2025 INSC 1263 Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 1 of 22

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1770 OF 2014

P. SOMARAJU …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

1. This Appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 08.07.2011 passed

by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal

Appeal No. 1540 of 2004. By way of the impugned judgment, the High Court

reversed the order of acquittal dated 28.11.2003 passed by the Court of Principal

Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases, Hyderabad in Calendar Case No. 13 of

1999. The appellant, who was the accused before the Trial Court, was thereby

convicted for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

1

and was sentenced to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for one year with a fine of ₹10,000/- on each count.

1

For short, ‘the PC Act’

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 2 of 22

2. The facts leading to the instant Appeal may be described briefly. The

appellant was an Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Circle I, at Anjaiah Karmica

Bhavan, Ashoknagar, Hyderabad from 01.01.1996 to 26.09.1996. The

complainant, S. Venkat Reddy (PW-1) was a licensed Labour Contractor who had

been operating two establishments, Swetha Enterprises and Sindhu Enterprises,

for many years. In June 1997, the complainant made an application to the

appellant in connection with the renewal of contract labour licenses for the

aforementioned establishments for the year 1997 -1998 and also paid the

necessary fees, including a late application fee for one of the establishments, of

total ₹250/-. The appellant allegedly verified and signed the registers produced

by the complainant but he kept postponing the renewal of the licenses on some

pretext or the other. The nephew of the complainant, S. Prabhakar Reddy (PW-

3), had also sought renewal of license for his firm, Tirumala Enterprises, and

similarly states that he met the appellant twice or thrice along with the

complainant to renew his license, but after some delay, entrusted the matter to

the complainant.

3. The case of the prosecution is that on 25.09.1997, the complainant went

to meet the appellant in the evening. At that meeting, the appellant demanded a

sum of ₹9,000/- as bribe for renewing the three licenses, failing which he would

keep the renewals pending. Allegedly, a part payment of ₹3,000/- was made by

the complainant on that day itself by placing the money in the appellant’s table-

drawer and the remaining amount of ₹6,000/- was demanded to be paid within

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 3 of 22

one to two days. The complainant approached the Anti-Corruption Bureau

2

around 11:00 AM the next day and presented a written complaint against the

appellant (Ex. P1) to the Deputy Superintendent of Police

3

of ACB, U.V.S. Raju

(PW-7). The DSP asked the complainant to bring the balance bribe amount in

₹100/- denominations by 2:00-2:30 PM.

4. The DSP allegedly made some enquiries and found out that the reputation

of the appellant was not good. An FIR was registered around 1:00 PM. The DSP

also sent a requisition for two mediators. When the complainant returned with

the money, he was introduced to two Government employees: (i) P. N. Rajender

(PW-2), Office Superintendent in the Directorate of Insurance and Medical

Services, Hyderabad; and (ii) B. Balaji Rao, Junior Assistant, Directorate of

Insurance and Medical Services, Hyderabad. They were to be the mediators in

the trap proceedings. The complaint was handed over to them with instructions

to verify their contents. The mediators did so and further noted down the

numbers of the notes brought by the complainant in Annexure I to the pre-trap

mediators’ report (Ex. P2). A constable (PC 490, Sri Kistappa) applied

phenolphthalein powder to the notes and then kept them in the complainant’s

shirt-pocket. The DSP instructed the complainant not to touch the notes and

only hand it over to the appellant in case a demand for money was made.

Demonstration of the sodium carbonate solution or ‘hand-wash’ test was also

done. It was explained to the complainant that in case the tainted amount was

2

For short, ‘ACB’

3

For short, ‘DSP’

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 4 of 22

handed over to the appellant, the complainant was to give a signal to the trap-

party by wiping his face with a handkerchief. Lastly, everyone in the trap-party

then used sodium carbonate test to ensure they were free of phenolphthalein

powder.

5. The trap-party left the ACB office around 5:00 PM in two vehicles: the

complainant’s Maruti car and a Government jeep. The complainant and Rajender

went to the office of the accused, while the others took up vantage points around

the office. The complainant entered the appellant’s office while Rajender sat on

the stool meant for the office attendant outside, near the office doorway.

