Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.201 of 2005

PANKAJAKSHI (DEAD) THROUGH

L.RS. & OTHERS …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

CHANDRIKA & OTHERS …RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.8576 OF 2014

PULPARAMBIL VASUDEVAN …APPELLANT

VERSUS

NANGANADATH PULPARAMBIL

DEVADASAN AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

R.F. Nariman, J.

1.The present appeals arise out of two reference orders – one

by a Division Bench of this Court dated 8.11.2010 to 3 learned

Judges of this Court, and the second by a 3-Judge Bench of this

Court dated 27.8.2014, placing the matter before 5 learned Judges

of this Court.

1

Page 2 2.The reference order by two learned Judges, after referring to

Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, reads as

follows:-

“6. The above view was followed by three Judge

Bench Court in P.V. Hemalatha vs. Kattamkandi

Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda and Anr. AIR 2002 SC

2445. That was a case in which the High Court of

Kerala had, relying upon Section 98 of CPC, confirmed

the decree under appeal despite difference of opinion

between the two Judges comprising the Bench on a

question of fact. This Court held that while Section 23

of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act is the general

law, Section 98(2) is a special provision. Section 23 of

the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act reads as under:

"23. Reference by Chief Justice.--Where two

Judges forming a Division Bench agree as to the

decree, order or sentence to be passed, their decision

shall be final. But if they disagree, they shall deliver

separate judgments and thereupon the Chief Justice

shall refer, for the opinion of another Judge, the

matter or matters on which such disagreement exists,

and the decree, order or sentence shall follow the

opinion of the Judges hearing the case."

7. Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act by which the

Travancore-Cochin High Court Act was repealed to the

extent of its repugnance may also be extracted. It

reads:

"9. Repeal.--The provisions of the Travancore-

Cochin High Court Act, 1125 (5 of 1125), insofar as

they relate to matters provided in this Act, shall stand

repealed."

8. In our opinion Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin

Act is in the nature of a special provision while Section

2

Page 3 98(2) is in the nature of general law. As between the

two, the former would apply in preference to the latter.

The decision of this Court in P.V. Hemalatha's v.

Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda and Anr.

(supra) to the extent it takes a contrary view, in our

opinion, requires to be reconsidered.

9. That apart, the question whether in an appeal

arising out of an order passed by the High Court to

which Section 98(2) of the CPC applies, this Court can

in exercise of its power under Article 136 of the

Constitution direct the matter to be placed before a

third Judge to resolve the conflict arising from two

differing judgments, has not been examined either in

P.V. Hemalatha's or Tej Kaur's case. We, therefore,

consider it appropriate to refer to a larger Bench for

consideration and an authoritative pronouncement the

following two questions:

(1) Whether Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin

Act remains unaffected by the repealing provisions of

Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act. If so, whether

Section 23 is in the nature of a special provision vis-à-

vis Section 98(2) of CPC.

(2) Whether this Court can under Articles 136 and 142

of the Constitution direct in any appropriate case a

reference to a third judge to resolve the conflict arising

between two judges of the High Court hearing an

appeal, on a question of fact.”

3.The 3-Judge Bench in turn referred the matter to a 5-Judge

Bench as follows:-

“In the reference order, the 2-Judge Bench has

doubted the correctness of the decision of this Court in

P.V. Hemalatha Vs. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal

Saheeda and Anr. Since the decision has been given

by a 3-Judge Bench in P.V. Hemalatha, we are of the

view that correctness of the decision in P.V. Hemalatha

has to be considered by a Bench of 5 Judges.

2. The matter is, accordingly, referred to a Bench of 5

Judges.

3

Page 4 3. The matter may be placed before the Chief Justice

for appropriate administrative order in this regard.

S.L.P. (Civil) No. 34457 of 2010

Leave granted.

2. The issues involved in the present Appeal are

identical to the issues that arise in Civil Appeal No. 201

of 2005. Civil Appeal No. 201 of 2005 has been

referred to a Bench of 5 Judges.

3. For the self same reasons, this Civil Appeal is also

referred to a Bench of 5 Judges to be heard along with

Civil Appeal No. 201 of 2005.

4. The matter may be placed before the Chief Justice

for appropriate administrative order in this regard.”

4.In order to appreciate the controversy, which lies in a narrow

compass, we need first to advert to the decision in P.V. Hemalatha

v. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda & Another, (2002) 5

SCC 548. In that judgment this Court has held that the

Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, Section 23 of which contains a

provision which states that if two Judges forming a Division Bench

of the High Court disagree, they shall refer their disagreements to

the opinion of another Judge and the opinion of the majority will

then prevail, was said to be general as against Section 98(2) of the

Code of Civil Procedure which was said to be special. It may be

stated that Section 98(2) in dealing with appeals to a superior

court generally, has a reference to a third or more Judges in the

event of disagreement between two Judges only on a point of law.

If the disagreement exists on a point of fact, the lower court

judgment is to be confirmed. Hemalatha’s case (supra) therefore

4

Page 5 decided:

“Submission made on comparing Section 23 of the

Travancore-Cochin Act and Section 4 of the Kerala Act

read with Section 9 of the latter Act is that as the

procedure indicated to Judges constituting a Division

Bench delivering separate judgments is governed by

Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin Act and as it is

not covered by Section 4 of the Kerala Act, the former

cannot be said to have been repealed by Section 9 of

the Kerala Act. The submission, therefore, is that the

Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court of

Kerala could take recourse to Section 23 of the

Travancore-Cochin Act and as they had delivered two

separate judgments they could refer the matter to the

Chief Justice for the opinion of the third Judge.

The above argument advanced is attractive but cannot

be accepted for another reason. In our view, the law

contained in the Travancore-Cochin Act and the Kerala

Act regulating the practices, procedure and powers of

the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court in

relation to all cases from all enactments appearing

before them is a general law which cannot be made

applicable to appeals from the Code of Civil Procedure

regulated by special law that is contained in Sections

96 to 98 of the Code. There is a clear conflict between

the provisions contained in Section 23 of the

Travancore-Cochin Act which allows the reference by

differing Judges who have delivered separate

judgments or opinions to a third Judge on issues both

on fact and law and the provisions contained in proviso

of sub-section (2) of Section 98 of the Code which

permits reference to one or more Judges only on

the difference of opinion on the stated question of law.

When the Courts are confronted with such a situation,

the Courts' approach should be “to find out which of

the two apparently conflicting provisions is more

general and which is more specific and to construe the

more general one as to exclude the more specific”. The

principle is expressed in the maxims generalia

specialibus non derogant (general things do not

derogate from special things) and specialia

generalibus derogant(special things derogate from

5

Page 6 general things). These principles have also been

applied in resolving a conflict between two different

Acts and in the construction of statutory rules and

statutory orders. (See Principles of Statutory

Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 7th Edn., 1999,

pp. 113-14.)

Assuming for the sake of argument that provisions of

Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin Act are saved by

Section 9 of the Kerala Act and are applicable to the

High Court of the new State of Kerala, in our

considered opinion since provisions contained in

Section 98 of the Code is a special law as compared to

the general law contained in Section 23 of the

Travancore-Cochin Act read with Section 9 of the

Kerala Act, the “special law” will prevail over the

general law and the provisions of Section 98 of the

Code in all its terms will have to be applied to civil

appeals arising from civil suits which are regulated by

the Code.

Undisputedly, the High Court of Kerala is not a

Chartered High Court and was not a court in British

India. It was a High Court established after formation of

the new State of Kerala in 1956 under the SR Act of

1956. The High Court of Kerala, therefore, has no

Letters Patent. The Travancore-Cochin Act and the

Kerala Act are not Letters Patent of the High Court and

therefore they cannot be held to have been saved

under the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 98 of

the Code. It is interesting to note that provision similar

to Section 98(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

and proviso thereunder has been on the statute-book

in Section 577 of the old Civil Procedure Code of 1877.

These provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure were

in existence when the Travancore-Cochin Act, 1125

(Indian calendar 1948-49) and the Kerala Act, 1958

were enacted but at no point of time any change was

made by amendment to sub-section (3) of Section 98

of the Code to give an overriding effect along with the

Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts to other

enactments dealing with formation of new High Courts

for new States under the SR Act of 1956 or any other

laws.” [at paras 32 – 34 and 38]

6

Page 7 Shri V. Giri, learned senior counsel, who has argued on behalf of

the appellants in the present cases, has referred to a judgment of

five learned Judges of this Court in P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra

Bank Ltd. (2004) 11 SCC 672, by which learned counsel has

referred to the exactly opposite finding insofar as appeals under

the Letters Patent are concerned. According to the learned senior

counsel, this judgment having decided that for the purpose of

Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 98 not being a

specific law to the contrary would therefore govern the present

case as well, as it has been expressly held in that decision that

qua the Letters Patent, the Code of Civil Procedure is general and

the Letters Patent is special. Furthermore, in this case also, since

the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, being the old Charter of the

Kerala High Court, is similarly a special law qua the general law

contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Shri V. Giri’s entire

argument is that therefore Sathappan’s case (supra) concludes

the issue at hand and being inconsistent with the 3-Judge Bench

in Hemalatha’s case (supra), the law declared in Hemalatha’s

case (supra) is no longer good law.

5.Apart from the above, Shri V. Giri also based his arguments

on a judgment of the Privy Council contained in Bhaidas Shivdas

v. Bai Gulab & Another, AIR 1921 PC 6, as followed and

7

Page 8 explained in various decisions including two Full Bench decisions

in particular, Immidisetti Dhanaraju & Another v. Motilal Daga &

Another, AIR 1929 MAD 641 and Shushila Kesarbhai & Ors. v.

Bai Lilavati & Others, AIR 1975 Guj 39 (FB). According to Shri V.

Giri, the Privy Council judgment as followed in the two Full Bench

decisions referred to hereinabove again makes it clear that Section

4 of the Code of Civil Procedure when pitted against a High Court

Charter like the Letters Patent, the said Charter being a special

law would prevail over the Code of Civil Procedure unless there is

a specific provision to the contrary in the Code of Civil Procedure

itself. Section 98 was directly held not to be such specific

provision to the contrary in the Privy Council judgment and

therefore it is clear that Section 98(2) did not apply to Letters

Patent Appeals, whether intra court or appeals that arose from

subordinate courts and would have their origins in Section 96 of

the Code of Civil Procedure. His further submission is that when

the legislature, by amendment in the year 1928, introduced

Section 98(3) into the Code of Civil Procedure, it made the position

amply clear that all High Courts were excluded from the ambit of

Section 98. Since, in 1928, only High Courts established by

Letters Patent existed in British India, the Letters Patent alone was

referred to in the said provision. However, after India became

8

Page 9 independent and other High Courts were either set up, or

assimilated from the princely States into the constitutional

framework of India, the same position would necessarily obtain

inasmuch as the various High Court Acts setting up High Courts

other than those already set up by the Letters Patent would also

be the basic Charter (like the Letters Patent) of each High Court.

Section 98(3) therefore only declares what is already contained in

Section 4, namely, that qua the High Courts in this country, Section

98 would not be a specific provision to the contrary and that the

High Court Acts being special in this regard would necessarily

prevail by virtue of the other provisions of Section 4 over the

general provision contained in Section 98(2) of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

6.Shri K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the respondents, countered these submissions and

marshalled his arguments on four different points. He argued the

case with great ability and learning and we heard him with

considerable interest. According to learned counsel, the Code of

Civil Procedure Amendment Act of 1951, which extended the Code

of Civil Procedure to the whole of India, contained a provision

(namely Section 20) by which all laws that corresponded to the

Code of Civil Procedure in the territory of India were repealed.

