2025 INSC 1286 CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 1 of 30

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3934 OF 2006

P. ANJANAPPA (D) BY LRs …APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

A.P. NANJUNDAPPA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAM NATH,J.

1) The present civil appeal arises from the final judgment and

decree dated 30 August 2005 passed by the High Court of

Karnataka at Bengaluru in Regular First Appeal No. 750 of

1994 (hereinafter, “impugned judgment”), whereby the High

Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and

preliminary decree dated 19 August 1994 rendered by the

Principal Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural District, in Original

Suit No. 146 of 1987 decreeing a suit for partition and

separate possession of the suit schedule properties. The

appellants before this Court are the legal heirs of late P.

Anjanappa, who was arrayed as defendant no. 5 before the

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 2 of 30

Trial Court, and for ease of reference the parties shall

hereinafter be described by their status before the Trial

Court, with the appellants being referred to as defendant no.

5.

2) The facts giving rise to the present case are set out hereafter.

2.1. The parties trace their lineage to one Pillappa, who is

stated to be the common ancestor. His widow Muniyamma

was arrayed as defendant no. 1 before the Trial Court. The

plaintiffs pleaded that Pillappa had four sons, namely

plaintiff no. 1 A. P. Nanjundappa, plaintiff no. 2

Venkataswamappa, defendant no. 3 Sreeramappa, and

defendant no. 5 P. Anjanappa, and five daughters, namely

plaintiff no. 3 Narayanamma, plaintiff no. 4 Sonnamma,

plaintiff no. 5 Anjanamma, and defendant no. 4

Lakshmamma, besides one daughter who had predeceased

and whose branch was represented in the suit as

defendant no. 2. Defendant no. 6 Muniswamappa is the

husband of plaintiff no. 3 and is not a member of the joint

family. Defendant no. 7 is a lessee in respect of certain

items of the suit properties. The other defendants are

members of the wider family as reflected in the array of

parties.

2.2. The suit schedule properties comprised of three parts.

Schedule “A” described immovable properties said to have

originally belonged to Pillappa and thereafter to have

continued as joint family properties in the hands of the

coparcenary comprising the parties to the suit. Schedule

“B” described immovable properties purchased under a

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 3 of 30

registered sale deed dated 25 April 1974 in the joint names

of defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6. Schedule “C”

described movables, including, inter alia, an item

representing amounts realised by way of rent from the

Schedule “B” properties.

2.3. The plaintiffs’ case, in brief, was that Schedule “A”

properties were joint family properties liable to partition

and that Schedule “B” properties, though standing in the

joint names of defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6, had

been acquired from and blended with the income of the

joint family and were therefore also subject to partition. It

was further asserted that defendant no. 7 had been

inducted as yearly lessee in respect of items comprised in

Schedule “B” and that defendant no. 5 had collected the

lease amounts, which were liable to be brought to account

as part of Schedule “C”. The plaint also adverted to certain

agricultural operations, including a casuarina plantation,

and claimed accounting of the proceeds.

2.4. Defendant no. 5 contested the suit. His principal defences,

as pleaded were: that plaintiff no. 2 had during the lifetime

of Pillappa executed a registered release deed; that

defendant no. 3 had, in the year 1967, executed a

registered release deed relinquishing his rights in the joint

family properties; and that after the death of Pillappa in

the year 1969 there had been, on 11 February 1972, a

partition between plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5 in the

presence of panchayatdars, recorded in a palupatti

(‘Palupatti’ means partition deed or a family settlement

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 4 of 30

agreement) pursuant to which they had been in separate

possession and enjoyment and separate entries had been

made in the revenue records. Defendant no. 5 further

pleaded that Schedule “B” properties were his self -

acquisitions, that defendant no. 6 was only a name lender,

and that the plaintiffs’ sisters had been given in marriage

with customary expenses and were not entitled to shares

in the immovable properties.

2.5. Defendant no. 6, though not a member of the joint family,

was a joint purchaser of Schedule “B” and was impleaded

on that footing. Defendant no. 7, being the lessee in

respect of Schedule “B”, was impleaded to answer the

claim for rendition of accounts of rent. The remaining

defendants were added as necessary parties to an action

for partition.

2.6. On 2 July 1987, plaintiff no. 1 and plaintiff no. 2 instituted

Original Suit No. 146 of 1987 before the Court of the City

Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural District, seeking partition

and separate possession of their alleged shares in the suit

schedules, together with consequential accounts including

mesne profits.

2.7. Upon service of summons, defendant no. 5 entered

appearance and contested the suit. Defendant no. 6,

though he did not at first file a written statement, lodged a

counter claim asserting half share in Schedule “B”

properties as a joint purchaser and sought a

corresponding share in the amounts described as item no.

17 in Schedule “C”. Defendant no. 7 filed a written

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 5 of 30

statement admitting its status as lessee in respect of

Schedule “B” and stating that rents had been paid to

defendant no. 5 until disputes arose between defendant

no. 5 and defendant no. 6, whereafter the lessee expressed

willingness to deposit rents in court. Defendants nos. 1 to

4 did not contest the matter and remained absent.

