RSA-1329-1995 -1-

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

RSA-1329-1995

OM PARKASH 

.....APPELLANTS

VERSUS 

RAJ SINGH           

....RESPONDENTS      

1. The date when the judgment is reserved 27.05.2026

2. The date when the judgment is pronounced             15.07.2026

3. The date when the judgment is uploaded             15.07.2026

4. Whether only operative part of the judgment is

pronounced   or   whether   the   full   judgment   is

pronounced

Full 

5. The delay, if any of the pronouncement of full

judgment and reason thereof.

Not applicable

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MOUDGIL.

Present: Mr. Sanjiv Gupta, Sr. Advocate with

  Mr. Aayush Bansal, Advocate

for the appellant.

Mr. Abhinav Sood, Advocate 

Mr. Vikram Singh, Advocate for

respondents no. 1 to 3.

SANDEEP MOUDGIL, J 

The present appeal arises out of the judgment and decree dated

07.03.1995 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Karnal, affirming the

judgment and decree dated 05.08.1991 passed by the learned Sub Judge Ist Class,

Karnal, whereby the suit for possession by way of pre-emption instituted by the

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plaintiffs was decreed. The vendee-defendants, having remained unsuccessful

before both the Courts below, have preferred the present Regular Second Appeal

under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The plaintiffs instituted a suit for possession by way of pre-emption in

respect  of  agricultural  land  measuring  23  Bighas,  which  had  been  sold  by

defendant Nos.4 and 5 in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 3 vide registered sale deed

dated 16.05.1988. The claim was founded on the plea that the plaintiffs were co-

sharers in the joint khewat by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 05.07.1985 and

the mutation sanctioned in their favour on 18.02.1986, thereby entitling them to a

preferential right of pre-emption.

It was further pleaded that although the sale deed reflected the

consideration as ₹1,66,000/-, the actual sale consideration was only ₹1,10,000/-

and the enhanced amount had been incorporated merely to defeat the plaintiffs'

right of pre-emption. The plaintiffs accordingly sought possession of the suit land

on payment of the actual consideration.

The suit was contested by the vendee-defendants, who pleaded that

the plaintiffs had no subsisting right of pre-emption as the joint holding had

already been partitioned and the vendors were in exclusive possession pursuant to

a prior family partition. It was further alleged that the plaintiffs had actively

participated in the transaction, the suit was collusive and barred by limitation, and

the sale consideration recorded in the sale deed had been fixed in good faith and

actually paid.

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On the basis of the pleadings, the learned trial Court framed the

necessary issues regarding the plaintiffs' superior right of pre-emption, limitation,

estoppel, alleged partition, sale consideration and other ancillary issues. After

appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court held that the

plaintiffs continued to be co-sharers in the joint holding, as they had not been

impleaded in the partition proceedings and no legally recognised private partition

had been established.

The trial Court further held that the sale was of an undivided share in

the joint holding and, therefore, limitation was to be computed from the date of

registration of the sale deed. While accepting the sale consideration mentioned in

the sale deed as genuine, the suit was decreed for possession by way of pre-

emption   upon   deposit   of   the   sale   consideration   together   with   stamp   and

registration charges.

Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the vendee-defendants

preferred   an   appeal   before   the   learned   Additional   District   Judge,   Karnal,

reiterating the pleas regarding prior partition, limitation and absence of any

superior right of pre-emption in favour of the plaintiffs.

The learned first appellate Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed

the findings recorded by the trial Court. It held that no valid partition had been

proved,   the   plaintiffs  continued  to  be   co-sharers,  and  the   suit  having  been

instituted within one year from the date of registration of the sale deed was within

limitation. The appellate Court also noticed that the partition proceedings had

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subsequently been set aside by the Financial Commissioner, thereby reinforcing

the plaintiffs' status as co-sharers.

Still dissatisfied, the vendee-defendants have preferred the present

Regular Second Appeal, assailing the concurrent judgments primarily on the

grounds that the Courts below erred in ignoring the effect of the alleged partition,

wrongly computed limitation, misappreciated the evidence regarding possession

and consideration, and failed to apply the amended provisions of Section 15 of the

Punjab Pre-emption (Haryana Amendment) Act, 1995 which extinguished the

plaintiffs' right of pre-emption during the pendency of the proceedings.

