2026 INSC 390 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 5673 -5674 OF 2025

NILESH C. OJHA ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE

AT BOMBAY THROUGH

SECRETARY & ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.

2. The appellant, Nilesh C Ojha

1, has preferred the

instant appeals under Section 19 of the Contempt of

Courts Act, 1971, for assailing the order dated 17

th

September, 2025 passed by a Full Bench of the High

Court of Judicature at Bombay

2 in Interim

Application No.3297 of 2025, arising out of Criminal

Suo Motu Contempt Petition No.1 of 2025 . By the

impugned order, the High Court rejected the prayer

3

1

Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant-contemnor”.

2

Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”.

3

Interim Application No. 3297 of 2025.

2

made by the appellant-contemnor seeking

impleadment of a sitting Judge

4 of the High Court as

a party-respondent. The impleadment was sought in

connection with Interim Application No.2005 of 2025,

filed by the appellant-contemnor for discharge from

the contempt proceedings initiated against him

pursuant to a show cause notice dated 9

th April,

2025. While disposing of the said application, the

High Court further directed the Registry to register a

separate suo motu criminal contempt case

5 against

the appellant-contemnor.

3. The appellant-contemnor, has also assailed the

order dated 16

th October, 2025 passed by the High

Court in Interim Application No.3843 of 2025 in

Criminal Suo Motu Contempt Petition Nos.1 of 2025

and 4 of 2025, whereby the High Court dismissed the

said application seeking recall of the order dated 17

th

September, 2025.

BRIEF FACTS

4. Succinctly stated, the facts relevant and

essential for disposal of these appeals are noted

hereinbelow.

4

Hereinafter, referred to as “Justice X”.

5

Criminal Suo Motu Contempt Petition No. 4 of 2025.

3

5. The appellant-contemnor had instituted

Criminal Writ Petition No.1612 of 2025 on behalf of

his client, Mr. Satish Salian, inter alia seeking a

direction for investigation by the Central Bureau of

Investigation into the death of his daughter, which

was alleged to have occurred under suspicious

circumstances.

6. Criminal Writ Petition No.1612 of 2025 came to

be listed for admission on 2

nd April, 2025 before a

Division Bench of the High Court, of which “Justice

X” was one of the Judges constituting the Bench. On

the said date, the appellant-contemnor mentioned

the matter before the said bench and apprised the

Court that the subject-matter jurisdiction to

entertain the matter vested in another Bench of the

High Court. Upon such submission, the Division

Bench directed the Registry to take appropriate steps

in accordance with law and the roster assignment.

7. However, on the evening of 1

st April, 2025, prior

to mentioning of the matter before the Division

Bench, the appellant-contemnor addressed a press

conference wherein he made certain insinuations,

casting aspersions on the Honourable Judge. In the

course of the said press interaction, he alleged that

4

“Justice X” was disqualified from hearing the case on

the ground that her sister was an accused in the FIR

lodged at the instance of his client and was also

stated to be associated with the Nationalist Congress

Party (Sharadchandra Pawar).

8. Upon becoming aware of the aforesaid press

conference, “Justice X” addressed a letter dated 4

th

April, 2025 to the then Chief Justice of the High

Court, placing on record the statements made therein

and bringing the same to his notice, and stated that

the aspersions cast by the appellant-contemnor had

not only tarnished her personal reputation but also

impugned and maligned her reputation in the judicial

fraternity.

9. The Chief Justice of the High Court, upon

receipt of the letter forwarded by “Justice X”, took suo

motu cognizance which in the opinion of the

Honourable Chief Justice tantamounted to contempt.

Consequently, in exercise of the administrative

powers vested in him, the Chief Justice constituted a

Bench of five Judges to consider and adjudicate the

matter in accordance with law. The proceedings were

accordingly drawn up and registered as Criminal Suo

Motu Contempt Petition No.1 of 2025.