3) The Trial Court, upon consideration of the pleadings and

evidence, decreed the suit for partition and separate

possession by a preliminary decree dated 19 August 1994.

The Trial Court’s decision was based on the following

reasons:

3.1. In relation to Schedule “A”, the Trial Court held that the

properties were joint family properties. It rejected the

defence of a concluded partition as of 11 February 1972

on the basis of an unregistered palupatti. The Trial Court

recorded that the document, being unregistered, could not

be received in evidence to prove either severance in status

or the quantum of shares, and that the surrounding

revenue materials did not demonstrate that the alleged

partition had been acted upon. The Trial Court noted that

entries in the revenue records reflected possession by

inheritance and management rather than by partition,

that there was no subdivision or demarcation in

accordance with a partition, and that the conduct relied

upon by defendant no. 5, including a subse quent

alienation said to discharge family debts, was inconsistent

with a complete earlier severance.

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 6 of 30

3.2. In relation to Schedule “B”, the Trial Court found that the

properties were purchased in the joint names of defendant

no. 5 and defendant no. 6 under a registered sale deed

dated 25 April 1974 and that the lease granted in favour

of defendant no. 7 had been executed jointly by defendant

no. 5 and defendant no. 6. On an appraisal of the oral and

documentary evidence, including the admissions elicited

from defendant no. 5, the Trial Court rejected the plea that

defendant no. 6 was a mere name lender and negatived the

contention that the entire of Schedule “B” was the self-

acquisition of defendant no. 5. The Trial Court concluded

that defendant no. 6 was entitled to a half share in

Schedule “B” and to a half share in the moneys

represented by item no. 17 of Schedule “C”, with the

remaining half of those items forming part of the family

pool for partition.

3.3. In relation to the release deeds set up by defendant no. 5,

the Trial Court held that the registered release deed

attributed to plaintiff no. 2 was not shown to have been

acted upon, since the proponent did not lead convincing

evidence to establish separation of plaintiff no. 2 from the

joint family or exclusion of his claim to partition. As

regards defendant no. 3, the Trial Court noticed the release

deed and treated him as having separated for the purpose

of survivorship, yet held that he would participate to the

extent of a share in the notional accretion arising on the

death of the father. On that footing, the Trial Court

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 7 of 30

declined to exclude either plaintiff no. 2 or defendant no.

3 from the suit entirely.

3.4. The computation of shares was undertaken on the basis

that, at the time of the death of Pillappa in the year 1969,

the coparcenary consisted of the father and three sons,

namely plaintiff no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, and defendant no. 5,

with defendant no. 3 being treated as separated for the

purpose of survivorship. A notional partition was therefore

posited to the extent of 1/4 in favour of Pillappa. The Trial

Court then proceeded on the footing that the notional 1/4

th

share of Pillappa devolved in equal measure among nine

sharers represented in the suit, namely plaintiff no. 1,

plaintiff no. 2, defendant no. 5, the four daughters, the

branch of the predeceased daughter represented by

defendant no. 2, and defendant no. 3. On that basis, each

of the nine received an accretion of 1/36, and plaintiff no.

1, plaintiff no. 2, and defendant no. 5 each took, in

addition, 1/4 as their coparcenary share, yielding a total

of 5/18 for each of plaintiff no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, and

defendant no. 5, and 1/36 for each of plaintiff no. 3,

plaintiff no. 4, plaintiff no. 5, defendant no. 4, defendant

no. 3, and defendant no. 2. The share of defendant no. 6

was determined separately as 1/2 of Schedule “B” and 1/2

of item no. 17 of Schedule “C”, outside the family pool, in

terms of the findings recorded in relation to those items.

3.5. The Trial Court directed an enquiry into mesne profits and

consequential accounts, including in respect of the lease

moneys pertaining to Schedule “B”, to be worked out in the

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 8 of 30

final decree proceedings in accordance with the shares so

declared.

4) Aggrieved by the preliminary decree dated 19 August 1994,

defendant no. 5 preferred Regular First Appeal no. 750 of

1994 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru. By

the impugned judgment dated 30 August 2005, the High

Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decree of the

Trial Court with the following observations:

4.1. The High Court noted the defence of defendant no. 5 that

there had been a partition on 11 February 1972 reduced

into a palupatti and that the revenue entries thereafter

reflected separate possession. Upon examining the

document and the surrounding materials, the High Court

held that the palupatti, being unregistered, was

inadmissible to prove either severance of the joint family

status or the quantification of shares. It further found, on

an appraisal of the mutation extracts, record of rights, and

other revenue papers, that the entries indicated

possession by inheritance and management rather than

pursuant to a partition; that there was no phodi or sub-

division (‘Phodi’ means process of surveying and

demarcating land) corresponding to a partition; and that a

subsequent alienation reciting discharge of joint family

debts was inconsistent with an earlier partition. The plea

of an effective partition as on 11 February 1972 was

therefore rejected.

