affront to human dignity is unacceptable being in direct

violation of Articles 14 and 21. For any classification to be acceptable,

an intelligible differentia and a rational nexus to its object must be

clearly made out. In absence of the same, such conduct is plainly

exploitative, which is especially deplorable in a welfare State like ours.

21. Furthermore, it is no longer res integra that the application

of the doctrine of Equal Pay for Equal Work is strictly contingent upon

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES

13

the claimant successfully demonstrating that they are being paid less for

the duties, functions, qualifications, responsibilities, and quantum of

work they perform despite their being identical in nature and quality to

the employees with whom parity is sought. Once it is established that

the similarity is not merely superficial but the claimant is substantially

interchangeable with their better-paid counterparts with respect to

performance of core functions of the post, the two sets of employees

cannot be paid different wages regardless of whether they are ad-hoc,

daily wage, temporary, contractual, or casual employees.

22. A two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State

of Punjab Vs. Jagjit Singh 2017(1) SCC 148 has discussed the

applicability of the doctrine of Equal Pay for Equal Work in extenso and

speaking through Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar, made the following

observations,

“44. We shall first outline the conclusions drawn in cases

where a claim for pay parity, raised at the hands of the

concerned temporary employees, was accepted by this

Court, by applying the principle of ‘equal pay for equal

work’, with reference to regular employees:

(i) In the Dhirendra Chamoli case this Court

examined a claim for pay parity raised by temporary

employees, for wages equal to those being disbursed

to regular employees. The prayer was accepted. The

action of not paying the same wage, despite the

work being the same, was considered as violative of

Article 14 of the Constitution. It was held that the

action amounted to exploitation - in a welfare state

committed to a socialist pattern of society.

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES

14

(ii) In the Surinder Singh case this Court held that

the right of equal wages claimed by temporary

employees emerged, inter alia, from Article 39 of the

Constitution. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal

work’ was again applied, where the subject employee

had been appointed on temporary basis, and the

reference employee was borne on the permanent

establishment. The temporary employee was held

entitled to wages drawn by an employee on the

regular establishment. In this judgment, this Court

also took note of the fact that the above proposition

was affirmed by a Constitution Bench of this Court,

in the D.S. Nakara case.

(iii) In the Bhagwan Dass case this Court recorded

that in a claim for equal wages, the duration for

which an employee would remain (or had

remained) engaged, would not make any difference.

So also, the manner of selection and appointment

would make no difference. And therefore, whether

the selection was made on the basis of open

competition or was limited to a cluster of villages,

was considered inconsequential, insofar as the

applicability of the principle is concerned. And

likewise, whether the appointment was for a fixed

limited duration (six months, or one year), or for an

unlimited duration, was also considered

inconsequential, insofar as the applicability of the

principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is

concerned. It was held that the claim for equal

wages would be sustainable where an employee is

required to discharge similar duties and

responsibilities as regular employees, and the

concerned employee possesses the qualifications

prescribed for the post. In the above case, this Court

rejected the contention advanced on behalf of the

Government that the plea of equal wages by the

employees in question was not sustainable because

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES

15

the concerned employees were engaged in a

temporary scheme, and against posts which were

sanctioned on a year-to-year basis.

(iv) In the Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed

under P&T Department through Bhartiya Dak Tar

Mazdoor Manch case this Court held that under

principle flowing from Article 38(2) of the

Constitution, Government could not deny a

temporary employee at least the minimum wage

being paid to an employee in the corresponding

regular cadre, along with dearness allowance and

additional dearness allowance, as well as all the

other benefits which were being extended to casual

workers. It was also held that the classification of

workers (as unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled),

doing the same work, into different categories, for

payment of wages at different rates, was not tenable.

It was also held that such an act of an employer

would amount to exploitation, and further that the

same would be arbitrary and discriminatory, and

therefore violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution.

(v) In State of Punjab v. Devinder Singh, (1998) 9

SCC 595, this Court held that daily-wagers were

entitled to be placed in the minimum of the pay-

scale of regular employees, working against the

same post. The above direction was issued after

accepting that the concerned employees were doing

the same work as regular incumbents holding the

same post, by applying the principle of ‘equal pay

for equal work’.

(vi) In the Secretary, State of Karnataka case, a

Constitution Bench of this Court set aside the

judgment of the High Court, and directed that daily-

wagers be paid salary equal to the lowest grade of

salary and allowances being paid to regular

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES

16

employees. Importantly, in this case, this Court made

a very important distinction between pay parity and

regularisation. It was held that the concept of

equality would not be applicable to issues of

absorption/regularisation. But the concept was held

as applicable, and was indeed applied, to the issue

of pay parity - if the work component was the same.

The judgment rendered by the High Court was

modified by this Court, and the concerned daily-

wage employees were directed to be paid wages

equal to the salary at the lowest grade of the

concerned cadre.

(vii) In State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh, 2006

(3) S.C.T. 170 : (2006) 9 SCC 321, a three-Judge

Bench of this Court held that the decisions rendered

by this Court in State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh,

(1996) 11 SCC 77; State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj,

2003 (4) S.C.T. 485 : (2003) 6 SCC 123; the Orissa

University of Agriculture & Technology case; and

Government of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, 2004 (1)

S.C.T. 78 : (2004) 1 SCC 347, laid down the correct

law. Thereupon, this Court declared that if the

concerned daily-wage employees could establish

that they were performing equal work of equal

quality, and all other relevant factors were fulfilled,

a direction by a Court to pay such employees equal

wages (from the date of filing the writ petition)

would be justified.

(viii) In State of U.P. v. Putti Lal, (2006) 9 SCC 337,

based on decisions in several cases (wherein the

principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ had been

invoked), it was held that a daily-wager discharging

similar duties as those engaged on regular basis,

would be entitled to draw his wages at the minimum

of the pay-scale (drawn by his counterpart

appointed on regular basis), but would not be

entitled to any other allowances or increments.