9

Page 10 Therefore, according to learned counsel, Section 23 of the

Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, being a law which

corresponded to the Code of Civil Procedure, was repealed. This

being so, there is no conflict between any provision of the Kerala

High Court Act, 1958 and the Code of Civil Procedure and hence

Section 98(2) would be the only provision governing the field. He

further argued that, assuming that, he were to fail on the first

argument, Section 98 read with Sections 117, 120, 122, 125 and

129 of the Code of Civil Procedure are specific provisions to the

contrary for the purposes of Section 4(1) of the Code of Civil

Procedure and that Section 98 would therefore prevail over

Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act. A third

submission is that, in any event, Section 98(2) is a special

provision which deals with appeals under Section 96 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, and since all appeals under the Kerala High

Court Act, 1958 are appeals under Section 96 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, Section 98 which is an adjunct to Section 96 would

alone apply. For the purposes of this argument, he made a

distinction between appeals which arise under clause 15 of the

Letters Patent, where appellate jurisdiction is conferred by the

Letters Patent, as contrasted with clause 16 of the Letters Patent,

which referred only to appellate jurisdiction conferred by other laws

10

Page 11 including the Code of Civil Procedure. He further argued that

viewed thus, Section 98 is undoubtedly a special provision and

Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act would thus be

a general provision in this regard. His fourth submission is that

Articles 136 and 142 cannot be used to apply Section 23 of

the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, if it were otherwise clear

that the said provision had been expressly excluded and Section

98(2) alone were to apply.

7.Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we need to first

set out the relevant statutory provisions:

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

“S. 4:- Savings

(1) In the absence of any specific provision to the

contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit

or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force

or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any

special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any

other law for the time being in force.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality

of the proposition contained in sub-section (1), nothing

in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise

affect any remedy which a landholder or landlord may

have under any law for the time being in force for the

recovery of rent of agricultural land from the produce of

such land.

S. 96:- Appeal from Original Decree

(1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the

body of this Code or by any other law for the time

being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree

passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to

the Court authorized to hear appeals from the

11

Page 12 decisions of such Court.

(2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed

ex parte.

(3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the

Court with the consent of parties.

(4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law,

from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by

Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of

the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed

ten thousand rupees.

S. 98:- Decision where appeal heard by two or

more judges.

(1) Where an appeal is heard by a bench of two or

more Judges, the appeal shall be decided in

accordance with the opinion of such Judges or of the

majority (if any) of such Judges.

(2) Where there is no such majority which concurs in a

judgment varying or reversing the decree appealed

from, such decree shall be confirmed:

Provided that where the Bench hearing the appeal

is composed of two or other even number of Judges

belonging to a court consisting of more Judges than

those constituting the Bench and Judges composing

the Bench differ in opinion on a point of law, they may

state the point of law upon which they differ and the

appeal shall then be heard upon that point only by one

or more of the other Judges, and such point shall be

decided according to the opinion of the majority(if any)

of the Judges who have heard the appeal including

those who first heard it.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to alter or

otherwise affect any provision of the letters patent of

any High Court.

S. 117:- Application of Code to High Courts.

Save as provided in this Part or in Part X or in rules,

the provisions of this Code shall apply to such High

Courts.

12

Page 13 Section 120 - Provisions not applicable to High

Court in original civil jurisdiction

(1)The following provisions shall not apply to the

High Court in the exercise of its original civil

jurisdiction, namely, sections 16, 17and 20.

Section 121 - Effect of rules in First Schedule

The rules in the First Schedule shall have effect as if

enacted in the body of this Code until annulled or

altered in accordance with the provisions of this Part.

Section 122 - Power of certain High Courts to make

rules

High Courts not being the Court of a Judicial

Commissioner may, from time to time after previous

publication, make rules regulating their own procedure

and the procedure of the Civil Courts subject to their

superintendence, and may by such rules annul, alter or

add to all or any of the rules in the First Schedule.

Section 129 - Power of High Courts to make rules

as to their original civil procedure

Notwithstanding anything in this Code, any High Court

not being the Court of a Judicial Commissioner may

make such rules not inconsistent with the Letters

Patent or order or other law establishing it to regulate

its own procedure in the exercise of its original civil

jurisdiction as it shall think fit, and nothing herein

contained shall affect the validity of any such rules in

force at the commencement of this Code.”

Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125

Preamble –

Whereas it is necessary to make provision regulating

the business of the High Court of Travancore-Cochin,

for fixing the jurisdiction and powers of single Judges,

Division Benches and Full Benches and for certain

other matters connected with the functions of the High

13

Page 14 Court;

It is hereby enacted as follows:-

S. 18:- Jurisdiction and powers of the High Court-

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act of the High

Court shall have and exercise all the jurisdiction and

powers vested in it by this Act and any other law in

force or which may hereafter come into force and any

jurisdiction vested in existing High Court immediately

prior to the coming into force of this Act.

S. 21:- Powers of Division Benches of two Judges-

A Division Bench consisting of two Judges of the High

Court, is empowered:

(i)to hear and decide appeals against orders

passed by a single Judge under sub-clause (A) (X) of

clause (4) of Section 20: to hear and decide appeals

against judgments passed by a single Judge under

sub-clause (c) of clause (4) of Section 20 where the

Judge who passed the Judgment declares that the

case is a fit one for appeal and to hear and decide

applications or appeals or other proceedings that a

single Judge may refer under Section 20;

(ii)(a) to hear and decide all appeals, civil and

criminal, preferred from the decrees, orders,

convictions or sentences of the civil and criminal courts

where the same are allowed by law.

(b) to hear and decide all appeals preferred from such

orders as are provided in Section 104 of the Civil

Procedure, 1903, of a single Judge of the High Court

passed in exercise of the original jurisdiction;

(c) to hear and decide all appeals preferred against

convictions or sentences and orders of acquittal

passed by a single Judge of the High Court in the

exercise of original jurisdiction:

(iii) to transfer on its own motion civil or criminal cases

from one court to another;

(iv) to dispose of references made by the subordinate

courts in non-appealable civil cases, and to revise on

its own motion or otherwise, the proceedings of the

civil courts in non-appealable cases;

14

Page 15 (v) to revise convictions or sentences or orders

passed by subordinate criminal courts in cases called

up by the High Court on its own motion and to pass

orders on references made by subordinate criminal

courts;

(vi)to hear and determine applications under Section

491 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1898; and

(vii)to pass orders on all petitions and applications,

civil or criminal not falling under any of the preceding

clauses.

Section 23:– Reference by Chief Justice-

Where two Judges forming a Division Bench agree as

to the decree, order or sentence to be passed, their

decision shall be final. But if they disagree, they shall

deliver separate judgments and thereupon the Chief

Justice shall refer, for the opinion of another Judge, the

matter or matters on which such disagreement exists,

and the decree, order or sentence shall follow the

opinion of the majority of the judges hearing the case.”

Kerala High Court Act, 1958.

Preamble-

WHEREAS it is expedient to make provision regulating the

business and the exercise of the powers of the High Court of the

State of Kerala.

BE it enacted in the Ninth Year of the Republic of India as

follows:--

Section 2 – Definition

In this Act, "High Court" means the High Court of the

State of Kerala.

Section 4 - Powers of a Bench of two Judges

The powers of the High Court in relation to the

following matters may be exercised by a Bench of two

15

Page 16 Judges, provided that if both Judges agree that the

decision involves a question of law they may order that

the matter or question of law be referred to a Full

Bench:--

(1) Any matter in respect of which the powers of the

High Court can be exercised by a single Judge.

(2) An appeal--

(a) from a decree or order of a Civil Court, except

those coming under section 3;

(b) from the judgment of a Criminal Court in which a

sentence of death or imprisonment for life has been

passed on the appellant or on a person tried with him.

(3) A reference--

(a) under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908;

(b) under section 307, section 374 or section 432 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure,1898.

(4) An application under Rule 2 of Order XLV of the

First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

(5) An application for the exercise of the powers

conferred by section 491 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1898 or by clause (1) of article 226 of the

Constitution of India where such power relates to the

issue of a writ of the nature of habeas corpus.

(6) An appeal from any original judgment, order or

decree passed by a single Judge.

(7) All matters not expressly provided for in this Act

or in any other law for the time being in force.

Section 9 – Repeal

The provisions of the Travancore Cochin High Court

Act, 1125 (5 of 1125) in so far as they relate to matters

provided in this Act, shall stand repealed.”

8.Before proceeding to resolve the controversy at hand, it first

needs to be stated that Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act,

1958, set out hereinabove, repeals the provisions of the

Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, insofar as the said Act relates

to matters provided in the Kerala High Court Act. Though Mr.

16

Page 17 Viswanathan sought to urge to the contrary, ultimately it was

common ground between the parties that there is no provision

corresponding to Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court

Act in the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 and that therefore the said

provision continues in force, not having been repealed by Section

9 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958.

9.Shri Viswanathan’s first submission requires us to set out

Section 20(1) of the 1951 amendment to the Code of Civil

Procedure. The said Section reads as follows:-

“20. Repeals and Savings.-

(1) If immediately before the date on which the said

Code comes into force in any Part B State, there is in

force in that State any law corresponding to the said

Code, that law shall on that date stand repealed:

Provided that repeal shall not affect-

(a)The previous operation of any law so repealed or

anything duly done or suffered thereunder, or

(b)Any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,

accrued or incurred under any law so repealed, or

(c)Any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in

respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability,

penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid and any

such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be

instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty,

forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act

has not been passed.”

10.Travancore-Cochin was a princely state till the year 1956.

The Constitution of India as originally enacted referred to princely

states as Part B states. Apart from Travancore-Cochin, there were

17

Page 18 7 other princely states which got assimilated into India by the

Constitution. Prior to 1951, the Code of Civil Procedure did not

extend to these princely states as even the Adaptation of Laws

Order of 1950 did not extend the Code of Civil Procedure to Part B

States. The 1951 amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, for

the first time, applied the Code of Civil Procedure to Part B States,

and as a consequence repealed any law which corresponded to

the Code of Civil Procedure in Part B States. According to Shri

Viswanathan, the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, being a law

corresponding to the Code of Civil Procedure, was repealed, and

Section 23, being a part of the said High Court’s Act, would also

therefore stand repealed. For this purpose Shri Viswanathan

relied upon several authorities. First he relied upon Krishan

Prasad Gupta v. Controller, Printing & Stationery, (1996) 1

SCC 69 to buttress this submission. In this judgment, this Court

had to consider Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act,

which stated that authorities constituted under the Industrial

Disputes Act or any other corresponding law for the time being in

force, were exempted from the provisions of Section 28. In

construing the expression “any other corresponding law” this Court

relied upon a New Zealand judgment and observed as follows:-

“The word ‘corresponding’ is defined in Shorter Oxford

Dictionary as “answering to in character and function;

18

Page 19 similar to.” This meaning has been adopted

in Winter v.Ministry of Transport [1972 NZLR 539] in

which it has been observed as under:

“We read ‘corresponding’ in Section 20-A as

including a new section dealing with the same subject-

matter as the old one, in a manner or with a result not

so far different from the old as to strain the accepted

meaning of the word ‘corresponding’ as given in

the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary — ‘answering to

in character and function; similar to’. The new (section)

answers to the old one … in character and function; it

is similar in purpose, prescribes the same thing to be

done, and is designed to produce the same result. We

hold it to be a ‘corresponding’ section.” (See Words &

Phrases, 3rd Edn., Vol. 1)

Our conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that the

‘Authority’, constituted under Section 15 and the

appellate authority under Section 17 of the Payment of

Wages Act, fall within the exception indicated in

Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act and this

Act, namely, Payment of Wages Act, is positively

covered by the connotation “corresponding law” used

in that section. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the

Authority to entertain and decide claim cases under

Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act is not affected

by the establishment of the Administrative Tribunals.”