5

10. The matter was listed on 8

th April, 2025, when

the High Court took note of the allegations and

imputations levelled by the appellant-contemnor

against “Justice X”. The Court observed that the

statements made during the press conference

demanding the recusal of a sitting Judge, prima facie,

had the tendency to scandalize the Court, lower its

authority, and interfere with the due course of

judicial proceedings. Consequently, the High Court

directed the Registry to issue a notice to the

appellant-contemnor under Rule 9(1) read with Rule

8 of the Contempt of Courts (Bombay High Court)

Rules, 1994. Accordingly, a show cause notice came

to be issued by the Registry on 9

th April, 2025 and

the same was duly served upon the appellant -

contemnor on 11

th April, 2025.

11. On 29

th April, 2025, the High Court, on the oral

prayer of the appellant-contemnor, granted him time

to file an appropriate application seeking discharge in

the pending contempt proceedings. In pursuance of

the said liberty, the appellant-contemnor instituted

Interim Application No.2005 of 2025, inter alia,

seeking discharge from the contempt notice issued

against him.

6

12. In the interregnum, the appellant-contemnor

filed Interim Application No.3209 of 2025 placing on

record his reply-cum-defence to the show cause

notice, inter alia contending that he had been falsely

implicated at the instance of “Ju stice X”. The

appellant-contemnor also preferred Interim

Application No.3297 of 2025 seeking impleadment of

“Justice X” as a party respondent to the proceedings

and for issuance of directions to call for the response

thereto.

13. The High Court vide impugned order dated 17

th

September, 2025, dismissed the Interim Application

No.3297 of 2025, observing that the person who

merely furnishes information to the Chief Justice

cannot be construed as a complainant nor can such

a person be regarded as a necessary or proper party

in the contempt proceedings. While dismissing the

Interim Application No.3297 of 2025, the High Court

suo motu proceeded to take additional cognizance of

the disparaging and scandalous imputations made

by the appellant-contemnor against “Justice X”

within that very application. The Registry was

accordingly directed to register a separate criminal

contempt proceeding against the appellant -

7

contemnor, which consequently came to be registered

as Criminal Suo Motu Contempt Petition No.4 of

2025.

14. Furthermore, the High Court held the

appellant-contemnor and the fifteen advocates

representing/associating with him to be equally

liable for contempt and professional misconduct on

account of their collaboration in the drafting and

filing of the said application, characterizing the same

as an “adventure”. While so holding, the High Court

issued a strong advisory to the said advocates, asking

them to remain mindful of their professional

obligations in future rather than directing any

immediate punitive action or interdiction.

15. Aggrieved by the aforesaid findings, the

appellant-contemnor filed Interim Application

No.3843 of 2025 seeking multiple reliefs, including

the recall of the order dated 17

th September, 2025,

which the appellant-contemnor contended was per

incuriam, impliedly overruled, and void . The

appellant-contemnor had also sought disqualification

of the five-Judge Bench on the ground of alleged

conflict of interest and also pleaded that the learned

8

Chief Justice ought to recuse from hearing the

criminal contempt proceedings.

16. The High Court, vide the impugned order dated

16

th October, 2025, dismissed Interim Application

No.3843 of 2025, holding that if the appellant -

contemnor claimed that the precedents relied upon

had been overruled, the appropriate remedy lay in

assailing the judgment before a higher forum. The

Court further held that the prayer seeking recusal of

the Chief Justice and disqualification of the five

Judges constituting the larger bench, on the ground

of an alleged conflict of interest, was wholly frivolous,

misconceived and amounted to a sheer abuse of the

process of the Court. The High Court also cautioned

the appellant-contemnor that, in the event his

conduct is found to be inappropriate, it would be

constrained to direct that he be taken into custody.

17. Being aggrieved by the orders dated 17

th

September, 2025 and 16

th October, 2025, as well as

the consequential directions issued therein, the

appellant-contemnor has approached this Court by

way of the present appeals.

