REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1481 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 1513 OF 2011)

NEVADA PROPERTIES PRIVATE LIMITED

THROUGH ITS DIRECTORS ….. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER ….. RESPONDENT(S)

W I T H

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1122 OF 2011

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1482-1485 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NOS.891-894 OF 2011)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1486 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 4360 OF 2011)

A N D

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1487 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 3958 OF 2013)

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J U D G M E N T

SANJIV KHANNA, J.

Leave granted in Special Leave Petitions.

2.A Division Bench of this Court (Jagdish Singh Khehar and Arun

Mishra, JJ.) vide order dated November 18, 2014, noticing that the

issues that arise have far reaching and serious consequences,

had referred the aforesaid appeals to be heard by a Bench of at

least three Judges. After obtaining appropriate directions from

Hon’ble the Chief Justice, these appeals have been listed before

the present Bench.

3.For the sake of convenience, we have treated the Criminal Appeal

arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1513 of 2011,

filed by Nevada Properties Pvt. Ltd., as the lead case. This

appeal arises from judgment of the High Court of Judicature at

Bombay dated November 29, 2010 wherein the majority judgment

has held that the expression ‘any property’ used in sub-section (1)

of Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’) does not include immovable

property and, consequently, a police officer investigating a criminal

case cannot take custody of and seize any immovable property

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which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion

of the commission of any offence. According to the majority

judgment, earlier decision of the Division Bench of the same High

Court in Kishore Shankar Signapurkar v. State of Maharashtra

and Others

1

lays down the correct ratio and the contrary view

expressed in M/s. Bombay Science and Research Education

Institute v. The State of Maharashtra and Others

2

does not lay

down the correct law. The minority view holds that the police

officer has power to seize any property, whether movable or

immovable, under Section 102 of the Code and the decision of the

Division Bench in M/s. Bombay Science and Research

Education Institute (supra) lays down the correct law and the

ratio in Kishore Shankar Signapurkar (supra) is not good law.

4.In order to decide the present controversy which is primarily legal,

we would begin by reproducing Section 102 of the Code, which

reads as under:

“S.102 Power of police officer to seize certain

property.

(1) Any police officer may seize any property which

may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or

which may be found under circumstances which create

suspicion of the commission of any offence.

1

1997 Vol.IV L J 793

2

2008 All M.R.(Crl.) 2133

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(2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the office in

charge of a police station, shall forthwith report the

seizure to that officer.

(3) Every police officer acting under sub-section (1)

shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate

having jurisdiction and where the property seized is

such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the

Court, or where there is difficulty in securing proper

accommodation for the custody of such property, or

where the continued retention of the property in police

custody may not be considered necessary for the

purpose of investigation, he may give custody thereof

to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to

produce the property before the Court as and when

required and to give effect to the further orders of the

Court as to the disposal of the same.

Provided that where the property seized under sub-

section (1) is subject to speedy and natural decay and

if the person entitled to the possession of such property

is unknown or absent and the value of such property is

less than five hundred rupees, it may forthwith be sold

by auction under the orders of the Superintendent of

Police and the provisions of Sections 457 and 458

shall, as nearly as may be practicable, apply to the net

proceeds of such sale.”

5.Section 102 of the Code is part of a fasciculus of provisions under

Chapter VII – ‘Process to Compel the Production of Things’. Part

A of the said Chapter deals with Summons to produce; Part B

deals with Search-warrants; Part C deals with General provisions

relating to searches; and Part D, of which Section 102 is the first

Section, falls under the part described as Miscellaneous. The

marginal note of Section 102 states – “Power of police officer to

seize certain property”. Sub-section (3) of Section 102 was

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inserted by Act No. 45 of 1978. It was later amended by section

13(a) of the Cr.P.C. Amendment Act, 2005 (Act 25 of 2005) by

adding the expression “or where there is difficulty in securing

proper accommodation for the custody of such property, or where

the continued retention of the property in police custody may not

be considered necessary for the purpose of investigation.” Proviso

to sub-section (3) was also added by the Amendment Act, 2005.

Sub-section (3) to Section 102 is intended to give greater

discretion to the police officer for releasing seized property, where

there is a difficulty in securing proper accommodation for the

custody of the property or where the continued retention of the

property in police custody is not considered necessary for the

purpose of investigation. Proviso states that if the seized property

is of perishable nature and the value of such property is less than

five hundred rupees and if the person entitled to the possession of

such property is unknown or absent, the police is empowered to

sell such property by auction under orders of the Superintendent

of Police.