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 9 of 30

4.2. In relation to the release attributed to plaintiff no. 2, the

High Court concurred with the Trial Court that the

document had not been shown to have been acted upon,

and that there was no reliable evidence of plaintiff no. 2

having separated so as to forfeit a claim in partition or in

the devolution of the notional share of the father. As

regards the release attributed to defendant no. 3, the High

Court referred to the nature of the instrument and the

applicable stamp requirements and held that the

proponent had not established its efficacy to exclude

defendant no. 3 entirely. The High Court supplemented the

reasons recorded by the Trial Court and declined to

disturb the inclusion of defendant no. 3 for purposes of

computing shares.

4.3. On Schedule “B”, the High Court affirmed the findings that

the properties were purchased jointly in the names of

defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6 and that the lease in

favour of defendant no. 7 was executed by both of them.

Having regard to the admissions in the evidence of

defendant no. 5 and the tenor of the documents, the High

Court rejected the contention that defendant no. 6 was a

mere name lender and upheld his entitlement to a one half

share in Schedule “B” and a one half share in the moneys

represented by item no. 17 of Schedule “C”. It held that

only the remaining one half of those items would enter the

family pool for partition.

4.4. On the basis of the above conclusions, the High Court

affirmed the computation adopted by the Trial Court,

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 10 of 30

namely that plaintiff no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, and defendant

no. 5 would each be entitled to 5/18 in the family pool and

that plaintiff no. 3, plaintiff no. 4, plaintiff no. 5, defendant

no. 4, defendant no. 3, and defendant no. 2 would each be

entitled to 1/36, with defendant no. 6 holding 1/2 of

Schedule “B” and 1/2 of item no. 17 of Schedule “C”

outside the family pool.

4.5. Consequential directions were issued for disbursal of rents

earlier deposited in respect of Schedule “B” in proportion

to the shares as affirmed, and certain ministerial

corrections in the cause title were permitted.

5) Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the first appeal, the

appellants, who are the legal heirs of defendant no. 5 before

the Trial Court, have preferred the present civil appeal.

Respondent nos. 1 to 5 herein are plaintiff nos. 1 to 5 before

the Trial Court. Respondent no. 6 herein is defendant no. 1

before the Trial Court, respondent no. 7 is defendant no. 2,

respondent no. 8 is defendant no. 3, respondent no. 9 is

defendant no. 6, respondent no. 10 is defendant no. 4, and

respondent no. 11 is defendant no. 7. As already stated, the

parties shall hereinafter be referred to by their descriptions

as they stood before the Trial Court.

6) Having considered the pleadings, the evidence on record and

the rival submissions of the respective parties, the questions

that fall for our determination are as follows:

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 11 of 30

I. Whether the registered release deeds dated 09.11.1956

(Ex.D-15) and 14.09.1967 (Ex.D-16) are valid and binding,

and if so, what is their legal effect on the membership and

share entitlements of plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3.

II. Whether the document dated 11.02.1972 styled as the

palupatti (Ex.D-17 with schedule Ex.D-17(a)) can be relied

upon for collateral purposes to establish severance of status

as well as the nature of subsequent possession and

enjoyment.

III. Consequent upon the answers to the above, what constitutes

the partitionable estate and how the shares are to be worked

out inter se the parties, including the treatment of Schedule

“B” property and item no. 17 of “C” schedule and the extent

to which the co-ownership of defendant no. 6 is to be

preserved.

7) Issue I - Validity and effect of the two release deeds.

7.1. The parties are at variance on whether plaintiff no. 2 and

defendant no. 3 had, prior to the death of the propositus

in 1969, effectively severed themselves from the joint

family and abandoned all claim to its estate (and to the

father’s share upon notional partition). The plaintiffs

contend that the alleged releases were either not proved,

or, if proved, were ineffectual for want of being “acted

upon.” The appellant (defendant no. 5) maintains that both

instruments are registered releases executed for

consideration, as borne out by the parties’ subsequent

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 12 of 30

conduct, and operate to exclude plaintiff no. 2 and

defendant no. 3 from any share.

7.2. Having perused the original records, including the

registered instruments, deposition of the parties, and the

contemporaneous revenue extracts placed before us, we

are satisfied that both Ex.D-15 and Ex.D-16 are duly

proved and carry legal effect.

7.3. As regards Ex.D-15 (09.11.1956), it is a registered deed by

which plaintiff no. 2 unequivocally released his right and

interest in the joint family and in the estate of his father in

consideration of a cash payment. It recites, in clear terms,

a complete severance of all claims save the bond of blood.

The deed was produced and exhibited without objection;

there was no cross-examination of defendant no. 5 on its

execution or contents; and plaintiff no. 2 did not present

himself for cross-examination to dislodge the document. In

these circumstances, the statutory presumption that

attaches to a registered instrument operates, and, in the

case of Ex.D-15 which was more than thirty years old

when tendered, the presumption under Section 90 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872/Section 89 of the Bharatiya

Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 is also attracted. The burden to

rebut the deed’s genuineness and effect lay squarely on

those who impeached it. No credible rebuttal was led. This

principle has been reiterated by this Court in Prem Singh

v. Birbal

1 in the following terms:

1

(2006) 5 SCC 353.