Submissions before this Court:

Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the Courts below

failed to appreciate that the plaintiffs had ceased to be co-sharers on account of the

prior family partition and the subsequent partition proceedings and, therefore, had

no subsisting right of pre-emption. It was further submitted that the vendors were

in exclusive possession of the suit land and had validly delivered possession to the

vendees under the sale deed. 

It was further submitted that the suit was barred by limitation as the

period under Article 97 of the Limitation Act commenced from the date of

execution of the sale deed and delivery of possession. It was also contended that

the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed was genuine and duly paid.

Lastly,   it  was   argued  that   by  virtue   of  the   Punjab Pre-emption

(Haryana Amendment) Act, 1995, the right of pre-emption of a co-sharer stood

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extinguished and, therefore, the decree passed by the Courts below could not be

sustained.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the

plaintiffs had acquired the status of co-sharers through the registered sale deed

dated 05.07.1985 and the sanctioned mutation, prior to the initiation of partition

proceedings, and continued to retain such status.

It was further contended that no valid partition had been proved in

accordance with law and the plaintiffs were never impleaded in the partition

proceedings. Since the sale related to an undivided share in the joint holding,

limitation was rightly computed from the date of registration of the sale deed,

rendering the suit within time.

It was lastly argued that the plaintiffs possessed the requisite right of

pre-emption on all the relevant dates and that the 1995 Amendment had no

retrospective operation so as to defeat rights which had already crystallised under

the decrees of the Courts below.

Substantive Questions of Law

1. Whether the plaintiffs continued to possess the  usu. tdntcdl gsjwj t

 dts tudthseauseatugwt .eutndjtpjwlwhpueda4t

2. Whether the amendment to Section 15 of the Punjabtfjwlwhpuedat

Act, 1913, as applicable to the State of Haryana, affects the

maintainability of the present suit?

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3. Whether the suit instituted by the plaintiffs was within the period of

limitation prescribed under Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

The substantial questions of law framed hereinabove shall now be

adverted to and determined individually in the light of the pleadings, evidence and

settled position of law.

Issue no. 1 Whether the plaintiffs continued to possess the stau. tdntcdl

 gsjwj t dts tudthseauseatugwt .eutndjtpjwlwhpueda4

The principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is that

the plaintiffs had ceased to possess the status of co-sharers on account of the

alleged private family partition and the subsequent partition proceedings, thereby

losing their preferential right to maintain the suit for pre-emption. The submission

does not merit acceptance.

The   record   unequivocally   establishes   that   the   plaintiffs   acquired

313/4946 share in the joint khewat from Pirthi Singh vide registered sale deed

dated 05.07.1985, pursuant whereto Mutation No.1266 (Ex.P1 and Ex.P4) was

sanctioned on 18.02.1986. The application for partition was admittedly instituted

by the vendor-defendants only on 18.03.1986, i.e. subsequent to the sanction of

mutation in favour of the plaintiffs. The documentary evidence, namely, the

registered sale deed and the sanctioned mutation, conclusively establishes that the

plaintiffs had acquired the status of co-sharers before the initiation of the partition

proceedings. 

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Equally significant is the fact that the plaintiffs were never impleaded

in the said proceedings, despite their interest in the joint holding having already

been reflected in the revenue record. Moreover, the record shows that Girdawar

Halqua never gave any notice to plaintiff about preparation of Naqsha B, therefore,

in these circumstances the petitioners cannot be  said to  have  acquired  any

knowledge of pendency of partition proceedings. 

It is also noted that the DW1 Ashok Kumar has also not deposed

about any such private partition having taken place. Consequently, any order

passed in such proceedings behind their back could not operate to divest them of

their proprietary rights or sever their status as co-sharers. 

