CWP-22548-2017 1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

CWP-22548-2017 (O&M)

Reserved on: 28.10.2025

Pronounced on:31.10.2025

Pankaj Kumar

....Petitioner

Versus

State of Haryana and others

....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR

Present:Mr. Surender Pal, Advocate,

for the petitioner.

Mr. Piyush Kumar, Addl. A.G., Haryana.

Mr. Keshav Gupta, Advocate,

for respondents No.2 to 6.

HARPREET SINGH BRAR J.

1. The present petition is preferred under Articles 226/227 of

the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a writ in the nature of

certiorari for quashing orders dated 05.03.2004 (Annexure P-13) and

08.10.2015 (Annexure P-16) passed by respondent No.3 vide which the

claim of the mother of the petitioner for grant of compassionate

appointment to the petitioner in lieu of disability and retirement of her

husband was rejected.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2. The father of the petitioner- Balraj Singh joined the service

of respondent-UHBVNL on 06.04.1977 as an Assistant Lineman in

Kaithal. On 02.06.1999, the father of the petitioner was repairing a light

point on a 25 feet long pole after switching off the main line. However,

CWP-22548-2017 2

someone from the department switched on the main line which resulted

in him falling on the ground due to the electric shock. He was examined

by the Board of Doctors, PGI, Rohtak, which came to the conclusion

that the father of the petitioner is 100% disabled. A disability certificate

dated 06.09.2000 (Annexure P-1) was also issued in this regard.

Thereafter, the father of the petitioner was also issued a Disability

Certificate dated 11.10.2000 (Annexure P-2) from the office of Civil

Surgeon, Sonepat.

3. Vide letter dated 20.03.2001 (Annexure P-3), the father of

the petitioner was given two options, either to continue in service with

respondent-UHBVNL till the age of superannuation or to seek

retirement on medical grounds with the assurance that the case of his

son i.e. the petitioner would be considered for appointment in his place.

The father of the petitioner chose the latter and vide letter dated

31.07.2001 (Annexure P-4), he was intimated that he shall be retired on

medical grounds and the petitioner would be granted employment under

ex-gratia scheme. Accordingly, he was retired from service w.e.f.

06.09.2000 vide order dated 06.08.2001 (Annexure P-5). The case of

the petitioner for grant of employment under ex-gratia scheme prevalent

at the time i.e. policies dated 23.11.1992 and 31.08.1995, was forwarded

to respondent No.6-XEN to respondent No.5-Superintending Engineer

(OP). However, the policy dated 23.11.1992 that allowed for

recruitment of a dependent of an employee who was disabled during his

CWP-22548-2017 3

service period, was withdrawn by respondent No.1 vide letter dated

20.03.2006 (Annexure P-7 colly).

4. Ultimately, the case of the petitioner was rejected vide

letter dated 05.03.2004 (Annexure P-13) as he was found ineligible in

terms of the Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependents of

the Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2003, which contains no

provision for providing employment to the dependents of an employee

who retired on medical grounds due to a disability. Thereafter, the

mother of the petitioner also sent a clarificatory letter dated 17.07.2004

to the respondent-UHBVNL and a representation dated 14.05.2015

(Annexure P-15/T) to the Chief Minister, Haryana. The representation

was forwarded to the department concerned and was rejected by

respondent No.3-Managing Director, UHBVNL on the ground that there

is no provision to provide employment in the present case.

CONTENTIONS

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that at the

time of the accident suffered by the father of the petitioner as well as on

the date of his retirement i.e. 06.09.2000, policy dated 31.08.1995

(Annexure P-8) was also applicable. Clause 5 of the said policy

provides for ex-gratia appointment to the dependents of disabled

employees who were declared medically unfit/blind/incapacitated by the

Special Medical Board and retired on or before attaining the age of 55

years, whereas the father of the petitioner suffered the accident at the

age of 45 years resulting in permanent disability and subsequent

CWP-22548-2017 4

retirement. Moreover, the father of the petitioner suffered a 100%

disability in the line of duty and only agreed to retirement on the

promise of grant of employment to his son, offered by the respondent-

UHBVNL of its own accord. The respondents are bound by the

principle of promissory estoppel, but neither did they grant employment

to the petitioner, nor was the father of the petitioner allowed to continue

serving till the age of his superannuation. Further still, the case of the

petitioner ought to be appreciated in view of the applicable policy at the

relevant time. The withdrawal of the policy dated 23.11.1992 would not

affect the case of the petitioner as the same was done vide letter dated

20.03.2006, while the father of the petitioner had already submitted his

consent for retirement in lieu of employment to his son in the year 2001.