6.The minority judgment and the contention of the appellant is

substantially predicated on the words ‘any property’ in sub-section

(1) of Section 102. Reference was made to the decision of this

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Court in State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy

3

. To avoid

prolixity, we are not referring to the contentions raised by both

sides as the same would be referred to and examined during the

course of our reasoning. At the outset, we must begin by referring

to the decision in Tapas D. Neogy (supra), a case arising from

three First Information Reports under Sections 120-B, 467, 468,

471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred

to as the ‘IPC’) and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The question was whether a

bank account of an accused or any relation of the accused was

‘property’ within the meaning of Section 102 of the Code and if so,

whether the Investigating Officer has the power to seize the bank

account or issue a prohibitory order restraining operation of the

bank account. Reference was made to several judgments of the

High Courts, some of which would be discussed later, to hold as

under:

“12. Having considered the divergent views taken by

different High Courts with regard to the power of

seizure under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, and whether the bank account can be held

to be “property” within the meaning of the said Section

102(1), we see no justification to give any narrow

interpretation to the provisions of the Criminal

Procedure Code. It is well known that corruption in

public offices has become so rampant that it has

become difficult to cope up with the same. Then again

the time consumed by the courts in concluding the

3

(1999) 7 SCC 685

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trials is another factor which should be borne in mind in

interpreting the provisions of Section 102 of the

Criminal Procedure Code and the underlying object

engrafted therein, inasmuch as if there can be no order

of seizure of the bank account of the accused then the

entire money deposited in a bank which is ultimately

held in the trial to be the outcome of the illegal

gratification, could be withdrawn by the accused and

the courts would be powerless to get the said money

which has any direct link with the commission of the

offence committed by the accused as a public officer.

We are, therefore, persuaded to take the view that the

bank account of the accused or any of his relations is

“property” within the meaning of Section 102 of the

Criminal Procedure Code and a police officer in course

of investigation can seize or prohibit the operation of

the said account if such assets have direct links with

the commission of the offence for which the police

officer is investigating into. The contrary view

expressed by the Karnataka, Gauhati and Allahabad

High Courts, does not represent the correct law. It may

also be seen that under the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1988, in the matter of imposition of fine under sub-

section (2) of Section 13, the legislatures have

provided that the courts in fixing the amount of fine

shall take into consideration the amount or the value of

the property which the accused person has obtained by

committing the offence or where the conviction is for an

offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of

Section 13, the pecuniary resources or property for

which the accused person is unable to account

satisfactorily. The interpretation given by us in respect

of the power of seizure under Section 102 of the

Criminal Procedure Code is in accordance with the

intention of the legislature engrafted in Section 16 of

the Prevention of Corruption Act referred to above. In

the aforesaid premises, we have no hesitation to come

to the conclusion that the High Court of Bombay

committed error in holding that the police officer could

not have seized the bank account or could not have

issued any direction to the bank officer, prohibiting the

account of the accused from being operated upon.

Though we have laid down the law, but so far as the

present case is concerned, the order impugned has

already been given effect to and the accused has been

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operating his account, and so, we do not interfere with

the same.”

7.Money, as per clause (7) of Section 2 of the Sales of Goods Act,

1930, is neither goods nor movable property, albeit Section 22 of

the IPC defines the term ‘movable property’ to include corporeal

property of every description, except land and things attached to

the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to

the earth. The expression ‘movable property’ has not been

specifically defined in the Code. In terms of Section 2(y) of the

Code, words and meanings defined in the IPC would equally be

applicable to the Code. Money, therefore, would be property for

the purposes of the Code. Money is not an immovable property.

8.Decision of this Court in Tapas D. Neogy (supra) was in respect

of the bank accounts and it did not examine and answer the

question whether the expression ‘any property’ would include

immovable property. This question was, however, noticed in

paragraph 6 in Tapas D. Neogy (supra), which had made

reference to a decision of the Delhi High Court in Ms. Swaran

Sabharwal v. Commissioner of Police

4

in which it was held that

Section 102 requires that the seized property by itself should lead

to the suspicion that some offence has been committed. In other

4

1988 CriLJ 241 (Del) (DB)

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words, the discovery of the offence should be a sequel to the

discovery of that property and not the other way around.

Reference in this regard can also be made to Jagdish Chander

and Others v. State and Others

5

, wherein the petitioner had

challenged the seizure action of the police on the ground that the

word ‘seizure’ appearing in Section 102 of the Code would imply

actual taking of possession and, therefore, would not include

immovable property. This contention was not answered and left

open as the Delhi High Court came to the conclusion that the

seizure order therein under Section 102 of the Code was not in

accordance with the statutory requirement as the property should

be discovered under circumstances which create a suspicion of

the commission of an offence, that is, the police officer should

come across certain property in circumstances which create in his

mind a suspicion that an offence has been committed. Section

102, it was held, would not be attracted where the property has

not been traced or discovered which leads to a suspicion of an

offence having been committed. Discovery of property should

precede the detection of crime. This ratio was subsequently

followed in P.K. Parmar and Others v. Union of India and

Another

6

in which the Delhi High Court had reiterated that unless

5

40 (199) DLT 233

6

1992 CriLJ 2499 (Del)

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discovery of the property leads to a suspicion of an offence having

been committed, Section 102 of the Code cannot be invoked for

seizing such properties. The Delhi High Court examined the

question; whether the discovery of the bank accounts had

preceded the suspicion of the offences having been committed

and held that there were good reasons, in view of the attending

circumstances, which had led Central Bureau of Investigation

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘CBI’) to be suspicious of an offence

having been committed in relation to such accounts. The accounts

were found either in the name of non-existent persons or in bogus

names and all such accounts were allegedly being maintained by

the principal accused. There was sufficient cause for the CBI to

set the criminal law into motion. In this case, the allegation was

that subsidies were obtained illegally and without entitlement from

the Government of India, and the amounts so received were

deposited in the bank accounts that had prima facie linked the

accused with various offences with which they were charged. The

cause of action, therefore, for seizing the bank accounts arose

when a suspicion was created relating to the multiple and spurious

handling of bank accounts.

