http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5

PETITIONER:

NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

ALLIED MOTORS PVT. LTD. & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/10/1995

BENCH:

PUNCHHI, M.M.

BENCH:

PUNCHHI, M.M.

SINGH N.P. (J)

CITATION:

1996 AIR 388 1995 SCC Supl. (4) 150

JT 1995 (7) 460 1995 SCALE (6)37

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

Punchhi, J.

This appeal by special leave is directed against the

judgment and order dated May 21, 1981 of the High Court of

Delhi at New Delhi passed in Letters patent Appeal No.121 of

1973, upturning the decision of a learned Single Judge, as a

result of which Civil Writ Petition No.653-D of 1963 stands

allowed, and sequally the demand of Advertisment Tax

quashed.

The appellant is the New Delhi Municipal Committee. In

exercise of its powers under the provisions of Section

188(v) and 199 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, the

committee appellant, after following the statutory

procedure, framed Bye-laws, providing for the control and

regulation of advertisements, which inter alia provided as

follows:

"Bye-laws

1. Every person who erects, exhibits,

fixes, paints, carries or retains upon

or over any land, building, wall,

scores, boarding, structure or vehicle

any advertisement within the limits of

the New Delhi Municipal Committee and as

mentioned in the Chief Commissioner's

notification No.F.3(56)/56-LSG dated the

23rd January 1958, shall be liable to

pay advertisement tax on the same

according to the schedule of rates

appended to the said notification. This

schedule of rates is reproduced in

Appendix 'A' to these Bye-laws.

2. No person shall fix up, erect or

exhibit any advertisement without paying

the entire amount of tax due in advance.

3. xxxxx

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5

4. xxxxx

5. xxxxx

6. xxxxx

7. The Tax shall not be payable on

the following categories of

advertisements :

(Before 19.2.1971) (After ( 19.2.71)

(a) Name boards Name boards display-

displayed by the ed by the traders on

traders on their their own premises

own premises provided they do not

provided the board contain any item of

is purely a name advertisement other

board and it does than the name of the

not contain any trade that may be

item of advertise- carried out at the

ment. premises.

(b) xxxxx

(c) xxxxx

(d) xxxxx

(e) Advertisement which relates to the

trade, profession or business carried on

within the land or building upon or over

which such advertisement is exhibited or

to any sale or letting of such land or

building or any effects therein or any

sale, entertainment or meeting to be

held on or upon or in the same.

Provided that exemption under this item

shall apply only to one board displayed

by the owner or his agent.

(f) Advertisement which relates to the

name of the land or building upon or

over which the advertisement is

exhibited or to the name of the owner or

occupier of such land or building.

(g) xxxxx

(h) xxxxx

EXPLANATION - The word advertisement'

means any word, letter, model, sign,

placard, notice, device or

representation, whether illuminated or

not, in the nature of and employed

wholly or in part for the purpose of

advertisement, announcement or

direction."

The writ-petitioners before the High Court are the

respondents herein. The first respondent M/s. Allied Motors

Pvt. Ltd. carries on business of sale, purchase and repairs

etc. of motor cars, Lambretta Scooters, and truck chasis and

also deals in the sale of Burshane Gas. The second

respondent is its Managing Director. The third respondent is

an Association of Traders having their business place in the

territorial area of the Committee. The Respondent No.1

exhibits eight neon signs boards on its premises, those

being:

1. "Allied Motors Private Ltd. " Board being of a

paerticular size

2. "Perkings" Board being of a particular size

3. "Perkings" "

4. "R.R." "

5. "Bedford" "

6. "Lambretta" "

7. "Burshane" "

8. "Gaskets" "

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5

In view of exhibitilon of these nenon-signs, the

appellant-Committee rasided a demand raised a demand against

the said respondents for payment of advertisement tax.

Feeling aggrieved, the respondents moved the High Court of

Delhi by was of a writ petition challenging the imposition

of tax on a veriety of grounds. A learned Single Judge, who

got to grips with the matter posed three questions for

determination, out of whom two relating to the

constitutionality of the measure do not survive as they

stand dropped, for they were answered against the writ-

petitioners by the learned Single Judge and those were not

raised again before the Letters Patent Bench. The Third

question was as follows:

"Whether the Boards displayed by the

Petitioners are not "advertisement"

boards but merely sign-boards of the

items in which the petitioners deal"

Holding that the boards displyed by the respondents

were in the nature of advertisments the learned Single Judge

dismissed the writ petition. Before the Letters Patent Bench

the third question got subsided and then came to the

forefront claim of the respondents for exemption under

clauses (a) of Bye Law 7. The Letters Patent Bench accepted

the appeal on the interpretaion given by it to clause (a) of

Bye-Law 7 to the effect that the boards displayed by the

respondents were purely nameboards, containing no item of

advertisement except the trade name of the articles

suggested to be offered for sale. This has given rise to

this appeal by the Committee as the respondents now stand

absolved from payment of tax.