[at paras 37 and 38]

The test laid down in this decision for a law to correspond to

another is whether it deals essentially with the same subject

matter as was dealt with by the old law.

11.Similarly, in A.B. Abdulkadir & Others v. The State of

Kerala & another [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 741, this Court dealt with

Section 13(2) of the Finance Act which provided that on and from

1.4.1950, any law corresponding to the Central Excise and Salt

Act, 1944 will stand repealed from that date. What had to be

19

Page 20 determined is whether the Cochin Tobacco Act had been so

repealed.

12.In arriving at the conclusion that the said Act had been so

repealed, this Court held that the main object and purpose of both

Acts being the same, namely to provide for control on tobacco

from the time it is grown till the time it reaches the ultimate seller,

and the fact that both Acts levied an excise duty on tobacco, albeit

in completely different ways, the Cochin Act was said to

correspond with the Central Excise Act in that the main object and

purpose of both Acts was in substance the same, and they both

dealt with the same subject matter, namely, control of the tobacco

trade and the levying of excise duty on tobacco.

13.Similarly, in The Custodian of Evacuee Property,

Bangalore v. Khan Saheb Abdul Shukoor, etc. [1961] 3 SCR

855, the question before this Court was whether a later Mysore Act

had been repealed by an earlier Mysore Act. It was held by this

Court, that as both Acts dealt with evacuee property, the fact that

the scheme under the second Act was different from the first would

make no difference as the subject matter that was dealt with was

in substance the same.

14.Applying the test laid down by the aforesaid decisions of this

Court, namely, that the subject matter of the two statutes must

20

Page 21 essentially be the same and/or that the main object and purpose of

the statutes should be substantially similar, we find that the

Travancore-Cochin High Court Act formed the Charter for

jurisdiction to be exercised by the said High Court. This

jurisdiction is exercised not only in civil matters but criminal and

other matters as well. The main object and purpose of the

Travancore-Cochin Act is to lay down the jurisdiction and powers

of the High Court that was established in the said State. On the

other hand, the subject matter of the Code of Civil Procedure is to

lay down procedure in all civil matters, and no others. Also, the

said Code would apply to all courts which deal with civil matters,

subject to the exceptions contained therein, and not only the High

Court. For this reason, it is difficult to say that the Code of Civil

Procedure corresponds to the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act.

Shri Viswanathan’s first contention must therefore fail.

15.Shri Viswanathan also relied upon two High Court judgments

to buttress his submission that the Travancore-Cochin High Court

Act had been repealed by the introduction of the Code of Civil

Procedure in 1951. He relied upon Jelejar Hormosji Gotla v. The

State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 AP 288, in which the Andhra

Pradesh High Court held that with the coming into force of

Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Hyderabad Suits

21

Page 22 against Government Act stood repealed. He also relied

upon Gurbinder Singh and Others v. Lal Singh and

Others, AIR 1959 P&H 123, whereby it was held that

Section 49(2) of a Pepsu Ordinance had been repealed by the

introduction of the Code of Civil Procedure by the 1951

Amendment Act.

16.Neither of these decisions carries the matter any further. In

the Andhra Pradesh decision, the Hyderabad Act dealt only with

civil suits against the Government and thus dealt with civil

procedure insofar as it applied to such suits. In the Punjab and

Haryana case, the High Court itself states that the Pepsu

Ordinance, which stood repealed, earlier provided for the civil

procedure to be applied in all civil courts in Pepsu. Both cases,

therefore, were cases in which the repealed Act dealt with the

same subject matter as the corresponding law, that is civil

procedure.

17.We now come to the main argument in this case, which is

the correct construction of Section 4(1) of the Code of Civil

Procedure. The scheme of Section 4(1), as its marginal note

provides, is to “save” any special or local law from the applicability

of the Civil Procedure Code. The said Section therefore states that

whenever there is a special, local, or other law which deals with

22

Page 23 any matter specified in the Code, those laws will continue to have

full force and effect notwithstanding that they deal with the same

matter as is contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. From this,

however, an exception is carved out, and that exception is that

there should not be any “specific provision to the contrary”

contained in the Code itself.

18.At one point in time it was not clear as to whether such

specific provision should be in the Code itself or could also be

contained in any other law. In fact, in Mati Lal Saha v. Chandra

Kanta Sarkar & Others, AIR 1947 Cal 1, the Calcutta High Court

held that such specific provision to the contrary could be contained

in a third Act, namely, the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act,

and need not be contained even in the two competing Acts,

namely the Code of Civil Procedure and a Bengal Agricultural

Debtors Act.

At this point it is necessary to advert to the pari materia

provision contained in the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 1(2)

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 stated:

“Section 1. Short title and commencement.

(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of

Jammu and Kashmir; but, in the absence of any

specific provision to the contrary, nothing herein

contained shall affect any special or local law now in

force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or

any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other

law for the time being in force, or shall apply –

23

Page 24

(a)The Commissioners of Police in the towns of

Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, or the police in the

towns of Calcutta and Bombay;

(b)Heads of villages in the State of Madras as it

existed immediately before the 1

st

November, 1956; or

(c)Village police-officers in the State of Bombay as it

existed immediately before the 1

st

November, 1956;

Provided that the State Government may, if it

thinks fit, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend

any of the provisions of this Code, with any necessary

modifications, to such excepted persons.

In 1973, however, the new Code of Criminal Procedure

repeated the same provision in Section 5 as under:

“Section 5 - Saving

Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of

a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or

local law for the time being in force, or any special

jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of

procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being

in force.”

It will be noticed that Section 1(2) of the old Code

corresponds almost exactly to Section 4(1) of the Code of Civil

Procedure. The change in phraseology in Section 5 clarifies that

what was intended was that the specific provision to the contrary

should only be contained in the Code itself and nowhere else.

Taking note of the legislative scheme contained in the Code of

Criminal Procedure, we have no doubt in construing Section 4(1)

to say that the specific provision to the contrary must be contained

in the Code of Civil Procedure itself and nowhere else.

24

Page 25 19.The next inquiry that needs to be made is what is the

meaning of the expression “specific provision to the contrary”. In

Maru Ram v. Union of India and others, (1981) 1 SCC 107, a

Constitution Bench dealt with the pari materia provision to Section

4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure contained in Section 5 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court relied upon the Lahore

High Court and the Allahabad High Court to explain what is meant

by “specific provision”. This Court held:-

“Section 1(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, is

the previous incarnation of Section 5 of the Present

Code and contains virtually the same phraseology. The

expression “specific provision to the contrary” in the

Code of 1898 was considered in the two Full Bench

decisions (supra). The setting in which the issue was

raised was precisely similar and the meaning of

“specific provision to the contrary” was considered by

Young, C.J., in the Lahore case where the learned

Judge observed: [AIR 1940 Lah 129, 133]

“The word ‘specific’ is defined in Murray's Oxford

Dictionary as ‘precise or exact in respect of fulfilment,

conditions or terms; definite, explicit’.”

In a similar situation, the same words fell for decision

in the Allahabad case where Braund, J., discussed the

meaning of “specific provision” in greater detail and

observed: [AIR 1940 All 263, 269]

“I have, I confess, entertained some doubt as to

what exactly the words 'specific provision' mean. I think

first, that they must denote something different from

the words ‘express provision’. For a provision of a

statute to be an ‘express’ provision affecting another

statute or part of it, it would have, I think, to refer in so

many words to the other statute or to the relevant

portion of it and also to the effect intended to be

produced on it. Failing this, it could hardly be said to be

‘express’ .... But the word ‘specific’ denotes, to my

25

Page 26 mind, something less exacting than the word ‘express’.

It means, I think, a provision which ‘specifies’ that

some ‘special law’ is to be ‘affected’ by that particular

provision. A dictionary meaning of the verb ‘to specify’

as given in Murray's New English Dictionary, is ‘to

mention, speak of or name (something) definitely or

explicitly; to set down or state categorically or

particularly....’ and a meaning of the adjective ‘specific’

in the same dictionary is ‘precise ... definite, explicit ...

exactly named or indicated, or capable of being so,

precise, particular’. What I think the words ‘specific

provision’ really mean therefore is that the particular

provision of the Criminal Procedure Code must, in

order to ‘affect’ the ‘special … law’, clearly indicate, in

itself and not merely by implication to be drawn from

the statute generally, that the 'special law' in question

is to be affected without necessarily referring to that

‘special law’ or the effect on it intended to be produced

in express terms. Lord Hatherley in (1898) 3 AC 933 at

p. 938 [ Thomas Challoner v. Henry WF Bolikow , (1878)

3 AC 933] has defined the word ‘specific’ in common

parlance of language as meaning ‘distinct from

general’…. It would, no doubt, be possible to multiply

illustrations of analogous uses of the words ‘specify’

and ‘specific’. But this is I think sufficient to show that,

while requiring something less than what is ‘express’,

they nevertheless require something which is plain,

certain and intelligible and not merely a matter of

inference or implication to be drawn from the statute

generally. That, to my mind, is what is meant by the

word ‘specific’ in Section 1(2) CPC....”

In an English case [ Re Net Book Agreement, 1957,

(1962) 3 All ER 751 (RPC)] Buckley, J., has interpreted

the word ‘specific’ to mean explicit and definable. While

Indian usage of English words often loses the Atlantic

flavour and Indian Judges owe their fidelity to Indian

meaning of foreign words and phrases, here East and

West meet, and “specific” is specific enough to avoid

being vague and general. Fowler regards this word

related to the central notion of species as distinguished

from genus and says that it is “often resorted to by

those who have no clear idea of their meaning but hold

it to diffuse an air of educated precision”. [ Fowler's

26

Page 27 Modern English Usage, 2nd Edn., p. 574] Stroud

[ Stroud's Judicial Dictionary Vol 4, 3rd Edn., p. 2836]

says “specifically ...” means “as such”. Black [ Blacks

Law Dictionary 4th Edn., p. 1571] gives among other

things, the following meaning for “specific”: definite,

explicit; of an exact or particular nature ... particular;

precise. While legalese and English are sometimes

enemies we have to go by judicialese which is the

draftsman's lexical guide.

The contrary view in the Biram case [(1976) 3 SCC

470 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 428 : 1976 Supp SCR 552] is

more assertive than explanatory, and ipse dixit, even if

judicial, do not validate themselves. We are inclined to

agree with the opinion expressed in the Lahore and

Allahabad cases. [Biram Sardar v. Emperor, AIR 1941

Bom 146 - [AIR 1939 PC 47 : 1939 IA 66 : 40 Cri LJ

364] A thing is specific if it is explicit. It need not be

express. The antithesis is between “specific” and

“indefinite” or “omnibus” and between “implied” and

“express”. What is precise, exact, definite and explicit,

is specific. Sometimes, what is specific may also be

special but yet they are distinct in semantics. From this

angle, the Criminal Procedure Code is a general Code.