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 13 of 30

“27. There is a presumption that a registered document

is validly executed. A registered document, therefore,

prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof,

thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut

the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has

not been able to rebut the said presumption.”

7.4. The Trial Court declined to give effect to Ex.D-15 on two

grounds: first, that the deed was not mentioned in the later

palupatti; and second, that it was not shown to have been

“acted upon.” In our considered opinion, both reasons are

misconceived. A release by a coparcener for consideration

operates immediately to divest his subsisting coparcenary

interest; it does not depend for its efficacy on any further

act of implementation. Silence in a later, separate

memorandum does not undo a concluded, registered

relinquishment inter partes, particularly when the deed is

produced from proper custody and stands unchallenged in

cross-examination.

7.5. We accordingly hold Ex.D-15 to be valid and binding and

to have the effect of removing plaintiff no. 2 from the

coparcenary from 1956 onwards. To the extent Ex.D -15

adverts to the father’s separate or future entitlement, we

treat the covenant, consideration and long-standing

conduct as creating an equitable estoppel against plaintiff

no. 2 setting up a contrary claim now. The estoppel effect

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 14 of 30

of similar release deeds was observed by this Court in

Elumalai v. M. Kamala

2 as follows:

“16. This Court went on to approve the view taken by

the High Court of Allahabad in Latafat Husain v.

Hidayat Husain [Latafat Husain v. Hidayat Husain,

1936 SCC OnLine All 315 : AIR 1936 All 573] . The

Court found as follows : (Gulam Abbas case [Gulam

Abbas v. Haji Kayyum Ali, (1973) 1 SCC 1] , SCC pp. 4-

5, paras 5 & 7)

“5. … With due respect, we are unable to concur with

the view [Abdul Kafoor v. Abdul Razack, 1958 SCC

OnLine Mad 129] of the Madras High Court that a

renunciation of an expectancy, as a purported but

legally ineffective transfer, is struck by Section 23 of

the Indian Contract Act. As it would be void as a

transfer at all there was no need to rely on Section 23,

Contract Act. If there was no “transfer” of property at

all, which was the correct position, but a simple

contract, which could only operate in future, it was

certainly not intended to bring about an immediate

transfer which was all that the rule of Muslim law

invalidated. The real question was whether, quite apart

from any transfer or contract, the declarations in the

deeds of purported relinquishment and receipt of

valuable consideration could not be parts of a course of

conduct over a number of years which, taken as a

whole, created a bar against a successful assertion of

a right to property when that right actually came into

being. An equitable estoppel operates, if its elements

are established, as a rule of evidence preventing the

assertion of rights which may otherwise exist.

***

2

(2023) 13 SCC 27.

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 15 of 30

7. Sir Roland Wilson, in his “Anglo Mohamadan Law”

(p. 260, para 208) states the position thus:

‘For the sake of those readers who are familiar with the

joint ownership of father and son according to the most

widely prevalent school of Hindu Law, it is perhaps

desirable to state explicitly that in Mohammedan, as in

Roman and English Law, nemo est her es

viventis………a living person has no heir. An heir

apparent or presumptive has no such reversionary

interest as would enable him to object to any sale or

gift made by the owner in possession; See Abdul Wahid

[Abdul Wahid Khan v. Nuran Bibi, 1885 SCC OnLine

PC 4 : (1884-85) 12 IA 91 : ILR (1885) 11 Cal 597] which

was followed in Hasan Ali [Hasan Ali v. Nazo, 1889

SCC OnLine All 29 : ILR (1889) 11 All 456] . The

converse is also true : a renunciation by an expectant

heir in the lifetime of his ancestor is not valid, or

enforceable against him after the vesting of the

inheritance.’

This is a correct statement, so far as it goes, of the law,

because a bare renunciation of expectation to inherit

cannot bind the expectant heir's conduct in future. But,

if the expectant heir goes further and receives

consideration and so conducts himself as to mislead an

owner into not making dispositions of his property inter

vivos the expectant heir could be debarred from setting

up his right when it does unquestionably vest in him.

In other words, the principle of estoppel remains

untouched by this statement.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. The property i.e. ‘A’ schedule, was not the ancestral

property of Shri Chandran. Shri Chandran would have

acquired rights over the same only if his father had died

intestate. He was, thus, only an heir apparent.

Transfer by an heir apparent being mere spes

successionis ineffective to convey any right. By the

mere execution of release deed, in other words, in the

facts of this case, no transfer took place. This is for the

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 16 of 30

simple reason that the transferor, namely, the father of

the appellants did not have any right at all which he

could transfer or relinquish. However, if his conduct

was such that he could be estopped then the execution

of the release deed would imperil his right and

therefore cast an irremovable shadow on the claim of

the appellants as well unless we find merit in other

submissions of Shri Siddharth Iyer, learned counsel for

the appellants.”

7.6. Turning to Ex.D-16 (14.09.1967), it is a registered deed by

which defendant no. 3 relinquished all his rights, title and

interest in favour of the father and the then coparceners,

and contemporaneously received seven items of property.

