No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 1
Reportable
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+WP(C) Nos.3669/2006 and 3672/2006
Date of Decision: 28.03.2008
#Oman International Bank S.A.O.G. …..Petitioner
! Through: Mr.Adarsh B. Dial,
Senior Advocate with
Mr.Rajeev K. Pandey and
Mr.Sushil Kr. Tekriwal
Versus
$Appellate Authority for Industrial
And Financial Reconstruction and Ors. …..Respondents
^ Through Mr.Vibhu Bakru with
Mr.Sumesh Dhawan and
Mr.Vikas Chandel for respondent
No.2
Mr.Vijay Kumar for respondent
No.13/Canara Bank
Mr.Raj Kumar for the Insurance
Inspector, ESIC
Ms.Sushmita Banerjee for Federal
Bank
CORAM :-
*THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE A.K.SIKRI
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI
1.Whether Reporters of Local papers may be allowed to see
the Judgment?
2.To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3.Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
A.K. SIKRI, J.
:
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 2
WP(C) No.3669 & 3672/2006
1. The petitioner is a banking company constituted under the
laws prevailing in Sultanate of Oman. For carrying out banking
business in India, it has been granted licence by the Reserved
Bank of India. It had granted financial accommodation to the two
companies, namely, Premier Synthetics Ltd. (respondent No.2 in
WP(C) No.3669/2006) and Blue Blends (India) Ltd. (respondent
No.2 in WP(C) No.3672/2006) and both the companies are
declared as sick companies. Both these companies have
approached the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction
(in short the „BIFR‟) for revival/rehabilitation on the ground that
they are sick companies. Though their reference under Section
15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act (in
short the „SICA‟) for declaring them sick companies was rejected
by the BIFR, appeals filed by them before the Appellate Authority
for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (in short the „AAIFR‟)
under Section 25 of the Act have been allowed and the cases are
remanded back to the BIFR for fresh consideration on the basis of
the principle set out by the AAIFR in the impugned judgment.
The petitioner bank was objector in both the appeals and is not
happy with the impugned orders passed by the AAIFR. In these
circumstances, these two writ petitions are filed assailing the
orders of the AAIFR. The legal effect of both the orders is same
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 3
as identical question is determined by the AAIFR in a common
judgment. It is, in these circumstances, both these writ petitions
were clubbed and heard together. For the sake of brevity, we
take note of facts of WP(C) No.3672/2006.
2. In the year 1986, credit facilities were sanctioned by the
petitioner in favour of Blue Blends (India) Ltd. (hereinafter
referred to as the „Company‟). The company had availed similar
facilities from some other banks as well. As it committed default
in making repayments of these loans, all those banks, forming a
consortium, filed an OA, being OA No.2518/2000, before the Debt
Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai. The same is still pending
adjudication. As per the petitioner bank, as on 30.9.2002 an
amount of Rs.25.30 crores with further interest was due from the
company.
3. After the filing of the said OA, on 6.2.2001, the company
filed a reference under Section 15(1) of the SICA before the BIFR,
which was registered as Reference Case No .235/2002. The
company had sought the prayer that it be declared a sick
industrial company and measures be determined for its
rehabilitation by the BIFR. The BIFR heard this reference and
vide its order dated 6.11.2002 rejected the same on the ground
that reference filed by the company was time-barred. In coming
to this conclusion the BIFR took into consideration certain dates.
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 4
4. The company had preferred first reference under Section
15(1) of the SICA on the basis of balance-sheet as on 31.3.2000.
The Board of Directors of the company in their meeting held on
29.11.2000 had formed an opinion on the basis of the aforesaid
balance-sheet, to the effect that net worth of the company was
completely eroded and therefore, a reference was required to be
made before the BIFR. Accordingly, reference was made on
6.2.2001. Admittedly, this was after the expiry of 60 days‟ period
from the date on which the Board of Directors formed the opinion
that the company had become a sick industrial company.
Limitation period for making such a reference is 60 days as per
Section 15(1) of the SICA. Thus, on 1.5.2002, the reference was
rejected by the BIFR as time-barred.