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9.Tapas D. Neogy (supra) had also referred to the judgment of a

Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Bharat Overseas Bank

v. Minu Publication

7

, which had made reference to Sections 451,

452, 453, 456 and 457 of the Code to observe that these

provisions seek to reimburse or compensate victims of crime and

bring about restoration of the property or its restitution. The

provision empowering seizure was necessary to preserve the

property for the purpose of enabling the Criminal Court to pass

suitable orders under the aforesaid provisions at the conclusion of

the trial. The judgment also refers to restoration of immovable

property under certain circumstances dealt with under Section 456

of the Code.

10.The reason why we have referred to the two decisions in P.K.

Parmar (supra) and Bharat Overseas Bank (supra) is to notice

the wide range of issues and contentions with reference to the

term ‘property’ that could arise for consideration while interpreting

the power of the police officer to effect seizure under Section 102

of the Code, albeit this Court did not deal with and express an

opinion on several issues in Tapas D. Neogy (supra) and the

judgment was confined and limited to the question; whether bank

accounts would fall within the category of ‘any property’. Holding

7

1988 MLW (Cri) 106

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that the bank accounts would fall under the expression ‘any

property’ under Section 102 of the Code, it was observed that

there was no justification or reason to give a narrow interpretation

to the words to exclude bank accounts, elucidating that corruption

in public offices has become rampant and this aspect has to be

borne in mind while interpreting the provisions of Section 102 of

the Code and the underlying object engrafted in the provision.

11.It follows from the aforesaid discussion that the decision in Tapas

D. Neogy (supra) did not go into and decide the issue; whether

immovable property would fall under the expression ‘any property’

under Section 102 of the Code. We say so by applying the

inversion test as referred to in State of Gujarat and Others v.

Utility Users’ Welfare Association and Others

8

, which states

that the Court must first carefully frame the supposed proposition

of law and then insert in the proposition a word reversing its

meaning to get the answer whether or not a decision is a

precedent for that proposition. If the answer is in the affirmative,

the case is not a precedent for that proposition. If the answer is in

the negative, the case is a precedent for the original proposition

and possibly for other propositions also. This is one of the tests

applied to decide what can be regarded and treated as ratio

8

(2018) 6 SCC 21

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decidendi of a decision. Reference in this regard can also be

made to the decisions of this Court in U.P. State Electricity

Board v. Pooran Chandra Pandey and Others

9

, Commissioner

of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd.

10

and other

cases which hold that a decision is only an authority for what it

actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio.

Not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from

those observations is the ratio decidendi. Judgment in question

has to be read as a whole and the observations have to be

considered in light of the instances which were before the Court.

This is the way to ascertain the true principles laid down by a

decision. Ratio decidendi cannot be decided by picking out words

or sentences averse to the context under question from the

judgment. It is, therefore, clear to us that Tapas D. Neogy (supra)

did not decide the issue in question; whether or not an immovable

property will fall within the expression ‘any property’ in Section 102

of the Code. We will have to, therefore, examine the issue and

answer the same.

12.This Court in R.K. Dalmia etc. v. Delhi Administration

11

had

interpreted the word ‘property’ in Section 405 and other sections

9

(2007) 11 SCC 92

10

(1992) 4 SCC 363

11

AIR 1962 SC 1821

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of the IPC to opine that there was no good reason to restrict the

meaning of the word ‘property’ to movable property when the word

was used without any qualification in Section 405 or in other

sections of the IPC. At the same time, this Court had cautioned

that whether an offence defined in a particular section of the IPC

can be committed in respect of any particular kind of property, will

depend not on the interpretation of the word ‘property’ but on the

fact that whether that particular kind of property can be subject to

acts covered by that section. In that sense, it can be said that the

word ‘property’ in a particular section covers only that type of

property in respect of which the offence contemplated in that

section can be committed. This, we would observe, is the central

and core principle which would have to be applied when we

interpret the expression ‘any property’ used in Section 102 of the

Code, which as noticed above and elucidated below is a power

conferred upon the police officer and relates to the stage of

investigation and collection of evidence to be produced in the

Court during trial.