9

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

18. The learned counsel appearing for the

appellant-contemnor submitted that the impugned

orders reflect an erroneous, impermissible and

excessive exercise of contempt jurisdiction, inasmuch

as the High Court while initiating suo motu

proceedings proceeded beyond the settled contours

governing criminal contempt. It was contended that

the directions impugned herein, including the

institution of fresh contempt proceedings and the

summary rejection of the appellant -contemnor’s

applications and objections, suffer from manifest

legal infirmities and warrant interference by this

Court.

19. It was submitted that the appellant-contemnor

was well justified in contending that the decisions in

Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P.

6, and C.K.

Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta

7, do not continue to govern

the field in view of the subsequent authoritative

pronouncement of this Court in P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv

Shankar

8. Placing specific reliance on paragraph 39

6

1993 Supp (1) SCC 529.

7

(1971) 1 SCC 626.

8

(1988) 3 SCC 167.

10

thereof, learned counsel submitted that this Court

unequivocally held that the ratio in C.K. Daphtary

(supra), stood statutorily eclipsed upon enactment of

the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and was of no

assistance thereafter. It was thus contended that

raising such a legal submission could not, by any

stretch, constitute contempt, but rather falls within

the permissible bounds of bona fide legal defence.

20. It was also submitted that the ratio laid down in

C.K. Daphtary (supra) no longer holds the field in

light of the later decision of this Court in In re: C.S.

Karnan

9, wherein a seven-Judge bench, while

examining the contours of contempt jurisdiction,

unequivocally clarified that imputations against a

Judge are not ipso facto impermissible, and that an

allegation founded on demonstrable truth, made

bona fide and in public interest, does not

automatically constitute contempt.

21. It was further submitted that the finding of

professional misconduct recorded by the High Court

against sixteen advocates is wholly unjustified,

without jurisdiction and void ab initio, inasmuch as

9

(2017) 7 SCC 1.

11

the power to initiate and adjudicate disciplinary

proceedings against advocates is statutorily vested

exclusively with the State Bar Council/Bar Council of

India, which is to be exercised strictly in the manner

prescribed under the Advocates Act, 1961 and the

Bar Council of India Rules. It was contended that, in

the absence of initiation of proceedings by the

concerned Bar Council and strict compliance with

the mandatory statutory procedure, any

determination recording professional misconduct by

the High Co urt amounts to assumption of

jurisdiction not conferred by law, rendering the

impugned finding a nullity, and liable to be set aside.

22. Concluding the submissions, learned counsel

for the appellant-contemnor implored the Court to

allow the present appeals and consequently set aside

the impugned orders as being arbitrary, perverse and

unsustainable in law and on facts.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE

RESPONDENTS

23. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the

High Court of Judicature at Bombay opposed the

appeals and supported the impugned orders,

12

submitting that the same have been rendered upon

proper appreciation of the material on record and for

ensuring proper administration of justice by the High

Court.

24. It was contended that the orders under

challenge do not suffer from any illegality, perversity,

or procedural irregularity so as to warrant

interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate

jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

25. We have heard and considered the submissions

advanced by learned counsel for the parties. We have

also carefully perused the impugned orders and sifted

the material available on record.

26. Judicial independence forms a foundational

and non-derogable feature of the constitutional

scheme. It ensures that courts are able to discharge

their adjudicatory functions free from external

influence, fear, favour, or pressure, thereby

safeguarding the rule of law and securing the effective

dispensation of justice. The strength and legitimacy

of the judiciary lie not in any capacity to command or

compel, but in the confidence of the people in its

integrity, neutrality, and institutional independence.

13

27. This Court in Shanti Bhushan v . Supreme

Court Of India

10, emphasised that sole strength of

the judiciary lies in the confidence and trust reposed

in it by the public, and proceeded to observe as

follows:-

“36. The judiciary even without the sword or

the purse, remains the guardian of the

Constitution. Its sole strength lies in the

public confidence and the trust. A.S. Anand,

J. (as his Lordship then was, later the Chief

Justice of India) highlighted this aspect (though

in the context of contempt jurisdiction of the

Court) in State of Rajasthan v. Prakash

Chand [State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand,

(1998) 1 SCC 1] in the following words : (SCC pp.