The plea of the appellants that a private family partition had already

taken place is equally untenable. Section 123 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act,

1887 contemplates that where a partition has been privately effected, any party

thereto may seek its affirmation from the Revenue Officer, who, upon satisfying

himself about its genuineness, records the same in the revenue record. Admittedly,

no such procedure was ever followed in the present case. On the contrary, the

vendors themselves instituted partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector

after the plaintiffs had already become co-sharers, which completely belies the

plea that the joint status had already stood severed. The burden to establish the

alleged partition squarely rested upon the appellants, who failed to produce any

cogent documentary evidence in support thereof. It is well settled that mere

separate possession or cultivation of a portion of the joint holding does not, by

itself, establish partition in the eye of law. 

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The law is equally well settled that a co-sharer remains owner of

every inch of the joint holding until there is a lawful partition recognised by law.

Separate enjoyment or exclusive cultivation of a particular portion is merely an

arrangement for convenience and does not amount to severance of title. In the

absence of a legally recognised partition, the vendors could transfer only their

undivided share in the joint holding and the plaintiffs, being co-sharers, continued

to enjoy a preferential right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court in “Bishan Singh

v. Khazan Singh 1958 INSC 62” explained that the right of pre-emption is a right

of substitution founded upon the existence of a superior right as against the vendee

and that such right has to be determined strictly in accordance with the statute. The

relevant extract of the same is as under:

“7. Before attempting to give a satisfactory answer to the question

raised, it would be convenient at the outset to notice and define the

material incidents of the right of preemption. A concise but lucid

statement of the law is given by Plowden J. in Dhani Nath v. Budhu,

136 Pun Re 1894 , at page 511, thus :

"A preferential right to acquire land, belonging to another person

upon the occasion of a transfer by the latter, does not appear to me to

be either a right to or a right in that land. It is jus ad rem alienum

acquirendum and not a jus in re aliena ...........A right to the offer of a

thing about to be sold is not identical with a right to the thing itself,

and that is the primary right of the pre'emptor. The secondary right is

to follow the thing sold, when sold without the proper offer to the pre'

emptor, and to acquire it, if he thinks fit, in spite of the sale, made in

disregard of his preferential right."

The aforesaid passage indicates that a pre'emptor has two rights : (1)

inherent or primary right i.e. a right to the offer of a thing about to be

sold and (2) secondary or remedial right to follow the thing sold.

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8. Mahmood J. in his classic judgment in Gobind Dayal v.

Inayatullah, ILR 7 Allahabad 775 at p. 809 (FB) , explained the

scope of the secondary right in the following terms :

"It (right of pre'emption) is simply a right of substitution, entitling the

pre'emptor, by means of a legal incident to which sale itself was

subject, to stand in the shoes of the vendee in respect of all the rights

and obligations arising from the sale, under which he derived his

title. It is, in effect, as if in a sale deed the vendee's name were rubbed

out and preemptor's name inserted in its place."

9. The doctrine adumbrated by the learned Judge, namely, the

secondary right of pre'emption is simply a right of substitution in

place of the original vendee, has been accepted and followed by

subsequent decisions.” 

The aforesaid conclusion is further fortified by the principle reiterated

by the Constitution Bench in “Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar 2001 INSC 323”

reiterated the settled principle that a pre-emptor must possess the qualifying right

on the date of sale, the date of institution of the suit and the date of the decree of

the trial Court. The relevant part is here as under:

“11. An analysis of the aforesaid decisions referred to in first

category of decisions, the legal principles that emerges are these :

1. The pre'emptor must have the right to pre'empt on the date of sale,

on the date of filing of the suit and on the date of passing of the

decree by the Court of the first instance only.

2. The pre'emptor who claims the right to pre'empt the sale on the

date of the sale must prove that such right continued to subsist till the

passing of the decree of the first court. If the claimant loses that right

or a vendee improves his right equal or above the right of the

claimant before the adjudication of suit, the suit for pre'emption must

fail.

3. A pre'emptor who has a right to pre'empt a sale on the date of

institution of the suit and on the date of passing of decree, the loss of

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such right subsequent to the decree of the first Court would not affect

his right or maintainability of the suit for pre'emption.

4. A pre'emptor who after proving his right on the date of sale, on the

date of filing the suit and on the date of passing of the decree by the

first court, has obtained a decree for pre'emption by the Court of first

instance, such right cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation

during pendency of the appeal filed against the decree unless such

legislation has retrospective operation.”