13.Before we proceed further, we would like to refer to the Criminal

Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 (No. XXXVIII of 1944) which

was promulgated in exercise of powers conferred under Section

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72 of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935 to

prevent disposal or concealment of property procured by means of

offences specified in its Schedule, which include offences

punishable under Sections 406, 408, 409, 411 and 414 of the IPC

in respect of Government property, property of local authority or a

Corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State

Act, etc., and an offence punishable under the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988, an insertion made by the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988. It sets out the procedure when the Central/

State Government has a reason to believe that a person has

committed any scheduled offence, whether or not the Court has

taken cognisance of the said offence, by attachment of money or

other property which the Central/State Government believes that

the person has procured by means of the scheduled offence, and

if such money or property cannot for any reason be attached, any

other property of the said person of value as nearly as may be

equivalent to that of the aforesaid money or property. This

enactment mandates application of provisions of Order XXVII of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 with a provision for filing an

application before the District Judge who is entitled to pass an ad

interim attachment order after following the prescribed procedure

including examination and investigation of objections to

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attachment of the property. The District Judge can pass an order

either making the interim attachment absolute or varying it by

releasing the property or portion thereof or withdrawing the order

on satisfaction of certain conditions. Other sections contained in

the Ordinance provide for attachment of property of mala fide

transferees, execution of orders of attachment, security in lieu of

attachment, administration of attached property, duration of

attachment, appeals, power of Criminal Court to evaluate property

procured by scheduled offences and disposal of attached property

upon termination of criminal proceedings. Section 14 bars legal

proceedings in other Courts in respect of the property attached

under the Ordinance. The Ordinance is a permanent Ordinance

which was promulgated during the Second World War. It was

adopted by the Presidential Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950

issued under the powers conferred by clause (2) of Article 372 of

the Constitution, thus, making it effective in the territory of India

and, therefore, continues to remain in force.

14.Similarly, there are provisions in the form of Sections 145, 146,

165 amongst others in the Code which specifically relate to

immovable properties. Chapter VIIA – ‘Reciprocal Arrangements

for Assistance in Certain Matters and Procedure for Attachment

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and Forfeiture of Property’ specifically includes immovable

properties under the expression ‘property’ for the purpose of the

said Chapter unless the context otherwise requires. Similarly, we

have specific provisions relating to and dealing with immovable

property under the Narcotics, Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

Act, 1985.

15.We would now refer to Chapter XXXIV of the Code, which has the

heading ‘Disposal of Property’ and consists of Sections 451 to

459. We would like to reproduce Sections 451, 452, 453, 454,

456 and 457 of the Code, which read as under:

“451. Order for custody and disposal of property

pending trial in certain cases.— When any property

is produced before any Criminal Court during any

inquiry or trial, the Court may make such order as it

thinks fit for the proper custody of such property

pending the conclusion of the inquiry or trial, and, if the

property is subject to speedy and natural decay, or if it

is otherwise expedient so to do, the Court may, after

recording such evidence as it thinks necessary, order it

to be sold or otherwise disposed of.

Explanation.– For the purposes of this section,

"property" includes –

(a) property of any kind or document which is produced

before the Court or which is in its custody,

(b) any property regarding which an offence appears to

have been committed or which appears to have been

used for the commission of any offence.

452.Order for disposal of property at conclusion of

trial.-

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(1) When an inquiry or trial in any Criminal Court is

concluded, the Court may make such order as it thinks

fit for the disposal, by destruction, confiscation or

delivery to any person claiming to be entitled to

possession thereof or otherwise, of any property or

document produced before it or in its custody, or

regarding which any offence appears to have been

committed, or which has been used for the commission

of any offence.

(2) An order may be made under sub-section (1) for the

delivery of any property to any person claiming to be

entitled to the possession thereof, without any

condition or on condition that he executes a bond, with

or without sureties, to the satisfaction of the Court,

engaging to restore such property to the Court if the

order made under sub-section (1) is modified or set

aside on appeal or revision.

(3) A Court of Session may, instead of itself making an

order under sub-section (1), direct the property to be

delivered to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who shall

thereupon deal with it in the manner provided in

sections 457, 458 and 459.

(4) Except where the property is livestock or is subject

to speedy and natural decay, or where a bond has

been executed in pursuance of sub-section (2), an

order made under sub-section (1) shall not be carried

out for two months, or when an appeal is presented,

until such appeal has been disposed of.

(5) In this section, the term "property" includes, in the

case of property regarding which an offence appears to

have been committed, not only such property as has

been originally in the possession or under the control of

any party, but also any property into or for which the

same may have been converted or exchanged, and

anything acquired by such conversion or exchange,

whether immediately or otherwise.

453.Payment to innocent purchaser of money

found on accused.-

When any person is convicted of any offence which

includes, or amounts to, theft or receiving stolen

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property, and it is proved that any other person bought

the stolen property from him without knowing or having

reason to believe that the same was stolen, and that

any money has on his arrest been taken out of the

possession of the convicted person, the Court may, on

the application of such purchaser and on the restitution

of the stolen property to the person entitled to the

possession thereof, order that out of such money a

sum not exceeding the price paid by such purchaser be

delivered to him.

454.Appeal against orders under section 452 or

section 453.-

(1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by a Court

under section 452 or section 453, may appeal against it

to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from

convictions by the former Court.

(2) On such appeal, the Appellate Court may direct the

order to be stayed pending disposal of the appeal, or

may modify, alter or annul the order and make any

further orders that may be just.

(3) The powers referred to in sub-section (2) may also

be exercised by a Court of appeal, confirmation or

revision while dealing with the case in which the order

referred to in sub-section (1) was made.

xx xx xx

456.Power to restore possession of immovable

property.-

(1) When a person is convicted of an offence attended

by criminal force or show of force or by criminal

intimidation, and it appears to the Court that, by such

force or show of force or intimidation, any person has

been dispossessed of any immovable property, the

Court may, if it thinks fit, order that possession of the

same be restored to that person after evicting by force,

if necessary, any other person who may be in

possession of the property:

Provided that no such order shall be made by the Court

more than one month after the date of the conviction.