5. The company filed a fresh reference, which was treated as
Case No.235/2002. It was based on the balance-sheet as on
31.3.2002. However, no reference based on its balance-sheet as
on 31.3.2001 was filed by the company. The BIFR, in these
circumstances, noted that though the net worth of the company
was fully eroded as on 31.3.2001, and the statutory auditors had
confirmed in their audit reports that the company had become a
sick industrial company as per the provisions of the SICA and the
audited accounts as on 31.3.2001 were adopted at the AGM held
on 10.11.2001, no reference was filed by the company ba sed on
its balance-sheet as on 31.3.2001 when its net worth was fully
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 5
eroded. It, thus, rejected the reference as not maintainable. The
company preferred appeal before the AAIFR. The AAIFR has
reversed the judgment of the BIFR in its order dated 8.11.2005.
6. It is not in dispute that under Section 15(1) of the SICA,
reference is to be made by the Board of Directors of the company
“within 60 days from the date of finalization of the duly audited
accounts of the company for the financial year at the end o f
which the company has become a sick industrial company.”
Proviso to this Section, however, lays down that if the Board of
Directors has sufficient reasons even before such finalization, to
form the opinion that the company has become a sick industrial
company, then “within 60 days after it has formed such opinion”
the Board of Directors shall make a reference to the BIFR. The
Appellate Authority formulated the following questions for
determination while undertaking the exercise of interpreting
Section 15 with its proviso, with reference to the facts of this
case:-
i. Whether a reference under Section
15(1) of SICA filed within the period of
60 days after adoption of accounts
can be treated as time-barred?
ii. Whether BIFR/AAIFR have the power
to condone delay and entertain a
reference that has been filed after 60
days from the date of finalization of
accounts?
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 6
iii. When does the period of 60 days for
filing a reference as prescribed under
Section 15(1) of SICA start running?
iv. Whether the proviso to Section 15(1)
can override the main Section, i.e.
Section 15(1) of SICA.
v. Whether SICA provides any restriction
from filing reference based on
subsequent years‟ accounts if the
reference based on the accounts of an
earlier year has been rejected on the
ground that it was time barred?
vi. Whether SICA provides for filing of a
reference for subsequent financial
years when an earlier reference is
pending adjudication?
7. We may note at this stage itself that since the BIFR
had rejected the reference on the ground that earlier reference
was filed belatedly, and no reference on the basis of balance-
sheet as on 30.3.2001 was filed, this issue was covered by
question No.(v) formulated above. While answering this
question, the appellate authority noted that as per the
judgments of this Court in Madhumilan Syntex Ltd. V. AAIFR &
Ors., Denholm v. BIFR and Others, and Paam Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. V. BIFR & Ors., each year‟s reference had to be decided on
its own merits. There is no quarrel raised by the petitioner as
far as answer to this question formulated by the appellate
authority/AAIFR is concerned. However, the petitioner feels
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 7
aggrieved by the manner in which the proviso to Section 15(1)
is interpreted vis-à-vis main provision of Section 15 and in the
process following general principles for dealing with references
filed under SICA are laid down by the AAIFR:-
“On a careful consideration of the
averments made before us and records we
are of the opinion that:
a) That the earliest date on which the
reference can be filed is 60 days from
the date of the meeting of BOD, when
the opinion regarding sickness has been
formed under the Proviso to Section
15(1). The latest date on which the sick
company can file the reference is 60
days from the date of finalization of the
accounts under section 15(1).
b) If the reference is filed after the due
date, i.e., the period applicable under
(1), BIFR can determine whether there
were justifiable reasons for delay or
there was any mala fide in not filing the
reference within the stipulated period
and thereafter, deal with the reference
on merits even though it may be
belated. Delay in filing the reference
can, however, result in initiation of penal
action against the management of the
sick industrial company under Section
33(1) of SICA.
c) A belated reference should not be
rejected in limini but the reasons for
delay should be considered and delay
can be condoned if justifiable grounds
for the same are demonstrated.
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 8
d) Each year‟s reference on the basis of
which a declaration of sickness is
claimed should be examined after due
enquiry based on the criteria laid down
at section 3(1)(o) of SICA.
e) If one year‟s reference has been
dismissed as time barred, there is no bar
to examining the reference filed in the
subsequent year.”