Allegedly, during the trap proceedings, the complainant enquired about the

status of his licenses, in response to which the appellant asked if the

complainant had brought the amount demanded by him earlier. When the

complainant answered in the affirmative and extracted the tainted amount from

his shirt-pocket, the appellant indicated that he should place the same in his left

table-drawer. Having thus received the money, the appellant called an attendant

named Mohd. Abbas (PW-4) and instructed him to bring the licenses which were

lying with Y. Gopal Rao, a Senior Assistant (PW-5), and then signed them. The

appellant instructed Abbas to give the signed licenses to Gopal Rao, and told the

complainant to go to Gopal Rao and take them. Thereafter, around 5:30 PM, the

complainant stepped out and gave the pre -arranged signal. The trap-party

proceeded into the office of the appellant while the complainant waited outside.

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 5 of 22

6. Inside the office, after ascertaining the identity of the appellant, the

sodium carbonate solution was prepared on the spot in two glass tumblers. The

appellant rinsed his hands in the same; however, there was no change of color

in either tumbler. On questioning, the appellant spontaneously denied having

demanded or accepted any amount from the complainant and also mentioned

that he was in his office between 5:00 PM and 5:30PM. The complainant was

called into the office, where he said he had placed the amount in the table-

drawer. The mediator Balaji searched the drawer, recovered the tainted amount,

and matched the numbers of the notes with those noted down in the pre -trap

mediators’ report. Swab of the white paper on which the money was kept yielded

positive result in sodium carbonate solution. The DSP took statements of the

attendant Mohd. Abbas and Senior Assistant Y. Gopal Rao. All of this was

incorporated in the post-trap mediators’ report, which was prepared in the office

of the appellant itself.

7. Later on, on 26.06.1999, sanction order G.O.Ms. No. 30 was obtained for

prosecution of the appellant from Special Chief Secretary to the Government of

Andhra Pradesh, Labour, Employment Training and Factories (LAB. IV)

Department, Sri K. Swamy Nadhan, under Sections 7, 11 and 13(1)(d) read with

13(2) of the PC Act. The chargesheet was filed on 16.08.1999.

8. On 11.07.2000, charges for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and

13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the PC Act for demanding and accepting illegal

gratification worth ₹3,000/- on or about 5:30PM on 26.09.1997 were framed by

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 6 of 22

the Court of Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, Hyderabad in

Calendar Case No. 13 of 1999 against the appellant, and the same were denied.

9. The Trial Court after examining the evidence on record, acquitted the

appellant on 28.11.2003, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove

demand and acceptance of bribe beyond reasonable doubt. Aggrieved by such

order of acquittal, the State of Andhra Pradesh preferred an appeal before the

High Court. The High Court, vide its impugned judgment dated 08.07.2011,

reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant for the offences under

Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Hence, the instant

appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

10. We have carefully perused the record and heard the learned counsel for

both parties. The principal question that arises for our consideration is whether

the High Court was justified in reversing the order of acquittal passed by the

Trial Court i.e., whether the High Court correctly reappreciated the evidence and

reached a conclusion that the Trial Court’s conclusion was perverse,

unreasonable or unsupportable by the materials on record.

11. Before proceeding, it would be appropriate to recapitulate the well-settled

principles governing interference with an order of acquittal by an Appellate

Court, which were also discussed by the High Court in the impugned judgment.

At the outset, we rely upon the seminal case of Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 7 of 22

of Karnataka,

4

wherein this Court had laid down the five-point canonical test

as follows:

“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the

following general principles regarding powers of the

appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an

order of acquittal emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review,

reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the

order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no

limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such

power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may

reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of

law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and

compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very

strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring

mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers

of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such

phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of

language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate

court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power

of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own

conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in

case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of

the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is

available to him under the fundamental principle of

criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be

presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a

competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having

secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is

further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial

court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis

of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not

disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

4

(2007) 4 SCC 415.

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 8 of 22

12. To summarize, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review

and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and

386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or

‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited.

If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal

should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial

Court’s view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or

results in manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must

address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and

assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgements of this Court has more

firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa & Ors. vs. State

of Karnataka,

5

Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund & Anr. v s. The State of

Madhya Pradesh,

6

Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and O rs. vs. State of

Karnataka,

7

and Constable 907 Surendra Singh & Anr. v s. State of

Uttarakhand.