The subsequent change in policy cannot be used as a shield by the

respondent-UHBVNL to deny the benefit of ex-gratia appointment to

the petitioner. Additionally, the policy dated 23.11.1992 (Annexure P-

7) was duly adopted by the Haryana State Electricity Board during the

Board meeting held on 24.03.1993 (Annexure P-7 colly).

6. Per contra learned counsel for respondents No.2 to 6

submits that the present petition suffers from delay and laches as the

case of the petitioner was rejected in the year 2004 while this writ

petition has been filed in the year 2017. The objective of the ex-gratia

scheme is to enable the family of the deceased or disabled employee to

tide over immediate financial crisis. The case of the petitioner could not

be considered during the prevalence of the ex-gratia employment

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scheme as the sequence was based on seniority. The State introduced a

new ex-gratia policy dated 31.03.2003, adopted by the Nigam vide

memo dated 09.06.2003 which does not contain any provisions for

providing employment to the dependents of a disabled employee. The

policy dated 31.03.2003 supersedes all the previous ex-gratia policies,

including the policy dated 31.08.1995 (Annexure P-8) and therefore, the

case of the petitioner deserves to be dismissed.

OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS

7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perusing

the record with their able assistance, it transpires that the father of the

petitioner suffered a disability to the extent of 100% in a work-related

accident that occurred on 02.06.1999. The father of the petitioner

consented to early retirement on medical grounds and vide letter dated

31.07.2001 (Annexure P-4), it was decided to employ the petitioner

under the ex-gratia scheme. However, his claim was ultimately rejected

vide impugned order dated 05.03.2004 (Annexure P-13) solely on the

ground that no provision currently existed under the new policy adopted

on 09.06.2003 for appointment of dependents of those employees who

had retired for medical reasons owing to a disability.

8. The father of the petitioner suffered an accident on

02.06.1999 and was offered a choice by the respondent-UHBVNL on

20.03.2001 (Annexure P-3) between continuing service till

superannuation and retiring prematurely with an offer to consider the

case of his son, the petitioner, for employment. On the date of the

CWP-22548-2017 6

accident, when the father of the petitioner suffered said disability, both

policy dated 23.11.1992 (Annexure P-7) and policy dated 31.08.1995

(Annexure P-8), containing explicit provisions for appointment of such

dependents, were in force. Further, a perusal of orders dated 14.08.2001

(Annexure P-6), 23.08.2001 (Annexure P-10), 12.10.2001 (Annexure P-

11) and 21.01.2002 (Annexure P-12) all passed by respondent-

UHBVNL, indicates that the case of the petitioner was being considered

in light of the ex-gratia scheme that existed at the time of the

accident/retirement. However, the final order dated 05.03.2004

(Annexure P-13) has been passed in terms of policy dated 31.03.2003

that was adopted by the respondent-UHBVNL on 09.06.2003.

Indubitably, per Clause 19 of the policy dated 31.03.2003, all pre-

existing instructions regarding appointments under ex-gratia schemes

issued by the State would stand repealed with introduction of the policy

of 2003. Be that as it may, the same would have no implication on the

case of the petitioner as it was not in vogue at the time of the disability

causing accident/retirement, especially since the policy of 2003 does not

contain any provision that deals with its retrospective application.