8. The bone of contention is the principle laid down in (a)
above. As per this principle, AAIFR has given two dates
between which reference can be filed. Earliest date on which
reference can be filed is 60 days from the date of meeting of
the Board of Directors. Starting from that date it can be filed
on any date upto 60 days from the date on which the company
finalises its accounts. It is the contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioner that this principle is wholly erroneous
and it does violence to the language of Section 15(1) of SICA,
inasmuch as, there is no such warrant in the said provision for
fixing initial date and outer limit with full liberty to the
company to file its reference on any date during the said
period. In order to appreciate the contention, we first
reproduce Section 15(1) along with its proviso in its entirety:-
“15. Reference to Board
(1) When an industrial company has
become a sick industrial company, the
Board of Directors of the company,
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 9
shall, within sixty days from the date
of finalization of the duly audited
accounts of the company for the
financial year as at the end of which
the company has become a sick
industrial company, make a reference
to the Board for determination of the
measures which shall be adopted with
respect to the company.
PROVIDED that if the Board of
Directors has sufficient reasons even
before such finalization of form the
opinion that the company had
become sick industrial company, the
Board of Directors shall, within sixty
days after it has formed such opinion,
make a reference to the Board for the
determination of the measures which
shall be adopted with respect to the
company.”
9. As per sub-section (1) of Section 15, the Board of
Directors are under an obligation (as is clear from the
expression „shall‟ appearing therein) to make a reference to
BIFR within 60 days from the date of finalization of duly
audited accounts of the company for the financial year, at the
end of which the company has become a sick industrial
company. Since the financial year of a compa ny, for the
purposes is 31
st
March of a particular financial year, the date
on which accounts as on 31
st
March of that year are duly
audited and finalized shall be the starting point of counting the
limitation of 60 days for making reference. Thus, if the
accounts, say of the year as on 31.3.2002 after they are duly
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 10
audited, finalized on 30.9.2002, within 60 days to be counted
from 1.10.2002, the reference is to be made.
10. Proviso to sub-section (1), however, makes an
exception to the aforesaid principle. As per this proviso, if the
Board of Directors has sufficient reasons to form the opinion
that the company had become sick industrial company even
before the finalization of the duly audited accounts, the Board
is not required to wait till the date of finalization of the
accounts. In that event, when such an opinion is formed, the
period of 60 days shall start counting from the day the Board
of Directors has sufficient reason to form the opinion about the
sickness of the company and reference is to be made within 60
days after such an opinion is formed whether the accounts are
finalized or not. In the example given above, if we presume
that there were sufficient reasons to form the opinion about
the sickness of the company on 31.7.2002, the limitation of 60
days, within which reference is to be made, shall start running
from 1.8.2002, though the accounts were ultimately finalized
on 30.9.2002. When we interpret the provision in the
aforesaid manner it is difficult to agree with the opinion of the
AAIFR formulated at (a) above, namely, giving an option to the
company to make reference within 60 days from forming the
opinion and upto 60 days from the date of finalization of
accounts.
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 11
11. However, at the same time it is also important to
decide what treatment is to be given to a reference if it is filed
within 60 days computed in the aforesaid manner. Section
15(1) with its proviso rather exhibited a sense of urgency for
making such a reference. Whereas sub-section (1) of Section
15 deals with computation of 60 days from the date when the
duly audited accounts are finalized, proviso fixes an even
earlier date for making such a reference. The reason is
obvious, namely, if the company has become sick and
normally such a fact would be known when the accounts are
finalized, within 60 days the reference is to be made.
However, if this fact has come to the notice of the Board of
Directors even before finalization of the accounts, 60 days‟
period is to start from the formation of the opinion. The
purpose is to approach the BIFR as early as possible so that
immediate measures are taken for revival of such a sick
company by the BIFR. The law as laid down by various
judgments of the Bombay High Court as well as by this Court is
that Section 15(1) does not lay down any period of limitation
but creates an obligation upon the Board of Directors of a sick
industrial company to approach the BIFR at the earliest.