8

13. Having laid down the most essential principles, we now examine whether

the High Court was justified in interfering with the order of acquittal passed by

the Trial Court in the instant case. The Trial Court, after a detailed analysis of

the evidence, had acquitted the appellant on the following grounds:

(a) Both Senior Assistant Gopal Rao and the complainant’s nephew

testified that contractors typically remitted a renewal fee of ₹65/-

5

2024 INSC 104

6

2024 INSC 258.

7

2024 INSC 320.

8

2025 INSC 114.

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 9 of 22

along with their applications. Gopal Rao further stated that licenses

were deemed to be renewed (under Rule 29(2) of the Contract Labour

(Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules, 1971) if not renewed or

rejected within a month, on account of which the prevailing practice

was that contractors would rarely visit the office to collect renewed

licenses and the same could even remain uncollected for years. Per

Gopal Rao, the complainant, too, had never visited the office to

collect the license before 26.09.1997. Given the same, as well as the

complainant’s many years of experience operating his

establishments and his admitted awareness of the extant rules and

regulations, his claim that the appellant demanded ₹9,000/- for

renewal was doubtful.

(b) The complaint itself contained a number of inconsistencies. The

complainant alternately referred to the appellant as both “Soma

Raju” and “Rama Raju”. On being instructed by the DSP, when the

mediators reviewed the complaint during pre-trap proceedings, the

complainant confirmed its contents were correct without mentioning

any error in the name.

(c) During cross-examination, the complainant clearly testified that he

wrote his complaint on the morning of 25.09.1997, but had also

stated the bribe demand occurred that same evening.

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 10 of 22

(d) It was deposed by the complainant that during the trap operation,

the DSP had explicitly instructed the mediator Rajender to

accompany him to the appellant’s office and observe the transaction.

However, the complainant asked Rajender to wait outside the office

while he went in alone. Rajender confirmed the same and admitted

he did not know what transpired inside the room.

(e) Furthermore, Rajender in his deposition stated that the DSP had

asked him to draft the mediator’s report and he did so, but could

not answer whether the DSP or the Inspector (PW-8) questioned the

attendant Abbas and Senior Assistant Y. Gopal Rao and which

language the questioning took place in.

(f) During cross-examination, Abbas stated that ACB officials

threatened him with job loss if he did not support the prosecution

case. He stated that he had given and signed a truthful written

statement (Ex. D1) on 27.09.1997 describing what actually

transpired, but under pressure, gave contrary testimony in his

examination-in-chief. He was declared as hostile to the prosecution.

(g) The defense presented an alternative explanation. The appellant

claimed he briefly left his office to go to the toilet, and that the

complainant took advantage of his absence to plant the money in

the table drawer. This was supported by the testimony of S. Ramulu

Naik (DW-1), who testified that when he pulled the curtain aside, he

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 11 of 22

found the complainant sitting alone in the chamber to the left of the

appellant’s table, and Advocate Y. Veeranna Babu (DW-2) who also

corroborated that the appellant was standing and about to leave the

chamber, heading towards the toilet, as the complainant was

entering. The appellant further explained that he had issued notices

to the complainant (Ex. P8), requesting production of proper

registers and records. It was file clearance week, and the appellant

had given instructions that the pending licenses should only be

delivered after registers were produced, suggesting a motive for the

false complaint.

(h) Furthermore, other evidence also contradicted the prosecution's

case, as when the appellant’s fingers were tested with sodium

carbonate solution, it showed no change in color. He also

spontaneously denied demanding or accepting any money. Only

after the complainant was called in and questioned did he indicate

that he had placed the money in the left table drawer of the

appellant’s desk, where it was subsequently found.

14. Resultantly, the Trial Court held that the prosecution failed to prove

beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had demanded and accepted a bribe,

and acquitted him of charges under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with

Section 13(2) of the PC Act, ordering the return of seized cash to the complainant

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 12 of 22

and destruction of other seized materials after the appeal period expired. This

acquittal was set aside by the High Court vide the impugned judgement.

15. At the outset, it bears emphasis that the charge framed by the Trial Court

was confined to an alleged demand and acceptance of ₹3,000/- from PW-1 on

26.09.1997 at 5:30 PM, and no charge was framed for any demand or acceptance

of ₹6,000/-, nor was there any allegation in the charge-sheet to that effect.

Therefore, there is merit in the appellant’s contention that the High Court has

convicted him for something which he was not asked to meet.

