No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No.38635 of 2019
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-176 Year-2016 Thana- AIRPORT District- Patna
======================================================
Nilesh Kumar Singh @ Nilesh Kumar S/o Krishna Murari Singh R/o Prashya
Sadan, Riding Road, P.S.- Hawai Adda, District- Patna
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1.The State of Bihar
2.Pankaj Kumar Singh S/O Shri Raj Kishore Singh R/O Sanjay Gandhi Nagar,
Road NO-6, Hanuman Nagar, P.S.- Patrakar Nagar, District- Patna
... ... Opposite Party/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s: Mr. Naresh Dixit, Advocate
Mr. Binod Kumar Mishra, Advocate
Mr. Sanjay Pandey, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Nirmal Kumar Sinha, APP
For the Informant: Mr. Shubesh Pandey, Advocate
Mr. Amit Kumar Mishra, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE JITENDRA KUMAR
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 10.04.2024
The present petition has been filed on behalf of the
Petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.PC for quashing the
impugned order dated 29.03.2019 passed by Additional Sessions
Judge-II, Patna in Sessions Trial No. 467/2018 arising out of
Hawai Adda P.S. Case No. 176/2016 registered for offence
punishable under Section 304(B) read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code against the husband/Petitioner Nilesh Kumar
Singh, brother-in-law Ratnesh Kumar and wife of Ratnesh
Kumar. By the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court has rejected the
petition of the Accused/Petitioner Nilesh Kumar Singh filed
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under Section 227 of Cr.PC for discharge finding sufficient
material on record to frame charge under Section 304(B) of
Indian Penal Code.
2. The prosecution case as emerging from the First
Information Report is that the deceased, Rani Devi, daughter of
informant, Sri Pankaj Kumar Singh, was married with
the petitioner, Nilesh Kumar Singh @ Nilesh Kumar son of
Krishna Murari Singh about three years back. About after two
months of the marriage, the petitioner/husband, his brother,
Ratnesh Kumar son of Late Shyam Bihari Singh and wife of
Ratnesh Kumar started torturing the deceased stating that she
should ask her father to open a medical company for the
petitioner, failing which, she would not be allowed to live in her
matrimonial home. The informant was called by the petitioner
and his brother, Ratnesh Kumar to their home to be asked to
open a medical company for him. However, the informant
expressed his inability to open such a company saying that too
much money has already been spent on the marriage of his
daughter. Thereafter, all the accused persons stopped talking
with the deceased and started torturing her for dowry and
exerted pressure upon him to open a medical company. Then in
the month of September 2015, the petitioner who is son-in-law
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of the informant called him at his home by phone through his
friend, namely, Manish and again asked him to open medical
company for him and also demanded his house, upon which, the
informant told him that the house is in the name of three
brothers and he is unable to give this house to him. On such
statement, all the accused got angry. On 31.10.2016 at about
4:20 AM, a phone call came from Ratnesh Kumar, brother of
son-in-law, giving information that his daughter is ill and
admitted in PARAS Hospital. However, when the informant
wanted to know about the illness, he was informed that there
was a serious heart attack. When the informant reached PARAS
Hospital, he found his daughter, Rani Devi already dead. He has
claimed that the death of his daughter is unnatural. The
Fardbeyan was given at 7:30 AM at PARAS HMRI Hospital,
Patna.
3. After investigation, the police submitted charge-
sheet on 28.01.2017 bearing charge sheet No. 04/2017 for
offence punishable under Section 304(B)/34 of the IPC. As per
record, supplementary charge-sheet bearing charge-sheet No.
168/2017 dated 15.12.2017 was also submitted against two co-
accused, Ratnesh Kumar, son of Late Shyam Bihari Singh and
wife of Ratnesh Kumar for offence punishable under Sections
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304(B)/302/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
4. In course of trial, the petitioner moved an
application under Section 227 of the Cr.PC before the trial court
for his discharge. However, Ld. trial court vide its order dated
29.03.2019 rejected the aforesaid application against which the
petitioner has preferred the present petition under Section
482 Cr.PC for setting aside/quashing the impugned order dated
29.03.2019.
5. Heard Ld. counsel for the petitioner, Ld. counsel
for the informant and Ld. APP for the State.
6. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the
deceased, Rani Devi was an educated lady having degree of
M.Sc and she was an outgoing lady, though she was not in job.