38-39, para 58)

“58. … The virtue of humility in the

Judges and a constant awareness that

investment of power in them is meant

for use in public interest and to uphold

the majesty of rule of law, would to a

large extent ensure self-restraint in

discharge of all judicial functions and

preserve the independence of judiciary.

It needs no emphasis to say that all

actions of a Judge must be judicious in

character. Erosion of credibility of

the judiciary, in the public mind,

for whatever reasons, is the

greatest threat to the independence

of the judiciary. Eternal vigilance by

the Judges to guard against any such

latent internal danger is, therefore,

necessary, lest we “suffer from self-

inflicted mortal wounds”. We must

remember that the Constitution does

10

(2018) 8 SCC 396.

14

not give unlimited powers to anyone

including the Judge of all levels. The

societal perception of Judges as being

detached and impartial referees is the

greatest strength of the judiciary and

every member of the judiciary must

ensure that this perception does not

receive a setback consciously or

unconsciously. Authenticity of the

judicial process rests on public

confidence and public confidence rests

on legitimacy of judicial process.

Sources of legitimacy are in the

impersonal application by the Judge of

recognised objective principles which

owe their existence to a system as

distinguished from subjective moods,

predilections, emotions and

prejudices.”

37. We may also quote the following passage

from S.P. Gupta [S.P. Gupta v. Union of India,

1981 Supp SCC 87] (per Pathak, J.) : (SCC p.

705, para 874)

“874. … While the administration of

justice draws its legal sanction from

the Constitution, its credibility

rests in the faith of the people.

Indispensable to that faith is the

independence of the judiciary. An

independent and impartial judiciary

supplies the reason for the judicial

institution; it also gives character

and content to the constitutional

milieu.”

38. In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn.

case [Supreme Court Advocates -on-Record

Assn. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441] , J.S.

Verma, J. echoed the aforesaid sentiments with

the following message : (SCC pp. 646-47, para

329)

15

“329. The role of the judiciary under

the Constitution is a pious trust

reposed by the people. The

Constitution and the democratic polity

thereunder shall not survive, the day

judiciary fails to justify the said trust.

If the judiciary fails, the Constitution

fails and the people might opt for some

other alternative.”

39. Thus, the faith of the people is the

bedrock on which the edifice of judicial

review and efficacy of the adjudication are

founded. Erosion of credibility of the

judiciary, in the public mind, for whatever

reasons, is greatest threat to the

independence of the judiciary. We live in an

age of accountability. What is required of Judges

is changing. Judgments of the courts are widely

discussed, debated and even criticised. In this

age of technology, open society and liberal

democracy coupled with varied nature of cases

raising complex issues which are decided by the

courts, including “hard cases” any outcome

whereof may be susceptible to criticism, as both

views may appear to be equally strong. In that

sense, judiciary walks the tightrope of

independence. It has also become a regular

feature that even laymen, who are

constitutionally illiterate, enter such debate and

evaluate the outcomes influenced by their

emotions, rather than on legal or constitutional

principles.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

28. In this constitutional backdrop, any unfounded

or intemperate allegations impugning the integrity,

motives, or impartiality of the judiciary, whether

directed against the institution or an individual

16

Judge, assume serious significance. Such

imputations, when made without substantiated basis

and in a manner calculated to erode public faith,

have the potential to diminish the credibility of the

justice delivery system. While fair, reasoned, and

bona fide criticism of judicial decisions remains a

legitimate facet of democratic discourse, reckless

aspersions strike at the very foundation of judicial

independence by undermining the trust upon which

the authority of the judiciary ultimately rests.