9. A two-Judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State

of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Ashish Awasthi (2022) 2 SCC 157

categorically held that as far as compassionate appointment is

concerned, the policy applicable at the time of death of the deceased

employee would prevail. Speaking through Justice M.R. Shah, the

following was held:

CWP-22548-2017 7

“4. The deceased employee died on 08.10.2015. At the time

of death, he was working as a work charge employee, who

was paid the salary from the contingency fund. As per the

policy/circular prevalent at the time of the death of the

deceased employee, i.e., policy/circular No.C-3-

12/2013/1-3 dated 29.09.2014 in case of death of the

employee working on work charge, his dependents/heirs

were not entitled to the appointment on compassionate

ground and were entitled to Rs. 2 lakhs as compensatory

amount. Subsequently, the policy came to be amended vide

circular dated 31.08.2016, under which even in the case of

death of the work charge employee, his heirs/dependents

will be entitled to the appointment on compassionate

ground. Relying upon the subsequent circular/policy dated

31.08.2016, the Division Bench of the High Court has

directed the appellants to consider the case of the

respondent for appointment on compassionate ground. As

per the settled preposition of law laid down by this Court

for appointment on compassionate ground, the policy

prevalent at the time of death of the deceased employee

only is required to be considered and not the subsequent

policy.

4.1 In the case of Indian Bank and Ors. v. Promila and

Anr., (2020) 2 SCC 729, it is observed and held that claim

for compassionate appointment must be decided only on

the basis of relevant scheme prevalent on date of demise of

the employee and subsequent scheme cannot be looked

into. Similar view has been taken by this Court in the case

of State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. v. Amit Shrivas,

(2020) 10 SCC 496. It is required to be noted that in the

case of Amit Shrivas (supra) the very scheme applicable in

the present case was under consideration and it was held

that the scheme prevalent on the date of death of the

deceased employee is only to be considered. In that view of

the matter, the impugned judgment and order passed by the

Division Bench is unsustainable and deserves to be

quashed and set aside.”

9.1. Further, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court

Pramod vs. State of Maharashtra 2010(30) SCT 790 where the

compassionate appointment scheme was also limited to cases where the

employee passed away and withdrawn with respect to employees who

sustained disabilities. It was held that subsequent policies cannot be

CWP-22548-2017 8

given a retrospective effect and the employer is duty bound honour the

promissory estoppel. Speaking through Justice Shrihari P. Davaare, the

following was held:

“19. On perusal of the record and after considering the

rival submissions, it is seen that the order terminating

services of the father of the petitioner on the ground of

permanent disability acquired by him, was issued on 26-6-

2006, although it was given effect from 9-6-2006 i.e. the

date on which the medical certificate was issued, declaring

him permanently disable to continue in service. However,

respondent No. 3, by letter dated 11-9-2006, communicated

to the father of the petitioner that the case of the petitioner

could not be considered for appointment on compassionate

ground, in view of letter dated 28-7-2006 and circular

dated 24-8-2006, since the said scheme was restricted only

in cases of deaths of the employees during employment,

and was withdrawn in cases of disabilities acquired on

medical grounds.

20. Hence, it is clear from the record that it is only for the

first time that the policy was made public vide said letter

dated 28-7-2006 and circular dated 24-8-2006. It is settled

principle of law that services of the employees would be

governed by the service conditions as existed on the date

of their appointment/termination. In the present case, on

the date of order of termination of services of father of the

petitioner i.e. 26-6-2006 which is given effect from 9-6-

2006, the change in policy of respondent-Corporation was

not made known to public. Besides that, giving

retrospective effect to the letter dated 28-7-2006 and

circular dated 24-8-2006 by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 from

9-6-2006 is apparently arbitrary, more so when it was not

made public earlier, as aforesaid.

21. Moreover, it is significant to note that by way of

termination order dated 26-6-2006, the father of the

petitioner was given option either to prefer appeal against

the said order within the period of thirty days, or to submit

an application for appointment to any of his dependents on

compassionate ground within the period of fifteen days.

Admittedly, in the present case, father of the petitioner did

not challenge the said order of termination, but acted on

the representation made by the respondents in the said

termination order and, accordingly, petitioner applied for

appointment on compassionate ground as

dependent/legal heir of his father and, therefore, the

CWP-22548-2017 9

proposition of promissory estoppel would come into

picture and the petitioner would be entitled to rest his

claim on the said principle of promissory estoppel and

respondent Nos. 2 and 3 cannot be permitted to reside

from the representation made in the termination order.”