However, there is no complaint on her part against her husband
or against any of her in-laws ever. He also submits that there is
no allegation of any demand of dowry or torture soon before the
death which is one of the essential ingredients of Section 304(B)
of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, offence under Section
304(B) of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the
petitioner. He further submits that even going by the FIR, the
last call for opening a medical company for the petitioner was
received way back in the month of September, 2015 by the
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informant i.e., much before death in the month of October of
2016. He further submits that the deceased was never tortured
by the petitioner and on her complaint of chest pain and
vomiting, she was admitted to the best hospital available at
Patna i.e., PARAS HMRI Hospital, where in course of
treatment, she was subjected to cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR) for about 45 minutes in course of which
there is every possibility of fracture of chest ribs. Hence, she
died natural death on account of illness she was suffering from.
7. He further refers to report of PARAS Hospital
which is a part of the case diary. He points out that there is no
injury on the person of the deceased as per the report. He further
submits that as per the medical report of PARAS HMRI
Hospital, Patna, there is no physical injury on the person of the
deceased. Even postmortem report does not mention any
external injury on the person of the deceased. He further
submits that the fracture of sternum at 3rd rib label was on
account of CPR given by PARAS Hospital in course of the
treatment. He has also annexed a copy of medical article on
CPR in which it has been mentioned that Dr. Michael Sayre, a
spokesperson for the American Heart Association and a
professor at the University of Washington in Seattle, said broken
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ribs are to be expected when doing CPR and the worry of
causing a break shouldn't deter people from helping someone in
cardiac arrest. He also submits referring to the same article, that
women come under high risk groups to suffer fracture of ribs
during CPR.
8. Referring to viscera report, learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that even viscera report does not suggest any
culpability of the petitioner or any of the accused persons
because as per viscera report no metalic, alkaloidal, glycosidal,
pesticidal and volatile poison could be detected in the contents
of glass jar.
9. Ld. Counsel further submits that one of the
essential ingredients, amongst others, is that the woman must
have been, soon before her death, subjected to cruelty or
harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.
This ingredient is missing in the whole case against the
petitioner. He further submits that, as per the allegation, there is
no demand of dowry and torturing soon before death, because
last call for opening a medical company was made in
September, 2015 i.e., much prior to the death of the alleged
victim on 30.12.2016 and there is no allegation of torturing soon
before her death. There is no allegation that she was
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administered any poisonous substance or subjected to any
physical assault causing external injury. He also submits that
prerequisites for framing of charge are not fulfilled.
10. Ld. APP for the State and Ld. Counsel for the
informant submit that the Fardbeyan as well as material
collected by police during investigation clearly manifest that
there was demand for opening a medical company for the
petitioner and on account of non fulfillment of the same, the
victim was continuously subjected to torture. He also submits,
referring to the inquest report that there was injury on the person
of the deceased, like bleeding from mouth and nose, spot of
blood on shoulder, mark of injury on chest. He further submits
that the deceased as per version of the petitioner/accused
himself as emerging from para-12 of the case diary, there was
complaint of stomach pain. However, it has been wrongly
mentioned in the medical report that there was complaint of
vomiting. He further submits that in case of stomach pain or
vomiting there is no occasion for any CPR. It is also submitted
that as per postmortem report, postmortem commenced at 11:00
AM and rigor mortis was present all over the body at the time of
examination. He further submits that average duration of onset
of rigor mortis is about eight hours and rigor mortis develops in
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full body in about eighteen hours. He further points out that as
per the report of PARAS Hospital, she was brought to the
Hospital at 4:10 AM in gasping condition and there was no
carotid pulse palpable and she was declared dead at 4:55 AM.
But, he submits that in view of the rigor mortis at 11:00 AM
when postmortem was conducted, she must have died much
prior to her bringing to PARAS Hospital at 4:10 AM. He claims
that, in fact, the victim was already dead at home and the whole
treatment at PARAS was stage-managed to show that she has
died at hospital in course of treatment. He points out that as per
the postmortem report death is due to hemorrhage caused by
ante mortem injury caused by hard and blunt substance.
11. He further submits that all the ingredients of
Section 304(B) IPC are present as per material on record. At the
time of framing of charges, only prima facie case is to be seen;
proof of the alleged offence beyond reasonable doubt, is not to
be seen at this stage. He also submits that at the stage of framing
of charge, there is limited scope to weigh the probative value of
the material on record. A mini trial cannot be conducted at the
stage of framing of charge.