Execution was admitted in the pleadings; defendant no. 3

entered the box and accepted the deed; and the instrument

was exhibited. The courts below treated Ex.D-16 with

unwarranted scepticism. The Trial Court discounted it,

broadly on “not acted upon” and recital-based reasoning.

The High Court, while accepting that the deed partook the

character of an instrument of partition for stamp

purposes, declined to give effect to it on the footing that

proper valuation and stamp duty were not demonstrated

and that, in any case, it had not been acted upon. That

approach is unsustainable for multiple reasons.

7.7. Firstly, the deed is registered and was admitted in

evidence; no timely, specific objection on stamp duty was

pressed to a logical conclusion at the stage of marking, and

the instrument having been received in evidence, its

admissibility on that score cannot be re-agitated at the

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 17 of 30

appellate stage. Secondly, even if one were to regard Ex.D-

16 through the lens of a family arrangement, the law leans

strongly in favour of upholding such settlements among

close relations where consideration has passed and

possession has followed. Here, there is both consideration

and unequivocal admission of execution. Thirdly, the

“acted upon” objection is misplaced on the facts and in

principle. The record shows consistent, post-1967 conduct

aligning with the break-away of defendant no. 3: he did not

assert coparcenary incidents thereafter; the subsequent

family arrangement of 11.02.1972 proceeded between

plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5; and the revenue course

and dealings which we shall discuss while considering the

palupatti are plainly inconsistent with defendant no. 3

continuing as a coparcener. Where execution is admitted,

consideration is shown, and later conduct corroborates

severance, courts ought not to defeat a registered

relinquishment by demanding proof of superadde d

formalities.

7.8. We therefore disapprove the principal reasons furnished

by the Trial Court and the High Court. The Trial Court

erred in treating “non-mention” in a later document and

an asserted want of “acting upon” as fatal to Ex.D-15 and

Ex.D-16 despite the admissions and presumptions that

attached to them. The High Court compounded the error

by invoking stamp characterisation to withhold effect from

Ex.D-16 after admitting it in evidence and after

acknowledging its tenor, and by failing to appreciate that

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 18 of 30

the deeds carried their own operative force and were

reinforced by subsequent conduct.

7.9. On the cumulative appraisal of record, we hold that Ex.D-

15 severed plaintiff no. 2 from the coparcenary with effect

from 09.11.1956 and bars any claim by him to the joint

family estate. Moreover, we also hold that Ex.D-16 severed

defendant no. 3 from the coparcenary with effect from

14.09.1967 and bars any claim by him to the joint family

estate. In consequence, as on the death of the propositus

in 1969, the subsisting coparcenary comprised only

plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5. This legal position will

govern the computation of the partitionable estate and the

working of shares that we take up under Issue III.

8) Issue II - Whether the “palupatti” proves disruption of

the joint family and the parties’ subsequent separate

possession and enjoyment (collateral use).

8.1. The plaintiffs deny that there was any partition or

disruption of the joint family and contend that the writing

described as the palupatti is an unregistered partition deed

that cannot be looked at for any purpose. Defendant no. 5

asserts that Ex.D-17 records a family arrangement which

contains an unequivocal declaration of severance of status

between plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5 after the earlier

releases by plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3, that the

arrangement was acted upon in fact, and that even if it is

unregistered it is admissible for the limited collateral

purposes of proving disruption of joint status and

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 19 of 30

explaining the nature of subsequent possession and

enjoyment.

8.2. An unregistered partition deed, including the palupatti in

the present case, may be relied upon for the limited

collateral purposes of proving severance of the joint family

status and title, explaining the nature of possession,

recording the arrangement made thereunder, and

evidencing the parties’ subsequent c onduct as was

observed by this Court in various judgements such as Sita

Ram Bhama v. Ramvatar Bhama

3

, Yellapu Uma

Maheswari v. Buddha Jagadheeswararao

4

and K.G.

Shivalingappa v. G.S. Eswarappa

5. The same has been

clearly expounded by this Court in Thulasidhara v.

Narayanappa

6 in the following paras:

“9.4. It is required to be noted that the deed dated 23-

4-1971, under which the suit property had

gone/devolved in favour of Krishnappa, was reduced

in writing before the panchayat and panchas, and the

same was signed by the village people/panchayat

people and all the members of the family including even

the plaintiff. Though the plaintiff disputed that the

partition was not reduced in writing in the form of

document Ext. D-4, on considering the entire evidence

on record and even the deposition of the plaintiff (cross-

examination), he has specifically admitted that the oral

partition had taken place in the year 1971. He has also

admitted that he has got the share which tallies with

the document dated 23-4-1971 (Ext. D-4). Execution of

the document/partition deed/Palupatta dated 23-4-

1971 has been established and proved by examining

3

(2018) 15 SCC 130 at Para 13.

4

(2015) 16 SCC 787 at Para 16.

5

(2004) 12 SCC 189 at Para 14.

6

(2019) 6 SCC 409.