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(2) Where the Court trying the offence has not made an

order under sub-section (1), the Court of appeal,

confirmation or revision may, if it thinks fit, make such

order while disposing of the appeal, reference or

revision, as the case may be.

(3) Where an order has been made under sub-section

(1), the provisions of section 454 shall apply in relation

thereto as they apply in relation to an order under

section 453.

(4) No order made under this section shall prejudice

any right or interest to or in such immovable property

which any person may be able to establish in a civil

suit.

457.Procedure by police upon seizure of property.-

(1) Whenever the seizure of property by any police

officer is reported to a Magistrate under the provisions

of this Code, and such property is not produced before

a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial, the

Magistrate may make such order as he thinks fit

respecting the disposal of such property or the delivery

of such property to the person entitled to the

possession thereof, or if such person cannot be

ascertained, respecting the custody and production of

such property.

(2) If the person so entitled is known, the Magistrate

may order the property to be delivered to him on such

conditions (if any) as the Magistrate thinks fit and if

such person is unknown, the Magistrate may detain it

and shall, in such case, issue a proclamation

specifying the articles of which such property consists,

and requiring any person who may have a claim

thereto, to appear before him and establish his claim

within six months from the date of such proclamation.”

16.Section 451 empowers the Criminal Court to pass an order of

proper custody of ‘any property’ pending trial or inquiry. The Court

can also direct disposal in certain circumstances. Explanation to

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Section 451 states that for the purpose of the said Section,

‘property’ includes property of any kind or document which is

produced before the Court or which is in its custody or any

property regarding which an offence appears to have been

committed or which appears to have been used for the

commission of any offence. Section 451 applies during or pending

trial, or inquiry (the expression ‘inquiry’ is defined in Section 2(g) of

the Code). There are judgments that hold that the expression

‘property’ for the purpose of Section 451 includes immovable

property. In fact, preponderance of judicial decisions takes this

view, though there is no direct judgment of this Court. Same is the

position with regard to Section 452, which in sub-section (5) states

that the term ‘property’ includes, in case of property regarding

which an offence appears to have been committed, not only such

property as was originally in possession or under control of any

party, but also any property into which the same may have been

converted or exchanged, and anything acquired by such

conversion or exchange, whether immediately or otherwise.

Section 452 states that when an inquiry or trial in a Criminal Court

concludes, the Court may make an order as it thinks fit for the

disposal, by destruction, confiscation or delivery to any person

claiming himself to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise,

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of any property or document produced before it or in its custody,

or regarding which an offence appears to have been committed or

which has been used for the commission of any offence. The

context is wide, albeit the words, “may make such order as it

thinks fit” in Section 452 vests the Court with the discretion to

dispose of the property in any of the three modes specified,

namely, destruction, confiscation or delivery to the person entitled

to be in possession thereof or otherwise (see N. Madhavan v.

State of Kerala

12

). However, an order under Section 452 is not an

order determining title or ownership but that of the right to

possession, and therefore where serious claims to ownership are

put forward, it would be best if the Criminal Courts directs the

parties to establish their claim before the Civil Court. The Criminal

Court can, however, pass appropriate order of interim nature as it

may be appropriate. What is important and relevant for our

discussion is that the Sections 451 and 452 are broad and wide

conferring specific and clear powers upon the Criminal Court, and

the language indicates that they could equally apply to immovable

property. These Sections do not make reference to Section 102 of

the Code relating to the seizure of property by the police officer.

This is equally true of Section 456 which specifically empowers

12

(1979) 4 SCC 1

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the Criminal Court to restore possession of immovable property

when a person is convicted of an offence attended by criminal

force or show of force or by criminal intimidation and it appears to

the Court that by such force or show of force or intimidation any

person has been dispossessed of the property. This order can be

made without prejudice to the right or interest to or in such

immovable property which any person may be able to establish in

a civil suit. Section 457 applies when a property has been seized

by any police officer and is reported to a Magistrate under the

provisions of the Code and such property is not produced before a

Criminal Court during the course of inquiry or trial. The expression

‘not produced before a Criminal Court’ used in Section 457 of the

Code is significant. Thus, this provision applies to the property

seized under Section 102 of the Code, but not produced during

the trial or inquiry. In common parlance, the word ‘produced’ is an

expression used to signify actual or physical production which

would apply to movable property. Immovable property cannot be

‘produced’ in a Court.