12. Before I proceed to consider the rival submissions
of the parties on merits, it would be pertinent to see the scope
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and ambit of Section 482 of the Cr.PC.
13. Section 482 Cr.PC saves inherent power of High
Court and it reads as follows:-
“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.-
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as
may be necessary to give effect to any order under this
Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
14. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia Vs.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, [(1988) 1 SCC 692],
Hon’ble three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court has laid down the
law as to quashment of proceedings under Section 482 Cr.PC as
follows :
“7. The legal position is well settled that when a
prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the
test to be applied by the court is as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish
the offence. It is also for the court to take into
consideration any special features which appear in a
particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in
the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue.
This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for
any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court
chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore,
no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a
criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while
taking into consideration the special facts of a case also
quash the proceeding even though it may be at a
preliminary stage.”
15. Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana
Vs. Bhajan Lal [1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335], delivered the land
mark judgment on the scope and extent of the jurisdiction of
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High Court under Section 482 Cr.PC It is still holding the field
and being consistently followed and relied upon by all Courts
including the Apex Court.
16. Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal case (supra)
held as follows:-
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court
in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR
do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
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complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him
due to private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that
the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be
exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that
too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be
justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability
or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the
FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent
powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court
to act according to its whim or caprice.”
17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa Vs.
Saroj Kumar Sahoo, (2005) 13 SCC 540 explaining the ambit
and scope of Section 482 Cr.PC observed as follows:
“8. ………. While exercising the powers under the
section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or
revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though
wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by the
tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be
exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice for the administration of which alone the courts
exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of
justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority
so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to
prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court
to allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the
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court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds
that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings would
otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is
disclosed by the report, the court may examine the
question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it
is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the
report has alleged and whether any offence is made out
even if the allegations are accepted in toto.”
18. Now let us refer to what Hon’ble Apex Court has
observed from time to time in regard to application of Section
482 Cr.PC at the stage of framing of charge.
19. In the case of State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh,
(1977) 4 SCC 39, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
“4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the
case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe
the charge against the accused and state by what evidence
he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter
comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider
the record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and
the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass
thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228
of the Code. If “the Judge considers that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he
shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so
doing”, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand,
“the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming
that the accused has committed an offence which— …
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall
frame in writing a charge against the accused”, as
provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions
together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would
be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the
trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which
the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be
meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to
the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory
for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any
detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts,
if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of
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the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment
which is to be finally applied before recording a finding
regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not
exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter
under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that
stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient
ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is
sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the
accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion,
cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion
of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong
suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is
ground for presuming that the accused has committed an
offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is
no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
……... ”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of
India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4, has held as
follows:
“7…………The words “not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the
Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the
behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial
mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether
a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In
assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter
into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and
balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his
function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227,
the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find
out whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground
would take within its fold the nature of the evidence
recorded by the police or the documents produced before
the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious
circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge
against him.
………………………………………………………
10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities
mentioned above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of
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framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima
facie case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not
been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is
difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By
and large however if two views are equally possible and
the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before
him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave
suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his
right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section
227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code
is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a
Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to
consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect
of the evidence and the documents produced before the
Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so
on. This however does not mean that the Judge should
make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter
and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of
Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659, has
held as follows :-
“32. The aforesaid shows that if on the basis of
materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion
that commission of the offence is a probable consequence,
a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if
the court were to think that the accused might have
committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for
conviction the conclusion is required to be that the
accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at
the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the
materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials
brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as
true at that stage.”
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22. Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of State of
M.P. Vs. Mohanlal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338, has held as
follows :
“7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the
stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie
consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate
evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are
sufficient or not for convicting the accused.”
23. Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of K.
Ramakrishna Vs. State of Bihar, (2000) 8 SCC 547, has held
as follows:-
“4. The trial court under Section 239 and the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is not called upon to embark upon an inquiry as
to whether evidence in question is reliable or not or
evidence relied upon is sufficient to proceed further or not.
