Appeal is filed in Supreme Court of India, indicating it was appealed to the Supreme Court from a lower court decision
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
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NORTHERN INDIA CATERERS (INDIA) LTD.
v.
LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI
September 7, 1978
557
A
[P. N. BHAGWATI, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.) B
Bengal Fi11ance (Sales Tax) Act 1941 (as extended to the Union Territory
-0/ Delhi)--Service of meals to non-residents in a restaurant in a hoter.-SaJe,y
Tax-If payable on price charged for meals.
The appellant runs a hotel in which meals are served to non-residents
also in the restaurant located in the hotel. The sales tax authorities treal<d
a portion 9f the receipts M representing the price Of foodstuffs served and C
levied tax. The High Court affirmed the view of tho sales tax authorities.
On th:. question whether the transaction constituted sale of foodstuffs.
Allowing the appeals
lll~LD: 1. Service of meals W non~residents in the restaurant of the appcl~
lant is not taxable under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act 1941, as extended. D
to the Union Territory of Delhi. This is so whether a charge is imposed
for the
meal as a whole or according to the dishes separately ordered. [562
F·
G]
2. In State of Puniab v. Mjs. Associated Hotels of India [1972] 2 SCR 937
this Court held that there was no sale when food and drink were supplied
to guests residing in the hotel. The Court pointed out that the supply of meals
was essentially in the nature of a service provided to the guests and coulcl
not be identified as a transaction of sale. Tb.is Court 'declined to accept
the position that the Revenue was entitled to split up the transaction into
two
parts, one of service and the other of sale of foodstuffs. If that be true
in
respect of hotels, a similar approach seems to be called for on principle
in the case of restaurants.
Like the hotelier, a restaurateur provides many --services in addition to the supply of food. He provides furniture and furnish
ings, linen, crockery and cutlery, and he may add music, an area for floor
dancing and in some cases a floor show. The classical legal view being
that a number of services are concomitantly provided by way of hospitality,
the supply of meals must be regarded
as ministering to a bodily
want or to
the satisfaction
of a human need. No reason
hae been shown for preferring
any other
view. (562 B, 560 F-G,
562 CJ
E
F
State of Puniab v. Mis. Associated Hotels of India I,td. [1972] 2 SCR 937 G
applied.
M Js. Associated Hotels of India Ltd., Sinila v. Excise and Taxation
Officer Simla AIR 1961 Punjab 449 not "Jlproved.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxn1i Narain Tt1ndon <ind A11othtr
AIR 1970 Delhi 244 not approved.
Crisp v. Pratt [1639] Cro. Car 549, Parker v. Flint (1699] 12 Mod. 254
Nt!wton v. Trigg 3 Mod. 327, Sauttderson v. Rowles 4 Burr. 2065 Elecla B.
H
A
·B
c
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 1 S.C.R.
klerrill v. Jan1es W. Hodson 1915-B L.R.A. 481, and Mary Nisky v. Childr
Company 50 A.LR. 227 referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1768-1769/,
72.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
15-7-1971
of the Delhi High Court in
Sales Tax Reference No. 8 of
1969.
F. S. Nariman, (In CA 1768/72), V. S. Desai (in C.A. 1769).
M.
C. Bhandare (C.A. 1768/72) and Mrs. S. /Jlumdare and Miss
M. Poduval for the Appellants.
P. A. Francis, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A. Subhashini for the
Respondent.
,,;: .
",,'rY. S. Chita/e, Vinay Bhasin, A. K. Srivastava and Vineet Kumar
.. 'tffor the Interveners.
di.p" The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
F
PATHAK, J. This and the connected appeal are directed against
the judgment of the Higb Court
of Delhi disposing of a reference made
to it under section
21 (3) of the Bengal Finance
(Sales Tax) Act,
1941
as extended to the
Union Territory of Delhi on the following
question:-
"Whether the service of meals to casual visitors in the
Restaurant
is taxable as a
sale :
(i) when charges arc lumpsum per meal or
(ii)
when they are calculated per dish
?"
The High Court has answered the question in the affirmative.
The appellant runs a hotel
in which lodging and meals are pro
vided
on
"inclusive terms" to residents. Meals are served to non
residents also in the restaurant located
in the hotel. In the assessment
proceedings for the assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59 under the
G Bengal Finance
(Sales Tax) Act, 1941, the appellant contended that
the service of meals to residents and non-residents could not be
regarded
as a sale and therefore sales tax could not be levied in res
pect thereof. The contention
was rejected by the
Sales Tax authorities,
who treated a portion of the receipts from the residents and non
residents
as representing the price of the foodstuffs served. At the
II instance of the appellant, the Higb Court called for a statement of the
case on
two questions.