17.We have referred to the said provisions under Chapter XXXIV –

‘Disposal of Property’, as this would be of significance and,

addresses the argument and concern expressed by the appellant

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– Nevada Properties Pvt. Ltd. and some of the State

Governments. These provisions, specifically enable the Court to

pass orders relating to the properties, both movable and

immovable. We have referred to Section 451, which does not

specifically refer to any seizure order under Section 102 of the

Code but vide Explanation includes such property regarding which

an offence appears to have been committed or which appears to

have been used for the commission of any offence. Similarly,

Section 452 refers to property regarding which an offence appears

to have been committed as has been originally in possession or

under control of any party and also such property into or for which

the same may have been converted or exchanged. Again Section

452 per se, does not make any reference to Section 102 of the

Code. This is also true for Section 456 of the Code which relates

to restoration of possession of immovable property in certain

circumstances. These provisions, therefore, do not directly define

the contours and scope of Section 102 of the Code. On the other

hand, it would show that Section 102 is not the primary or the core

provision which would make the provisions of Section 451, 452 or

456 of the Code applicable. The parameters for application of

these sections are those as are enumerated in the specific

provisions. Sections 451 and 452 specifically define the

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expression ‘property’ for the purpose of an order of custody and

disposal by the Court. Section 456 applies to the category or type

of offences concerning immovable property regardless of whether

the immovable property is in custody of the Court or has been

attached. Power of the Criminal Court under these Sections,

except Section 457 of the Code, is not restricted to property

seized by the police officer under Section 102 of the Code.

Section 457, as noticed, applies to properties which have been

seized by the police officer under the Code but not produced

during inquiry or trial.

18.Having held and elucidated on the power of the Criminal Court, we

find good ground and reason to hold that the expression ‘any

property’ appearing in Section 102 of the Code would not include

immovable property. We would elucidate and explain.

19.The first part of sub-section (1) of Section 102 of the Code relates

to the property which may be alleged or suspected to have been

stolen. Immovable property certainly cannot be stolen and cannot

fall in this part. The second part relates to the property which may

be found by a police officer under circumstances which create

suspicion of the commission of any offence. We have already

referred to the judgments of the Delhi High Court in the case of

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P.K. Parmar (supra), Ms. Swaran Sabharwal (supra), and

Jagdish Chander (supra), which have elucidated and in a

restricted and narrow manner defined the requirement for invoking

the second part. However, we have come across a decision of this

Court in Teesta Atul Setalvad v. State of Gujarat

13

, on an appeal

from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court and had dealt with a

situation when an act of freezing the accounts was a sequel to the

crime as the crime was detected earlier. The Gujarat High Court

took a somewhat contrary view, by not interfering and directing

defreezing, observing that even if the action of the investigating

agency at the inception to seize may not be regular, the Court

cannot be oblivious to the collection of substantial material by the

investigating agency which justifies its action under Section 102 of

the Code. Further when the investigation had progressed to a

material point, de-freezing the bank accounts on the basis of such

arguments would paralyse the investigation which would not be in

the interest of justice. After referring to the factual matrix in

Teesta Atul Setalvad (Supra), this Court observed that the

Investigating Officer was in possession of material pointing out to

the circumstances that had created suspicion of the commission

of an offence, in particular the one under investigation, and

13

(2018) 2 SCC 372

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therefore exercise of power under Section 102 of the Code would

be in law legitimate as it was exercised after following the

procedure prescribed in sub-sections (2) and (3) of the same

provision.

20.Section 102 postulates seizure of the property. Immovable

property cannot, in its strict sense, be seized, though documents

of title, etc. relating to immovable property can be seized, taken

into custody and produced. Immovable property can be attached

and also locked/sealed. It could be argued that the word ‘seize’

would include such action of attachment and sealing. Seizure of

immovable property in this sense and manner would in law require

dispossession of the person in occupation/possession of the

immovable property, unless there are no claimants, which would

be rare. Language of Section 102 of the Code does not support

the interpretation that the police officer has the power to

dispossess a person in occupation and take possession of an

immovable property in order to seize it. In the absence of the

Legislature conferring this express or implied power under Section

102 of the Code to the police officer, we would hesitate and not

hold that this power should be inferred and is implicit in the power

to effect seizure. Equally important, for the purpose of

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interpretation is the scope and object of Section 102 of the Code,

which is to help and assist investigation and to enable the police

officer to collect and collate evidence to be produced to prove the

charge complained of and set up in the charge sheet. The Section

is a part of the provisions concerning investigation undertaken by

the police officer. After the charge sheet is filed, the prosecution

leads and produces evidence to secure conviction. Section 102 is

not, per se, an enabling provision by which the police officer acts

to seize the property to do justice and to hand over the property to

a person whom the police officer feels is the rightful and true

owner. This is clear from the objective behind Section 102, use of

the words in the Section and the scope and ambit of the power

conferred on the Criminal Court vide Sections 451 to 459 of the

Code. The expression ‘circumstances which create suspicion of

the commission of any offence’ in Section 102 does not refer to a

firm opinion or an adjudication/finding by a police officer to

ascertain whether or not ‘any property’ is required to be seized.

The word ‘suspicion’ is a weaker and a broader expression than

‘reasonable belief’ or ‘satisfaction’. The police officer is an

investigator and not an adjudicator or a decision maker. This is the

reason why the Ordinance was enacted to deal with attachment of

money and immovable properties in cases of scheduled offences.