(emphasis added)

9.2. Finally, a Full Bench of this Court in Krishna Kumari vs.

State of Haryana 2012 (2) SCT 736, speaking through Justice Rajan

Gupta, answered the reference- “whether it would be the rules in

operation at the time of death of the employee or the rules applicable

on the date when case is considered by the appropriate authority”in the

following manner:

“11. …In our considered view date of death of an

employee is an important factor to be taken into

consideration as schemes for compassionate appointment

are floated with a view to provide immediate relief to

families of deceased employees to meet the financial crisis

they face on death of sole bread winner. Travails of the

family begin immediately thereafter. In that context, date

of death assumes significance. Purpose of providing

compassionate appointment is to mitigate the hardship at

that time. Thus policy applicable on the date of death

needs to be invoked to provide immediate relief.

Application seeking compassionate appointment should be

moved promptly thereafter by his dependent and

considered by the employer without undue delay. In case

an application is considered by the authority after lapse of

time, objective of scheme is defeated. Such schemes which

are in the nature of social welfare measure and have been

recognised as an exception to the general rule for offering

public employment would necessarily be applicable strictly

in the parameters laid down therein and accepted by the

apex court in its various decisions. Particular reference

may be made here to Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of

Haryana & Ors, 1994(3) S.C.T. 174 : (1994) 4 SCC 138,

wherein it was held that whole object of granting

compassionate employment is to enable the family of

deceased employee to tide over sudden crisis and to save

the family from financial destitution. This favourable

treatment given to dependent of the deceased employee was

CWP-22548-2017 10

accepted as it bore a rationale nexus to the object sought to

be achieved viz. relief against destitution. The Supreme

Court held :-

"6. For these very reasons, the compassionate

employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a

reasonable period which must be specified in the

rules. The consideration for such employment is not

a vested right which can be exercised at any time in

future. The object being to enable the family to get

over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of

the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate

employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever

the lapse of time and after the crisis is over.

7. It is needless to emphasise that the provisions for

compassionate employment have necessarily to be

made by the rules or by the executive instructions

issued by the Government or the public authority

concerned. The employment cannot be offered by an

individual functionary on an ad hoc basis."

In view of this clear enunciation of law we cannot but

come to the conclusion that rules applicable on the date of

death/incapacitation of an employee need to be followed.

Needless to observe it is upto the authority to consider the

application without inordinate delay and take a decision

thereon. In the eventuality application remains pending

for considerable period and some other policy comes into

operation, no fault can be found on part of the employee.

This appears to be the principle recognised by the Apex

court in its recent judgment in Bhawani Prasad Sonkar's

case. As held therein, application for compassionate

employment has to be preferred without undue delay and

has to be considered within a reasonable period of time as

compassionate appointment is to meet the sudden crisis on

account of death or invalidation of the bread winner of the

family. We, thus, come to the conclusion that in case an

application is made by the dependent belatedly or is

considered after inordinate delay, basic requirement of

meeting the immediate crisis becomes redundant. Since the

objective of the policy is to rescue the family from sudden

event plunging it into penury, consideration of application

after number of years would be beyond the principles

accepted by the apex court in its various decisions. In such

circumstances, it would be difficult to accept the exception

to the general rule of employment as envisaged by

Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. We answer

the reference accordingly.”

CWP-22548-2017 11

(emphasis added)

9.3. In light of the pronouncements referred to above, this Court

is of the considered opinion that the ground taken by respondent-

UHBVNL that a new policy was introduced by the time the case of the

petitioner came to be considered is thoroughly untenable. Admittedly,

both the Schemes of 1992 and 1995 were applicable at the time of the

accident as well as the retirement of the father of the petitioner. The

petitioner had duly submitted the necessary documents for appointment

under the ex-gratia scheme promptly in the year 2001. However, the

decision in the said matter only arrived in the year 2004 for no fault of

the petitioner.