16. We firstly note that the High Court has returned an erroneous finding that

the negative ‘hand-wash test’ was “the first circumstance relied upon by the lower

Court in favour of the accused.” The High Court further stated that:

“6) …In order to avoid the same, some public servants

adopt several methods of collection of bribe amount

instead of receiving the bribe amount with their hands and

keeping the same in their pockets. One such method is

directing the victim/decoy witness to drop the tainted

currency into table drawer or into brief case or. into any

other place to which the accused alone has got

accessibility so that he can pick up the said dropped

amount conveniently at a later point of time. If such

methods are adopted by clever public servants, then the

routine method of phenolphthalein powder and sodium

carbonate solution and turning hand fingers as well as

pockets of the accused into pink, becomes not possible.

From the fact that hand finger rinses of the· accused not

turning pink in sodium carbonate solution, it cannot be

taken as a circumstance which disproves the prosecution

case. Though investigating agency may be unsuccessful in

nabbing the culprit by adopting such method in certain

cases, the prosecution is not precluded from proving that

the accused demanded and accepted bribe amount by

leading other evidence.”

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 13 of 22

17. We are unable to appreciate the reasoning adopted by the High Court in

this regard. In the first place, the negative result of the ‘hand-wash’ test was only

one of several suspicious circumstances considered by the Trial Court, not the

first or most determinative one. More importantly, it is not the case of either side

that the appellant physically handled the tainted notes, and the same has been

accepted by the High Court. The prosecution maintains that the notes were

dropped into the drawer at the appellant’s instance, while the defence asserts

that they were placed there without his knowledge. For either side, the ‘hand-

wash’ test and the negative result thereof is of no consequence as it cannot

advance the case one way or the other. What is troubling is that the High Court

has nevertheless seized upon this circumstance and gone on to attribute

wrongful intent to the appellant. We take this opportunity to reiterate that

suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.

18. The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is not automatic

and arises only once the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are

proved. The same has been reiterated time and again by this Court; in the recent

decision of Rajesh Gupta v s. State through Central Bureau of

Investigation,

9

it was held:

“17. For an offence under Section 7 of PC Act, the demand

of illegal gratification is a sine qua non to prove the guilt.

Mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute an

offence under Section 7 of PC Act, unless it is proved

9

2022 INSC 359.

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 14 of 22

beyond reasonable doubt that accused voluntarily

accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe. The proof of

acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is

proof of demand.”

19. It is therefore vital to examine these elements before the circumstance of

recovery can assume any significance. We once again rely on the observation of

this Court in Rajesh Gupta (supra):

“16. ….The law is well-settled by the judgments of this

Court in Panna Damodar Rathi vs. State of Maharashtra

(1979) 4 SCC 526 and Ayyasami vs. State of Tamil Nadu

(1992) 1 SCC 304, whereby it has been clarified that the

sole testimony of the complainant, who is the interested

witness, cannot be relied upon without having

corroboration with the independent evidence.”

20. In the instant case, too, the sole basis of the prosecution to prove demand

and acceptance is the narration of the complainant, a close scrutiny of which

reveals serious infirmities. At the outset, the complainant has no proof other

than his own oral statement that he visited the appellant on 25.09.1997, wherein

the appellant allegedly made his first demand for a bribe. His nephew also admits

he does not know when the complainant first informed him that the appellant

had demanded a bribe. Moreover, as the Trial Court has already noted:

(a) There is a material discrepancy as to when the complaint was

written, as the complainant claims it was drafted on the morning of

25.09.1997. Yet, the alleged demand is said to have occurred in the

evening of that very day. The High Court has dismissed this inconsistency

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 15 of 22

as “innocuous” by reasoning that it may be attributed to the lapse of five

years between incident and deposition;

(b) The complaint itself refers to “Rama Raju” rather than the appellant,

a mistake not corrected at the pre-trap stage on 26.09.1997. On this

point, the High Court has said:

“14) …Criminal law does not attach importance on

names of the accused, but gives importance to

identity of the accused. One person may be called

with many names, but all those names refer to one

and the same person and not different persons. It

cannot be a circumstance either to disbelieve the

prosecution case or to discredit P.W-1's evidence.”

21. Needless to say, the above observations are not tenable in law. Moreover,

what we find particularly troubling is the complainant’s conduct in directing

Rajender, the mediator and accompanying independent witness, to remain

outside the appellant’s office during the crucial half-hour in which the alleged

demand and acceptance occurred. This was contrary to the explicit instructions

of the DSP. Rajender could consequently make no positive statement on whether

the appellant demanded or accepted any bribe, and this gap is candidly admitted

by the prosecution itself.