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 20 of 30

different witnesses. The High Court has refused to look

into the said document and/or consider document

dated 23-4-1971 (Ext. D-4) solely on the ground that it

requires registration and therefore as it is unregistered,

the same cannot be looked into. However, as observed

by this Court in Kale [Kale v. Director of Consolidation,

(1976) 3 SCC 119] that such a family settlement,

though not registered, would operate as a complete

estoppel against the parties to such a family

settlement. In the aforesaid decision, this Court

considered its earlier decision in S. Shanmugam Pillai

v. K. Shanmugam Pillai [S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K.

Shanmugam Pillai, (1973) 2 SCC 312] in which it was

observed as under: (S. Shanmugam Pillai case [S.

Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pil lai, (1973) 2

SCC 312] , SCC pp. 319 & 321, paras 13 & 22)

“13. Equitable, principles such as estoppel, election,

family settlement, etc. are not mere technical rules of

evidence. They have an important purpose to serve in

the administration of justice. The ultimate aim of the

law is to secure justice. In the recent times in order to

render justice between the parties, courts have been

liberally relying on those principles. We would hesitate

to narrow down their scope.

***

22. As observed by this Court in T.V.R. Subbu Chetty's

Family Charities case [T.V.R. Subbu Chetty's Family

Charities v. M. Raghava Mudaliar, AIR 1961 SC 797] ,

that if a person having full knowledge of his right as a

possible reversioner enters into a transaction which

settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponents

at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back

on that agreement when reversion actually falls open.”

9.5. As held by this Court in Subraya M.N. [Subraya

M.N. v. Vittala M.N., (2016) 8 SCC 705 : (2016) 4 SCC

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 21 of 30

(Civ) 163] even without registration a written document

of family settlement/family arrangement can be used

as corroborative evidence as explaining the

arrangement made thereunder and conduct of the

parties. In the present case, as observed hereinabove,

even the plaintiff has also categorically admitted that

the oral partition had taken place on 23-4-1971 and he

also admitted that 3 to 4 panchayat people were also

present. However, according to him, the same was not

reduced in writing. Therefore, even accepting the case

of the plaintiff that there was an oral partition on 23-4-

1971, the document, Ext. D-4 dated 23-4-1971, to

which he is also the signatory and all other family

members are signatory, can be said to be a list of

properties partitioned. Everybody got right/share as

per the oral partition/partition. Therefore, the same

even can be used as corroborative evidence as

explaining the arrangement made thereunder and

conduct of the parties. Therefore, in the facts and

circumstances of the case, the High Court has

committed a grave/manifest error in not looking into

and/or not considering the document Ext. D-4 dated

23-4-1971.”

8.3. We have perused the original Ex.D-17 and its schedule

Ex.D-17(a) as they stand on the trial record. Plaintiff no. 1

admitted his signature, which was marked in evidence as

Ex.D-6. The signatures of defendant no. 5 and the mother

were also marked. The writing bears the attestation of

panchayatdars and was written by the village accountant.

At the stage of production, the Trial Court permitted Ex.D-

17 and Ex.D-17(a) to be marked for collateral purpose. The

surrounding materials from 1972 onwards are consistent

with that position. There are mutation and revenue entries

that refer to the post-1972 arrangement and to the earlier

releases. Revenue records, including RTCs and index

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 22 of 30

extracts, stand separately in the names of plaintiff no. 1

and defendant no. 5 for the very survey numbers that

Ex.D-17(a) allots to them. Separate residence and separate

cooking from 1972 were admitted. Plaintiff no. 1

independently mortgaged lands that fell to his share.

Plaintiff no. 1 independently acquired and alienated

property after 1972. In 2014, plaintiff no. 1 executed a

relinquishment in favour of the municipal authority and

independently monetised the transaction through transfer

of development rights. The lands allotted under Ex.D-17(a)

lie in different villages and no survey number is common

between plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5. This bears

upon the objection based on the absence of partition by

metes and bounds.

8.4. The governing principles in such cases are well settled.

Under Hindu law, severance of joint status can be brought

about by an unequivocal declaration reduced to writing or

otherwise, and a writing evidencing such disruption is

admissible to prove the fact of disruption, the

arrangement, and the character of subsequent possession.

The same was laid down by a 3 Judge Bench of this Court

in Kalyani v. Narayanan

7 in the following paras:

“18. One thing is crystal clear that Ex. P-1 is not a deed

of partition in the sense it does not purport to divide the

property amongst various coparceners by metes and

bounds. However, in Hindu law qua joint family and

joint family property the word “partition” is understood

7

1980 Supp SCC 298.

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 23 of 30

in a special sense. If severance of joint status is brought

about by a deed, a writing or an unequivocal

declaration of intention to bring about such disruption,

qua the joint family, it constitutes partition (see

Raghavamma v. Chenchamma [AIR 1964 SC 136 :

(1964) 2 SCR 933 : (1964) 1 SCA 593] ). To constitute a

partition all that is necessary is a definite and

unequivocal indication of intention by a member of a

joint family to separate himself from the family. What

form such intimation, indication or representation of

such interest should take would depend upon the

circumstances of each case. A further requirement is

that this unequivocal indication of intention to separate

must be to the knowledge of the persons affected by

such declaration. A review of the decisions shows that

this intention to separate may be manifested in diverse

ways. It may be by notice or by filing a suit.