29. A litigant aggrieved by a judicial order is

undoubtedly entitled to question its correctness

before a higher forum. However, the legitimacy of

such challenge rests upon civilised and temperate

criticism of the judicial determination and not upon

insinuations directed at the integrity or neutrality of

the Judge. A clear distinction must be maintained

between assailing the correctness of a judicial

decision and personalising the grievance by

attributing motives to the Judge concerned.

30. In the present case, the appellant-contemnor

has levelled serious imputations against “Justice X”,

a sitting Judge of the High Court. The allegations

voiced by the appellant-contemnor during the press

17

conference, as well as those reiterated in the Interim

Application No.3297 of 2025 , attribute lack of

impartiality and improper motives to a constitutional

functionary discharging judicial duties.

31. The appellant-contemnor, being a member of

the Bar and an officer of the Court, was under a

heightened obligation to conduct himself in a manner

befitting the dignity of the legal profession and the

institutional sanctity of the judicial process.

Members of the Bar occupy a position of privilege and

responsibility in the administration of justice, and

their conduct, both within and outside the

courtroom, must reflect restraint, sobriety and

fidelity to the ethical standards governing the

profession.

32. In this backdrop, the course adopted by the

appellant-contemnor in addressing a press

conference and publicly voicing allegations against a

sitting Judge cannot be viewed lightly. The act of

carrying a pending judicial controversy into the

public domain in a manner that tends to

sensationalise the proceedings or scandalise the

institution or its constitutional component, i.e., the

Judges, is wholly inconsistent with the discipline

18

expected of an advocate. Professional ethics require

that grievances against judicial orders must be

ventilated through established legal remedies before

appropriate judicial forums, rather than through

public commentary capable of influencing perception

about the fairness or integrity of the judicial process.

The manner in which the press conference w as

convened and the allegations were projected is, prima

facie, unbecoming of a member of law professional

and falls short of the standards of propriety,

restraint, professional, and ethical responsibility

which the legal profession demands. An advocate,

more than any other stakeholder in the justice

delivery system, bears a heightened duty to uphold

the dignity of the institution and to act with

circumspection in matters touching upon the

administration of justice. Public confidence in the

judiciary constitutes an indispensable foundation of

the rule of law, and any attempt to scandalise or

sensationalise judicial proceedings undermines that

very foundation.

33. Upon a prima facie consideration of the material

on record, the allegations, as presently framed,

appear to traverse that well-recognised boundary.

19

They are not confined to identifying any error of law

or fact, but extend to imputing motives without any

demonstrable foundation. Assertions of this nature,

particularly when directed against a sitting Judge of

the High Court, require a degree of responsibility and

substantiation commensurate with their

seriousness. The tenor and sweep of the allegations,

therefore, raise concerns that go beyond the

immediate lis between the parties.

34. In our considered view, allegations of this

character, if left unchecked, possess an inherent

tendency to erode public confidence in the

administration of justice. While accountability and

scrutiny are integral to a constitutional democracy,

imputations of personal nature against a Judge must

rest on unimpeachable material and be pursued

strictly in accordance with law, failing which, they

risk undermining the very edifice of judicial

independence.

35. As an upshot of the above discussion and having

regard to the stage at which the proceedings

presently stand, we are of the opinion that no case for

interference with the impugned orders is made out.

20

The issues raised can appropriately be examined by

the High Court in accordance with law.

36. We are, therefore, not inclined to interdict the

proceedings at this stage. We request the High Court

to proceed with the matter expeditiously and to

adjudicate upon all issues arising therein

independently and on their own merits.

37. We clarify that the observations made in the

preceding paragraphs are confined to a prima facie

consideration for the limited purpose of adjudication

of the present appeals. They shall not be construed

as any expression of opinion on the merits of the

controversy, nor shall they in any manner influence

the High Court in the independent exercise of its

judicial functions.

38. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.

39. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

……………………….J.

(VIKRAM NATH)

……………………….J.

(SANDEEP MEHTA)

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 20, 2026.