Before we garner our minds to discover how certain

advertisements are exempted from taxation, it needs to be

priorly accepted that those would be advertisements, as

covered and concerived of by Bye-law 1. If the act

attracting taxation does not come within the scope of

'advertisement' within the meaning of Bye-law 7 any

exemption from payment of tax on exempted advertisements

does not arise. But if the act comes within the scope of

advertisement, unguestionably and undeniably, then alone can

resort be had to bye-law 7 to discover whether the

advertisement is such a one to which any exemption can be

attracted. It is in this light that we see that Clause (a)

of Bye-law 7, provides that tax shall not be payable on

nameboard displayed by the traders on their own premises,

provided the board is purely a nameboard and it does not

contain any item of advertisement. It is plain therefore

that it shall intitially by an advertisement but would be

exempted from taxation if (i) is displyed by a trader, (ii)

on his own premises, (iii) purely as a name board as such

and (iv) on purity maintained by not containing any other

item of advertisement. That is the pre-amended Bye-law with

which we are instantly concerned. In contrast Clause (f)

specifically takes out advertisements which relate to the

name of the land or building upon or over which the name of

the land or building upon or over which the advertisement is

exhibited or relating to the name of the owner or occupier

of such land or building. By process of contrast and

exclusion, advertisements so exhibited, which related to the

name of the land or builiding or to the name of its owner or

occupier is a category apart and distinct from advertisement

by means of nameboards. Even distinct are the

advertisements, as conceived of in Clause (e) of Bye-law 7,

which relate to the trade, profession or business carried on

within the land or building upon or over which such

advertisement is exhibited or to any sale or letting of such

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5

land or building or any effects therein or any sale,

entertainment or meeting to be held on or upon or in the

same; provided that exemption under this item shall apply

only to one board displayed by the owner or his agent.

Such being the state of bye-laws, we would be

causing violence to the spirit of Clause (a) of of Bye-law

7, in splitting the expression "nameboard" into two separate

words i.e. name and board and depleting the provision of its

intent. Apparently this is a term of art, finding its way to

the alleys of law by subordinate legislation. Necessarily,

we need to seek help from English dictionaries and cannot go

by just impressions. According to The Random House

Dictionary of the English language, the expression

"name.board" (perhaps hyphenated) means a sign-board that

identifies a place or object; it is a name painted,

stenciled, etc. on something, as on the side of a ship.

(Name + Board). According to Webster's Third New

International Dictionary, the word "nameboard" (as one word)

is meant as an identifying signboard (as for a station, a

shop or a ship) ; also an identifying name displayed (as on

the side of a ship) other than on a board. The nameboard (be

it called a single word, or combination of two words, or an

expression) thus in the English diction a distinct meaning

which cannot be mutilated by splitting the same into two

separate words of 'name' and 'board', discovering their

individual meanings and then tying them up. It would rather

be safe to rely on the aforesaid two dictionary meanings to

deduce that even though under Clause (a) of Bye-law 7 two

words, i.e. 'name' and 'board' are used in succession, what

is intended to mean is that these go to make one word or a

combined word, in order to exempt advertisement by

displaying of the name-board by the trader on his

ownpremises, provided the board is purely a name-board and

does not contain any item of advertisment. Significantly, in

the in-built proviso, the word "name-board" in its pristine

purity, reflects something more than a board and in that

manner distinctive. This adds to our analysis that the words

'name' and 'board' are not separate so as to be given

separate meanings anf then coalescing them up. Rather, in

our view the name-board is one word, as recognised

separately, on its own strength, in the dictionaries. And

according to those dictionaries, the identifying name so

displayed pertains to the place or object, not the name of

the trade or the owner. A name-board thus plays the part of

the identifier, if the place/premises has a name, by display

of such name. To demonstrate and clarify it further, we say

that if by means of paint or structural signs an identifying

name is engrafted over a building, as an identifying

measure, thenm it is a name board. because becoming a part

of the premises it makes the premises self introductory by

name.

The case of the respondents being that they use neon-

lights to disply the names of commodities they sell would

fall since those advertisements cannot be called name-boards

or even as identifying the name of any object in which the

trader was doing his business that being barely barely

descriptive of the commodity. It would be more apt to say

that the name-board relates to the objest and not to the

subject. This marked distinction takes out the case of the

respondents from seeking exemption under Clause (a) of By-

law 7. The Division Bench of the High Court apparently was

misled to discover separate meaning of the word 'name' and

then of the word 'board' whereafter to put them into a

combination, assigning a meaning to 'name-board' as if

covering trade description of commodities offered for sale

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5

and granted relief to the responedents on that basis. This

in our view was a wrong approach leading the judgment to be

view was a wrong approach leading the judgment to be

vulnerable.

The respondents did not claim any exemption under

Clause (e) of Bye-law 7. The said provision has been

adverted earlier in passing. It is to be seen that

advertisement as relating to the trade, profession or

business carried on within the land or building upon or over

which such advertisement is put are to be exempted. Equally

exemption is claimable for such land or building or any

effects therein. Like-wise adertisments relating to any

entertainment or meeting to be held on or upon or in the

same is to be exempted; provided that exemption is valid to

the owner or agent for one board. Thus advertisement which

has nexus with the trade profession or business would

qualify for exemption if relating to the named activites.

The respondents succeeded before the Letters Patent Banch of

the High Court only on the basis of clause (a) of Bye law 7.

The bench when called upon by the present appellant to give

favourable interpretation to clause (a) of Bye laws 7 on the

basis of clause (e) observed that it appears to them that

clause (e) observed that it appears to them that clause (e)

would apply to those adertisements which relate (only) to

the trade, profession or business or something more than

mere name boards. The respondents herein (the appellants

there-at) did not build their case on the envil of claiuse

(e) of Bye laws 7 and any attempt herein, in the absence of

the views of the High Court, would negate proper handling.

We would therefore leave the matter at that. This course is

all the more necessary when there is an amendment in clause

(a) of Bye laws 7 effective from 19-2-1971 whereunder a

name-boards remains as such displayable by the traders on

their own premises provided they do not add any item of

advertisement thereto other than the name of the trade that

may be carried out at the premises. But, as said before, we

are concerned with the period prior to that requiring us not

to give a positive opinion.

For the foregoin reasons we are of the considered view

that the judgment and order of the Latter Patent Bench

deserves to be set aside. We accordingly allow this appeal,

set aside the same dismissing the civil writ petition of

respondent 1 to 3, upholding the damand of advertisement

tax. Parties to bear their own costs throughout.