Undoubtedly, indication or intimation must be to

members of the joint family likely to be affected by such

a declaration.”

8.5. Moreover, a family arrangement recorded in writing, when

relied upon only to explain how the parties thereafter held

and enjoyed the properties, does not require registration

for that limited collateral use. The same was observed by

this Court in Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan

Singh

8 as follows:

“28. The validity of the assignment was however

questioned by the appellants on the ground that the

first two agreements were not registered. The

submission is untenable. Section 17(1) of the

Registration Act, 1908 insofar as it is relevant, requires

under clause (b) thereof, registration of “non -

testamentary instruments which purport or operate to

create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in

present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether

8

(2006) 1 SCC 148.

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 24 of 30

vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred

rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property”.

Sub-section (2) of Section 17 creates exceptions to the

mandatory requirements of Sections 17(1)(b) and (c).

One of the exceptions made in Section 17(2) of the

Registration Act, 1908, is clause (i). This exception

pertains to “any composition deed”. In other words, all

composition deeds are exempt from the requirement to

be registered under that Act [ See Govind Ram v.

Madan Gopal, 72 IA 76 : AIR 1945 PC 74, 76] . The

composition deed in this case was a transaction

between the members of the same family for the mutual

benefit of such members. It is not the appellants' case

that the agreements required registration under any

other Act. Apart from this, there is the principle that

courts lean in favour of upholding a family arrangement

instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial

grounds particularly when the parties have mutually

received benefits under the arrangement [ See Kale v.

Dy. Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 : AIR

1976 SC 807] . Both the courts below had concurrently

found that the parties had enjoyed material benefits

under the agreements. We have ourselves also

rescrutinised the evidence on record on this aspect and

have found nothing to persuade us to take a contrary

view. Furthermore, in this case the agreements had

merged in the decree of the Court which is also

excepted under sub-section (2)(vi) of Section 17 of the

Registration Act, 1908 [ “17. (2)(vi) any decree or order

of a court except a decree or order expressed to be

made on a compromise and comprising immovable

property other than that which is the subject-matter of

the suit or proceeding;”] .”

8.6. In our considered opinion, the reality of disruption is

tested by a cumulative assessment of conduct that

includes separate possession, separate cultivation,

separate residence, independent dealings with the lands

allotted, and revenue records that consistently reflect such

separation. Where the allotted lands are situated in

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 25 of 30

different villages with distinct survey numbers, an

insistence on further partition as a precondition to infer

disruption misdirects the inquiry, because the

determinative question is whether the joint status stood

severed and the subsequent enjoyment was separate.

8.7. Tested on these principles, Ex.D-17 qualifies for collateral

use. It records the post-release arrangement between the

only surviving coparceners at the material time, namely

plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5. It bears admitted

signatures and the attestation of village elders. It was

marked by the Trial Court for collateral purposes. The long

and consistent course of conduct that followed confirms

the reality of disruption on 11.02.1972. The parties lived

separately and cooked separately. They cultivated distinct

survey numbers in different villages. Plaintiff no. 1 dealt

with his lands as owner, including mortgages and later

transactions. The municipal relinquishment and the

transfer of development rights in 2014 were undertaken by

plaintiff no. 1 alone. This cumulative matrix corroborates

that the family ceased to be joint from 11.02.1972 and that

each branch thereafter held and enjoyed separately what

Ex.D-17(a) allotted.

8.8. The approach of the Trial Court and the High Court does

not withstand scrutiny. The Trial Court declined to act on

Ex.D-17 on the footing that it was unregistered and not

acted upon and it read the mutation entry as if it were

based on inheritance or consent rather than on the

palupatti. That approach is erroneous. The writing was

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 26 of 30

expressly marked for collateral purposes and registration

was not a bar on that plane. The insistence on division by

metes and bounds ignored the undisputed position that

the allotted lands are in different villages with no overlap

of survey numbers and it overlooked the longstanding

separate possession reflected in the revenue records. The

Trial Court further misread the mortgage record by

assuming the participation of defendant no. 5 where the

document and the bank notices show plaintiff no. 1 alone

acting as owner. The High Court affirmed the Trial Court’s

observation without independently framing and deciding

the points that arose and without engaging with the

cumulative materials. It therefore did not correct the Trial

Court’s misdirection on the collateral use of Ex.D-17 and

on the legal effect of the established course of conduct.

8.9. We therefore hold that Ex.D-17, read with Ex.D-17(a), is

admissible and reliable for the collateral purposes of

proving that, on and from 11.02.1972, there was severance

of joint status between plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5

and that each thereafter held and enjoyed separately the

properties allotted under Ex.D-17(a). We clarify that Ex.D-

17 is not treated as a conveyance that creates or

extinguishes rights by itself. Our conclusion rests on the

severance of status and on the character of subsequent

possession and enjoyment as borne out by the writing and

the long course of conduct.