The remission rules are special laws but Section 433-A

is a specific, explicit, definite provision dealing with a

particular situation or narrow class of cases, as

distinguished from the general run of cases covered by

Section 432 CrPC. Section 433-A picks out of a mass

of imprisonment cases a specific class of life

imprisonment cases and subjects it explicitly to a

particularised treatment. It follows that Section 433-A

applies in preference to any special or local law

because Section 5 expressly declares that specific

provisions, if any, to the contrary will prevail over any

special or local law. We have said enough to make the

point that “specific” is specific enough and even though

“special” to “specific” is near allied and “thin partition

do their bounds divide” the two are different. Section

433-A escapes the exclusion of

Section 5. [at paras 35 – 38]

20.Thus, “specific provision” must mean that the particular

provision in the Code of Civil Procedure must clearly indicate in

27

Page 28 itself and not merely by implication that the special law in question

is to be affected. It is important to note that one of the meanings

of the word “specific” is that it is distinct from something that is

general. In Maru Ram’s case, Section 433A of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973, was challenged as being against

various provisions of the Constitution. That challenge was

repelled by this Court. Section 433-A begins with a non obstante

clause specifically dealing with a particular situation, that is, where

a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed in certain

circumstances, then notwithstanding the commutation power

contained in Section 433, such person is not to be released from

prison unless he has served at least 14 years of imprisonment. In

applying Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to

Section 433A, great emphasis was placed on the non obstante

clause contained in Section 433A, and it was ultimately held that

Section 433A picks out of a mass of imprisonment cases a specific

type of case – namely, life imprisonment cases and subjects such

cases explicitly to a particularized treatment. It was for this reason

that Section 433-A was held to be a specific provision to the

contrary to the Prison Rules which were subsumed in the general

provision contained in Section 432 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973.

28

Page 29 21. It is in this primary sense that the expression “specific

provision” is used in Section 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure

because, as we have seen above, it carves out an exception to

special, local, or other laws which deal with the same subject

matter as the Code of Civil Procedure but get overridden by the

Code of Civil Procedure.

22.Viewed in this perspective, we have to discover whether the

various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to by

Shri Viswanathan can be said to be “specific provisions to the

contrary” for the purpose of Section 4(1) of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

23.Section 117 is a general provision which applies the Code to

the High Courts of this country. Similarly, Section 120 is another

general provision which states that Section 16, 17 and 20 of the

Code do not apply to the High Courts in exercise of their original

civil jurisdiction. Sections 122, 125 and 129 equally are general

provisions and not specific to the case at hand, namely, what is to

happen if two Judges hearing an appeal differ with each other.

This leaves Section 98, which will be dealt with a little later in this

judgment.

24.Shri Viswanathan also relied upon a Division Bench

judgment of this Court in Kulwant Kaur and Others v. Gurdial

29

Page 30 Singh Mann (dead) by LRS and Others, (2001) 4 SCC 262, to

submit that this decision is an authority for the proposition that

there is no need to expressly refer to a local law when the

legislative intent to repeal local laws inconsistent with the Code of

Civil Procedure is otherwise clear.

The judgment in Kulwant Kaur’s case raised a question

which arose on an application of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts

Act, 1918. This Section was couched in language similar to

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it existed before the

Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, which amended

Section 100 to make it more restrictive so that a second appeal

could only be filed if there was a substantial question of law

involved in the matter. The question this Court posed before itself

was whether Section 41 stood repealed by virtue of Section 97(1)

of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, which

reads as under:-

“97. Repeal and savings

(1) Any amendment made, or any provision inserted in

the principal Act by a State Legislature or a High Court

before the commencement of this Act shall, except

insofar as such amendment or provision is consistent

with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by

this Act, stand repealed.”

This Court concluded that Section 41 of the Punjab Courts

Act was repealed because it would amount to an amendment

30

Page 31 made or provision inserted in the principal Act by a State

Legislature. This Court further held that, in any event, Section 41

of the Punjab Courts Act being a law made by the Legislature of a

State is repugnant to a later law made by Parliament, namely,

Section 97(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,

1976, and that therefore, by virtue of the operation of Article 254 of

the Constitution of India, the said provision is in any case

overridden. In arriving at the aforesaid two conclusions, this Court

held:-

“Now we proceed to examine Section 97(1) of the

Amendment Act and the amendment of Section 100

CPC by the said 1976 Act. Through this amendment,

right to second appeal stands further restricted only to

lie where, “the case involves a substantial question of

law.” This introduction definitely is in conflict with

Section 41 of the Punjab Act which was in pari materia

with unamended Section 100 CPC. Thus so long there

was no specific provision to the contrary in this Code,

Section 4 CPC saved special or local law. But after it

comes in conflict, Section 4 CPC would not save, on

the contrary its language implied would make such

special or local law inapplicable. We may examine now

the submission for the respondent based on the

language of Section 100(1) CPC even after the said

amendment. The reliance is on the following words:

“100. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided …

by any other law for the time being in force….”

These words existed even prior to the amendment and

are unaffected by the amendment. Thus so far it could

legitimately be submitted that, reading this part of the

section in isolation it saves the local law. But this has

to be read with Section 97(1) of the Amendment Act,

which reads:

“97. (1) Any amendment made, or any provision

inserted in the principal Act by a State Legislature or a

31

Page 32 High Court before the commencement of this Act shall,

except insofar as such amendment or provision is

consistent with the provisions of the principal Act as

amended by this Act, stand repealed.” (Noticed again

for convenience.)

Thus language of Section 97(1) of the Amendment Act

clearly spells out that any local law which can be

termed to be inconsistent perishes, but if it is not so,

the local law would continue to occupy its field.

Since Section 41 of the Punjab Act is expressly in

conflict with the amending law, viz., Section 100 as

amended, it would be deemed to have been repealed.

Thus we have no hesitation to hold that the law

declared by the Full Bench of the High Court in the

case of Ganpat [AIR 1978 P&H 137 : 80 Punj LR 1

(FB)] cannot be sustained and is thus overruled.” [at

paras 27 – 29]

25.We are afraid that this judgment does not state the law

correctly on both propositions. First and foremost, when Section

97(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976

speaks of any amendment made or any provision inserted in the

principal Act by virtue of a State Legislature or a High Court, the

said Section refers only to amendments made and/or provisions

inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure itself and not elsewhere.

This is clear from the expression “principal Act” occurring in

Section 97(1). What Section 97(1) really does is to state that

where a State Legislature makes an amendment in the Code of

Civil Procedure, which amendment will apply only within the four

corners of the State, being made under Entry 13 of List III of the 7

th

32

Page 33 Schedule to the Constitution of India, such amendment shall stand

repealed if it is inconsistent with the provisions of the principal Act

as amended by the Parliamentary enactment contained in the

1976 amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure. This is further

made clear by the reference in Section 97(1) to a High Court. The

expression “any provision inserted in the principal Act” by a High

Court has reference to Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure

by which High Courts may make rules regulating their own

procedure, and the procedure of civil courts subject to their

superintendence, and may by such rules annul, alter, or add to any

of the rules contained in the first schedule to the Code of Civil

Procedure.

26.Thus, Kulwant Kaur’s decision on the application of Section

97(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, is not correct

in law.

27.Even the reference to Article 254 of the Constitution was not

correctly made by this Court in the said decision. Section 41 of the

Punjab Courts Act is of 1918 vintage. Obviously, therefore, it is not

a law made by the Legislature of a State after the Constitution of

India has come into force. It is a law made by a Provincial

Legislature under Section 80A of the Government of India Act,

1915, which law was continued, being a law in force in British

33

Page 34 India, immediately before the commencement of the Government

of India Act, 1935, by Section 292 thereof. In turn, after the

Constitution of India came into force and, by Article 395, repealed

the Government of India Act, 1935, the Punjab Courts Act was

continued being a law in force in the territory of India immediately

before the commencement of the Constitution of India by virtue of

Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India. This being the case,

Article 254 of the Constitution of India would have no application to

such a law for the simple reason that it is not a law made by the

Legislature of a State but is an existing law continued by virtue of

Article 372 of the Constitution of India. If at all, it is Article 372(1)

alone that would apply to such law which is to continue in force

until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or

other competent authority. We have already found that since

Section 97(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,

1976 has no application to Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, it

would necessarily continue as a law in force. Shri Viswanathan’s

reliance upon this authority therefore does not lead his argument

any further.

28.Shri Viswanathan drew our attention to Section 29(2) of the

Limitation Act which reads thus:-

“29. Saving.

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any

34

Page 35 suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different

from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the

provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period

were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the

purpose of determining any period of limitation

prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any

special or local law, the provisions contained in

sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as,

and to the extent to which, they are not expressly

excluded by such special or local law.”

29.He also referred us to various judgments, namely,

Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC

133 at page Nos.146-147, (para 17), Anwari Basavaraj Patil v.

Siddaramaiah, (1993) 1 SCC 636, at page 639 (para 8), Gopal

Sardar v. Karuna Sardar, (2004) 4 SCC 252 at page 264 (para

13), which construed the expression “expressly excluded” as

including something that one can derive from the scheme and

words used in a statute without necessarily referring to the subject

matter at hand specifically.

30.The three decisions cited by him do not carry the matter

much further for the simple reason that the expression “express

exclusion” is to be gleaned from the special or local law and not

from the Limitation Act. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act thus

differs from Section 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure in a very

important respect, namely, that the specific or express exclusion

must be contained in the special or local law, so far as the

Limitation Act, 1963 is concerned, as opposed to Section 4(1) of

35

Page 36 the Code of Civil Procedure, where we have to look for the specific

exclusion in the Code of Civil Procedure itself, and not in the

special or local law. It is for this reason that the judgments cited by

Shri Viswanathan embarked upon a survey of the scheme of the

Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the West Bengal

Land Reforms Act, 1955, and held that the said Acts were a

complete Code dealing with elections to Parliament and to

preemptions in the State of West Bengal, respectively, which

expressly excluded Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the present

case, there is no question of examining the scheme of the

Travancore-Cochin High Court Act to see whether it contains any

provision which expressly excludes the applicability of the Code of

Civil Procedure.

31.This brings us to the main contention urged by both parties,

namely, whether the Constitution Bench in Sathappan’s case

(supra) concludes the issue in the present case.

32.Since the judgment in Sathappan’s case was strongly relied

upon by both sides, we need to refer to it in a little detail.

Sathappan was a judgment which dealt with the correct

interpretation of Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Section 104 provides:

“Section 104 - Orders from which appeal lies

(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and

36

Page 37 save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of

this Code or by any law for the time being in force,

from no other orders:--

** * * * * * *

Provided that no appeal shall lie against any

order specified in clause (ff) save on the ground that no

order, or an order for the payment of a less amount,

ought to have been made.

No appeal shall lie from any order passed in

appeal under this section.” [at para 6]

33.The question which arose before this Court was whether

Letters Patent Appeals, which were referred to in “any other law for

the time being in force”, and therefore outside Section 104(1),

could be said to be governed by Section 104(2) which provided

that no appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this

Section. After noticing several earlier judgments of this Court, this

Court concluded:-

“Thus the unanimous view of all courts till 1996 was

that Section 104(1) CPC specifically saved letters

patent appeals and the bar under Section 104(2) did

not apply to letters patent appeals. The view has been

that a letters patent appeal cannot be ousted by

implication but the right of an appeal under the Letters

Patent can be taken away by an express provision in

an appropriate legislation. The express provision need

not refer to or use the words “letters patent” but if on a

reading of the provision it is clear that all further

appeals are barred then even a letters patent appeal

would be barred.” [at para 22]

This Court then went on to hold:

37

Page 38 “Thus, the consensus of judicial opinion has been that

Section 104(1) of the Civil Procedure Code expressly

saves a letters patent appeal. At this stage it would be

appropriate to analyse Section 104 CPC. Sub-section

(1) of Section 104 CPC provides for an appeal from the

orders enumerated under sub-section (1) which

contemplates an appeal from the orders enumerated

therein, as also appeals expressly provided in the body

of the Code or by any law for the time being in force.

Sub-section (1) therefore contemplates three types of

orders from which appeals are provided, namely,

(1) orders enumerated in sub-section (1),

(2) appeals otherwise expressly provided in the body

of the Code, and

(3) appeals provided by any law for the time being in

force.