As   noticed   hereinabove,   the   plaintiffs   fulfilled   all   the   aforesaid

requirements. Furthermore, the learned first appellate Court also noticed that the

Financial Commissioner, Haryana, vide order dated 12.10.1992 (Ex.RX), had set

aside the earlier partition proceedings and directed a de novo partition, thereby

lending further assurance to the conclusion that no final or binding partition had

ever come into existence earlier. 

The findings recorded by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the

learned first appellate Court are thus firmly founded upon the registered sale deed,

Mutation No.1266 (Ex.P1 and Ex.P4), the revenue record and the admitted

chronology of events. Learned counsel for the appellants has failed to demonstrate

that the concurrent findings suffer from perversity, are based on no evidence, or

are vitiated by any misapplication of law. In the limited jurisdiction of this Court

under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no ground is made out to

interfere with such concurrent findings of fact. It is, therefore, held that the

plaintiffs continued to possess the status of co-sharers so as to maintain the suit for

pre-emption. The substantial question of law is answered against the appellants

and in favour of the plaintiffs.

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Issue no.2  Whether the amendment to Section 15 of the Punjab Pjwl

emption Act, 1913, as applicable to the State of Haryana, affects the

maintainability of the present suit?

Another contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is that by

virtue of the Punjab Pre-emption (Haryana Amendment) Act, 1995, whereby

Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 came to be substituted, the right of

pre-emption available to a co-sharer stood extinguished and, therefore, the decree

passed in favour of the plaintiffs cannot be sustained merely because the present

Regular Second Appeal remained pending on the date the amendment came into

force.

 The contention, however, does not merit acceptance. It is well settled

that in a suit for pre-emption, the claimant is required to possess the qualifying

right on three material dates, namely, the date of sale, the date of institution of the

suit and the date on which the trial Court passes the decree as held by the Apex

Court in  Shyam Sunder (supra).  In the present case, the sale in question was

effected on 16.05.1988, the suit was instituted on 22.05.1989, and the learned trial

Court decreed the suit on 05.08.1991. The said decree was thereafter affirmed by

the learned Additional District Judge on 07.03.1995, both much prior to the

enforcement of the Amendment in the existing statute, which was only brought in

the year 1995. Thus, on all the material dates recognised by law, the plaintiffs

possessed the requisite qualification to maintain the suit. Moreover, a careful

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reading of Section 12 of the Punjab Pre-emption (Haryana Amendment) Act, 1995,

which can be referred to as under:

0W5R(gwtos7t3wuwjheaeaVtugwtjeVgutdntpjwlwhpueda5

In respect of all sales and foreclosures not completed before the

commencement of this Act the right of pre'emption shall be

determined by the provisions of this Act; but in respect of all sales

and foreclosures completed before the commencement of this Act the

right of pre'emption shall be determined by the law in force at the

time of such completion.

This provision provides that the right of pre-emption in respect of

sales completed after the commencement of the Act shall be determined in

accordance with the provisions of the Act, whereas sales completed before its

commencement shall be governed by the law in force at the time of such

completion of the sale.

The legislative intent underlying the provision is that the rights of the

parties are to be determined with reference to the law governing the transaction

giving rise to the cause of action. Since the sale in question was completed in favor

of the plaintiff-respondents on 16.05.1988, when the unamended provisions of the

Act were in force, the rights of the parties fell to be determined in accordance with

the law prevailing on the date of the sale. The plaintiffs, having fulfilled all the

statutory requirements under the unamended Act, acquired a right which was duly

recognised by both the Courts below.

This court is of the considered view that a decree validly passed by

the Court of first instance is not ordinarily defeated by subsequent events unless

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the subsequent legislation expressly or by necessary implication mandates such a

consequence. A perusal of the Punjab Pre-emption (Haryana Amendment) Act,

1995 does not disclose any express provision rendering decrees already passed and

affirmed before its enforcement liable to be nullified merely because a further

appeal remained pending. 