However, if upon the admitted facts and the documents
relied upon by the complainant or the prosecution and
without weighing or sifting of evidence, no case is made
out, the criminal proceedings instituted against the
accused are required to be dropped or quashed. As
observed by this Court in Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of
Delhi (1999) 3 SCC 259, the High Court or the Magistrate
are also not supposed to adopt a strict hypertechnical
approach to sieve the complaint through a colander of
finest gauzes for testing the ingredients of offence with
which the accused is charged. Such an endeavour may be
justified during trial but not during the initial stage”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of State of
Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, has held
as follows:
“8. What is the meaning of the expression “the record
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of the case” as used in Section 227 of the Code. Though
the word “case” is not defined in the Code but Section 209
throws light on the interpretation to be placed on the said
word. …….. It is evident that the record of the case and
documents submitted therewith as postulated in Section
227 relate to the case and the documents referred in
Section 209. That is the plain meaning of Section 227 read
with Section 209 of the Code. No provision in the Code
grants to the accused any right to file any material or
document at the stage of framing of charge. That right is
granted only at the stage of the trial.
………………………………………………………
16. ………….This aspect, however, has been adverted to
in State Anti-Corruption Bureau v. P. Suryaprakasam
[1999 SCC (Cri) 373] where considering the scope of
Sections 239 and 240 of the Code it was held that at the
time of framing of charge, what the trial court is required
to, and can consider are only the police report referred to
under Section 173 of the Code and the documents sent
with it. The only right the accused has at that stage is of
being heard and nothing beyond that. (emphasis supplied)
The judgment of the High Court quashing the proceedings
by looking into the documents filed by the accused in
support of his claim that no case was made out against
him even before the trial had commenced was reversed by
this Court. It may be noticed here that learned counsel for
the parties addressed the arguments on the basis that the
principles applicable would be same — whether the case
be under Sections 227 and 228 or under Sections 239 and
240 of the Code.”
25. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Soma
Chakravarty Vs. State, (2007) 5 SCC 403, has held as follows:
“10. It may be mentioned that the settled legal
position, as mentioned in the above decisions, is that if on
the basis of material on record the court could form an
opinion that the accused might have committed offence it
can frame the charge, though for conviction the
conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the
time of framing of the charges the probative value of the
material on record cannot be gone into, and the material
brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as
true at that stage. Before framing a charge the court must
apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record
and must be satisfied that the commitment of offence by
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the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused
committed the offence, can only be decided in the trial.”
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Onkar
Nath Mishra Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2008) 2 SCC 561, has
held as follows:-
“11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge
the court is required to evaluate the material and
documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts
emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed
the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep
into the probative value of the material on record. What
needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for
presuming that the offence has been committed and not a
ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At
that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material
which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to
the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the
offence alleged would justify the framing of charge
against the accused in respect of the commission of that
offence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.
Vijayan Vs. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398, has held as
follows:
“11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has
merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or
not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would
take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by
the police or the documents produced before the court
which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious
circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge
against him.
12. …..This Court has thus held that whereas strong
suspicion may not take the place of the proof at the trial
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stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the
trial Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)
28. In Sajjan Kumar Vs. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368,
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
“21. On consideration of the authorities about the
scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following
principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227CrPC has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima
facie case against the accused has been made out. The test
to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts
of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not
been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the
broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the court,
any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there
cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the
matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a
trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court
could form an opinion that the accused might have
committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for
conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the
offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the
probative value of the material on record cannot be gone
into but before framing a charge the court must apply its
judicial mind on the material placed on record and must
be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused
was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record
with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom
taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the
ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this
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limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected
even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution
states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common
sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives
rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave
suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge
the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the
trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”
(Emphasis supplied)
29. In the case of Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh
Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 Hon’ble Supreme Court held as
follows:-
“19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the
court is concerned not with proof but with a strong
suspicion that the accused has committed an offence,
which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the
court has to see is that the material on record and the facts
would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or
not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that
stage………….
……………………………………………………
27. …….... At best and upon objective analysis of
various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out
some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise
of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of
charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397
or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of
the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the
power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in
invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal
proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of
Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the
rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether
the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of
the case and the documents submitted therewith prima
facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so
patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent
person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the
basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied
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then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere.
No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for
considering whether the case would end in conviction or
not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of
charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such power is
absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of
justice and for correcting some grave error that might be
committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases,
the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the
threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its
inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in
any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in
force to the very initiation or institution and continuance
of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to
provide specific protection to an accused.
27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom
of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution
to investigate and prosecute the offender.
27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted
to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
27.8. Where the allegations made and as they
appeared from the record and documents annexed
therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a
“civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does
not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the
court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in
such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical
analysis of the evidence.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the
courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts,
evidence and materials on record to determine whether
there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case
would end in a conviction; the court is concerned
primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether
they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of
the process of court leading to injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called
upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate
evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find
out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.