Therefore, in the event of delay in fulfilling the obligation, and
not preferring the reference within 60 days from the date the
same ought to be preferred, the consequence would be to take
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 12
penal action against the management of the sick industrial
company as provided under Section 33(1) of the SICA. At the
same time, in so far as reference is concerned, it is not to be
rejected on the sole ground of belated filing of the reference,
unless the Board finds that delayed filing of reference is on
account of the Board of Directors of the company being guilty
of „supine indifference‟ or that there was a lack of bona fides
on the part of the Directors. This principle was first laid down
by the Bombay High Court in the matter of Garware Chemicals
Ltd. v. BIFR & Ors., (2004) 1 CLJ 350 Bom. and followed by it in
its subsequent judgment in the case of Esquire Polymers Ltd.
v. AAIFR & Ors., (2004) 53 SCL 183. In this judgment, the
Bombay High Court also held that there was no provision in
the Act which debarred the BIFR to exercise its discretion of
condonation of delay, in a given case on the basis of material
placed on record before it. It was subsequently held that in
the event of delay in filing the reference, it is not to be
rejected on the sole ground that it was not filed within
stipulated period of 60 days. Rather, there was an obligation
on the part of the BIFR to take the reference to its logical
conclusion and not to scuttle it down by reading Section 15(1)
as a period of limitation. Following observations from this
judgment are worth a quote:-
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 13
“10. As noted above, under Section
16(1)(b) of the SICA, the BIFR itself is
empowered to take cognizance of the
problem and register reference on its own.
There is no period of limitation therein.
There is no period of limitation when it
comes to the reference at the instance of
Central Government, Reserve Bank, State
Bank or Public Financial Institutions under
Section 15(2) of the SICA. In this
background, when we look at Section 15(1)
of the SICA, the only inference, that can be
drawn, will be that this is a requirement
which puts the Companies on their toes and
it expects them to file their reference within
a period of sixty days. In the event, the
reference is not filed, there will be a penal
consequence under Section 33(1) of the
SICA. However, to say that the reference
would not be registered at the end of the
period of sixty days, would be negating the
objectives, for which the quasi judicial
Authority under the Act is created. The
Authority cannot close the eyes in the
problem brought to its notice merely
because the reference is made beyond
sixty days. It has power to hold an inquiry
as required under Section 16(1) of the SICA
and proceed to frame an appropriate
scheme by way of rehabilitation and/or to
pass appropriate order, if it is of the opinion
that no rehabilitation is possible; reference
must to go its logical conclusion and it
cannot be scuttled by reading Section 15(1)
as a period of limitation.”
12. This Court in its judgment dated 23.9.2004 rendered
in WP(C) No.713/2003 entitled Avik Pharmaceuticals Limited
agreed with the view of the Bombay High Court expressed in the
aforesaid judgments. In that case, the Board of Directors formed
an opinion that the company had become sick vide its resolution
recorded in its meeting dated 5.2.2001. The reference was
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 14
registered on 30.4.2001, which was beyon d 60 days. The BIFR
dismissed the reference vide judgment dated 26.6.2002 holding
that it lacked power to condone the delay. The AAIFR upheld the
order of the BIFR, which was reversed by this Court in its decision
rendered in the aforesaid writ petition extracting the aforesaid
quote of the Bombay High Court in its judgment. The AAIFR in its
impugned order has also referred to another judgment of this
Court in M/s.Empire Jute Co. v. AAIFR – WP(C) No.4035/2001 –
decided on 13.8.2001. In that case, reference was filed based on
the audited balance-sheet for the financial year dated 31.3.1998.
However, on noticing that the company had become sick in the
year 1989 itself, the BIFR rejected the reference as time-barred,
which decision was upheld by the AAIFR holding that cause of
action would arise as soon as the company became sick for the
first time and not every year when its annual accounts are
audited even though the sickness persisted in subsequent years.
Though Section 15(1) of SICA does not lay down l imitation but
casts an obligation on the part of the Board of Directors to file the
reference within time as stipulated in the said sub-section, the
position, thus, emerges would be the following:-
a) Section 15(1) does not lay down any period of
limitation but creates an obligation upon the Board
of Directors of the sick industrial company to
approach the BIFR within the period prescribed.
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 15
b) In case the Board of Directors fails to approach the
BIFR within the stipulated period, the management
of such sick industrial company would be liable for
penal action under Section 33(1) of SICA.
c) The reference can still be entertained on merits as
the purpose is to take expeditious steps for revival
of a sick industrial company, if such revival is
feasible.
d) Even in the absence of any specific provision, the
BIFR can exercise its discretion to condone the
delay.
e) The reference should be rejected only if the Board
of Directors of the company are guilty of „supine
indifference‟ or when there is lack of bona fides in
making such a reference.