Therefore, the findings regarding the plaintiffs' status as co-sharers

and their superior right of pre-emption had thus received concurrent judicial

affirmation prior to the legislative change. In the absence of a clear statutory

mandate giving retrospective operation to the amendment so as to unsettle decrees

already passed by the competent Courts, the mere pendency of the present Regular

Second Appeal cannot be construed to retrospectively extinguish the rights which

had already crystallised in favour of the plaintiffs.

This court is of the considered view that accepting the submission

advanced by the appellants would amount to attributing retrospective operation to

the amending Act in the absence of express words or necessary implication to that

effect. Such an interpretation would run contrary to the settled principle that a

statute affecting substantive rights is ordinarily prospective unless the legislature

manifests a contrary intention in clear and unequivocal terms.

Consequently,   this   Court   is   of   the   considered   opinion   that   the

amendment of the year 1995 as brought to Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption

Act, 1913, as applicable to the State of Haryana, does not affect the maintainability

of the present suit in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The

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substantial question of law is, accordingly, answered against the appellants and in

favour of the plaintiffs.

Issue no.3 Whether the suit instituted by the plaintiffs was within the

period of limitation prescribed under Article 97 of the Limitation Act,

1963?

The principal contention of the appellants is that the suit instituted by

the plaintiffs on 22.05.1989 was barred by limitation inasmuch as the sale deed

had been executed on 16.05.1988 and possession of the suit land had also been

delivered on the said date. According to the appellants, the limitation prescribed

under Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963 commenced from the date of

execution of the sale deed and, therefore, the suit having been instituted beyond

one year was liable to be dismissed as time-barred.

The submission cannot be accepted. Article 97 of the Limitation Act

prescribes two different starting points for computing limitation in a suit to enforce

a right of pre-emption. Where the subject matter of sale admits of physical

possession and possession is delivered under the sale, limitation commences from

the date of taking such physical possession. However, where the sale does not

admit of physical possession, the period of limitation begins from the date of

registration of the sale deed. The determination of the applicable clause, therefore,

necessarily depends upon the nature of the property transferred.

As already held while dealing with the first substantial question of

law, the appellants have failed to establish that the vendors were exclusive owners

in   exclusive   possession   of   the   suit   property.   Both  the   Courts   below   have

RSA-1329-1995 -15-

concurrently found that no lawful partition had taken place either by virtue of the

alleged family settlement or under the provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act,

1887. The vendors continued to hold only an undivided share in the joint khewat

and, consequently, the sale in favour of the appellants was nothing but a transfer of

an undivided share in the joint holding. The mere recital in the sale deed

describing specific khasra numbers or recording delivery of possession cannot

alter the true legal character of the transaction. In law, a co-sharer cannot convey

exclusive possession of any specific portion of the joint property in the absence of

a valid partition.

Thus, this court is of the opinion that the lower Courts have rightly

concluded that where the transfer relates to an undivided share in joint property,

the second limb of Article 97 becomes applicable and limitation is to be reckoned

from the date of registration of the sale deed. 

Admittedly, although the sale deed was executed on 16.05.1988, it

was registered on 25.05.1988 and the present suit came to be instituted on

22.05.1989, i.e. within one year from the date of registration. The concurrent

finding  that   the   suit  was  within  limitation   is  thus  founded  upon  a   correct

interpretation of Article 97 of the Limitation Act and a proper appreciation of the

evidence on record. Accordingly, it is held that the suit instituted by the plaintiffs

was well within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 97 of the

Limitation Act, 1963, and the substantial question of law is answered against the

appellants and in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents.

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Conclusion

In view of the discussion made hereinabove, this Court is of the

opinion that no material has been placed before this Court to demonstrate that the

aforesaid concurrent finding of the lower Courts suffers from any perversity or is

contrary to the settled legal position, so as to warrant interference of this Court

while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908.

Consequently, the Trial Court judgement and decree dated 05.08.1991

and First appellate Court judgement and decree dated 07.03.1995 is upheld. 

The present Regular Second appeal is hereby dismissed. 

Pending applications, if any, stand disposed off. 

(SANDEEP MOUDGIL)

                    JUDGE

15.07.2026

Meenu

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No

Whether reportable : Yes/No