10. It is settled law that cases pertaining to compassionate

appointment must be decided with a sense of urgency as the purpose

behind granting such benefits is to aid the dependents of the

deceased/incapacitated employee to tide over the sudden financial crisis

caused by such death/incapacitation. Had the respondent-UHBVNL

been more prompt with their decision making process, the petitioner

could have availed the benefit of compassionate appointment in the first

attempt itself. However, the petitioner and his mother were compelled to

run from pillar to post since passing of the impugned order dated

05.03.2004 (Annexure P-13). As far as the argument pertaining to delay

in filing the present writ petition is concerned, it can be seen that the

petitioner and his mother were continuously making efforts to seek

relief, which also suggests their difficult fiscal condition. Vide letter

CWP-22548-2017 12

dated 17.07.2004 (Annexure P-14/T), the mother of the petitioner

clarified to the respondent-UHBVNL that the promise of appointment of

the petitioner was the reason her husband opted for premature

retirement. Left hopeless by the inaction in spite of continuous efforts,

the mother of the petitioner made a representation dated

14.05.2012(Annexure P-15/T) to the Chief Minister, Haryana. The same

was forwarded to the respondent-Department, which was rejected by

respondent No.3-Managing Director vide impugned order dated

08.10.2015 (Annexure P-16) on the same grounds as order dated

05.03.2004 (Annexure P-13). Thereafter, the present writ petition was

filed on 25.09.2017.

11. While it is apparent that there is a delay of about 02 years

from passing of impugned order dated 08.10.2015 (Annexure P-16) and

filing of the present writ petition on 25.09.2017, this Court finds it

appropriate to condone the same in view of the trauma experienced by

the petitioner and his family. The father of the petitioner suffered a

damaged spine and four fractured discs due to the strong electric shock

received by him while on duty. In addition to this, his lower limbs were

also paralysed. Moreover, the letter (Annexure P-9) written by him to

respondent No.3-Managing Director praying for expeditious processing

of relief and appointment of his son, also highlights the lackadaisical

attitude of the respondent-UHBVNL. This Court is satisfied that

considering their circumstances, the petitioner and his mother have

made persistent efforts to remedy their situation. Moreover, grant of the

CWP-22548-2017 13

said benefit to the petitioner would not unsettle settled matters qua any

other affected party.

12. Further still, this Court is not bound by any hard and fast

rules to condone delay while entertaining writ petitions under Article

226 of the Constitution of India, and possesses the power to analyse

each case on its own merits. Reference in this regard can also be made

to the judgment rendered by a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High

Court in P.V. Narayana vs. A.P. State Road Transport Corporation

2013(8) SCT 508, speaking through Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghosh,

issued the following guidelines in this regard:

“52. On the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court

referred to above, the relevant considerations that may be

taken into account in determining the issue of delay and

laches may be summarised thus:

(1) Though no period of limitation is prescribed for

the Writ Courts to exercise their powers under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India or to file a

writ petition, a person aggrieved should approach

the Court without loss of time. In appropriate cases,

where there is delay and the same has properly

been explained with cogent reasons, Court may

condone the delay as an exception to meet the ends

of justice. But, it would be a sound and wise exercise

of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their

extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case

of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for

relief and who stand by and allow things to happen

and then approach the court to put forward stale

claims and try to unsettle settled matters.

(2) Courts have evolved rules of self-imposed

restraints or fetters where the High court may not

enquire into belated or stale claim and deny relief to

a party if he is found guilty of laches. One who is

tardy, not vigilant and does not seek intervention of

the Court within a reasonable time from the date of

accrual of cause of action or alleged violation of the

CWP-22548-2017 14

constitutional, legal or other right, is not entitled to

relief under Article 226.

(3) No hard and fast rule can be laid down for

universal application and every case shall have to

be decided on its own facts.

(4) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever

there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse

to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice

based on sound and proper exercise of discretion,

and each case must be dealt with on its own facts.

(5) There is no lower limit or upper limit and it will

all depend on what the breach of the fundamental

right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay

arose.

(6) The principle on which the Court refuses relief on

the ground of laches or delay is that the rights

accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition

should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable

explanation for the delay, because Court should not

harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by

the delay on the part of the petitioners.

(7) Where there is remiss or negligence on the part

of a party approaching the Court for relief after an

inordinate and unexplained delay, in such cases, it

would not be proper to enforce the fundamental

right. As a general rule if there has been

unreasonable delay the Court ought not ordinarily to

lend its aid to a party in exercise of the extraordinary

power of mandamus.

(8) There is no waiver of fundamental right. But,

while exercising discretionary jurisdiction Court can

take into account delay and laches on the part of the

applicant in approaching a Writ Court.