14. When the position in law, is as stated hereinabove, it
cannot follow that the reference can be made during the
period as opined by the AAIFR in its conclusion (a). If that
interpretation is accepted, even when the reference is made
beyond 60 days, the Board of Directors can contend that there
is no fault on their part and they are not liable for action under
Section 33(1) of SICA. The carving out of „earliest date‟ and
„latest date‟ between which reference can be filed is clearly in
the teeth of provisions of Section 15, as if the proviso lays
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 16
down an additional date for filing the reference. The provisos
are not to be interpreted in this manner. It would be of
interest to note that the AAIFR took note of certain judgment
of the Apex Court as well as Privy Council providing guidelines
as to how provisos are to be interpreted, as is clear from the
following discussion contained in the judgment:-
“In the case of Angurbala Mullick Vs.
Bebabrata Mullick, AIR 1951 SC 293, the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“proviso is normally an
excepting or qualifying clause and
the effect of it is to execute out of
the preceding clause upon which
it is engrafted something which
but for the proviso would be
within it. Proviso which is found
contradictory to the whole
document, held to be ignored.”
13. In the words of Lord Macmillan
[Madras & Southern Maharatta Rly. Co. Vs.
Bezwada Municipality AIR 1944 PC 71 at
73]:
“As a general rule, a proviso is
added to an enactment to qualify
or create an exception to which is
in the enactment and ordinarily, a
proviso is not interpreted as
stating a general rule.”
(iv) In the case of S. Sundaram Pillai v.
V.R. Pattabiraman, [(1985) 1 SCC 591, at
page 611], the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has
held as under:
“43. We need not multiply
authorities after authorities on
this point because the legal
position seems to be clearly and
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 17
manifestly well established. To
sum up, a proviso may serve four
different purposes:
(1) qualifying or excepting
certain provisions from the
main enactment:
(2) it may entirely change the
very concept of the
intendment of the
enactment by insisting on
certain mandatory
conditions to be fulfilled in
order to make the
enactment workable.
(3) it may be so embedded in
the Act itself as to become
an integral part of the
enactment and thus acquire
the tenor and colour of the
substantive enactment
itself; and
(4) it may be used merely to act
as an optional addenda to
the enactment with the sole
object of explaining the real
intendment of the statutory
provision.”
15. In spite thereof, the Tribunal concluded that proviso to
Section 15(1) was an enabling provision and could not have
overriding effect over the main provision. On this basis
principle (a) was laid down with which we are unable to agree
and substitute the said principle in the following words:-
“(a) The reference is normally to be made
by the Board of Directors of a sick industrial
company, with BIFR, within 60 days from
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 18
the date of finalization of the duly audited
accounts of the company for the financial
year. However in case the Board of
Directors has sufficient reasons to form the
opinion, even before the finalization of
accounts, that the company has become
sick, then the Board of Directors are not to
wait till the accounts are finalized but are
under obligation to make a reference to the
BIFR within 60 days from the date of
forming such an opinion. In this
eventuality, provided under the proviso, the
date by which reference is to be made
would even be earlier than the time, which
is stipulated in sub-section (1)
In so far as principles (b) to (e) are concerned, we
approve the same.
16. Notwithstanding the view which we have taken, we do
not deem it proper to interfere with the direction given by the
AAIFR in remanding the case to the BIFR for fresh
consideration. Reason is simple. As noted above, BIFR had
rejected the reference as time-barred only on the ground that
the company did not approach on the basis of balance -sheet
as on 1.3.2001, though statutory auditors had confirmed that
it had become a sick industrial company as per the provisions
of the Act. Even in such a case, when the reference is sought
on the basis of balance-sheet as on 31.3.2002, it has to be
considered in the light of the principles laid down in paras (b)
to (e) above and the BIFR has to determine as to whether
there were justifiable reasons for delay or it was a case of
„supine indifference‟ or there was any mala fides in not filing
WP(C) Nos.3669 3672/06 Page 19
the reference within the stipulated period. Of course, because
of delay, action under Section 33(1) of SICA could be taken
against the management of the company as observed by the
AAIFR as well. We, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions and
direct the BIFR to consider the reference submitted by these
companies in the light of the discussion above. There shall,
however, be no order as to costs.
(A.K. SIKRI)
JUDGE
March28, 2008 (VIPIN SANGHI)
HP. JUDGE
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