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In case and if we allow the police officer to ‘seize’ immovable

property on a mere ‘suspicion of the commission of any offence’, it

would mean and imply giving a drastic and extreme power to

dispossess etc. to the police officer on a mere conjecture and

surmise, that is, on suspicion, which has hitherto not been

exercised. We have hardly come across any case where

immovable property was seized vide an attachment order that was

treated as a seizure order by police officer under Section 102 of

the Code. The reason is obvious. Disputes relating to title,

possession, etc., of immovable property are civil disputes which

have to be decided and adjudicated in Civil Courts. We must

discourage and stall any attempt to convert civil disputes into

criminal cases to put pressure on the other side (See Binod

Kumar and Others v. State of Bihar and Another

14

). Thus, it will

not be proper to hold that Section 102 of the Code empowers a

police officer to seize immovable property, land, plots, residential

houses, streets or similar properties. Given the nature of criminal

litigation, such seizure of an immovable property by the police

officer in the form of an attachment and dispossession would not

facilitate investigation to collect evidence/material to be produced

during inquiry and trial. As far as possession of the immovable

14

(2014) 10 SCC 663

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property is concerned, specific provisions in the form of Sections

145 and 146 of the Code can be invoked as per and in

accordance with law. Section 102 of the Code is not a general

provision which enables and authorises the police officer to seize

immovable property for being able to be produced in the Criminal

Court during trial. This, however, would not bar or prohibit the

police officer from seizing documents/ papers of title relating to

immovable property, as it is distinct and different from seizure of

immovable property. Disputes and matters relating to the physical

and legal possession and title of the property must be adjudicated

upon by a Civil Court.

21.In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Reference is answered by

holding that the power of a police officer under Section 102 of the

Code to seize any property, which may be found under

circumstances that create suspicion of the commission of any

offence, would not include the power to attach, seize and seal an

immovable property.

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22.The Registry is directed to list the individual appeals for disposal

before the appropriate Bench.

..................................CJI.

(RANJAN GOGOI)

......................................J.

(DEEPAK GUPTA)

......................................J.

(SANJIV KHANNA)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 24, 2019.

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1481 OF 2019

(@ SLP (CRL.) NO.1513 of 2011)

NEVADA PROPERTIES PRIVATE LIMITED 

THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR                                 …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.        …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1122 OF 2011

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.  1482­1485    OF 2019

(@ SLP(CRL.) NOS.891­894 OF 2011)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1486      OF 2019

(@ SLP(CRL.) NO.4360 OF 2011)

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.    1487      OF 2019

(@ SLP(CRL.) NO.3958 OF 2013)

J U D G M E N T

Deepak Gupta, J.

1.I have gone through the judgment delivered by my brother,

Justice   Sanjiv   Khanna.     I   agree   with   the   finding   in   the   said

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judgment. However, in view of the nature of the issue involved, I

intend to give a few additional reasons of my own.

2.Since brother Khanna in his judgment has given elaborate

reasons to hold that in the context of Section 102 the words ‘any

property’ would mean only movable property, I am not repeating

the same for the sake of brevity.  

3.The main issue involved is what is the meaning to be given to

the word ‘property’ occurring in Section 102 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure which reads as follows:­

“Power   of  police  officer  to  seize  certain   property.  ­  (1) Any

police officer may seize any property which may be alleged or

suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under

circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of

any offence.

(2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in charge of

a   police   station,   shall   forthwith   report   the   seizure   to   that

officer.

(3)   Every   police   officer   acting   under   sub­section   (1)   shall

forthwith   report   the   seizure   to   the   Magistrate   having

jurisdiction   and   where   the   property   seized   is   such   that   it

cannot be conveniently transported to  the Court, or where

there is difficulty in securing proper accommodation for the

custody of such property, or where the continued retention of

the   property   in   police   custody   may   not   be   considered

necessary   for   the   purpose   of   investigation,   he   may   give

custody   thereof   to   any   person   on   his   executing   a   bond

undertaking to produce the property before the Court as and

when required and to give effect to the further orders of the

Court as to the disposal of the same:

Provided that where the property seized under sub­section

(1) is subject to speedy and natural decay and if the person

entitled to the  possession  of such  property  is unknown or

absent   and   the   value   of   such   property   is   less   than   five

hundred rupees, it may forthwith be sold by auction under

the orders of the Superintendent of Police and the provisions

of   Sections   457   and   458   shall,   as   nearly   as   may   be

practicable, apply to the net proceeds of such sale.”

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Sub­section (1) of Section 102 empowers a police officer to seize

any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been

stolen or which may be found under circumstances which create

suspicion of the commission of any offence.   On behalf of the

appellant it is urged that the word ‘any property’ is of very wide

amplitude and will cover movable and immovable properties.  This

stand is also supported by the State of Maharashtra.  On the other

hand, it is contended by the respondents that in the context in

which the word ‘any property’ is used in the Section, it has to be

limited to movable property and cannot be extended to immovable

property.

4.At first blush, the arguments on behalf of the appellant seem

attractive because normally the words ‘any property’ would mean

property of any kind or description.  However, it is a well settled

principle   of   statutory   interpretation   that   when   construing   the

words of a statute, they must be read in a manner in which they fit

into the section and in the context of the purpose sought to be

achieved by that particular provision of law.  