22. Both, the DSP and the Inspector of ACB, admit they did not question the

complainant on this point, and till date no explanation has ever been offered for

keeping Rajender out of the room. They also admit that they did not question

any of the other office staff or visitors. We note that the other mediator Balaji

was not examined by the prosecution at all. These circumstances are nowhere

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 16 of 22

addressed by the High Court. Such omissions cannot be brushed aside lightly,

as they strike at the root of the prosecution version and cast serious doubt on

whether demand and acceptance were proved beyond reasonable doubt.

23. In contrast, the defence has consistently maintained that the alleged

demand and acceptance of bribe never took place. According to the appellant,

the complainant entered his office alone and during the appellant’s brief

absence, placed the tainted amount in the left-drawer of the table. Accordingly,

when the trap-party entered, the appellant immediately denied having received

any money, and the phenolphthalein test on both hands yielded negative results.

24. We opine that the High Court has placed undue weight on the fact that, in

his statement recorded on the spot, the appellant did not mention going to the

bathroom between 5:00 PM and 5:30 PM, and the same has clinching value as

the evidence recorded at the “earliest point of time.” We disagree. The post-trap

report and several depositions themselves note that the appellant was perplexed

and confused when the trap-party burst into his chambers. If the defense version

is believed and he first saw the money in the drawer only after it was opened in

the course of the trap proceedings, it is more consistent that he would not have

thought to refer to a routine detail such as a brief bathroom break at all.

25. The circumstances on record support this version. As discussed above, the

complainant did not take Rajender into the chamber. Even in his version, the

complainant acknowledges that he himself placed the money in the left-hand

drawer of the appellant’s desk. The defense attempted to establish that this was

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 17 of 22

planted, not placed at the instance of the appellant, by examining two witnesses:

S. Ramulu Naik, President of Bakelite Hylam Limited Contract Workers Union

(DW-1) and Y. Veeranna Babu, a practicing Advocate (DW-2).

26. Both the DWs support the defense version. DW-1 explained that he had

official reasons to visit the appellant’s office on 25.09.1997 and again on

26.09.1997. On that day, around 5:15 PM, he came to the appellant’s office after

finishing work at the neighbouring Ranga Reddy Labour Office, and the

attendant Abbas told him the appellant was in the bathroom. Importantly, DW-

1 states that pulling aside the curtain of the chamber, he saw the complainant

sitting on the left side of the table with the appellant’s chair vacant. He then

stepped back into the verandah, where he encountered DW-2.

27. DW-2 has independently corroborated this sequence. He testified that he

had gone to the appellant’s chamber at about 5:10 PM in connection with two

workers’ compensation cases. By the time he was leaving, he saw the appellant

walking towards the toilet attached to the chamber, and simultaneously

observed the complainant entering the chamber. As he stepped into the

verandah, DW-2 encountered DW-1, and both exchanged greetings. His account

matches up with DW-1’s, as each locates the other at the scene, each describes

the appellant leaving for the toilet, and both place the complainant, alone, inside

the chamber at that time.

28. We note that both DWs were cross-examined on possible bias but did not

waver. They frankly admitted knowing one another, but gave independent

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 18 of 22

reasons for being at the office. Their testimony cannot be brushed aside as

manufactured. It directly supports the appellant’s explanation that the

complainant took advantage of his brief absence to place the tainted notes in the

drawer without any demand or acceptance by the appellant.

29. This is pertinent as the High Court has completely discounted the

testimony of DW-1 and DW-2 by stating that they would have appeared before

the appellant in official capacity and thus might be inclined to oblige him. We

find no merit in this reasoning. A witness’s evidence is not to be rejected merely

because he appeared before or dealt with the accused in an official or

professional capacity, particularly when it was in course of their business that

they visited the spot i.e., they are ‘natural’ witnesses.

30. In the instant case, DW-1 gave a full account of his visits on 25.09.1997

and 26.09.1997 linked to bonus disputes of his union, and DW-2 explained his

visit in connection with pending Workers’ Compensation Case Nos. 11/1997 and

13/1997. We find that these are legitimate reasons rather than manufactured

pretexts. Moreover, with respect to the quality of the evidence, both DWs

provided mutually consistent accounts. This convergence on material details is

not easily explained away as a product of bias. Both were cross-examined, both

admitted acquaintance with the appellant and one another (and DW-1 with the

complainant), and both denied suggestions of fabrication. They have also stated

that the suggestion that no one could enter or leave the office without the

appellant’s permission is incorrect, which directly contradicts the High Court’s

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 19 of 22

finding to this effect. Unless the DWs’ evidence is shown to be inherently

improbable or contradicted by the record, it cannot be discarded solely because

they were professionals who had cause to interact with the appellant’s office.