(9) Though the High Court in exercise of the power

under Article 226 in its discretion grant relief in

cases where the fundamental rights are violated, but,

in such cases also, High Court, to meet the ends of

justice, shall refuse to exercise its high prerogative

jurisdiction in favour of a party who has been guilty

of laches and where there are other relevant

circumstances which indicate that it would be

inappropriate to exercise the discretionary

jurisdiction.

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(10) The maximum period fixed by the Legislature as

the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil

court must be brought may ordinarily taken to be a

reasonable standard by which delay in seeking

remedy under Article 226 can be measured.

(11) If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain

silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable

belief in the mind of others that he is not interested

in claiming that relief. Courts have applied the rule

of delay with greater rigor in service matters.

(12) The benefit of a judgment cannot be extended to

a case automatically. The Court is entitled to take

into consideration the fact as to whether the

petitioner had chosen to sit over the matter and wake

up after the decision of the Court. If it is found that

the petitioner approached the Court with

unreasonable delay, the same may disentitle him to

obtain a discretionary relief. Long Delay disentitles

a party to the discretionary relief under Articles 32

and 226 and persons who had slept over their rights

for long and elected to wake up when they had the

impetus from the judgment of similarly placed

persons.

(13) Where during the intervening period rights of

third parties have crystallized, it would be

inequitable to disturb those rights at the instance of

a person who has approached the Court after long

lapse of time and where there is no cogent

explanation for the delay.

(14) Where the appellate authority acting within its

jurisdiction condoned the delay after being satisfied

with the facts stated in relation thereto, the High

Court in exercise of its powers under

Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution should not

ordinarily interfere with the order.”

CONCLUSION

13. The constitutional philosophy prioritises human dignity

above all else and the State as well as its instrumentalities are expected

to conduct themselves in a manner that aligns with the same. In that

vein, the administrative machinery must function as the custodian of

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public welfare, guided by the basic constitutional promise of dignity,

fairness, and responsive governance. However, this Court is constrained

to note that administrative authorities often display persistent and

unwarranted apathy and insensitivity, highlighted by the lack of

compassion when dealing with the employees, pensioners and the

marginalised, who require time-sensitive relief. When officials

mechanically dispose of representations, delay decisions, ignore judicial

orders, or raise pedantic objections, they fail to recognise the urgent

human needs of citizens. This indifference manifests itself as disregard

for human exigencies and adopting a hyper-technical approach to deny

substantive justice. Such lack of compassion calls into question the

integrity of the constitutional guarantee of justice, which widens the gap

between the government and the citizenry. Time and again, Courts have

censured such conduct and have reiterated that the State is not permitted

to act with cold indifference and formalistic detachment, considering its

duty to be in the nature of charity. Unnecessary delay and arbitrary

approach in deciding representations and claims, ultimately result in

avoidable litigation burdening the Courts that are already struggling

with considerable pendency. Everyday this Court deals with matters

pertaining to issues that already stand settled and which could be

decided expeditiously, in terms of the respective litigation policies

framed by the States of Punjab and Haryana, had they been practically

implemented. Ultimately, the ethos of administration must shift.

Governance must transcend rule bound rigidity and endorse a humane,

CWP-22548-2017 17

compassionate, and accountable approach, consistent with constitutional

values and public trust.

14. The case at hand is a classic example of the administrative

apathy that has resulted in denial of livelihood to a deserving candidate.

The petitioner was eligible for ex-gratia appointment in terms of a duly

enforced government policy. However, the manner of decision of his

claim has not only caused the petitioner a loss of livelihood but also

considerable mental harassment due to denial of a legitimate

expectation. At this stage, the petitioner is about 47 years old, far

beyond the age to be eligible for government service, and much closer

to the age of retirement. Therefore, this Court is of the considered

opinion that he deserves to be compensated for the utter disregard to

human dignity displayed by concerned department.

15. Accordingly, the present petition is partly allowed. The

respondent-UHBVNL/competent authority is directed to pay a

compensation of Rs.7,50,000/- to the petitioner with an interest at the

rate of 6% p.a., calculable from the date of filing of this petition i.e.

25.09.2017 till its actual realization, within a period of 02 months from

receipt of a certified copy of this order.

16. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand

disposed of.

(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)

JUDGE

31.10.2025

yakub Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No