8.10. Therefore, two consequences follow and will be worked out

while fixing shares. Properties acquired after 11.02.1972

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 27 of 30

do not form accretions to a subsisting coparcenary and fall

to the acquirer’s separate estate, subject to any proven

joint purchase. Daughters, who were not coparceners at

the material time, do not obtain a coparcenary share by

virtue of a disruption that took place before 2004. The

computations will be made under Issue III and the half

share of defendant no. 6 in the jointly purchased items will

be safeguarded.

9) Issue III - Consequential determination of the

partitionable pool, fractional shares, and directions.

9.1. Having upheld Ex.D-15 and Ex.D-16 as valid releases

and having accepted Ex.D-17, read with Ex.D-17(a), for

the collateral purposes of severance and subsequent

separate enjoyment, the partitionable estate must be

identified and the precise shares determined. The family

hotchpot for partition shall comprise Schedule A

together with items 1 to 16 of Schedule C. Schedule B

and item 17 of Schedule C shall stand outside the family

pool. Between defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6,

Schedule B and item 17 of Schedule C shall be held in

equal parts, and nothing in this judgment shall dilute

the half share of defendant no. 6 therein.

9.2. The fractional computation over the partitionable pool

follows the notional partition under the unamended

Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as on the

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 28 of 30

death of Pilappa in 1969. On that date, the coparcenary

then subsisting for Schedule A consisted of Pilappa,

plaintiff no. 1, and defendant no. 5, since plaintiff no. 2

and defendant no. 3 had earlier executed Ex.D-15 and

Ex.D-16 and thereby stood outside the coparcenary. A

notional partition at that point would allot 1/3 to

Pilappa, 1/3 to plaintiff no. 1, and 1/3 to defendant no.

5. Pilappa’s 1/3 would then devolve by succession

among his seven children who were alive at the time,

namely plaintiff no. 1, defendant no. 5, and the five

daughters, with plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3

taking nothing by virtue of their binding releases which

expressly extended to the ancestral and the self -

acquired properties of Pilappa. Each of the seven

children would therefore take 1/7 out of Pilappa’s 1/3,

thereby getting 1/21 each, so that plaintiff no. 1 and

defendant no. 5 augment their respective 1/3 with a

further 1/21.

9.3. On the findings recorded above, the partitionable pool

consists of Schedule A and items 1 to 16 of Schedule C.

Over this pool, plaintiff no. 1 shall take 8/21, defendant

no. 5 shall take 8/21, and each of the five daughters’

branches shall take 1/21, with the predeceased

daughter’s 1/21 to be worked out in favour of defendant

no. 2 as representing her estate. Plaintiff no. 2 and

defendant no. 3 take no share by reason of Ex.D-15 and

Ex.D-16. Schedule B and item 17 of Schedule C do not

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 29 of 30

enter the hotchpot. They stand in equal moieties of

defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6.

10) Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.

11) The judgment and decree dated 30.08.2005 in RFA No.

750 of 1994 and the preliminary decree dated 19.08.1994 in

O.S. No. 146 of 1987 are set aside. A fresh preliminary decree

is substituted in the following terms:

I. Ex.D-15 and Ex.D-16 are declared valid and binding

releases. Ex.D-17 read with Ex.D -17(a) is held

admissible for the collateral purposes of establishing

severance of joint status with effect from 11.02.1972

and explaining the nature of subsequent separate

possession and enjoyment.

II. The partitionable pool shall consist of Schedule A and

items 1 to 16 of Schedule C. Shares over this pool are

fixed as follows: plaintiff no. 1 at 8/21, defendant no. 5

at 8/21, and each of the five daughters’ branches at

1/21, with the predeceased daughter’s 1/21 to be given

effect in favour of defendant no. 2 as representing her

estate. Plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3 take none.

III. Schedule B and item 17 of Schedule C are excluded

from the hotchpot. Defendant no. 5 and defendant no.

6 shall hold these in equal halves.

IV. Any deposits, lease receipts, or other accretions

referable to Schedule B or item 17 of Schedule C and

presently in court or traceable through the lessee shall

be apportioned equally between defendant no. 5 and

CA NO.3934 OF 2006 Page 30 of 30

defendant no. 6, subject to just allowances, in the final

decree proceedings. Mesne profits, if any, pertaining to

Schedule A and items 1 to 16 of Schedule C shall be

determined in accordance with law in the final decree

proceedings.

12) The Trial Court shall draw the final decree by metes and

bounds in conformity with this judgment. It shall demarcate

the shares over Schedule A and items 1 to 16 of Schedule C

and shall separately give effect to the equal moieties of

defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6 in Schedule B and item

17 of Schedule C. Any pendente lite alienations touching

Schedule B or item 17 of Schedule C shall abide these

declarations and be considered, if required, in the final decree

proceedings without disturbing the equal halves.

13) There shall be no order as to costs.

14) All pending interlocutory applications stand disposed

of.

………….........................J.

[VIKRAM NATH]

…………..........................J.

[SANDEEP MEHTA]

…………..........................J.

[N.V. ANJARIA]

NEW DELHI

NOVEMBER 06, 2025