One was whether the supply of meals to
residents, who paid a single all-inclusive charge for all services in the
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J.
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NORTHERN INDIA CATERERS v. LT. GOVERNOR (Pathak,!.) 559
hotel, including board, was exigible to sales tax. The second was the
question set forth above. The
High Court answered the first question
in favour of the appellant and the second against it. And
now these
appeals by special leave.
Tax is payable by a dealer under section 4 of the Bengal Finance
(Sales Tax) Act,
1941 on sales effected by him, and
the expression
"sale" has been defined by section 2 (g) of the Act to mean "any
transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other
v~luable consideration including a transfer of properly in goods in-
volved in the execution of a contract
.......
". The question is
whether in the case of non-residents the service of meals by the appel
lant in the restaurant constitutes a sale of foodstuffs. It appears to us
that after the view taken by this Court in State of Punjab v. MI s Asso
ciated Hotels of India Ltd.,(1) the approach to the question before us
is clearly indicated .
This
is a case where the origin and historical development of an
institution has profoundly influenced the nature and incidents it
possesses in law.
In the case of an hotelier this Court proceeded on
the footing that
his position in law was
assimilable to that of an inn
keeper. At common law an innkeeper was a person who received
travellers and provided lodging and necessaries for them and their
attendants and employed servants for this purpose and for the protec
tion of travellers lodging in his inn and of their goods("). It was hos
pitality that he offered, and the many facilities that constituted the
components of that hospitality determined the legal character of the
transactions flowing from them. Long ago, in
Crisp v.
Pratt(') it was
pointed out that innkeepers do not get their living by buying and selling
and that although they buy provisions
to be spent in their house, they
do not sell them but what they
do is to
"utter" them. "Their gain", it
was added, "is not only by uttering of their commodities, but for the
attendance
of their servants, and for the furniture of their house, rooms,
and
loggings, for their guests ...... ". This test went to the root, and
w~ find it repeated in Parker v. Flint.(') In Newton v. Trigg(') Holt,
C.J., defined the true status of an inn-keeper by reference
to the
services
afforded by him, that he was an "hos pita tor", and was "not paid upon
the account
of the intrinsic
value pf his provisions, but for other
reasons : the recompence he receives,
is for care and pains,
and for
protection and security. . . . . . . . . . . but the end of an inn-keeper in
(I) [l972j 2 S. C. R. 937.
(2) Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd l'dn. Vol. 21 p. 442 paras 93?.
(3) [1639! Cro.
Car. 549.
(4) [1699] 12 Mod 254.
(5) 3 Mod. 327.
2-549SCil78
A
B
c
D
E
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G
R
A
B
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 1 S.C.R.
his buying, is not to sell, but only a part of the accommodation be
is bound to prepare for bis guests." And for the purpose of the question
betore
us it would be relevant to quote Professor
Beale(") :
''As an inu-keeper docs uot lease
his rooms, so he does
not sell the food be supplies to the guest. It is his duty to
supply such food
as the guest needs, and the corresponding
right
of the guest is to consume the food he needs, and to
take no more. Having finished his meal, be
has no right to
take food from the table, even the uneaten portion of food
supplied to him, nor can be claim a certain portion
of food
as bis own to
bll banded over to another in case he chooses
C not to consume it himself. The title to
food never passes as a
result of an ordinary transaction
of supplying food to a
guest."
D
E
F
G
n
Having proper regard to those particular considerations, it is not
surprising that the principle
was extended in
England to the service of
food at eating places or restaurants. The keeper
of an eating house, or
victualler,
was regarded fundamentally as providing sustenance to
those
who ordered food to eat in the premises. That eminent
and
learned Judge, Lord Mansfield, saw no distinction, in Saunderson v.
Rowles('), between an innkeeper and a victualler. He observed :-
"The analogy between the two cases of an inn-keeper and
a victualler
is so strong that it cannot be got over. And we
are all clear that this man (victualler) is not within these
laws; upon the authority of a determined case
of an inn-
keeper, and also upon the reason of the thing
....... He
buys only to spend in
his house, and when he utters it again
it is attended with many circumstances additional to the
mere selling
price."
Like the hotelier, a restaurateur provides many services in addition to
the supply of food. He provides furniture and furnishings, linen,
crockery and cutlery, and
in the eating places of today he may add
music and a specially provided area for floor dancing and in
some
cases a floor show. The view taken by the English law found accep
tance on American soil, and after some desultory dissent initially
in
certain states it very soon became firmly established as the general
view of the law. The first edition of American Jurisprudence sets(')
forth the statement of the law in that regard, but
we may go to the
case itself,
Electa B. Merrill v. James W.