27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim
and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil
claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal
complaint cannot be maintained.
27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section
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228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into
consideration external materials given by an accused for
reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or
that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to
consider the record and documents annexed therewith by
the prosecution.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the
rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even
broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to
permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing
at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal
the records with a view to decide admissibility and
reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion
formed prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section
173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal
defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to
frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where
the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of
the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it
may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex
debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for
administration of which alone, the courts exist…...
27.16. These are the principles which individually
and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into
consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and
wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for
an offence has been laid down, the courts should be
reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings
even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not
been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is
substantial compliance with the requirements of the
offence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
30. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
T.N. Vs. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, has held as
follows:
“29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials
has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go
deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not
warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be
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considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that
the offence has been committed and not whether a ground
for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it
differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have
committed the offence on the basis of the materials on
record on its probative value, it can frame the charge;
though for conviction, the court has to come to the
conclusion that the accused has committed the offence.
The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.”
(Emphasis supplied)
31. In State of Karnataka Vs. M.R. Hiremath,
(2019)7 SCC 515, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as
follows:
“25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of
the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application
for discharge under the provisions of Section 239CrPC.
The parameters which govern the exercise of this
jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of
this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage
of considering an application for discharge the court must
proceed on the assumption that the material which has
been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and
evaluate the material in order to determine whether the
facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value,
disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to
constitute the offence. .....”
(Emphasis supplied)
32. In Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel Vs. State of
Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547], Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed as follows:
“ 23. At the stage of framing the charge in
accordance with the principles which have been laid down
by this Court, what the Court is expected to do is, it does
not act as a mere post office. The Court must indeed sift
the material before it. The material to be sifted would be
the material which is produced and relied upon by the
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prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the
sense that the Court dons the mantle of the trial Judge
hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been
adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not
whether the prosecution has made out the case for the
conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the Court
must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case
is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong
suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be
founded on some material. The material must be such as
can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The
strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction
based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case
where it is possible that the accused has committed the
offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is
premised on some material which commends itself to the
court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that
the accused has committed the offence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
33. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Odisha Vs. Pratima Mohanty, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1222,
has held as follows:
“16...........At the stage of discharge and/or
considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the
courts are not required to go into the merits of the
allegations and/or evidence in detail as if conducing the
mini-trial. As held by this Court the powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power
requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous
and more diligent duty on the Court.
......................................................................................
18. Therefore, considering the aforesaid it cannot be
said that the criminal proceedings against the respondents
- accused were in any way an abuse of process of law
and/or the Court.......”
(Emphasis supplied)
34. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Saranya
v. Bharathi, (2021) 8 SCC 583, has held as follows:
“11. ……..it is observed and held that at the stage of
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framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material
only with a view to find out if there is a ground for
“presuming” that the accused had committed the offence.
It is observed and held that at that stage, the High Court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record
with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom,
taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the
ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. It
is further observed and held that at this stage the High
Court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record
and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on
the basis of the evidence recorded the accused
chargesheeted or against whom the charge is framed is
likely to be convicted or not.”
(Emphasis supplied)
35. In Ghulam Hassan Beigh Vs. Mohd. Maqbool
Magrey, (2022) 12 SCC 657, Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed as follows:
“27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the
trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the
time of framing of charge and should not act as a mere
post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet
presented by the police as it is without applying its mind
and without recording brief reasons in support of its
opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material
which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time
of framing charge should be the material which is
produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting
of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render
the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise
of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the
court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the
prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has
committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would
suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is
placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of
final report in terms of Section 173CrPC, the court may
also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of
sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid
before it by the prosecution. .....”
(Emphasis supplied)
36. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CBI Vs.
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Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379, has held as follows:
“10. From the impugned common judgment and
order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High
Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the
High Court was conducting a mini trial and/or the High
Court was considering the applications against the
judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on
conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at
the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal
proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section
482 Cr. P.C. , the Court is not required to conduct the mini
trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment
and order has observed that the charges against the
accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the
prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove
the charges. The charges are required to be proved during
the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the
prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High
Court has materially erred in going in detail in the
allegations and the material collected during the course of
the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the
stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers
under Section 482 Cr. P.C. , the Court has a very limited
jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any
sufficient material is available to proceed further against
the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or
not”.