It is not disputed that an appeal provided under the

Letters Patent of the High Court is an appeal provided

by a law for the time being in force.

As such if an appeal is expressly saved by Section

104(1), sub-section (2) cannot apply to such an

appeal. Section 104 has to be read as a whole. Merely

reading sub-section (2) by ignoring the saving clause

in sub-section (1) would lead to a conflict between the

two sub-sections. Read as a whole and on well-

established principles of interpretation it is clear that

sub-section (2) can only apply to appeals not saved by

sub-section (1) of Section 104. The finality provided by

sub-section (2) only attaches to orders passed in

appeal under Section 104 i.e. those orders against

which an appeal under “any other law for the time

being in force” is not permitted. Section 104(2) would

not thus bar a letters patent appeal. Effect must also

be given to legislative intent of introducing Section 4

CPC and the words “by any law for the time being in

force” in Section 104(1). This was done to give effect to

the Calcutta, Madras and Bombay views that Section

104 did not bar a Letters Patent appeal. As appeals

under “any other law for the time being in force”

undeniably include a letters patent appeal, such

appeals are now specifically saved. Section 104 must

be read as a whole and harmoniously. If the intention

was to exclude what is specifically saved in sub-

38

Page 39 section (1), then there had to be a specific exclusion. A

general exclusion of this nature would not be sufficient.

We are not saying that a general exclusion would

never oust a letters patent appeal. However, when

Section 104(1) specifically saves a letters patent

appeal then the only way such an appeal could be

excluded is by express mention in Section 104(2) that

a letters patent appeal is also prohibited. It is for this

reason that Section 4 of the Civil Procedure Code

provides as follows:

“4. Savings.—(1) In the absence of any specific

provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be

deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local

law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power

conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed,

by or under any other law for the time being in force.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality

of the proposition contained in sub-section (1), nothing

in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise

affect any remedy which a landholder or landlord may

have under any law for the time being in force for the

recovery of rent of agricultural land from the produce of

such land.”

As stated hereinabove, a specific exclusion may be

clear from the words of a statute even though no

specific reference is made to Letters Patent. But where

there is an express saving in the statute/section itself,

then general words to the effect that “an appeal would

not lie” or “order will be final” are not sufficient. In such

cases i.e. where there is an express saving, there must

be an express exclusion. Sub-section (2) of Section

104 does not provide for any express exclusion. In this

context reference may be made to Section 100-A. The

present Section 100-A was amended in 2002. The

earlier Section 100-A, introduced in 1976, reads as

follows:

“100-A. No further appeal in certain cases .—

Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters

Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument

having the force of law or in any other law for the time

being in force, where any appeal from an appellate

decree or order is heard and decided by a Single

Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from

the judgment, decision or order of such Single Judge in

39

Page 40 such appeal or from any decree passed in such

appeal.”

It is thus to be seen that when the legislature wanted to

exclude a letters patent appeal it specifically did so.

The words used in Section 100-A are not by way of

abundant caution. By the Amendment Acts of 1976 and

2002 a specific exclusion is provided as the legislature

knew that in the absence of such words a letters patent

appeal would not be barred. The legislature was aware

that it had incorporated the saving clause in Section

104(1) and incorporated Section 4 CPC. Thus now a

specific exclusion was provided. After 2002, Section

100-A reads as follows:

“100-A. No further appeal in certain cases .—

Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters

Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having

the force of law or in any other law for the time being in

force, where any appeal from an original or appellate

decree or order is heard and decided by a Single

Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from

the judgment and decree of such Single Judge.”

To be noted that here again the legislature has

provided for a specific exclusion. It must be stated that

now by virtue of Section 100-A no letters patent appeal

would be maintainable. However, it is an admitted

position that the law which would prevail would be the

law at the relevant time. At the relevant time neither

Section 100-A nor Section 104(2) barred a letters

patent appeal.

Applying the above principle to the facts of this case,

the appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is an

appeal provided by a law for the time being in force.

Therefore, the finality contemplated by sub-section (2)

of Section 104 did not attach to an appeal passed

under such law.

It was next submitted that clause 44 of the Letters

Patent showed that Letters Patent were subject to

amendment and alteration. It was submitted that this

showed that a Letters Patent was a subordinate or

subservient piece of law. Undoubtedly, clause 44

permits amendment or alteration of Letters Patent, but

then which legislation is not subject to amendment or

40

Page 41 alteration? CPC is also subject to amendments and

alterations. In fact it has been amended on a number

of occasions. The only unalterable provisions are the

basic structure of our Constitution. Merely because

there is a provision for amendment does not mean

that, in the absence of an amendment or a contrary

provision, the Letters Patent is to be ignored. To submit

that a Letters Patent is a subordinate piece of

legislation is to not understand the true nature of a

Letters Patent. As has been held in Vinita Khanolkar

case [(1998) 1 SCC 500] and Sharda Devi

case [(2002) 3 SCC 705] a Letters Patent is the charter

of the High Court. As held in Shah Babulal Khimji

case[(1981) 4 SCC 8] a Letters Patent is the specific

law under which a High Court derives its powers. It is

not any subordinate piece of legislation. As set out in

the aforementioned two cases a Letters Patent cannot

be excluded by implication. Further it is settled law that

between a special law and a general law the special

law will always prevail. A Letters Patent is a special law

for the High Court concerned. The Civil Procedure

Code is a general law applicable to all courts. It is well-

settled law, that in the event of a conflict between a

special law and a general law, the special law must

always prevail. We see no conflict between the Letters

Patent and Section 104 but if there was any conflict

between a Letters Patent and the Civil Procedure

Code then the provisions of the Letters Patent would

always prevail unless there was a specific exclusion.

This is also clear from Section 4 of the Civil Procedure

Code which provides that nothing in the Code shall

limit or affect any special law. As set out in Section 4

CPC only a specific provision to the contrary can

exclude the special law. The specific provision would

be a provision like Section 100-A.” [at paras 29 – 32]

34.Based on the aforementioned extracts from the Constitution

Bench decision, Shri Viswanathan sought to urge that a specific

exclusion need not refer to the very provision that is sought to be

excluded but it was enough if the subject matter at hand is referred

41

Page 42 to and that therefore it is not necessary for any provision in the

Code of Civil Procedure to expressly refer to Section 23 of the

Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, but that it would be enough

that on a reading of the said provision it would be clear that the

particular special, local, or other law would not apply.

35.As has been stated by us above, for the exclusion to be

specific, we must first hold that the provision contained in Section

98(2) is special as against Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin

High Court Act. This we are afraid we cannot do, as it would be in

the teeth of the Constitution Bench judgment in Sathappan’s

case, in particular paragraph 32 thereof. This Court has

unequivocally held that a Letters Patent is a special law for the

High court concerned, the Code of Civil Procedure being a general

law applicable to all courts, and that it is well settled that in the

event of a conflict between the two, the special law must always

prevail. In the present case, substitute the words “High Court’s

Act” for “Letters Patent”. What follows is that the High Court’s Act

is a special law for the High Court concerned, the Code of Civil

Procedure being a general law applicable to all courts. This

according to us really concludes the matter in favour of the

appellants. Hemalatha’s case (supra) has therefore been

wrongly decided and must therefore be overruled.

42

Page 43 36.Shri Viswanathan referred various judgments to us on the

applications of the general versus special principle. In particular

he relied strongly on Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J.

Bahadur and Others, (1981) 1 SCC 315. The question that arose

before this Court in that case was whether the Life Insurance

Corporation Act, 1956 is a special statute qua the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 when it came to a dispute regarding conditions

of service of the employees of the Life Insurance Corporation of

India. This Court ultimately held that the Industrial Disputes Act

would prevail over the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act as

the Industrial Disputes Act relates specially and specifically to

industrial disputes between workmen and employers, whereas the

LIC Act is a general statute which is silent on what happens to

disputes between management and workmen. The fact that the

LIC Act must be considered to be a special legislation regulating

the takeover of private insurance business not being relevant to

the subject matter at hand would not make the said Act special in

any sense. The working test laid down by this Court to determine

which statute is general and which special, is laid down in

paragraph 52 of the said judgment thus:-

“In determining whether a statute is a special or a

general one, the focus must be on the principal

subject-matter plus the particular perspective. For

certain purposes, an Act may be general and for

43

Page 44 certain other purposes it may be special and we

cannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer points

of law. In law, we have a cosmos of relativity, not

absolutes — so too in life. The ID Act is a special

statute devoted wholly to investigation and settlement

of industrial disputes which provides definitionally for

the nature of industrial disputes coming within its

ambit. It creates an infrastructure for investigation into,

solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes. It

also provides the necessary machinery for

enforcement of awards and settlements. From alpha to

omega the ID Act has one special mission — the

resolution of industrial disputes through specialised

agencies according to specialised procedures and with

special reference to the weaker categories of

employees coming within the definition of workmen.

Therefore, with reference to industrial disputes

between employers and workmen, the ID Act is a

special statute, and the LIC Act does not speak at all

with specific reference to workmen. On the other hand,

its powers relate to the general aspects of

nationalisation, of management when private

businesses are nationalised and a plurality of problems

which, incidentally, involve transfer of service of

existing employees of insurers. The workmen qua

workmen and industrial disputes between workmen

and the employer as such, are beyond the orbit of and

have no specific or special place in the scheme of the

LIC Act. And whenever there was a dispute between

workmen and management the ID Act mechanism was

resorted to.”

37.Applying the aforesaid test, we have no doubt that the

principal subject matter contained in the present case is appeals

before the High Court of Kerala. The particular perspective that we

are concerned with is what is to happen, in such appeals, if there

is a difference of opinion between two Judges hearing such

appeals in the High Court. Viewed from this perspective there can

be no doubt that the subject matter pertains to appeals in the High

44

Page 45 Court alone and not other courts. Those appeals can deal with

civil, criminal, and other matters. The particular perspective

therefore demands the application of a uniform rule to all such

appeals, which rule is provided by the special rule contained in

Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, which in turn

displaces the general rule which applies under Section 98(2) of the

Code of Civil Procedure to all Courts and in civil proceedings only.

38.Viewed from another perspective, even the topics for

legislation contained in the 7

th

Schedule of the Constitution of India

would show that civil procedure is dealt with differently from

jurisdiction and powers of courts. In this regard the relevant entries

in the 7

th

Schedule make interesting reading:-

“1.List III entry 13

13. Civil procedure, including all matters included in

the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of

this Constitution, limitation and arbitration.

2. List I entry 95

95. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the

Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in

this List; admiralty jurisdiction.

3. List II entry 65

65. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the

Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in

this List.

4. List III entry 46

45

Page 46 46. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the

Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in

this List.”

39.We now turn to the arguments based on Section 98(3) of the

Code of Civil Procedure.

40.As has been stated hereinabove, Section 98(3) was

introduced in the year 1928 when all the High Courts in British

India were governed only by the Letters Patent establishing them.

The reason for the introduction of the said Section goes back to

the landmark judgment of the Privy Council in Bhaidas’ case and

various other judgments following the said landmark judgment.

41.In Bhaidas’ case (supra), the Privy Council had to decide

whether clause 36 of the Letters Patent would prevail over Section

98 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Clause 36 of the Letters Patent

was similar to Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act.

The Privy Council, after setting out Section 4 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, held:-

“There is no specific provision in section 98, and there

is a special form of procedure which was already

prescribed. That form of procedure section 98 does

not, in their Lordships’ opinion, affect. The

consequence is that the appellant is right in saying that

in this instance a wrong course was taken when this

case was referred to other Judges for decision, and he

is technically entitled to a decree in accordance with

the judgment of the Chief Justice. This view of the

section is not novel, for it has been supported by

46

Page 47 judgments in Madras, in Allahabad and in Calcutta.”