Hodson('), from which the
(I) Inn-keeper.< & Hotels, para 169.
\2) 4 Burr. 2065.
(3) Vol. 46 p. 207 para 13.
t4) 1915-B L.R.A. 481.
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NORTHERN INDIA CATERERS V. LT. GOVERNOR (Pathak, J.) 561
statement has been derived. Holding that the supply of food or drink
to customers did uot partake of the character of a sale of goods, the
Court commented
:-
"The essence of it is not an agreement for the transfer of
the general property of the food or drink placed at the com
mand of the customer for the satisfaction of his desires, or
actually appropriated by
him in the process of appeasing
his appetite or thirst. The customer does not become the
owner of the food set before
him, or of that portion which
is carved for his use, or of that which finds a place upon his
plate, or in side dishes set about it. No designated portion
becomes
his. He is privileged to eat, and that is all. The un
eaten food
is not his. He cannot do what he pleases with it.
That which
is set before him or placed at his command
is
provided to enable him to satisfy his immediate wants, and
for no other purpose. He
may satisfy those wants; bnt there
he must stop. He may not turn over unconsumed portions to
others at
his pleasure, or carry away such portions. The true
essence of the transaction
is service in the satisfaction of a
human need or desire,-ministry to a bodily want. A neces-
sary incident of
this service or ministry is the consumption
of the food required. This consumption involves destruc-
tion, and nothing remains of what
i~ consun1ed to which
the right of property can be said to attach. Before consump
tion title does not pass; after consumption there remains
nothing to become the subject of title. What the customer
pays for
is a right to satisfy his appetite by the process of
destruction. What he thus pays for includes more than the
price of the food
as such. It includes all that enters into
the conception of service, and with it no small factor of
direct personal service.
It does not contemplate the transfer
of the general property in the food supplied
as a factor in
the service
rendered."
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Subsequent cases drew on these observations, notably Mary Nisky v.
Childs Company. (
1
)
The position was radically altered in the G
United States by the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which provides in effect that the serving for valne of food or drink
to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere constitutes a
· sale. Nonetheless it is affirmed in the second edition of American
Jurisprudence(') that where the
Code does not operate,
"in general
the pre-Code distinction between a contract for sale and one for the H
giving of services should continue."
(1) SO A.L.R. 227. (2) Vol. 67 p. 142 .P•ra 33,
A
B
c
D K
F
G
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 1 S.C.R.
It bas already been noticed that in regard to hotels this Court bas
in Mis. Associated Hotels of India Limited (supra) adopted the
concept of the English
Jaw that there is no sale when food and drink
are supplied to guests residing
in the hotel. The Court pointed out
that the supply of meals
was essentially in the nature of a service
provided to them and could not
be iden!ified as a transaction of sale.
The Court declined
to accept the proposition that the Revenue was
entitled to split
up the transaction into two parts, one of service and
the other of sale of
foodstuffs. If that be true in respect of hotels, a
similar approach
seems to be called for on principle in the case
af
restaurants. No reason has been shown to us for preferring any other.
The classical legal view being that a number of services arc con
comitantly provided
by way of hospitality, the supply of meals must
be regarded
as ministering to a bodily want or to the satisfaction of
a human need. What
has been said in Electa B. Merrill (supra)
appears to be
as much applicable to restaurants in India as it does
elsewhere. It has not been proved that any different view should be
taken, either at common
law, in usage or under statute.
It was urged for the respondent that in Associated Hotels of India
Ltd.
(supra) this Court drew a distinction between the case of meals
supplied to a resident in a hotel and those served to a customer in a
restaurant.
We are unable to find any proposition of
law laid down
by the court there whi'ch could lead to that inference. We may point
out that
in the view which appeals to us we find ourselves unable to
agree with the observations to
the contrary made by the
Punjab
High Court in M/s. Associated Hotels of India Ltd., Simla v. Excise
and Taxation Officer, Simla(') and by the Delhi High Court in
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon and
another. (') .
In the result, we hold that the service of meals to visitors in the
restaurant of the appellant
is not taxable under the Bengal Finance
(Sales Tax) Act, 1941,
as extended to the
Union Territory of Delhi,
and this
is so whether a charge is imposed for the meal as a whole
or according to the dishes separately ordered.
In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
N.V.K.
(1) A. I. R. 1966
Punjab 449.
(2) A, I. R. 1970 Delhi 244.
Appeals allowed.