(Emphasis supplied)
37. Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of State of
T.N. Vs. R. Soundirarasu, (2023) 6 SCC 768, has held as
follows:
“69. The suspicion referred to by this Court must be
founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate
which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the
existence of the factual ingredients constituting the
offence alleged. Therefore, the words “a very strong
suspicion” used by this Court must not be a strong
suspicion of a vacillating mind of a Judge. That suspicion
must be founded upon the materials placed before the
Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion
about the existence of the factual ingredients constituting
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the offence alleged.
......................................................................................
84. In the overall view of the matter, we are
convinced that the impugned orders passed by the High
Court are not sustainable in law and deserve to be set
aside. The circumstances emerging from the record of the
case, prima facie, indicate the involvement of the accused
persons in the alleged offence. Having regard to the
materials on record, it cannot be said that the charge
against the accused persons is groundless. There are
triable issues in the matter. If there are triable issues, the
court is not expected to go into the veracity of the rival
versions.”
(Emphasis supplied)
38. From the aforesaid discussions of law, it clearly
emerges that the power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.PC,
for quashing the criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge
framed in course of trial is required to be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of
rare cases. The Court should apply the test as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case
and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the
offence or not. The Court can interfere only if the allegations are
found to be so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no
prudent person can believe such an allegation or where the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied as per the
material on record.
39. It also emerges that at the stage of framing charge,
the Court is required to conduct a mini trial. It is required to
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consider the material on record only with a view to find out if
there is a ground for presuming that accused had committed the
offence, and not to see whether prosecution has made out a case
for conviction of the accused. At this stage, the probative value
of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material
brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true.
The truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the
Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously
examined. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable
defence of the accused. The court is required to evaluate the
material and documents on record with a view to find out if the
facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the
existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence.
Even strong suspicion based on material on record is sufficient
to frame charge.
40. Now coming to the case on hand, the question for
this Court to consider is whether there is sufficient material on
record to frame charge against the Petitioner under Section
304B of the Indian Penal Code.
41. Before I proceed, it would be pertinent to refer to
Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code which reads as follows:
“304B. Dowry death.— (1) Where the death of a
woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs
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otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven
years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her
death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall
be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative
shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section,
“dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for
life.”
42. The ingredients of Section 304B of the Indian
Penal Code as pointed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Paranagouda & Anr Vs. State of Karnataka & Anr, 2023
SCC Online SC 1369, are as follows:
“ 20. ………………………...
(i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns
or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal
circumstance.
(ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven
years of her marriage.
(iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband.
(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in
connection with demand of dowry.
(v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been
meted out to the woman soon before her death.”
43. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bansilal Vs. State of
Haryana, (2011) 11 SCC 359, has held that, to attract the
provision of Section 304B of the IPC, one of the main
ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is
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that “soon before her death”, she was subjected to cruelty and
harassment “in connection with the demand of dowry”. It has
been also held that the expression “soon before her death” has
not been defined in either of the statutes. Therefore, in each
case, the Court has to analyse the facts and circumstances
leading to the death of the victim and decide if there is any
proximate connection between the demand of dowry and act of
cruelty or harassment and the death.
44. In regard to import of the word “Soon” used in
Section 304 B IPC, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sher Singh
Alias Partapa Vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 3 SCC 724, has
held as follows:
“16. ……..We are aware that the word “soon” finds
place in Section 304-B; but we would prefer to interpret
its use not in terms of days or months or years, but as
necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should
not be stale or an aberration of the past, but should be the
continuing cause for the death under Section 304-B or the
suicide under Section 306 IPC. ……..”
45. It would would be also relevant to refer to Section
113B of the Indian Evidence Act which deals with
presumption as to the dowry death. It reads as follows:
“113 B. Presumption as to dowry death.— When
the question is whether a person has committed the dowry
death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
death such woman had been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
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person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,
“dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in Section
304-B of Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860)”
46. In regard to Section 304 B of IPC and Section 113
B of the Evidence Act, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Baijnath
Vs. State of M.P., (2017) 1 SCC 101, has also held as follows:
“29. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded
on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead
for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the
person charged with the offence. The presumption as to
dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof
of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to
cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any
demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the
reasonable contiguity of death. ..........
.................................................................................
32. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and
purport of Section 304-B of the Code and Section 113-B
of the Act have propounded that the presumption is
contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out
the ingredients of the offence of Section 304-B as in
Shindo v. State of Punjab [Shindo v. State of Punjab,
(2011) 11 SCC 517 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 394] and echoed
in Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rajeev Kumar v.
State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 640 : (2014) 6 SCC
(Cri) 346] . In the latter pronouncement, this Court
propounded that one of the essential ingredients of dowry
death under Section 304-B of the Code is that the accused
must have subjected the woman to cruelty in connection
with demand for dowry soon before her death and that this
ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume
that the accused has committed the offence of dowry death
under Section 113-B of the Act. It referred to with
approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prema S.
Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao [K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla
Srinivasa Rao, (2003) 1 SCC 217 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 271]
to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304-B
of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence
which is required to be established is that “soon before her
death” she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in
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connection with the demand for dowry”.
47. Coming back to the case on hand, I find that
deceased Rani Devi was married with the Accused-Petitioner
Nilesh Kumar Singh @ Nilesh Kumar about three years back
and as per the allegation, after two months of the marriage, the
petitioner and his brother Ratnesh Kumar and wife of Ratnesh
Kumar started torturing the deceased on account of non-
fulfilment of their demand to open a medical company by the
father of the deceased for the Petitioner. However, the father of
the deceased, who is informant herein kept expressing his
incapability to open such a company. On 31
st
October, 2016 at
about 4:20 AM, the informant was informed by Accused-
Petitioner that his daughter was ill and admitted in PARAS
Hospital on account of serious heart attack. When the informant
reached PARAS Hospital, his daughter Rani Devi was found to
be already dead. As per the inquest report, there was injury on
the chest besides bleeding from mouth and nose and spot of
blood on shoulder. As per the postmortem report, amongst other
things, there is ante mortem fracture of sternum at third rib label
caused by hard and blunt substance and cause of death is on
account of haemorrhage due to injury ante mortem injury. Rigor
mortis was also found to be present all over the body. As per the
postmortem report, postmortem had commenced at 11 AM on
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31.10.2016.
48. As per Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner, there was no
demand of dowry, nor was any torturing for dowry, much less
there was any torturing soon before her death. It is on account of
chest pain and vomiting, she was admitted to the Paras Hospital
at about 4:10 AM on 31.10.2016, where in course of treatment,
she was subjected to cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) for
about 45 minutes, in course of which chest ribs were fractured.
Hence, she died natural death and no offence of dowry death has
been committed by the Petitioner.
49. However, Ld. APP for the State and Ld. Counsel
for the Informant vehemently submit that there was demand of
dowry in the form of opening of medical company for the
Petitioner-Husband and on account of non-fulfilment of the
same the victim/wife of the Petitioner was subjected to torturing
since after two months of the marriage and such torturing
continued resulting into her death. As such, all the ingredients of
Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 113B
of the Indian Evidence Act are present and there is no illegality
or infirmity in the impugned order, whereby discharge petition
filed by the Petitioner has been rejected by Ld. Trial Court
finding that there are sufficient material to frame charge under
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33/34
Section 304(B).
50. To substantiate their claim, Ld. APP for the State
and Ld. Counsel for the Informant point out that initially the
Informant-Father of the deceased, was informed that his
daughter was admitted to Paras Hospital on account of heart
attack, whereas during course of investigation, the accused have
stated to the police that she was making a complaint of stomach
pain and vomiting. In both situations, there was no occasion for
any CPR and there was no reason for fracture of the ribs. They
also point out that at the time of commencement of the
postmortem, rigor mortis was present all over the body which
means that the victim was dead prior to her admission in the
Paras Hospital at 4:10 AM on 31.10.2016, because and at 11:00
AM on the same day when postmortem commenced, rigor
mortis was found to be present all over the body of the victim
and as per Medical Science, rigor mortis develops in full body
in about 18 hours, which shows that she must have died much
earlier to her bringing to Paras Hospital. Admission and
treatment of the victim at Paras Hospital was stage - managed to
show that she had died at hospital in course of treatment.
51. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances,
there is no hesitation to hold that there is sufficient material on
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34/34
record to frame charge against the petitioner under Section 304
B of IPC. Hence, there is no illegality or infirmity in the
impugned order, nor is any abuse of the process of Court or
miscarriage of justice.
52. The present petition is dismissed, accordingly,
upholding the impugned order.
chandan/ravisha
nkar/shoaib
(Jitendra Kumar, J.)
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 29.04.2024
Transmission Date 29.04.2024
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