31. On the point of the testimony of the attendant Abbas, we note that he

wrote a letter to the appellant on 27.09.1997 supporting the defence version,

even stating that while the appellant was in the toilet, he heard the sound of a

drawer being opened. He states therein that when he entered the chamber, he

found the complainant sitting alone, and the complainant said that he had

merely closed the drawer which had been left half open. Abbas also described

that in his presence, the appellant told the complainant the licences were ready

but would be issued after submission of certain registers, to which the

complainant agreed and left. The High Court has strongly castigated the

appellant for the same, holding that he could not “enquire into his own affair”

and the letter amounted to an attempt to influence Abbas and interfere with the

investigation.

32. We further note that the record shows that the appellant on 28.01.1998

complained in writing that his statement had not been properly recorded in the

post-trap report, that portions were distorted, and that he was made to sign a

copy without being allowed to read it. It is admitted that this written explanation

was not placed on record by the prosecution, only being marked by the defense

as Ex. D-1. Abbas ultimately turned hostile and alleged that he had been

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 20 of 22

threatened by ACB officials to support the prosecution version. In the end, his

evidence did not clearly support either side and remained internally inconsistent.

33. In light of the foregoing discussion, and applying the principles laid down

in Chandrappa (supra), we hold that the Trial Court’s view was both reasonable

and firmly rooted in the evidence on record. The acquittal was based on careful

evaluation of this evidence, including the above -discussed material

contradictions, unreliable testimonies, and serious procedural lapses, and

cannot be termed perverse or unsustainable. The High Court, on the other hand,

did not demonstrate any compelling reason to depart from that view. It failed to

engage with the Trial Court’s detailed reasoning and instead substituted its own

inferences without addressing the evidentiary gaps identified above. The strength

of the criminal process lies in restraint as much as in scrutiny. The appellant’s

acquittal, having stood on reasonable grounds, deserves to stand restored.

34. Lastly, though we will not undertake a detailed examination of the

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and the Contract Labour

(Regulation & Abolition) Central Rules, 1971 framed thereunder, as they are not

directly in issue before us, certain findings recorded by the High Court merit

comment. As elaborated below, the High Court’s discussion of Rule 29 of the

abovementioned Act is wholly inconsistent with the statutory scheme, while the

Trial Court’s view, by contrast, appears consistent. First, where an application

for renewal is made within the prescribed time, the licence stands deemed

renewed during the pendency of the application. Therefore, the considerable

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 21 of 22

evidence on record that there was no obligation on and no practice of contractors

making repeated visits to the office to enquire about the licence appears quite

sound. Senior Assistant Gopal Rao has also made a statement to the effect that

in four years (1995-1997), the complainant never visited the office for taking the

renewed license before 26.09.1997. Second, the High Court travels into an

unrelated tangent by stating that the appellant had no right to demand

inspection of registers and the same was a “creative procedure” devised by him

to keep contractors under his control. This reasoning is unsustainable. An

Assistant Commissioner of Labour is statutorily empowered to call for and

inspect registers and other documentation to satisfy himself as to compliance,

and the record shows that the appellant in fact issued written notices dated

20.09.1997 requiring such inspection in respect of Shweta and Tirumala

Enterprises. Where the application was made within time and no notice was

issued (i.e., in the case of Sindhu Enterprises), the High Court itself notes that

the file was cleared. To describe inspection as an exploitative device and then

conjecture that a file was cleared only because ₹3,000/- was paid as a bribe, as

the High Court has done, is totally unwarranted. Contract labour regulation is

necessarily precarious, and an officer cannot be faulted and aspersed for

requiring documentary proof of compliance, especially when the request is

recorded in writing.

35. Accordingly, the Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order

dated 08.07.2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at

Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No.1540 of 2004 is set aside, and the order of

Criminal Appeal No.1770 of 2014 Page 22 of 22

acquittal dated 28.11.2003 passed by the Court of Principal Special Judge for

SPE & ACB Cases, Hyderabad in Calendar Case No. 13 of 1999 is restored. The

appellant is on bail, his bail bonds are discharged.

………………………………………J.

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

………………………………………J.

(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 28, 2025