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES

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(ix) In the Uttar Pradesh Land Development

Corporation case this Court noticed that the

respondents were employed on contract basis, on a

consolidated salary. But, because they were actually

appointed to perform the work of the post of

Assistant Engineer, this Court directed the

employer to pay the respondents wages in the

minimum of the pay-scales ascribed for the post of

Assistant Engineer.

X X X

55. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine

artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee

engaged for the same work, cannot be paid less than

another, who performs the same duties and

responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare state. Such an

action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very

foundation of human dignity. Any one, who is compelled

to work at a lesser wage, does not do so voluntarily. He

does so, to provide food and shelter to his family, at the

cost of his self respect and dignity, at the cost of his self

worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that

his dependents would suffer immensely, if he does not

accept the lesser wage. Any act, of paying less wages, as

compared to others similarly situated, constitutes an act

of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a

domineering position.Undoubtedly, the action is

oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels

involuntary subjugation.”

(emphasis added)

23. Adverting to the facts of the present case, notably, there is

no denial on the part of the respondents that the petitioners perform

duties, functions, and responsibilities identical to those of their similarly

situated counterparts, namely Accounts Officers/Senior Accounts

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES

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Officers in UHBVNL, and that they possess the same qualifications. It

is also undisputed that such counterparts are drawing pay scales

approved by the UHBVNL Board of Directors on the basis of the same

recommendations of the Coordination Committee. The respondents

have not been able to demonstrate any intelligible differentia or rational

nexus to a legitimate object that would justify paying the petitioners a

lower scale for identical work. The mere allocation to a different

corporate entity (DHBVNL), which was a consequence of a statutory

bifurcation over which the employees had no control, cannot constitute

a valid ground for discrimination. The plea of separate legal identity, in

the face of common recruitment, identical job profiles, and a statutory

framework designed for parity, cannot be accepted to defeat the

constitutional guarantee of equal pay for equal work. The subsequent

decision of the BoD dated 02.06.2016/06.07.2016 (Annexure P-11),

withdrawing the approval dated 25.11.2009 (Annexure P-4), was based

primarily on grounds of financial constraint. However, the principle of

‘Equal Pay for Equal Work’ was not considered by the BoD while

withdrawing its earlier decision.

24. Furthermore, the core issue regarding the competence of the

BoD vis-à-vis the HBPE has been conclusively settled by the coordinate

Bench of this Court in Pawan Kumar (supra), which has been upheld

by the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 383 of 2014 vide

judgment dated 18.02.2015 (Annexure P-8), and the Special Leave

Petition was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 14.08.2015

CWP-18478-2015 & CONNECTED CASES

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(Annexure P-9). The law is thus settled that the Board of Directors of

the respondent-Nigam was the competent authority for pay revision, and

the HBPE had no jurisdictional authority to interfere with or veto such a

decision. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Pawan

Kumar (supra) are reproduced as under:

“In the present case as per Article 43 of the Articles of

Association the Board of Directors is competent to revise

the pay scales of its employees.

Clause 43 of the Articles of Association read as follow: -

xx

The Board of Directors in view of above said article is

competent to fix the salaries or emoluments or

remuneration of its employees. Following the judgment in

cases of Deva Singh (supra) and Surjit Singh (supra), I

am of the considered opinion that the Board of Directors

can take decision for grant of higher pay scales to the

petitioners as mentioned in Annexure P8. It is also not

out of place to observe here that pay scales had earlier

been enhanced by the Board of Directors without the

approval of Haryana Bureau of Public Enterprises in the

case of other employees which is apparent from the

following instances: -

xx

In view of above said circumstances, present writ petition

is allowed and the order Annexure P8 dated 2.12.2012

declining the proposal of the Board of Directors by the

Standing Committee of Bureau of Public Enterprises

communicated through the Superintendent Power for

Financial Commissioner and Principal Secretary to the

Government of Haryana, Power Department, is hereby

set aside. It will be open to the petitioners to seek

implementation of the order of the Board of Directors

and consequential reliefs in accordance with law as the

financial burden is to be borne by none else but the

Corporation itself. It is left open to the Board of Directors

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20

to implement its decision with effect from any date decided

by the Board.”

(Emphasis added)

25. This Court is of the considered opinion that the respondents’

reliance on the 2020 amendment to the AoA (insertion of Clause 68) is

entirely misplaced. The amendment, which purports to mandate

reference of pay revision matters to the HBPE, was introduced in

September 2020. It cannot be applied retrospectively to validate the

non-implementation of a decision validly taken by the competent BoD

in November 2009, or to justify the reference made to HBPE around

that time. The aforesaid amendment shall only operate prospectively.

CONCLUSION

26. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present petition(s)

are disposed of with the following directions:

a. The impugned decision/order of the Board of Directors of

DHBVNL dated 06.07.2016 (Annexure P-11), whereby the

earlier decision dated 25.11.2009 was withdrawn, is hereby

quashed and set aside.

b. The matter is remitted back to the Board of Directors of the

respondent-DHBVNL. The BoD is directed to consider

afresh the petitioners’ grievance in light of the fact that the

petitioners and their counterparts in UHBVNL, possessing

identical qualifications and discharging identical duties,

were appointed through a common selection process

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21

pursuant to a combined advertisement for all power utilities

and, despite such parity, are presently being paid

differently.

c. The BoD shall take a fresh, reasoned decision in this regard

and communicate the same to the petitioners within a

period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified

copy of this order.

27. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand

disposed of.

28. A photocopy of this order be placed on the files of the

connected cases.

(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)

JUDGE

15.01.2026

yakub

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No