42.The controversy which reared its head after the aforesaid

judgment was as to whether appeals under the Code of Civil

Procedure, being referred to in clause 16 of the Letters Patent,

would also be covered by clause 36. In order to appreciate the

aforesaid controversy, it is necessary to set out clauses 15, 16 and

36 of the Letters Patent as follows:-

“Clause 15. Appeal from the courts of original

jurisdiction to the High Court in its appellate

jurisdiction:-

And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the

said High Court of Judicature at Madras, Bombay, Fort

William in Bengal from the judgment (not being a

judgment passed in the exercise of appellate

jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the

exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to

the superintendence of the said High Court and not

being an order made in the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed

or made in exercise of the power of superintendence

under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government

of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of

one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any

Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the

Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding

anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to

the said High Court or one Judge of any Division

Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of

India Act, on or after the first day of February, 1929 in

the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a

decree or order made in the exercise of appellate

jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence

of the said High Court where the Judge who passed

the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for

appeal; but that the right to appeal from other

judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such

47

Page 48 Division Court shall be to Us, Our heirs or successors

in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.

Clause 16. Appeal from Courts in the Provinces:-

And we do further ordain that the said High Court of

Judicature at Fort William in Bengal shall be a court of

Appeal from the Civil Courts of the Bengal Division of

the Presidency of Fort William, and from all other

Courts subject to its superintendence, and shall

exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases as are

subject to appeal to the said High Court by virtue of

any laws or regulation now in force.

Clause 36. Single Judges and Division Courts:—

And we do hereby declare that any function which is

hereby directed to be performed by the said High Court

of Judicature at (Madras), (Bombay), Fort William in

Bengal in the exercise of its original or appellate

jurisdiction, may be performed by any Judge, or by any

Division Court thereof, appointed or constituted for

such purpose, in pursuance of section 108 of the

Government of India Act, 1915; and

if such Division Court is composed of two or more

Judges and the Judges are divided in opinion as to the

decision to be given on any point, such point shall be

decided according to the opinion of the majority of the

Judges if there shall be a majority, but if the Judges

should be equally divided, they shall state the point

upon which they differ and the case shall then be

heard upon that point by one or more of the other

Judges and the point shall be decided according to the

opinion of the majority of the Judges who have heard

the case including those who first heard it.”

43.It will be seen that clause 36 refers to the “appellate

jurisdiction” of the High Court, which jurisdiction would contain

appeals both under clause 15 of the Letters Patent and under

Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Despite this, some

High Courts took the view that appeals under Section 96 of the

48

Page 49 Code of Civil Procedure would not be covered by clause 36 of the

Letters Patent, and that therefore Section 98(2) and not Clause 36

would be applied in such appeals before the High Courts.

44.In an instructive Full Bench judgment in Immidisetti

Dhanaraju & Another v. Motilal Daga & Another, AIR 1929 MAD

641, owing to the difference of opinion between two learned Judges of

the High Court, the question that had to be decided was whether

clause 36 of the Letters Patent would apply or Section 98 of the

Code of Civil Procedure. Phillips,J. after referring to the Privy

Council judgment in Bhaidas’ case, stated:-

“There is no specific provision in S. 98, and there is a

special form of procedure which was already

prescribed. That form of procedure S. 98 does not, in

their Lordships' opinion, affect.”

This is a very general statement and is wide enough to

include the statement that S. 98 does not affect the

procedure laid down in the Letters Patent. That

procedure is given in Cl. 36 which applies to cases

arising both under Cl. 15 and Cl. 16. It would,

therefore, appear that this dictum would apply equally

to Cls. 15 and 16 of the Letters Patent and this is

supported by the judgment of Lord Sumner in Sabitri

Thakurain v. Savi where he observes.

“In conclusion, there is no reason why there should be

any general difference between the procedure of the

High Court in matters coming under the Letters Patent

and its procedure in other matters.”

In an interesting passage, Phillips,J. went on to hold:-

“It is suggested that the amendment of S. 98 merely

leaves the law as it was before, but as there has been

no pronouncement of the Privy Council saying that S. 4

did not protect Cl. 36 equally with Cl. 15, which it was

definitely held to protect, it cannot be said that S. 98,

49

Page 50 prior to the amendment, necessarily affected Cls. 16

and 36. The distinction drawn between the jurisdiction

of the High Court under Cl. 15 and Cl. 16 was based

on the Ianguage of S. 96; for, it has been held that S.

96 refers only to appeals from Subordinate Courts and

not to appeals from one Judge of the High Court to the

High Court, S. 96 does not in terms exclude appeals

from one Judge to the other Judges of the High Court;

for, it includes all appeals from “any Court exercising

original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear

appeals from decisions of such Court.” This language

is wide enough to include appeals from one Judge to

the other Judge of the High Court. If that is so then S.

96, applies to all appeals and S. 98 which clearly

relates back to S. 96 must also deal with all appeals. If

S. 98 does not affect appeals under Cl. 15, how can it

be held to affect appeals under Cl. 16? It appears to

me that in view of the judgments of the Privy Council

in Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab and Sabitri

Thakurain v. Savi

)

Sec. 4 of the Civil Procedure Code

of 1908 was enacted in order to save, amongst other

enactments, the provisions of the Letters Patent. That

this was the view of the Legislature is now made

clearly the very recent amendment of S. 98, Civil

Procedure Code.”

45.In the Full Bench decision in the same case, Ramesam,J.,

agreed with the view of Phillips, J., and held:-

“The result is that it is now beyond all doubt that Cl. 36

of the Letters Patent applies to all appeals. It may be

asked, when does S. 98 of the Civil Procedure Code

have any operation and why should the legislature not

say that the section does not apply to Chartered High

Courts instead of adding an explanation to the section?

The reply is that S. 98 applies now only to Courts other

than the Chartered High Courts, that is, the Chief

Courts, and Courts of Judicial Commissioners and the

reason why the legislature adopted this particular form

of elucidating the matter is that it was intended to

retain S. 98, as applicable even to Chartered High

Courts, but to make the application subject to Cl. 36 of

the Letters Patent. If, at any time, Cl. 36 of the Letters

50

Page 51 Patent ceases to exist, S. 98 will come into operation.

It is to attain this particular result that the explanation

was added to S. 98, instead of saying that S. 98 does

not apply to Chartered High Courts at all. I would

answer the question referred to us thus:

“The procedure adopted by the High Court should be

governed by Cl. 36 of the Letters Patent.”

While so holding, the Full Bench of the Madras High Court held

that Section 98(3) was declaratory of the law as it always stood. It

was held:

“It is true that the Amending Act is intended to be

declaratory, that is, not only is its object to make the

law clear from its date but also to make the Act

retrospective; that is, there is no change in the law. The

law both before the amendment and after the

amendment is the same. To this extent I agree with the

argument of the learned Advocate, that the

amendment is declaratory. But to assume from this that

the Amending Act did not intend to alter the law, as

expounded by the decisions up to that date, does not

follow: In the first place, it is not correct to say that

there is a well-understood rule of law prior to the

amendment, in the manner stated by the learned

Advocate for the respondents. The decision

in Lachmam Singh v. Ram Lagan

Singh and Veeraraghava Reddi v. Subba

Reddi indicate the contrary. In my opinion, the object of

the amendment is to make it now perfectly clear that

for any purpose Cl. 36 of the Letters Patent should

never be controlled by the Civil Procedure Code. This

was the view of Lord Buckmaster in Bhaidas

Shivdas v. Bai Gulab and the cases approved therein.

The Amending Act is really the response of the

legislature to the invitation of Page, J.”

46.In an instructive Full Bench judgment reported in Shushila

Kesarbhai & Ors. v. Bai Lilavati & Ors., AIR 1975 Guj. 39 (FB),

the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court had to consider whether a

51

Page 52 decision given by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in

Bhuta v. Lakadu Dhansing reported in AIR 1919 Bom 1 (FB), laid

down the correct law. After an exhaustive discussion discussing

the entire history of the CPC Acts starting from 1859 right up to

1908 the Gujarat High Court held:

“It would thus be seen that under the Code of 1882 the

High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and

Allahabad were all agreed that Section 575

superseded Clause 36 and since appeals from

subordinate Courts were covered, by Section 575, the

procedure in case of difference of opinion in such

appeals was governed by Section 575 and not by

Clause 36, though, if Section 575 had not been there

and Clause 36 had not been superseded by it, the

procedure applicable would have been that set out in

Clause 36. There was difference of opinion amongst

the High Courts only in regard to the procedure

applicable in case of intra-High Court appeals under

the Letters Patent. The Calcutta High Court took the

view that even in case of intra-High Court appeals,

Section 575 applied and Clause 36 was excluded while

the Madras and Allahabad High Courts held that the

procedure in case of intra-High Court appeals was

governed by Clause 36 and not by Section 575.”

After setting out Sections 98 and 117 of the Code of Civil

Procedure the Full Bench further went on to say:

“If these were the only relevant Sections there can be

no doubt that by reason of Section 117, Section 98

would ordinarily apply in case of difference amongst

Judges hearing an appeal from a subordinate Court as

did Section 575 by reason of Section 632 of the Code

of 1882. But Section 4, sub-section (1) provides in so

many terms that nothing in the Code and since the

Code includes Section 98, nothing in Section 98, shall

be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special form

of procedure prescribed by or under any other law for

52

Page 53 the time being in force. We have already discussed the

scope and content of Clause 36 and it is apparent from

that discussion that Clause 36 is wide enough to

include appeals from subordinate Courts as well as

intra-High Court appeals and, therefore, the procedure

for resolving difference of opinion, set out in Clause 36

is applicable not only in case of intra-High Court

appeals but also in case of appeals from subordinate

Courts. This procedure is different from that set out in

Section 98 and it is clearly, qua Section 98, a special

form of procedure prescribed by Clause 36. Now there

is no specific provision to the contrary in Section 98 or

any other provision of the Code and nothing in Section

98 is, therefore, to be deemed to limit or otherwise

affect the special form of procedure prescribed by

Clause 36 and consequently notwithstanding Section

98, Clause 36 must operate in its fullness and apply to

appeals from subordinate Courts. Section 4,

subsection (1) saves the special form of procedure

prescribed in Clause 36 and provides that it shall

prevail despite conflict with Section 98. It is therefore,

clear as a matter of plain grammatical construction that

under the present Code the procedure in case of

difference of opinion in appeals from subordinate

Courts is governed by Clause 36 and not by S. 98.

This would appear to be the undoubted position in

principle but let us see what the decided cases say.

The first decision to which we must refer in this

connection is the decision of the Full Bench of the

Bombay High Court in 21 Bom LR 157 : (AIR 1919

Bom 1 (FB)) (supra) but before we do so, we may

make a brief reference to an earlier decision of the

Bombay High Court in Suraj Mal v. Horniman, 20 Bom

LR 185 : (AIR 1917 Bom 62 (SB)). That was a case of

an intra-High Court appeal under Clause 15 and the

question arose whether on difference of opinion

amongst the Judges, Section 98 applied or Clause 36.

The Division Bench observed that Clause 36

prescribed a special form of procedure in certain cases

where the Judges of a Division Bench differed and this

special form of procedure was saved by Section 4,

sub-section (1) and the applicability of Section 98

excluded in cases to which this special form of

53

Page 54 procedure applied. It was held that Section 129 made it

abundantly clear that the intention of the Legislature

was that in trial of oases on the Original Side as well

as appeals arising in the Original Jurisdiction, nothing

should be done which is inconsistent with the Letters

Patent and, therefore, the special form of procedure

prescribed in Clause 36 applied in case of intra-High

Court appeals arising from the Original Side and

Section 98 had no application in case of such appeals.