•
In a foundational judgment concerning the principles of Review of Judgments and the applicability of Sales Tax on Food, the Supreme Court of India in Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi delivered a nuanced decision that continues to shape commercial and tax law. This pivotal 1979 ruling, available on CaseOn, explores the fine line between a 'service' and a 'sale' in the context of restaurant transactions, establishing critical precedents on when a review of a court's own judgment is permissible. The case delves into the essential question: when you pay for a meal at a restaurant, are you buying food, or are you paying for an experience? The answer, as the Court clarified, has significant tax implications.
Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. operated a hotel that included a restaurant serving meals to both resident guests and non-resident casual visitors. The tax authorities sought to levy sales tax on the meals served to these casual visitors, arguing it constituted a sale of goods. The Delhi High Court agreed with the tax authorities. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court initially overturned this decision, holding that the supply of meals was part of a larger service and not a sale. The Court's reasoning was based on the fact that the transaction was a composite experience involving ambiance, music, furnishings, and service, and crucially, customers were not entitled to take away any unconsumed food. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the Lt. Governor of Delhi filed a review petition, leading to the judgment analyzed here.
The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether there were sufficient grounds to review its earlier judgment. Specifically, the court had to determine if the original decision contained a “glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error” or an “error apparent on the face of the record” that would justify a departure from the principle of judicial finality.
The Court's power of review is established under Article 137 of the Constitution and further guided by rules in the Code of Civil Procedure (Order XLVII, Rule 1). The established principles are:
The Supreme Court began its analysis by firmly establishing the high threshold required for a review petition. It stated, “a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision in the case.”
The respondent (Lt. Governor of Delhi) presented extensive legal material from English and American jurisprudence that had not been brought up during the original hearing. While the Court acknowledged that this material would have been useful, it held that its absence during the initial proceedings did not constitute an “error apparent on the face of the record” in the original judgment. The Court must decide based on the facts and arguments presented before it at the time.
The cornerstone of the Court's analysis was the undisputed factual foundation of the original case. Northern India Caterers had consistently argued that their transaction was one of service, highlighting the provision of amenities like air-conditioning, music, specially designed crockery, and a luxurious atmosphere. Most importantly, it was an accepted fact that “the guest is not entitled to carry away the unconsumed portion of his food.” The Court reasoned that if it were a true sale, the property in the goods (the food) would have passed to the customer, who could then dispose of it as they pleased. Since this was not the case, the original conclusion that it was a service was a “possible view” based on the record.
Legal professionals often grapple with the nuances of fact-dependent rulings. Resources like CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs can be invaluable in quickly understanding the specific factual matrix that led to a particular judgment, saving hours of research time when analyzing such pivotal rulings.
In his concurring opinion, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer brilliantly contextualized the decision, emphasizing that the law adapts to facts. A high-end restaurant offering a bundled experience is fundamentally different from a coffee shop where a customer buys two dosas, eats one, and takes the other home. The latter is undeniably a sale. The Court clarified that its ruling was not a blanket exemption for all eateries. It explicitly stated that “where food is supplied in an eating-house or restaurant, and it is established upon the facts that the substance of the transaction, evidenced by its dominant object, is a sale of food... the transaction would undoubtedly be exigible to sales-tax.”
The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, finding no compelling reason to overturn its original judgment. It concluded that based on the specific and uncontested facts—where the transaction was a composite supply of services and the customer had no right to the leftover food—the view that it was not a sale did not constitute a manifest or patent error. The judgment rests on its unique factual foundation and does not create a universal rule exempting all restaurant transactions from sales tax.
The Supreme Court upheld the principle of judicial finality by dismissing the review petition. It ruled that a review cannot be used as a tool for a re-hearing. The original judgment, which classified the specific restaurant transaction as a 'service' rather than a 'sale' for sales tax purposes, was based on the undisputed facts presented, particularly the inability of customers to take away unconsumed food. This conclusion, being a possible view, was not an “error apparent on the face of the record.” The Court carefully limited its ruling to the facts at hand, clarifying that restaurant transactions where the dominant object is the sale of food remain taxable.
For Lawyers: This case is a masterclass on the stringent requirements for filing a review petition. It underscores the critical importance of presenting all relevant arguments and materials during the initial hearing, as post-judgment introductions of new material are unlikely to succeed. Furthermore, it provides a foundational analysis of the 'dominant object' test used to dissect composite transactions, a principle applicable across various areas of commercial and tax law.
For Law Students: This judgment is an excellent educational tool for understanding the distinct functions of an appeal versus a review. It clearly illustrates how legal principles are not applied in a vacuum but are contingent on the specific factual matrix of a case. It teaches students to critically analyze the facts underlying a precedent before applying it to a different scenario.
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Disclaimer: The information provided in this article is for educational and informational purposes only. It should not be construed as legal advice. Please consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on any specific legal issues or matters.
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