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5.Sub­section (1) of Section 102 empowers a police officer to

seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been

stolen. Theft can take place only of movable property and not of

immovable property.  In my view, the word ‘seized’ has been used

in the sense of taking actual physical custody of the property.

Sub­section 3 of Section 102 provides that where it is difficult to

conveniently   transport   the   property   to   the   court   or   there   is

difficulty in securing proper accommodation for the custody of the

property, then the property can be given to any person on his

executing a bond.  This per se indicates that the property must be

capable of production in court and also be capable of being kept

inside some accommodation.  This obviously cannot be done with

immovable property.

6.Section 102 has been in the statute book for more than a

century.   Section 102 corresponds to Section 550 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1898.   For more than a century the courts

have read the words ‘any property’ to mean movable property

151617

15

 AIR 1960 AII 405

16

 WP(C) No. 12275 of 2012, Judgment dated 26.07.2012 (Ker HC)

17

 2016(3) PLJR 464

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and   no   decision   to   the   contrary   was   brought   to   our   notice.

Reliance is only placed on the judgment of this Court in State of

Maharashtra vs.   Tapas D. Neogy

18

.  In that case, the question

was   totally   different   and   this   court   only   decided   that   a   bank

account of an accused was property within the meaning of Section

102.     The   Court   did   not   go   into   the   question   of   movable   or

immovable property and, therefore, this judgment would not be

applicable.

7.I would also like to point out that in the Code of Criminal

Procedure   itself   the   Legislature   has   in   various   provisions

specifically used the words ‘movable’ and ‘immovable’ property.

Some of those have been dealt with by my learned brother. In this

regard reference may be made to Section 83 of the Cr.P.C. which

relates to seizure of the property of a proclaimed absconder.  Sub­

section 1 of Section 83 reads as follows:­

“(1) The   Court   issuing   a   proclamation   under   section   82   may,   for

reasons to be recorded in writing, at any time after the issue of the

proclamation,   order   the   attachment   of   any   property,   movable   or

immovable, or both, belonging to the proclaimed person:...”

18

 (1999) 7 SCC 685

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The Legislature in its wisdom uses the words “order the attachment

of   any   property,   movable   or   immovable   or   both”.     This   is   in

contradistinction to the words ‘any property’ used in Section 102.

8.Chapter VIIA was introduced in Cr.P.C. vide Act 40 of 1993

w.e.f.   20

th

  July   1994.     This   Chapter   deals   with   reciprocal

arrangements for assistance in certain matters and procedure for

attachment and forfeiture of property.  Property has been defined

in Section 105A(d) as follows:­

“‘Property’ means property and assets of every description whether

corporeal   or   incorporeal,   movable   or   immovable,   tangible   or

intangible and deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest

in, such property or assets derived or used in the commission of an

offence and includes property obtained through proceeds of crime.”

This would include property of all kinds, movable and immovable.

The Legislature made it clear that property of all kinds can be

attached and forfeited.

Section 105C (1) reads as follows:­

  “S.105C   (1)   Where   a  Court   in   India   has   reasonable  grounds   to

believe   that   any   property   obtained   by   any   person   is   derived   or

obtained, directly or indirectly, by such person from the commission

of an offence, it may make an order of attachment or forfeiture of

such property, as it may deem fit under the provisions of Section

105D to 105J (both inclusive).”

Reading all these provisions together, it is clear that when any

court in India has reasonable grounds to believe that any property

has been obtained by any person directly or indirectly from the

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commission  of   an  offence,   the  Court   may  make  an  order   for

attachment or forfeiture of such property.

9.This Court is not concerned with the procedure to be followed

for attachment and forfeiture of the property but only the meaning

of the word ‘property’.  Thus, Section 105C empowers the court to

order forfeiture of any property which it may feel is derived or

obtained directly or indirectly by the commission of an offence.  

10.If the argument of the appellant and the State of Maharashtra

is accepted then there was no need for the legislature to have

introduced Chapter VIIA.  It would also be pertinent to mention

that the power of attachment and forfeiture is given to courts and

not to police officer.  As pointed out in the judgment of my learned

brother, if a police officer is given the power to seize immovable

property it may lead to an absolutely chaotic situation.  To give an

example, if there is a physical fight between the landlord and the

tenant over the rented premises and if the version of the appellant

is to be accepted, the police official would be entitled to seize the

tenanted property.  This would make a mockery of rent laws.  To

give another example, if a person forges a will and thereby claims

property on the basis of the forged will, can the police officer be

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given the power to seize the entire property, both movable and

immovable, that may be mentioned in the will?  The answer has to

be in the negative.  Otherwise it would lead to an absurd situation

which could never have been envisaged by the Legislature.  The

power of seizure in Section 102 has to be limited to movable

property. 

11.As far as the  meaning of  property in Section 452 of  the

Cr.P.C. is concerned, that is not a question referred to the larger

Bench and therefore, I would refrain from saying anything about

that.  

12.In view of the above, I would answer the reference by holding

that   the  phrase  ‘any  property’  in Section  102  will  only  cover

moveable property and not immovable property.  

………………………… J.

(Deepak Gupta)

New Delhi

September 24, 2019

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