This decision was no doubt given in the context of

intra-High Court appeals but the principle on which it

was based must apply equally in relation to appeals

from subordinate Courts. Clause 36, as we have

already pointed out, embraces appeals from

subordinate Courts as well as intra-High Court appeals

and, therefore, if the special form of procedure

prescribed in Clause 36 is saved from intra-High Court

appeals, it must be held equally to be saved for

appeals from subordinate Courts and Clause 36 must

accordingly be held to apply in relation to them and not

Section 98.”

The Full Bench of Gujarat then went on to state that the Full Bench

of the Bombay High Court stood overruled by referring to Bhaidas’

case in the following terms:-

“This fallacy underlying the decision of the Full Bench

in 21 Bom LR 157 : (AIR 1919 Bom 1 (FB)) was

exposed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

in a decision given only two years later in Bhaidas

Shivdas v. Bai Gulab, 23 Bom LR 623 : 48 Ind App 181

: (AIR 1921 PC 6). That was, of course, a case of an

intra-High Court appeal under Clause 15 and while

dealing with the question as to what is the procedure to

be followed in case of difference of opinion in such an

appeal, Lord Buckmaster, after referring to Section 4,

sub-section (1) of the Code of 1908 observed:—

“There is no specific provision in Section 98, and

there is a special form of procedure which was already

prescribed. That form of procedure Section 98 does

not, in their Lordships' opinion, affect. The

consequence is that the appellant is right in saying that

54

Page 55 in this instance a wrong course was taken when this

case was referred to other Judges for decision, and he

is technically entitled to a decree in accordance with

the judgment of the Chief Justice. This view of the

section is not novel, for it has been supported by

judgments in Madras, in Allahabad, and in Calcutta:

see Roop Lal v. Lakshmi Doss, (1906) ILR 29 Mad

1: Lachman Singh v. Ram Lagan Singh, (1904) ILR 26

All 10 and Nundeepat Mahta v. Urquhart, (1870) 4

Beng LR 181.” These observations were undoubtedly

made in the context of intra-High, Court appeals but

the reasoning behind these observations is equally

applicable in case of appeals from subordinate Courts

because both categories of appeals are embraced by

Clause 36. This decision of the Privy Council must,

therefore, be held to have overruled 21 Bom LR 157 :

(AIR 1919 Bom 1 (FB)) by necessary implication.

Moreover, the Judicial Committee pointed out that the

view taken by them in regard to the inter-action of

Section 98 and Clause 36 was not novel for it was

supported inter alia by the judgment of the Calcutta

High Court in 1870 Beng LR 181 (supra). The case of

1870 Beng LR 181 as we have pointed out above,

related to an appeal from a subordinate Court and it

was held by the Calcutta High Court in that case that

the procedure in case of difference of opinion in such

an appeal was governed by Clause 36. This decision

of the Calcutta High Court was approved by the

Judicial Committee and it must, therefore, be held that

according to the Judicial Committee it is Clause 36 and

not Section 98 which applies in case of an appeal from

a subordinate Court. The decision in 21 Bom LR 157 :

(AIR 1919 Bom 1) (FB) cannot, therefore, be regarded

as good law after the decision of the Judicial

Committee in 23 Bom LR 623 : (AIR 1921 PC 6) and it

need not deter us from taking a different view.”

After this long discussion on the point at hand, the Full Bench went

on to consider the amendment made in Section 98 by adding

Section 98(3). The Full Bench held that Section 98(3) merely

clarified the existing legal position by removing a doubt which was

55

Page 56 cast upon it by some judicial decisions. The very Statement of

Objects and Reasons of the Repealing and Amending Act of 1928

said that the object of introduction of sub-section (3) in Section 98

is to enact more clearly a provision which was previously implied in

Section 4 of the Code. Thus, the Full Bench of the Gujarat High

Court held:-

“This sub-section makes it clear beyond doubt that

nothing in Section 98 shall be deemed to alter or

otherwise affect Clause 36. Clause 36 is not to be

controlled by Section 98. If there is any area in which

Section 98 and Clause 36 operate simultaneously.

Clause 36 must prevail and Section 98 must give way.

Now we need not repeat that Clause 36 embraces

exercise of appellate jurisdiction in both categories of

appeals, namely, appeals from subordinate Courts as

well as intra-High Court appeals under Clause 15. It is,

therefore, obvious that, at any rate, since the

introduction of sub-section (3), the procedure in case

of difference of opinion in appeals from subordinate

Courts must be held to be governed by Clause 36 and

not by Section 98. In fact as we have pointed out

above, that was always the law under the Code of

1908 even before the amendment by reason of Section

4, sub-section (1). Sub-section (3) of Section 98

merely clarified the existing legal position by removing

a doubt which was cast upon it by some judicial

decisions. That is made clear by the Statement of

Objects and Reasons of the Repealing and Amending

Act 18 of 1928 where it is stated that the object of

introduction of sub-section (3) in Section 98 is to enact;

more clearly the provision which was previously

implied in Section 4 of the Code. The respondents

relied on the decision of the Allahabad High Court

in Muhammad Ishaq Khan v. Muhammad Rustam Ali

Khan, ILR 40 All 292 : (AIR 1918 All 412) and urged

that it is a recognised rule that where there have been

decided cases before an Act is amended, if the

amendment does not expressly show that the law as

56

Page 57 interpreted by the decisions is altered, the rule laid

down by the decisions must be adhered to. We accept

this principle but we do not see how it has any

application here. The law prior to the amendment was

never different. The amendment did not seek to alter

the law: it merely clarified what was always the law

under the Code of 1908 and what that law was on a

proper interpretation of Section 4, sub-section (1) has

already been discussed by us. But even if the view be

taken that prior to the amendment, the law was that

appeals from subordinate Courts were governed by

Section 98 despite the existence of Section 4, sub-

section (1). sub-section (3) introduced in Section 98

made it very clear that Clause 36 must operate in its

fulness and its applicability to appeals from

subordinate Courts should not be excluded by Section

98 and to that extent the preexisting law must be held

to have been altered. The decision in 21 Bom LR 157 :

(AIR 1919 Bom 1) (FB) (supra) cannot, therefore, in

any view of the matter, stand after the introduction of

sub-section (3) in Section 98.

We may now turn to the decisions of the other High

Courts. The Madras High Court in a Division Bench

judgment in Veeraraghava Reddy v. Subba Reddy, ILR

43 Mad 37 : (AIR 1920 Mad 391) (SB) held that even

in case of appeals from subordinate Courts. Clause 36

applies and not Section 98 but this judgment is not of

much help because it does not contain any discussion

of the question on principle. This question again came

up for consideration before a Division Bench of the

Madras High Court

in Venkatasubbiah v. Venkatasubbamma, AIR 1925

Mad 1032. The Division Bench held that the previous

practice of the Court was to apply Section 98 to

appeals from subordinate Courts and the decision in

23 Bom LR 623 : (AIR 1921 PC 6) was not intended to

override the rule of law enshrined in this practice. This

decision is plainly incorrect for reasons which we have

already discussed. We need not repeat those reasons.

The Madras High Court was again called upon to

consider this question in Dhanaraju v. Motilal, AIR 1929

Mad 641 (FB) which was a Full Bench decision. The

Full Bench relied on 23 Bom LB 623 : (AIR 1921 PC 6)

(supra) and also emphasized Section 98. sub-section

57

Page 58 (3) for taking the view that Clause 36 is not controlled

by Section 98 and it applies to all appeals, whether

from a Single Judge of the High Court or from

subordinate Court. This decision of the Full Bench has

been consistently followed in the Madras High Court

and it supports the view we are taking.

The view taken by the Calcutta High Court on this point

varied from time to time, though there was no specific

decision on the point in Suresh Chandra v. Shiti Kanta,

AIR 1924 Cal 855 (SB), Page J., observed in that case

that Clause 36 applies to all appeals, whether intra-

High Court or from subordinate Courts. Two different

views were expressed in the subsequent case

of Becharam v. Purna Chandra, AIR 1925 Cal 845

(FB). There Walmsley, J., took the view that Clause 36

applies not only to intra-High Court appeals but also to

appeals from subordinate Courts while Suhrawardy J.,

observed that so far as appeals from subordinate

Courts are concerned, they are governed by Section

98. The next decision which followed was that

in Prafulla Kamini v. Bhabani Nath, AIR 1926 Cal 121.

In this case Page, J., who was a party to the judgment

in AIR 1924 Cal 855 (supra) changed his opinion and

held that 23 Bom LR 623 : (AIR 1921 PC 6) was

confined to appeals under the Letters Patent and did

not apply to appeals from subordinate Courts and

Walmsley, J., also allowed himself to be persuaded to

take the same view as Page, J. Page, J., observed in

the opening paragraph of his judgment that this

controversy can be satisfactorily set at rest “only by the

action of the Legislature now long overdue” and invited

the legislature to solve the doubts and differences by

an express enactment. There were in fact no doubts

and differences. The effect of Section 4, sub-section

(1) was clear and indubitable and in our opinion, it

saved the full content and operation of Clause 36

notwithstanding Section 98. But even so the

Legislature in response to the invitation of Page J., and

with a view to leave no scope for doubts or debate,

introduced sub-section (3) in Section 98 by the

Repealing and Amendment Act 18 of 1928. Since then

the Calcutta High Court has taken the view that the

procedure in case of difference of opinion in appeals

from subordinate Courts also is governed by Clause

58

Page 59 36.

So far as the Lahore High Court is concerned, a

Division Bench of that Court held in AIR 1926 Lah 65

(supra) that appeals under the Code were governed by

Section 98 and those under the Letters Patent by

Clause 36. Shadilal, C.J., who presided over the

Bench pointed out that if the matter were res integra,

he would have held that Clause 26 of the Letters

Patent of the Lahore High Court applied to all appeals

heard by the High Court and it was immaterial whether

they were appeals within the High Court itself or from

Courts of inferior jurisdiction but he felt compelled by

authorities to take a different view. We do not think, for

reasons “which we have already discussed, that the

learned Chief Justice should have felt constrained to

decide the case contrary to his personal opinion. The

personal opinion entertained by the learned Chief

Justice was plainly correct. This question again came

up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Lahore

High Court in Mt. Sardar Bibi v. Haq Nawaz Khan, AIR

1934 Lah 371. The Full Bench held relying on AIR

1929 Mad 641 (FB) (supra) and Debi

Prasad v. Gaudham Rai, AIR 1933 Pat 67 that “It is

now well-settled that with the addition of sub-section

(3), Section 98 of the CPC, made by the Repealing

and Amending Act, 18 of 1928, that Section has no

application to cases heard by a Division Bench of a

Chartered High Court, whether in appeals from

decrees of subordinate Courts or from decrees passed

by a Judge of the High Court on the original side, and

that all cases of difference of opinion among the

Judges composing the Division Bench are governed by

Clause 26, Letters Patent”. This decision completely

supports the view we are taking.

We have no decision of the Patna High Court prior to

the introduction of sub-section (3) in Section 98 — at

any rate none was cited before us. The first case

where the question of competing claims between

Section 98 and Clause 28 of the Letters Patent of the

Patna High Court in relation to appeals from

subordinate Courts came to be considered by the

Patna High Court was that in AIR 1933 Pat 67 (supra).

The Division Bench held in that case that the

introduction of subsection (3) in Section 98 had

59

Page 60 resolved the controversy and it was clear that Clause

28 applied to all appeals, irrespective whether they

were intra-High Court appeals or appeals from

subordinate Courts. The same view was reiterated by

the Patna High Court in Rajnarain v.Saligram, (1948)

ILR 27 Pat 332 and Bokaro and Bangur Ltd. v. State of

Bihar, AIR 1966 Pat 154.

It would, therefore, be seen that there is now a

consensus amongst most of the High Courts in the

country that the procedure in case of difference of

opinion in appeals from subordinate Courts is

governed by the appropriate clause of the Letters

Patent and not by Section 98 and the view we are

taking is in accord with the decisions of the other High

Courts.”

47.The Gujarat High Court’s Full Bench decision, with which we

respectfully concur, is important on several counts. Not only does

it correctly explain what is meant by a “specific provision to the

contrary” in Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but it also

goes on to state that what was achieved by Section 98(3) of the

Code of Civil Procedure was already previously implied in Section

4 of the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as Section 98 being a

general provision could not possibly be said to be a “specific

provision” which would take away the effect of the Letters Patent in

that case. The self same reasoning would apply to the question of

law presented before us. If the Letters Patent, being the Charter

of the High Courts in British India, was a special law governing the

High Courts untouched by any specific provision to the contrary in

the Code of Civil Procedure, so would the High Court Acts, being

60

Page 61 the Charter of other High Courts, similarly remain as special laws

untouched by any specific provision in the Code of Civil Procedure

for the self-same reason. Viewed from any angle, therefore, it is

clear that Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act,

alone is to be applied when there is a difference of opinion

between two learned Judges of the Kerala High Court in any

appeal, be it civil, criminal, or otherwise, before them.

48.At this juncture, we may also point out that if we were to

accept Shri Viswanathan’s argument, several anomalous

situations would arise. First and foremost, Section 23 of the

Travancore-Cochin High Court Act would not apply to appeals

under the Code of Civil Procedure before the High Court, but

would apply to criminal and other appeals, making appeals before

the same High Court apply a different procedure, depending upon

their subject matter. As against this, having accepted Shri V. Giri’s

argument, a uniform rule applies down the board to all appeals

before the High Court, whether they be civil, criminal, or otherwise

by applying Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act to

all of them. In fact, in Civil Appeal No. 8576 of 2014 which on facts

arises out of the Malabar region of Kerala, Clause 36 of the Letters

Patent of the Madras High Court would directly apply. As we have

seen, Clause 36 of the Letters Patent is pari materia to Section 23

61

Page 62 of the Travancore Cochin High Court Act. This being so, even for

regions that were governed by a different law – namely, the Letters

Patent of the Madras High Court – a uniform rule is to be applied

to the entire Kerala High Court. It may be mentioned here in

passing that the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court which

applied to the Malabar region in the State of Kerala has been

continued by virtue of Article 255 of the Constitution of India read

with Sections 5, 49(2), 52 and 54 of the States Reorganisation Act,

1956.

49.At this juncture it is necessary to refer to the decision in Tej

Kaur and another v. Kirpal Singh and another, (1995) 5 SCC

119, which was referred to in the course of arguments by both Shri

Giri and Shri Viswanathan. This judgment only decided that a

difference between two Judges of the Punjab and Haryana High

Court would have to be decided in accordance with the provisions

of Section 98(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure because Section

98(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply, as the

Punjab High Court is not governed by the Letters Patent. What

appears to have been missed by this decision is the fact that the

Punjab and Haryana High Court continues to be governed by the

Letters Patent governing the High Court set up at Lahore. The

Lahore Letters Patent contains a provision similar to clause 36 of

62

Page 63 the Letters Patent that governed Bombay and Calcutta by a pari

materia provision contained in clause 26 of the Lahore Letters

Patent. In accordance with our judgment, therefore, it is clear that

this authority is no longer good law inasmuch as Section 98(3) of

the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 would expressly save the said

Letters Patent, and would thus make clause 26 applicable in place

of Section 98(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

1

50. Even between the High Courts themselves another

anomalous situation would arise. Those High Courts, such as

Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, which are “Letters Patent” High

Courts so to speak, would not be governed by Section 98 in view

of sub-section (3) thereof, but if we were to accept Shri

Viswanathan’s argument, High Courts like the Kerala High Court

which are not established by any Letters Patent, would be so

governed. This again would lay down two different rules for

different sets of High Courts depending upon a wholly irrelevant

circumstance – whether their Charter originated in the Letters

Patent or in a statute. Here again the acceptance of Shri V. Giri’s

argument leads to one uniform rule applying down the board to all

1

In fact, even the PEPSU Ordinance which governed the princely states of Punjab and which had set up a

High Court for such states, also contained a provision similar to Clause 26 of the Letters Patent. Clause 56 of

this PEPSU Ordinance stated as follows:

Clause 56 – Difference of opinion between two judges – In all appeals or other proceedings heard

by two judges, if there is a difference of opinion between them, each judge shall record his separate opinion

and the case shall be laid for hearing before a third judge and the decision of the Court shall be in accordance

with the opinion of such third judge.

63

Page 64 the High Courts in this country.

51.For the aforesaid reasons we conclude that Hemalatha’s

case was wrongly decided and answer Question 1 referred to us

by stating that Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act

remains unaffected by the repealing provision of Section 9 of the

Kerala High Court Act, and that, being in the nature of special

provision vis-à-vis Section 98(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure,

would apply to the Kerala High Court.

52.In view of the answer to Question 1, it is not necessary to

answer Question 2. The reference is disposed of accordingly.

……………………………J.

(Anil R. Dave)

……………………………J.

(Kurian Joseph)

……………………………J.

(Shiva Kirti Singh)

……………………………J.

(Adarsh Kumar Goel)

……………………………J.

(R.F. Nariman)

New Delhi;

February 25, 2016.

64

Page 65 65

Page 66 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 201 OF 2005

PANKAJAKSHI (DEAD) THROUGH L.RS.

AND OTHERS ... APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

CHANDRIKA AND OTHERS ... RESPONDENT (S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8576 OF 2014

PULPARAMBIL VASUDEVAN ... APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

NANGANADA TH PULPARAMBIL

DEVADSAN AND OTHERS ... RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.:

1.I wholly agree with the excellent exposition of law by my

esteemed brother Rohinton Fali Nariman, J. I have nothing to add on

the reference part. However, for appropriate guidance at the

quarters concerned, I feel a few observations would be contextually

relevant.

2. Legislature has thought it fit to allocate certain matters to be

heard by a Single Judge and a few by a Bench of not less than two

Judges, in common parlance what is known as Single Bench and

66

REPORTABLE

Page 67 Division Bench. A matter is stipulated to be heard by a Division

Bench on account of the seriousness of the subject matter and for

enabling two or more heads to work together on the same. Sitting in

Division Bench is not as if two Single Judges sit. In Division Bench or

in a Bench of larger strength, there is a lot of discussion in-between,

clarifications made, situations jointly analysed and positions in law

getting evolved.

3.Under Section 98 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short,

‘the CPC’), when the Judges differ in opinion on a point of law, the

matter is required to be placed for opinion of the third Judge or more

of other Judges as the Chief Justice of the High Court deems fit and

the point of law on which a difference has arisen is decided by the

majority and the appeal is decided accordingly. It is to be seen that

under the proviso to Section 98 (2) of the CPC, hearing by a third

Judge or more Judges is only on the point of law on which the

Division Bench could not concur. There is no hearing of the appeal

by the third Judge or more Judges on any other aspect. Under

Section 98 (2) of the CPC, in case an appeal is heard by a Division

Bench of two or more Judges, and if there is no majority and if the

proviso is not attracted, the opinion of that Judge or of the equally

divided strength in the Bench which concurs in a judgment following

or reversing the decree appealed from, such decree shall stand

67

Page 68 confirmed.

4.Kerala High Court Act, 1958 has provided for the powers of a

Bench of two Judges under Section 4. It is clarified thereunder that if

the Judges in the Division Bench are of opinion that the decision

involves a question of law, the Division Bench may order that the

matter or question of law be referred to a Full Bench. Needless to

say, it should be a question of law on which there is no binding

precedent.

5.Under Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act,

1125, if the Division Bench disagrees either on law or facts, the

Chief Justice is required to refer the matter or matters of

disagreement for the opinion of another Judge and the case will be

decided on the opinion of the majority hearing the case.

6.Under The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the

Cr.PC’), the position is slightly different. Section 392 reads as

follows:

“392. Procedure when Judges of Court of Appeal

are equally divided. -When an appeal under this

Chapter is heard by a High Court before a Bench of

Judges and they are divided in opinion, the appeal, with

their opinions, shall be laid before another Judge of that

Court, and that Judge, after such hearing as he thinks

fit, shall deliver his opinion, and the judgment or order

shall follow that opinion:

Provided that if one of the Judges constituting the

Bench, or, where the appeal is laid before another

Judge under this section, that Judge, so requires, the

appeal shall be re-heard and decided by a larger Bench

68

Page 69 of Judges.”

7.The emerging position is that there is no uniformity or clarity

with regard to the Judge strength in the event of difference of

opinion, and according to me, it has affected the purpose for which

the matters are required to be heard by a strength of more than one

Judge, be it a Division Bench or Full Bench (Larger Bench).

8.Under the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125, Section 23

enables the Chief Justice to refer for the opinion of another Judge,

the matter or matters on which the Division Bench has disagreed

either on law or on facts and the appeal will be ultimately decided

on the view taken by that Judge sitting and hearing the appeal

alone.

9.Under Section 392 of the Cr.PC, the situation again is different.

In case, the Division Bench is divided in their opinion, the appeal

with the opinions should be laid before another Judge of that Court

and the appeal will be decided clearly on the basis of the opinion

rendered by that Judge hearing the matter sitting alone. However,

the proviso under Section 392 of the Cr.PC enables any one of the

Judges of the Division Bench or the third Judge to order the appeal to

be heard by a larger Bench of Judges.

10.The coram is not dealt with in the CPC or the Cr.PC. It is

stipulated by the respective High Court Acts. When the High Court

69

Page 70 Act provides for an appeal to be heard by a Division Bench in

situations where Section 98 (2) without proviso operates, it virtually

becomes a decision of the Single Judge since the differing view is

only to be ignored. When the Judges hearing the appeal differ in

opinion on a point of law, under the proviso, the said point of law

has to be heard by one or more of other Judges and the appeal be

decided according to the opinions of the majority of the Judges who

have heard the appeal, including at the initial stage. In such

situations also, unless the Chief Justice decides otherwise, the

opinion on the point of law is formed only by one Judge, the third

Judge. This position is actually against the very principle of reference

on difference. Reference is always made to a larger coram. Not only

that, when two judicial minds sitting together could not concur, that

difficulty is to be resolved, ideally, if not on common sense, not by a

third one, but by a Bench of larger coram.

11.In my humble view, if the purpose behind the requirement of a

matter to be heard by a Bench of not less than two Judges is to be

achieved, in the event of the two Judges being unable to agree

either on facts or on law, the matters should be heard by a Bench of

larger strength. Then only the members of the Bench of such larger

strength would be able to exchange the views, discuss the law and

together appreciate the various factual and legal positions. The

70

Page 71 conspectus of the various provisions, in my view, calls for a

comprehensive legislation for handling such situations of a Bench

being equally divided in its opinion, either on law or on facts, while

hearing a case which is otherwise required to be heard by a Bench

of not less than two Judges, both civil and criminal. It is for the High

Court and the Legislature of the State concerned to take further

steps in that regard.

…………………… ..J.

(KURIAN JOSEPH)

New Delhi;

February 25, 2016.

71